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ABSTRACT 
 
The New Zealand news media have covered Iraq War II extensively, and from different 
perspectives, shaped by reporting restrictions, public opinion and editorial policies of the media 
organisations. This thesis studies New Zealand’s three largest daily newspapers’ coverage during 
the invasion phase of the war exploring their reliance on global news agencies such as Reuters, 
AFP and AP and on elite British and US newspapers. The research also aims to explore the 
newspapers’ dependence on global news agencies and other content providers and the extent of 
US and Coalition domination of the news agenda. 
 
Global news media, including mainstream news agencies which mostly rely on government and 
military officials for information on military conflicts such as Iraq War II, become channels for 
propaganda and facilitate elite sources to set the agenda for national and global audiences. A 
content analysis of the three daily newspapers – The New Zealand Herald, The Dominion Post 
and The Press – reveals that the war coverage in New Zealand was framed by international news 
agencies, US and UK newspapers. And their reliance on US and Coalition official sources in the 
news construction meant that they became vehicles for propaganda. The mainstream New 
Zealand newspapers’ coverage of Iraq War II is examined through the contexts of globalisation, 
news flows, media-source relations, news management and propaganda as these are the issues 
that have shaped the war journalism discourse in New Zealand. 
 
As there have not been many studies in New Zealand of news media coverage of wars, this 
research is an opportunity for studying mainstream newspapers of a country that is not a direct 
participant in the war. It gives the opportunity to compare reporting by newspapers in a country 
not directly involved in Iraq War II with that of countries that are directly involved. What 
emerges from this study is that the level of involvement in a war is no longer the most important 
factor in determining the direction of news media coverage. News values, globalisation, 
economic interdependence, news flows and propaganda are all highly significant factors 
affecting coverage. This thesis shows that the US military and government sources dominated 
the news agenda through various media management strategies. The findings of this research 
also demonstrate the dominance of the global news agencies and US and UK publications as 
main content providers in the war coverage. The implication of this is that the few Western 
media outlets are able to set the news agenda for news retailers such as New Zealand newspapers, 
and their readers. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Background to the research 
 
Despite the geographic distance from the conflict zone, New Zealand print media have 
given Iraq War II a high news value. At the outbreak of the war special sections were 
introduced by newspapers and more space was allocated for the war coverage, thus 
setting an agenda for public discussion and debate. In the construction of the conflict for 
local audiences, the mainstream New Zealand newspapers mainly relied on news 
sources such as Reuters, AFP and AP, also known as the ‘Big Three’ news agencies 
(Comrie & Fountaine, 2005; Interview with Gardner, March 8, 2006; Interview with 
Thompson, February 23, 2006; Interview with Piercy, February 13, 2007), which are 
“responsible for the image of the world presented to the world’s public” (Horvit, 2004, 
p 3). Content was also sourced from major US and UK newspapers.  
 
The global news media covered Iraq War II, which began on 20th March 2003, from 
different perspectives, shaped by reporting restrictions, news management, public 
opinion and editorial policies of media organisations. Reporting restrictions from the 
US and UK military were placed on the ‘embedded’ journalists and even those working 
independently (unilaterals) to report the war to a world audience. These unprecedented 
media policies and editorial leanings of major news media in the US and UK, as well as 
political and cultural factors, shaped the direction and orientation of the coverage. For 
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example, in the Middle East the way the Arab news media constructed the conflict 
differed from the approach of the news media in the US and UK, reflecting the 
significance of ideological orientation in covering Iraq War II (Rantanen, 2004). 
Coverage of military conflicts is challenging, given the pressures and constraints from 
military and government, in addition to public and market forces. These factors affect 
how conflicts are reported and covered in countries that are directly involved. Even in 
countries that are far removed from the conflicts, political, cultural and market factors 
influence the framing of the wars. According to Boyd-Barrett (2004), “War reporting is 
generally one sided. The media typically cover war from the point of view of the 
country in which they and their major owners and readers are based, reflecting the point 
of view of that country’s government and foreign policy elites” (p 29).  
 
As a senior BBC executive said in November 2003, in reference to Iraq War II coverage, 
“news organisations should be in the business of balancing their coverage, not banging 
the drum for one side or the other” (Cited in Allan & Zelizer, 2004, p 10). The 
normative aspects of ‘objectivity’ and ‘fairness’ are far removed from war journalism 
discourse. To construct a ‘balanced account’, journalists and editors should try to get 
both sides of the story (Knight, 1982). In war journalism, however, organisational, 
logistical and political factors compromise reaching the ideals of objective journalism. 
In Iraq War II a balanced and objective coverage has been difficult to achieve given the 
constraints both embedded and unilateral journalists have faced in covering the conflict.  
 
The heavy dependence on major news agencies for war coverage makes the news media 
vulnerable to propaganda and spin. As Boyd-Barrett (1997) contends, during major 
military conflicts “news agencies were vehicles for dissemination of state information 
and propaganda to national and international audiences” (p 132). However, through 
rigorous news selection, editing and framing processes, newspapers can orient the 
coverage in different ways (Entman, 1991; Zaman, 2004). In the case of the war in Iraq, 
a newspaper could emphasise the humanitarian impact or frame the war as a ‘war on 
terror’. 
 
This study explores how the three main daily newspapers of New Zealand – The New 
Zealand Herald, The Dominion Post and The Press – covered the military conflict 
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between March 21 and May 22, 2003, examining the news flows, media management, 
media-source relations, themes, direction and orientation of news sources, and the 
extent to which international news agencies were part of Iraq War II journalism 
discourse.  
 
The New Zealand news media “relied heavily on international news providers” for the 
coverage of the war in Iraq (Comrie & Fountaine, 2005, p 245). The heavy reliance on 
news agencies and other content providers for war coverage is a reflection of, amongst 
other things, the globalisation of news.  
 
Using globalisation as a theoretical framework, this thesis also focuses on the changing 
nature of news flows. The study seeks to understand the changing nature of news values 
among New Zealand print media as well as the global-local dynamics in news 
dissemination. In the process of globalisation, news agencies have become major 
players (Boyd-Barrett & Rantanen, 1998), providing content to a diverse mix of global 
newspapers and contributing towards large-scale homogenisation through media and 
other cultural products.  
 
Regarding the New Zealand print media, owned by foreign media corporations, the 
reliance on international news agencies and affiliated newspapers also reflects the 
growing dynamics of the globalisation of news. The mainstream New Zealand 
newspapers’ coverage of Iraq War II is examined through the theoretical dimensions of 
globalisation, news flow, media-state relations, news management and propaganda.  
 
1.2 Theoretical dimensions: An overview 
 
International news has become a significant component in the global news media output, 
which reflects several variables that are at play: the globalisation of media and cultural 
products; information and communications technology that is accelerating the 
‘globalisation of media’, and the interconnectedness of the nation state and global 
economy that creates a demand for global news and information about major news 
events such as wars and natural disasters. The globalisation of media and cultural 
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products is readily visible in the network of global news agencies and content providers 
for the world news media. These global news agencies are able not only to commodify 
news and information but also to set a common global news agenda and thus influence 
public opinion. Having commanded a larger market of news retailers around the world, 
a few elite global news agencies are able to shape how a military conflict is constructed 
in the wider global news media (Thussu, 2002). In the context of Iraq War II coverage 
in the world media, the news ‘wholesalers’ have the editorial advantage of constructing 
the conflict and setting the news agenda for media consumers, particularly if  
gatekeepers do not apply frames in order to make the news more relevant to the local 
audiences.  
 
When the world news media rely on news agencies and other third-party content 
providers for the coverage of military conflicts, the propaganda and public diplomacy 
practices of the key news actors also come into the equation. As news retailers in a 
periphery nation, New Zealand newspaper editors do not have the editorial influence to 
ask a news agency journalist in the conflict zone to pursue a story from a specific angle 
that may be relevant to New Zealand audiences, instead relying on what flows out from 
the wires. News retailers do not have an organisational set up or even time, in the fast-
paced news rooms, to verify the facts and check on the credibility of the primary 
sources. Thus not only news agencies become powerful agenda setters for news media 
in many nations (Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1985; Stevenson & Cole, 1984; Whitney & 
Becker, 1982) but also, especially in times of military conflicts such as Iraq War II, 
official sources are given the opportunity to convey messages to the global news media, 
and consumers.  
 
After the failure of the Vietnam War (1965-1975), partly blamed on the extensive 
negative media coverage of the “carnage and destruction” (Williams, 1993) in Vietnam, 
the US developed information and news management strategies to avert a ‘Vietnam 
Syndrome’. Since then, the US military and government have managed coverage of 
major conflicts, such as the 1983 invasion of Grenada (Taylor, 1997; Venable, 2002), 
conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and Iraq War I and II (Knightley, 2000; Kellner, 
1992; Norris, 1994; Katovsky & Carlson, 2003). Journalists working within this 
environment of news management are likely to be influenced by the orientation given 
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by military and government officials. In the conflict zones, official sources set the 
agenda for journalists constructing news events. When copy filed from the battlefields 
is fed into the global news cycle, the opportunities are maximised for military and 
government officials to manufacture consent, especially when there is high dependence 
by world news media on news agencies and other syndicated news services.  
 
1.2.1 Globalisation and news flow 
 
In defining globalisation, early theorists took a holistic approach encompassing media 
and communication within the cultural theories of economic and political globalisation 
(Rantanen, 2005). This is partly because early globalisation theorists were not media 
and communication scholars. Roland Robertson (1992), who has reviewed globalisation 
from a sociological perspective, sees the interconnectedness of societies around the 
world, whereby global events have a bearing on the local. For him “globalization as a 
concept refers both to the compression of the world and the intensification of the 
consciousness of the world as a whole” (p 8). In this process of compression and 
intensification, the communication media are principal agents. 
 
Anthony Giddens (1997) defined globalisation “as the intensification of world-wide 
social relations, which link distant localities in such a way as that local happenings are 
shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa” (p 19). This linking of 
distant localities has been made possible by the media and communications technology 
that has gradually transformed the world into a ‘global village’, as theorised by 
McLuhan in the 1960s (McLuhan & Fiore, 1967). The impact of the news media on 
political and economic decision making has become great, with instant global coverage 
of events by print and broadcast media, as well as web-based news media.  
 
As Herbert (2001) argues, the “globalisation of news is having far reaching effects on 
the news gatherers and the news disseminators” (p vii), with communications 
technology advancing the news gathering and dissemination process, and the 
commercialisation and globalisation of media impacting the content and directions of 
coverage. Held et al (Cited in Beynon & Dunkerly, 2000), who identified four periods 
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of globalisation – pre-modern, early modern, modern globalisation and contemporary 
globalisation – see new media technologies, global media infrastructure and media 
products as having been the key agents of cultural globalisation.  
 
The globalisation process has been accelerated by socio-economic and technological 
developments, and in this “intensification of world-wide social relations” (Giddens, 
1991, p 64) the news media, most notably the global news agencies have been key 
players. As gatherers and sellers of news, the news agencies have supplied news to 
clients around the world, meeting the growing demand for global news information. 
Since the 19th century the few news agencies concentrated in the developed nations 
have expanded their markets through business arrangements with local and national 
news agencies. Even today the “balance of news power” (Boyd-Barrett, 1998) remains 
the same, with three large news agencies – Reuters, AFP and AP – the key market 
players in the global news wholesale business. Boyd-Barrett (1997) contends that 
“[news] agencies contribute both to processes of national consolidation and to 
globalization, simultaneously” (p 132).  
 
News media, as retail outlets of the continuous news feed supplied by news agencies, 
are completely dependent on the news wholesalers for international news coverage. In 
the 1970s, debate about the imbalance this dependence created in the periphery nations 
has led to a UNESCO-sponsored research document, the MacBride Commission report, 
which outlined the main points of the New World Information Communication Order 
(NWICO). It recommended that “the utmost importance should be given to eliminating 
imbalances and disparities in communication and its structures, and particularly in 
information flows”, and that “developing countries need to reduce their dependence” on 
international news content flowing from the major news agencies (The MacBride 
Report, 1980). 
 
More than 30 years later, the imbalance remains. Although flow from periphery nations 
to the centre has increased, the relative change is marginal. There exists a major 
international ‘news cartel’ comprising the ‘Big Three’ news agencies and elite US and 
UK newspapers, which dominates global news space through the commodification and 
export of news products ranging from news text, photos, graphics, multimedia, video, 
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and online-ready content (Boyd-Barrett, 1997). The heavy dependence on a handful of 
news suppliers results in agencies dominating the foreign news agenda in world news 
media (Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1985). According to Stevenson and Cole (1984), there is 
evidence to suggest that Western news agencies influence what parts of the world and 
what kinds of news the national media should focus on in covering international news. 
In 2002, Reuters, AP, AAP and AFP accounted for nearly 70 percent of the 
international news in a study of five New Zealand metropolitan newspapers. News 
content from Reuters, which is one of the largest news agencies, accounted for 35.7 
percent (Taira, 2003). For the coverage of Iraq War II, the major New Zealand 
newspapers depended heavily on international news agencies and other content 
providers (Comrie & Fountaine, 2005; Interview with Gardner, March 8, 2006; 
Interview with Thompson, February 23, 2006; Interview with Piercy, February 13, 
2007).  
 
Most newspapers rely on news agency copy to fill the daily foreign newshole, although 
larger newspapers such as The New York Times can also use their foreign 
correspondents for coverage of global events and thus can choose what they print 
(Skurnik, 1981). However, smaller newspapers with fewer resources have to depend on 
news agencies and few can afford to subscribe to several news agencies, let alone send 
reporters on foreign assignments such as to cover the war in Iraq  
(Shoemaker, 1987).   
 
1.2.2 Source-media relations 
 
News sources are essential to the process of news production as they have access to and 
often own the necessary raw material. During military conflicts, military and 
government sources are in a position to be able to influence the news product through 
their relationship with news media. The media and military sources work closely 
together and the dependence of journalists upon the sources affects how a story is 
covered (Palmer, 2000). Noting how the news media are so often subject to the 
influence of their sources, Shoemaker (1987) wrote that “news comes to journalists 
primarily from institutional sources who exert pressure of various kinds on journalists 
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and the news process” (p 14). By analysing the extent of usage of official sources it is 
possible to determine how military and government sources are able to set the news 
agenda. According to Kern et al (cited in Horvit, 2004), “the best available measure of 
influence on news coverage” is the use of sources in the news items, as the preference 
given by journalists to their “choice of  sources allows one to quantify news content and 
to make inferences about who was the most successful in setting the media’s agenda” 
(Horvit, 2004, p 2). Measuring the number of stories attributed to official sources gives 
an indication of the levels of news control by the government (Bennett, 1988) or other 
official sources. 
 
Herman & Chomsky (1988) describe the existence of a “symbiotic relationship” 
between the sources and media, as it is in the economic interests of the news media to 
establish a good relationship with sources. According to Goldman (1999), “sources also 
exploit this dependency relationship by ‘managing’ the media, by suggesting the sort of 
‘spin’ on events that favours their own interests though it may be at odds with the truth” 
(p 186). 
 
Allen (1996) notes that the media dependency on institutional sources has undermined 
objective reporting of events and minimised the room for context and issue-oriented 
reporting in the coverage of US-led wars. There is a relationship between the military 
and the media that can be characterised as interdependency (Allen, 1996). According to 
Reese and Buckalew (1995), who studied the news framing of Iraq War I, “the news 
media and corporate needs work together to further a culture supportive of military 
adventures such as those in the Gulf” (p 41).  
 
1.2.3 News management and propaganda 
 
During military conflicts, political and military actors attempt to influence the news 
production through various strategic communication practices. Robust public relations 
and news management plans are laid out even before military campaigns are launched, 
and this has been very evident in Iraq War II with the embedding of journalists with 
troops. Although the Pentagon claimed that embedding has “revolutionized media 
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coverage of war” (Murray, 2003, p A 4), the practice has undermined the professional 
integrity of journalism, as embeds become potential tools for the military to 
communicate propaganda messages to the global audience. According to Anthony 
Lloyd (2003) of the Times of London, ‘embedded’ reporters “are potential propaganda 
tools, subject to limitations dictated by the military, including censorship and very little 
freedom of movement” (p 7). A study by Pfau et al (2004) showed that embedded print 
coverage of ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ was more favourable in overall tone towards the 
military and in depiction of individual troops. 
 
Long before the war in Iraq, warring nations have managed the media to obtain 
favourable coverage and undermine the enemies. During World War II the US managed 
the news media so as to achieve the military and political objectives of the war. 
According to Halliday (1999), “news management, that is control by states of coverage 
of wars, has been an element of media work in such conflicts for more than a century: 
the Gulf War was the occasion to put certain well-tried practices into operation” (p 131). 
Through news management and propaganda, official sources attempt to influence news 
gathering and reporting.  During the Yugoslav crisis, a news management technique 
used by the US and UK to counter oppositional views was to saturate the news space. 
NATO spokesman Jamie Shea noted that the alliance “deliberately saturated the 
airwaves with successive briefings from Brussels, London, and Washington, timed to 
keep the 24-hour media pack running breathlessly in circles” (Kitfield, 1999, p 2552). 
 
During military conflicts official sources are able to obtain favourable coverage through 
media management, which has become highly sophisticated and institutionalised in the 
US. According to Bennett, (1994) “the growing sophistication of press management 
techniques holds the constant possibility that some officials will be more successful 
engineering favourable media framings for their positions than others” (p 29). One of 
the successes of news management during Iraq War II was the story on the rescue of 
Jessica Lynch. As Compton remarked, “spectacular narrative forms” such as “Saving of 
Pvt. Jessica Lynch,” were “fully integrated into military and corporate public relations 
campaigns along with the daily production regimes of 24-hour cable news channels” 
(Compton, 2004).  
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In the process of news management and public diplomacy, propaganda is used to 
engineer opinion. As noted by Lasswell (1927), “Propaganda is concerned with the 
management of opinions and attitudes to …  mobilize hatred against the enemy; 
preserve the friendship of allies; preserve the friendship and, if possible, to procure the 
co-operation of neutrals and demoralise the enemy” (p 195). Thus, in the news 
management that has taken place during Iraq War II, the government and military have 
engaged in opinion engineering to achieve their objectives. 
 
Public Relations firms are used by governments in the information war. During the 
1990s, the CIA hired the Rendon Group to wage a PR war against Saddam Hussein, 
spending a reported $23 million (Meyers, 2004; Rampton & Stauber, 2003a). The 
Rendon Group also got a multimillion dollar contract from the Kuwaiti government for 
a PR campaign against Iraq’s 1990 invasion and mobilising public support for 
Operation Desert Storm (Miller, Stauber, & Rampton, 2004). In this way PR firms, 
employing both covert and overt methods, deluge the global media market with 
messages to promote ideas and interests and discredit opponents.  
 
1.3 Iraq War II and the New Zealand press 
 
Due to the time difference, The New Zealand newspapers could only carry the news of 
the start of the US-led attack on Iraq a day later, on March 21, 2003. US President 
George Bush gave orders to strike Iraq at about 6.30pm on Wednesday ET (11.30 am 
NZT, Thursday 20 March). As expected, the entire front pages of the three leading daily 
newspapers – The New Zealand Herald, The Dominion Post and The Press – were 
splashed with banner headlines about the war, with large photos across the page. With 
coverage sourced from leading world newspapers and news agencies, the editors placed 
very high emphasis on content and form in presenting the Iraq conflict. Content refers 
to writing and reporting, while form is associated with visual appeal (Gladney, 1997), 
such as the use of photos and news graphics. The international news agencies and other 
sources that dominated the war discourse in the New Zealand press were Reuters, AP, 
AFP, AAP, The Times of London, The Independent and The New York Times.  
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The New Zealand Herald ran a bold headline, “Iraq strikes back” on the front page of 
the March 21 issue. A picture of Baghdad in flames was splashed across the page, with 
the newspaper’s masthead superimposed on the photo ("Iraq strikes back," 2003). There 
was also a three-column photo showing crew loading bombs onto an F14 jet aboard 
aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln. The story, which was the only one on the front 
page, was sourced from Reuters, KRT, AAP, The Independent and The New York Times. 
 
Unlike The New Zealand Herald, the Wellington-based newspaper The Dominion Post 
highlighted the question whether Iraqi leader was dead or alive, as the initial attack on 
Baghdad was aimed at what Pentagon called “leadership targets”. The banner headline 
on the page read “Is Saddam dead?” on top of a full-width photo of Baghdad being 
bombarded by cruise missiles ("Is Saddam dead?," 2003). The news item was credited 
to The Washington Post and was also sourced from other agencies. 
 
As was the case with The New Zealand Herald and The Dominion Post, the 
Christchurch-based newspaper The Press carried a page-width photo of explosions in 
Baghdad. Besides the lead story about the attack under the headline “First strike by air” 
("First strike by air," 2003), there was a single-column piece on US attacks on Taliban 
targets in Afghanistan. There was also a single-column photo of tomahawk missiles 
being launched from a US military vessel in the Gulf. The main story was credited to 
AP. 
 
The Dominion Post ran an editorial note on the front page of the March 21, 2003 issue, 
pledging to readers that the newspaper would bring an “outstanding variety of news 
sources” in the coverage of the war Iraq and vowing that “Anywhere the news is 
breaking – from remote northern Iraq to the White House – The Dominion Post readers 
will have up-to-date coverage, backed by expert analysis”. The New Zealand Herald 
promised its readers on March 20, 2003 that they would be given the “most 
comprehensive coverage available in New Zealand” and said “our aim is not merely to 
relate what happens but to explain events and give their context, as only a good 
newspaper can”. In the main section several pages were devoted to the war, with 
information graphics and maps. Each newspaper used special logos to refer to the 
conflict, calling it “Attack on Iraq” (The New Zealand Herald), “War in Iraq” (The 
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Dominion Post) and “War on Iraq” (The Press). There were 81 items related to Iraq 
War II in the three newspapers on March 21, with most of the items being carried in 
Section A.  
 
Coverage of the war was concentrated on the fighting, leaving behind the real debate 
about whether the war was justified. According to Michael Wolf, who covered the war, 
the coverage was “90 percent Pentagon story. No context, just blow-by-blow” (Gamble, 
2003, p B4).  
 
The mainstream news media – broadcast and print – were not the only sources of news 
on Iraq War II that people relied on. There was a large increase in the use of alternative 
news sources such as the internet. According to Xtra, which is New Zealand’s biggest 
Internet Service Provider (ISP), internet use in New Zealand soared with the start of the 
war ("War Traffic Runs Hot On The Internet," 2003).  
 
Similar trends were seen in some other countries at the beginning of Iraq War II.   
According to Nielsen//NetRatings, American surfers accessed foreign news sites in 
March 2003 for additional and alternative coverage of the war in Iraq. Aljazeera.net, the 
website of Qatar-based satellite TV channel Al Jazeera, experienced a 1,208 percent 
increase in traffic, while in March the BBC World Service website surged 158 percent 
to 5.3 million surfers, 3.2 million more visitors than in February 2003  (PR Newswire., 
2003).  
 
The development of mainstream and alternative news websites on the internet has 
created diverse media choices for consumers around the world. In the early stages of 
Iraq War II, those who were not satisfied with national media coverage of the war also 
sought gratification from the internet, where an enormous range of information and 
perspectives was available (Rantanen, 2004). However, the mainstream news media’s 
relevance did not recede, as mainstream news media usually cover conflicts “within a 
national framework” and “offer complementary news, locating the global news, which 
often comes from a distance, by the addition of the national actors” (Rantanen, 2004, p 
301).  
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1.4 The impact of Iraq War II on New Zealand   
 
With the onset of the war, New Zealanders were concerned about the impact the 
conflict might have on them. An opinion poll showed that confidence in the economy 
was possibly the first New Zealand casualty of war in Iraq. According to a One News-
Colmar Brunton poll conducted a week before the war began, optimism in the economic 
outlook had dropped 11 percentage points from early February, and 45 percent of those 
polled were pessimistic ("War casts shadow over economy - poll," 2003). 
 
Iraq War II affected the global economy, and, as noted by New Zealand Trade Minister 
Jim Sutton, the result was “a lost opportunity for global economic development” 
("Sutton laments cost of war, lost global economic opportunities," 2003).With a 
weakened market, New Zealand economists warned of a slowing in economic growth 
for 2003, and Sutton observed that although a few might profit from war, “the world as 
a whole never does much good” out of major military conflicts ("Sutton laments cost of 
war, lost global economic opportunities," 2003). 
 
In early 2003 Business and Economic Research Ltd predicted that “worldwide 
economic uncertainty, escalated by the war with Iraq, could also take its toll” on New 
Zealand. With the conflict in the Middle East, and the rising dollar, employment was 
forecast in March 2003 to grow at about 1.5 percent, or 25,000 to 30,000 new jobs, per 
annum, which was half the rate predicted in Business and Economic Research Ltd’s 
December forecast (NZPA, 2003a). 
 
Just before Iraq War II began, New Zealand’s Dubai-based senior trade commissioner 
Gavin Young said that the country’s NZ$783 million Middle East market could be 
affected, with the risk of slow payment during the war (Fox, 2003). The Middle East 
was a major market for both meat and dairy exports. With total exports to the region 
reaching just under NZ$800 million in 2002, this was New Zealand’s fastest growing 
export market, up 16 percent on the previous year. Two thirds of these exports were 
dairy and meat products. For meat industry giant Richmond, 15 percent of its NZ$1.1bn 
annual revenue came from exports of chilled lamb and beef to the Gulf region (Stock, 
2003).  
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War II also affected the New Zealand tourism industry, with a drop in arrivals, and 
Tourism Industry Association chief executive John Moriarty predicted just before the 
war broke out that “a downturn following a war could last at least two years” 
(MacDonald, 2003).  
 
The economic impact of the war was felt by timber workers at a Wanganui timber mill, 
NDG Pine where all its hourly-rate workers were asked to voluntarily stand down for 
three weeks. With the decline in demand in the United States’ timber market with the 
onset of war, NDG Pine experienced a higher stock accumulation. The company took 
similar action after the September 11 attacks in the US in 2001 (NZPA, 2003c). The 
impact of war was also felt on NZ Post, with revenue expected to decline in the 2003 
financial year (Bergh, 2003). 
 
1.5 Iraq War II and New Zealand foreign policy   
 
Although New Zealand’s neighbour, Australia, joined the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ to 
disarm and overthrow Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, New Zealand took a position 
according to which it preferred diplomacy over force, and the use of force only through 
the United Nations. The New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark expressed a strong 
belief that “multilateralism is the appropriate way to resolve international disputes” 
such as the Iraq conflict (Parliamentary Debates, 2003).  
 
However, the opposition, the National Party, favoured supporting the United States. 
These differences over Iraq crisis reflected the distinct ideological orientation of the two 
parties. The ruling Labour Party’s foreign policy was shaped by a “liberal 
internationalist paradigm”, which has influenced its defence policy over the past 20 
years, while the National Party adopted a realist model (McCraw, 2006, p 23). In the 
liberal internationalist worldview, a peaceful world can be secured by promoting 
democracy, human rights, social justice, disarmament, end of military alliances and 
supporting international institutions (McCraw, 2006). 
. 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION                                                                                                      PAGE 
 
 
  15
New Zealand maintained that Security Council Resolution 1441, which was passed in 
November 2002, should be the mechanism for the disarmament of Iraq. The UN 
weapons inspection team, headed by Dr Hans Blix, noted in their report to the Security 
Council at the end of January the lack of co-operation from Iraq, however following a 
later visit to Baghdad by Dr Blix and Mr El Baradei, Iraq “moved to accommodate 
more of the weapons inspectors’ requests” (Clark, 2003b). 
 
However the US argued that diplomacy had been exhausted and Iraq’s non-compliance 
with resolution 1441 should be dealt with by military action. In an effort to build a case 
for war, US Secretary of State Collin Powell in February 2003 presented to the Security 
Council evidence of Iraq’s weapons programme (Schroeder & Robbins, 2003; 
Parkinson, 2003; Watson, 2003). Without a consensus in the Security Council on the 
use of military force to enforce Resolution 1441, the US, UK and Australia declared 
war on Iraq.  
 
Regarding the Iraq issue, in the context of Security Council Resolution 1441 and the 
findings of Dr Hans Blix, the Labour government made policy statements in New York 
and Wellington, calling for diplomacy to be used to solve the impending crisis. 
 
New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark also raised doubt as to the credibility of the 
US findings, in her speech in the parliament on 11 February, when she said that  Powell 
“did not present further concrete evidence of Iraq’s weapons programmes, but did 
present a case based on intelligence which strongly suggested a pattern of deception and 
concealment of such programmes” (Clark, 2003a). She made it clear that the New 
Zealand government favoured diplomacy and was against unilateral military action 
against Iraq: 
 
The New Zealand Government, like most governments, has sought to uphold the 
principles of multilateralism, the international rule of law, and the authority of the 
Security Council throughout this crisis. We do not support unilateral action against Iraq. 
We place considerable weight on the inspection and disarmament process which has 
been established. We have a strong preference for a diplomatic solution to the crisis 
(Clark, 2003a). 
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Like Helen Clark, Green MP Keith Locke said the revelations by Powell did not prove 
anything and were nothing but “unsubstantiated claims, vague linkages and 
unauthenticated pictures and audio” of Iraq’s activities. However, main opposition 
National Party foreign affairs spokesman Wayne Mapp said the evidence suggested 
New Zealand needed to get involved further and back US and British efforts to get a 
second Security Council resolution ("Politicians Differ In Opinions On Powell's 
Revelations," 2003).   
 
In support of the US, ACT leader Richard Prebble tabled a motion in parliament that 
called parliament to dissociate itself from the government’s position and instead offer 
support to the United States and its allies. The motion was defeated by 84 to 35. With 
reference to the request from the US for assistance from New Zealand, he told 
parliament: “shamefully – for the first time in our history – we are not standing up 
against fascism, against this terrorist, this threat to world peace. … We should be 
there … I don’t think New Zealand has ever been more irrelevant at a time when 
foreign policy is impacting on our daily lives … old alliances are being torn up” (Young 
& Mold, 2003, p 2). 
 
Two days before the start of the war Clark made another statement in parliament 
presenting the same arguments and reasoning, and regretting the breakdown of  the 
diplomatic process over the Iraq crisis (Clark, 2003b). 
 
In explaining the position of the New Zealand government with regard to the impasse 
on weapons inspection in Iraq and the impending threat of a US-led attack on that 
country, Foreign Affairs Minister Phil Goff told the Security Council, on 6th March, 
that the New Zealand government’s position remained as it stood a month earlier:  
 
We do not support military action against Iraq without a mandate from the Security 
Council, and we do not believe that the Council would be justified in giving that 
mandate at this time. As Dr Blix has stated, the inspection process needs months rather 
than days. 
 
… But now, when the inspection and disarmament process is finally gaining traction, is 
not, in our view, the time to abandon it in favour of the use of force.  
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The use of force can be authorised by the Security Council as a last resort to uphold its 
resolutions. But in view of the recent reports this Council has received from both 
UNMOVIC and IAEA, this is not a time of last resort (Goff, 2003b). 
 
Nonetheless, New Zealand did send a platoon of army engineers once the formal 
conflict ended after 1 May.  An engineering detachment of 61 New Zealand Defence 
Force personnel was deployed in September at an estimated cost of NZ$12 million, to 
work alongside the British forces under Security Council Resolution 1483, which called 
for  member countries to assist in the reconstruction and restoration of stability in Iraq 
(NZDF deployment to Iraq 2003; Goff, 2006). 
 
New Zealand was also concerned about the impact of an invasion of Iraq on the 
geopolitical situation in the Middle East, which included Iraq’s coherence as a state 
within its current borders, stability in the Middle East, and the future of the West’s 
relations with the Islamic world (Goff, 2003a). 
 
While the New Zealand government took an ‘isolationist’ policy, declining to join the 
US-led coalition, public opinion showed that New Zealanders preferred the Iraq issue to 
be dealt with through the UN. A National Business Review opinion poll in 2003 showed 
that opposition to unilateral action in Iraq without UN approval grew from 67 percent in 
October 2002 to 86 percent in February 2003 (Cone, 2003b). Another poll conducted by 
UMR Research in April 2003, showed that 56 percent of those polled said that it was 
wrong for the US to invade Iraq without UN approval, while 31 percent said they 
favoured the US decision, and 13 percent were unsure (Cone, 2003a).  
 
Another poll regarding New Zealand public opinion on the Iraq issue, showed that only 
eight percent favoured unilateral military attacks by the US-led Coalition against Iraq, 
while 52 percent supported a UN-sanctioned military intervention. The poll, conducted 
in the last week of January 2003 by Roy Morgan Research, also showed that 32 percent 
of New Zealanders said that they would not support military action under any 
circumstances. When people were asked: “If military action does go ahead, should your 
country support this action?”, 51 percent said New Zealand should not offer support, 
while 37 percent favoured the country’s engagement in the conflict (Roy Morgan 
Research Polls, 2003). 
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A One News/Colmar Brunton Poll conducted a month later in February revealed that 78 
percent believed that New Zealand should not support the US in a war against Iraq, 
while 19 percent favoured New Zealand involvement. Furthermore, 71 percent believed 
that there was no sufficient evidence to justify military action against Iraq (Phipps, 
2004). 
 
All the polls showed that public opinion in New Zealand did not favour a unilateral war 
against Iraq and that the majority of the people were opposed to any New Zealand 
support for the US in a unilateral war against Iraq.  
 
1.6 State and the media in New Zealand  
 
The following provides the opportunity to revisit and re-examine the relationship 
between the state and the media in a period of crisis such as Iraq War II.  
 
Whereas the news media are generally regarded as the fourth estate in a liberal 
democracy, the war situation is always a challenge for the news media, but also for the 
state, to meet the expectations placed on them. If, typically, the fourth estate 
requirement places responsibility on the press to provide a neutrally detached account of 
reality, certain fundamental factors must exist for this to be realised. Such factors could 
be both institutional and structural, ranging from professional journalistic values 
(Golding & Elliott, 1979; Tuchman, 1980) to ownership of the media and the emerging 
pressures and environment that accompany such ownership structures (Golding & 
Murdock, 1997; Herman & Chomsky, 1988). 
 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the professional values of journalism have placed a 
requirement on the news media to seek and rely on authoritative sources or ‘primary 
definers’ for daily news (Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke, & Roberts, 1978; Williams, 
2003). By virtue of their position, elected state representatives in New Zealand, such as 
the Prime Minister, Opposition spokespersons and parliamentarians, are important news 
sources who are sought by the media and who will seek to speak to the media. To the 
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extent that they seek each other, one can argue that a relationship of mutual support 
exists between the two. The mutuality, however, ends there, as friction between them 
often arises when journalists insist on investigating a line of story, as was seen in the 
TV3/Clark saga of 2002.  Prime Minister Helen Clark was displeased by the way John 
Campbell of TV3 interviewed her regarding an alleged government cover-up over 
commercial corn crops contaminated with genetically engineered seed. The matter was 
taken to the Broadcasting Standards Authority, which ruled in July 2003 that TV3 has 
been unfair to the prime minister, breaching the balance requirement in the Free-to-Air 
television code, and was not impartial. TV3 appealed to the High Court unsuccessfully 
(Campbell, 2003; Cheer, 2004). The private broadcaster was ordered by the BSA to pay 
NZ$11,000 in costs to Clark’s defence and NZ$14,000 in costs to the Crown ("TV3's 
Corngate costs fall due," 2004). 
 
Generally friction between state officials and news media is considered ‘normal’ in 
times of peace and the relationship between the two can be seen as ‘mutual suspicion’, 
even though each needs the other. As noted by Herman and Chomsky (1988), news 
sources, such as politicians, and the press have a ‘symbiotic relationship’, as each needs 
the other. 
 
Mutual support between state and the media is more noticeable in times of war 
(Dimitrova & Strömbäck, 2005; Boyd-Barrett, 2004; Allen, 1996; Lawrenson & Barber, 
1986). Where a country is directly involved in a war, state and the media cultivate an 
understanding bordering on patriotism and a sense of allegiance to the nation. This was 
evident in the media-state relationships in Britain during the Falklands War (Carruthers, 
2000) and the US during Iraq War II (Boyd-Barrett, 2004; Lee, 2004). 
 
Given that New Zealand is not directly involved in Iraq War II, a careful understanding 
of the state-media relationship in times of war is required. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
increasing media concentration and ownership in New Zealand has had implications on 
the diversity of views (Abel, 2004). The neo-liberal policies of de-regulation and 
privatisation in New Zealand the 1980s have influenced the media environment today 
(Norris, 2002; McGregor, 1992). First, those policies broadened the scope for 
involvement of foreign enterprises in the media environment in this country. Second, 
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they also introduced the prospect of linkages, through merges and acquisitions, between 
the media in New Zealand and the media off-shore. Third, they highlighted the role of 
the state in the contemporary media landscape. 
 
Because the state has no ownership of the press, one can only infer its position 
concerning the latter by a close look at its stand regarding broadcasting. In this regard, 
the charter governing the state broadcaster TVNZ  and which was approved by the 
government in May 2001 (Public TV charter released, 2001), demonstrates the state 
inviting TVNZ to provide diversity in programming and to remain relevant to minority 
interests as well. The charter, which was formally implemented in March 2003, states 
that in fulfilling the objectives of the Charter, TVNZ aims to “provide independent, 
comprehensive, impartial, and in-depth coverage and analysis of news and current 
affairs in New Zealand and throughout the world and of the activities of public and 
private institutions” (TVNZ Charter, 2007). 
 
To this extent one can speculate that the state in New Zealand expects the news media 
to be relevant to the wider society. Even though the charter was directed at TVNZ, 
newspaper editors in the country are not unaware of it. 
 
In Max Weber’s (1968) notion of ‘legal-rational’, state officials govern with the 
assumed consent of the public who elected them. State policies such as the one on the 
Iraq War will be seen as being in the interests of wider society, and by implication, 
deserving of media support rather than opposition. As Hardt (1992) noted, in the 
production and distribution of knowledge (news) society needs to seek guidance from 
the state: 
 
Accordingly, modern society shaped by the forces of technology and industrialization 
must turn to government and education for guidance in the production and distribution 
of knowledge and the protection of individuals against arbitrary rule and disregard of 
civil liberties (Hardt, 1992, p 57). 
 
What follows from this interpretation, is, therefore, that New Zealand newspaper editors 
are under no obligation to lend editorial support to the Iraq conflict for two dialectically 
related reasons. First, utterances from the Prime Minister Helen Clark and ruling Labour 
Party parliamentarians indicate opposition to the military intervention in Iraq and 
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second, opinion polls consistently indicate public opposition to the war. A third reason 
is the tendency of the press to lean towards a plurality of voices rather than just one. 
 
Even as we try to gain insight into the state-media relationship in New Zealand during 
the period of Iraq War II, it is important to comment on the role of non-governmental 
actors because of the pressure they put on the state. Church and pressure groups have 
been seen to be active voices in the condemnation of the attack on Iraq. In February 
2003, several leading NGOs, which included Combined Trade Unions (CTU), ECO 
(representing 65 environmental organisations), Greenpeace, the Peace Foundation, The 
Body Shop NZ and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom 
(Aotearoa) sent a joint letter to New Zealand Prime Minister Ms. Helen Clark, urging 
her to support a peaceful resolution of the crisis over Iraq (Greenpeace New Zealand, 
2003) . The letter said: 
 
We urge that the New Zealand Government now declare its support for the proposal 
being put to the UN Security Council on Friday 14 February by the Governments of 
France, Germany and Russia for extended inspection and disarmament teams in Iraq. 
Avoiding war and peacefully disarming Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction is 
possible. It now requires international leaders such as yourself to strongly advocate it. 
… As a Prime Minister with a history of peace activism, and from a country and 
political party known for standing internationally for justice your voice is now needed 
(Greenpeace New Zealand, 2003). 
 
The anti-war protests in New Zealand in the run-up to the start of the war in March 
2003, and during the conflict, reflected the mood of the public. Several NGOs such as 
Greenpeace, Peace Action Network, Global Peace and Justice Auckland, Coalition 
Against War, and many civil society organisations were active in organising protest 
rallies throughout New Zealand. At a protest rally in Christchurch the Anglican Dean of 
Christchurch, Peter Beck, said that from “What we hear and are told about the Iraqi 
situation in the context of other policies of American President George Bush’s 
administration, I am left with deep concerns as to the primary motives of the United 
States leadership” ("Peace rallies oppose war on Iraq," 2003, p 2). In Hamilton, a peace 
rally was organised by Waikato Catholic Bishop Denis Browne and Anglican Bishop 
David Moxon, which was attended by Christians and Muslims ("Marches have faith in 
peace," 2003).  
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While public opinion was stronger in favour of the government’s stand on Iraq the main 
opposition party, The National Party, believed that New Zealand should lend military 
support to its traditional allies. National Party’s Defence spokesperson Simon Power 
(2003) argued in an article published in The New Zealand International Review, that 
New Zealand should have joined the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ to support her traditional 
allies, the US, UK and Australia, in pursuing “defence and foreign policy strategies that 
are bilateral, regional and increasingly global” (p 29). And in this direction, he added, 
New Zealand “must be both responsible and responsive if it is to remain a First World 
country, and be prepared to adapt its defence and foreign policies to accommodate the 
new world order” (p 29). 
 
In response to the arguments that New Zealand should have joined the US-led 
‘Coalition of the Willing’, Matt Robson, a senior Labour government official, said on 
13th April 2003 at the New Zealand Political Studies Association Conference: 
 
It is no longer a case of ‘Where England (or the United States) goes we go’ 
automatically. The world is no longer made up of the imperial world and the 
colonialist. …  The ‘junior partner of traditional allies’ approach has seen New Zealand 
committing the foreign policy blunders of making war against Vietnam, supporting 
apartheid South Africa to almost the bitter end, and turning a blind eye to President 
Suharto’s crimes against his own people and the torture of a nation in East Timor. … 
These were blunders committed when we ignored international conventions in favour of 
unilaterally imposed solutions (Cited in O’Brien, 2003). 
 
New Zealand’s foreign policy is also partly based on its belief in rules-based 
international behaviour, maintaining a balance of interests as the foundation for 
equitable world order (O’Brien, 2003).  
 
In a special debate in parliament on the question of Iraq, the political parties were 
divided as to the best way to deal with the Iraq crisis, with Act and National calling for 
joining the US-led coalition, while Labour, NZ First, United Future, and the Progressive 
Coalition maintained that force should only be used as a last resort. The Green Party 
wanted peace at all costs ("The unilateral action that spawned the gamut of factions," 
2003). National leader Bill English said that as diplomacy was over, “it is only honest to 
back the coalition of the willing”. Green MP Keith Locke, describing the US-led 
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coalition as the “coalition of the killing”, told parliament that  war on Iraq would be a 
criminal assault and “in no way a just war”(Young & Mold, 2003, p 2).  
 
With the Labour government and main opposition, the National Party, opposed to each 
other’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Iraq, and with strong anti-war public opinion, it was 
likely that war journalism discourse in New Zealand would be influenced by these 
factors.  
 
As a developed country, with a liberal democratic tradition, New Zealand enjoys greater 
press freedom. Freedom of expression is guaranteed by the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 (The New Zealand Press Council, 2006). In interpreting the Bill of Rights, the 
New Zealand High Court states that freedom of expression guarantees “everyone [the 
right] to express their thoughts, opinions and beliefs however unpopular, distasteful or 
contrary to the general opinion or to the particular opinion of others in the community” 
(Human Rights Commission, 2007). 
 
Within the above legal framework, the New Zealand news media enjoys great freedom. 
According to Reporters Without Borders, New Zealand is “flourishing at the head of 
Asian countries in the World Press Freedom Index”, and is ranked 12th in the 2006 
index (Reporters Without Borders, 2006).  
 
However the New Zealand government indirectly tried to influence the coverage of Iraq 
War I, by expressing concern about the ‘propaganda’ originating from Iraq, while 
ignoring the media management and propaganda strategies of the US. When Iraq War I 
started, Minister of Communications Maurice Williamson issued a press release in 
which he called on the media to exercise responsibility and restraint in their reporting of 
the Gulf crisis. 
 
The statement was apparently issued to counter extensive reporting from Baghdad and 
Iraqi sources. The statement said: “The Minister also says he does not want the New 
Zealand media, television in particular, to buy into the Iraqi propaganda machine… 
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Saddam is deliberately using television and the rest of the news media for his own 
ends”.1 
 
In the early stages of Iraq War II, the New Zealand government and the opposition 
directed flak at the news media for publishing photos of US Prisoners of War (POW) 
captured by the Iraqis in the first week of the conflict. Both the Labour and National 
parties censured the newspapers for carrying the photos, which were released by Al 
Jazeera television. 
 
As stated by Herman and Chomsky (1988), use of flak is an attempt by the state or 
political elites to influence or ‘discipline’ the media (p 2). During the two conflicts – 
Iraq War I and II – the New Zealand government became critical of the media, when 
coverage affected their foreign policy objectives or angered close allies such as the US.  
 
Apart from the protest by the government concerning POW photos, there were no 
incidents in the period under investigation where the state directly interfered with the 
news media and tried to influence the direction of coverage.  
 
In the end therefore, unlike in countries such as Australia and the US for instance, New 
Zealand newspaper editors are not under the same pressure to editorialise in favour of 
the war. Majority of the public as well as NGOs do not impose pro-war pressure on the 
editors wither. 
 
1.7 The New Zealand news media – an overview 
 
The history of print media in New Zealand dates back to the mid 19th century, when 
newspapers were established in various colonies, mainly aimed at promoting the vested 
interests of their owners. However, with the launch of New Zealand’s first daily 
newspaper, The Otago Daily Times, in 1861, the commercialisation of print media 
                                                 
1 Press Release issued by Minister of Communications Maurice Williamson, 25 January 1991. 
Wellington. 
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began (Tucker, 1992). The other daily newspapers, which were launched in the latter 
part of the 19th century, were The New Zealand Herald (1863), The Evening Star of 
Dunedin (1863), The Evening Post (1865) and The Evening Star of Auckland (1870), 
which later became the Auckland Star (Bradley, 1973). 
 
Due to economies of scale, newspapers in the early days of print journalism saw the 
need for mergers and amalgamations, and as Bradley (1973) observed:  “… newspaper 
publishers found it increasingly necessary to co-operate in the construction and use of 
overseas telegraphic services and news agencies. Consolidation has occurred, as the 
large publishers in the main centres have amalgamated” (p 5). 
 
One of the major factors that restrained the growth of newspapers during the 1960s was 
transportation, and the decline in the number of weeklies and illustrated magazines has 
been blamed on the speedy and regular delivery of overseas periodicals. Cleveland 
(1970) pointed out that none of the major newspapers were able to achieve national 
circulation, and concentrated on their cities of publication, although “to some extent 
they continue to compete with each other and with a larger number of provincial 
dailies” (p 55). According to figures issued by the Newspaper Proprietors Association 
in March 1968, there were 39 daily newspapers, eight of which were metropolitans 
published in four main cities and which accounted for more than 70 percent of the gross 
daily circulation of 1,035,000 (Cleveland, 1970).  
 
The more recent figures show that there are eight daily newspapers with a circulation of 
over 25,000 and 13 newspapers with a circulation below that figure. The weekly press 
consists of seven newspapers, all published from Auckland, which is the main financial 
centre of New Zealand. There are also four non-daily newspapers. According to Audit 
Bureau of Circulation figures released in March 2006, the dailies had a combined daily 
circulation of  701,502 (ABC, 2006). The metropolitan newspapers accounted for more 
than 80 percent of the circulation at 559,468. The ABC statistics (Figure 1.1) show that 
among metropolitan newspapers there was a gradual decline in newspaper circulation, , 
from 577,123 in August 2002 to 568,811 in August 2003. A year later in March 2004 
circulation had increased to 575,961, but after that there was a gradual decline in 
aggregate circulation to 559,468 in March 2006 (ABC, 2006).  
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Figure 1.1 Circulations of New Zealand metropolitan newspapers 
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Source: Audit Bureau of Circulation  
 
According to a study by Fast Forward Future Marketing in 2002 (NPA, 2006b), in New 
Zealand readership of the print media is high, with nearly NZ$4.8 million being spent 
each week on the purchasing of newspapers. A Nielsen Media Research National 
Readership Survey for the period Jan-Dec 2004 shows that on an average day daily 
newspapers are read by 52 percent or 1.6 million New Zealanders over 15 years of age 
(NPA, 2006a).  The decline in newspaper circulation, since August 2004 may be due to 
the increase in the use of alternative news sources such as the internet or broadcast 
media by media consumers. A media consumption habit study exploring newspaper and 
alternative media use by New Zealanders would determine the reasons for the trends in 
newspaper circulation and readership. 
 
With the constitutional guarantees of press freedom – through the Bill of Rights Act 
1990 and the Official Information Act 1982 – and the capitalist market economy, the 
media business had by the end of the 20th century become a major industry, 
transcending national boundaries. Most of the major daily newspapers are now owned 
by foreign companies, The Otago Daily Times being the exception. The nature of media 
ownership in New Zealand is discussed in Chapter 3. 
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1.7.1 The New Zealand Herald 
 
The New Zealand Herald, which is owned by APN News & Media (ANM), is the 
largest daily newspaper in New Zealand. According to ABC circulation figures released 
in May 2006, in the six months to March 31 the newspaper sold an average of 200,309 
copies a day ("Herald maintains title as biggest selling daily " 2006). In 2004 the 
newspaper was estimated to have a daily readership of 547,000 (Industry Overview, 
2004). In August 2002 the newspaper’s circulation stood at 211,246, and gradually 
declined from 210,910 in March 2003 to 207,299 in August 2003 (ABC, 2003). 
APN News & Media, which operates a broad portfolio of businesses across five 
countries, is one of the largest media companies in Australasia. APN was listed on the 
Australian Stock Exchange in 1992 and listed on the New Zealand Exchange in June 
2004 (About APN News & Media, 2004). APN publishes 24 dailies and more than 90 
non-daily newspapers across Australia and New Zealand. In New Zealand, APN 
operates The New Zealand Herald, as well as a number of top-ranking regional and 
community newspapers and mass market magazines (About APN News & Media, 2004). 
 
1.7.2 The Dominion Post 
 
Published from the capital of New Zealand, Wellington, The Dominion Post is the 
second largest newspaper in New Zealand, with a net daily circulation of  98,251 in the 
six months to March 31, 2006 ("Dompost numbers increase," 2006). In August 2002 the 
newspaper’s circulation stood at 101,511, and gradually declined from 99,089 in March 
2003 to 98,107 in August 2003 (ABC, 2003). Its readership in 2004, according to a 
Nielsen survey, was 272,000 (Industry Overview, 2004).  
 
The Dominion Post was established after a merger, on 8 July 2002, between The 
Evening Post and The Dominion (The Dominion Post, 2004). During the period of Iraq 
War II under study, the newspaper was owned by INL, 45 percent of which was 
controlled by Rupert Murdoch’s News Ltd.   
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According to Nielsen The Dominion Post is a stand-out performer, gaining more new 
readers per average issue than any other daily newspaper in New Zealand. Readership is 
up by 10,000, taking it to 254,000, an increase of 4.1 percent. The newspaper has also 
increased penetration in Wellington, with half (50.7 percent) of all the city’s residents 
reading the paper each day, and over three quarters (75.9 percent) reading it each week 
(Fairfax Media, 2006).  
 
1.7.3 The Press 
 
The Press is the largest newspaper in the South Island of New Zealand, with a daily 
readership estimated in 2004 in excess of 233,000 (Industry Overview, 2004). In August 
2002 the newspaper’s circulation was at 90,759, and there was a small gain to 
91,111  in March 2003, followed by a decline to 90,394 in August 2003 (ABC, 2003). 
 
According to Nielsen research, The Press gained in readership with an extra 6,000 daily 
readers (2.6%), taking it to 233,000, and continues to perform strongly, recording 
continual readership gains year on year since 2003. In Christchurch well over half of the 
population reads the paper each day (55.3 percent), while 82 percent read it each week 
(Fairfax Media, 2006). Before Fairfax took control of The Press, the newspaper was 
owned by INL, whose 45 percent was controlled by Rupert Murdoch’s News Ltd.   
 
The paper, established more than 140 years ago, is distributed throughout Canterbury, 
Nelson, Marlborough, Central Otago and the West Coast. The Press provides local, 
regional, national, and international news and caters to special interest groups such as 
farmers and business people, and every publishing day provides pages of features 
covering such varied subjects as health, opinion, food, real estate, wine, entertainment, 
computers and technology, gardening and more (The Press, 2004). 
 
1.8 Research objectives  
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How news media cover military conflicts such as Iraq War II is likely to vary among 
countries, influenced as they are by several factors such as cultural or geographic 
proximity, economic implication, ideological orientation and public opinion. News 
media coverage in a country that is involved militarily in the war may be different from 
that in a country that remained neutral or where public opinion was against the war. In 
the case of Iraq War II, the US media ‘rallied around the flag’, thus supporting the 
invasion, while in a country such as Egypt or New Zealand the orientation of coverage 
was different.   
 
This research focuses only on the news media content, not on the impact of content on 
audiences. Thus this thesis will analyse the media content from the sampled newspapers 
– The New Zealand Herald, The Dominion Post and The Press – to determine the 
direction of coverage, and the topics and issues focused on the newspapers. Furthermore, 
the dependence on news agencies and other content providers, and how the US and 
Coalition dominated as primary definers of news, will also be analysed through relevant 
theoretical issues, which have already been outlined at the beginning of this chapter. 
 
The research is focused on the nature of war journalism content, news flows and news 
values and not on the effect of war coverage on audiences. An evaluation of the impact 
of Iraq War II coverage on public opinion, is another area of research, not within the 
purview of this analysis.   
 
The objectives of this research, which is focused on the invasion phase of Iraq War II 
are: 
 
1. To analyse the direction and orientation of military conflict news coverage and 
how the New Zealand newspapers constructed the war: 
 
The research examines the topics and themes of coverage and the direction of 
the content. In terms of direction, the items will be analysed to ascertain if they 
were favourable, unfavourable or neutral towards the main actors in the conflict, 
such as the US and Iraq. The thematic analysis will look at topics such as the 
process of combat, impact of war, debate about the war, casualties of war, 
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military build-up and the technologies of war. As New Zealand did not endorse 
the US-led invasion of Iraq and public opinion was also firmly against the war, a 
thematic analysis and examination of the direction of coverage will show how 
the newspapers framed the war in such a context. 
 
Newspapers orient their coverage according to their news values, news selection 
and editing processes, thus making some aspects of a story more salient. Hence, 
this study will find out how the newspapers framed the war through selection 
and placement of content.  
 
2. To study the dependence on international news agencies and other content 
providers during military conflicts: 
 
As wholesalers of news to world news media, a few news agencies dominate the 
global news market and through their coverage of events set the media agenda. 
In this process of internationalisation and setting news agendas they also act as 
agents of globalisation (Boyd-Barrett, 1997). This thesis will analyse the extent 
of dependence on news agencies, and how they oriented the war journalism 
discourse in New Zealand during the invasion phase of Iraq War II. The study 
will also analyse the direction of news agencies and editorial content from 
newspaper staff to determine how various content providers framed Iraq War II 
discourse. 
 
3. To analyse the extent to which the US and Coalition military and governments 
dominated the war journalism discourse during the study period: 
 
Media management and propaganda are extensively used by institutional news 
sources during military conflicts. In Iraq War II, the US and Coalition 
dominated the global war journalism discourse as they were primary definers of 
news and thus used PR strategies and public diplomacy to gain positive 
coverage. This research aims to ascertain the extent of US and Coalition 
dominance in Iraq War II coverage. The study will also analyse how sources 
from key countries involved in the conflict, including Iraq, are used in the media. 
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The following research into these aspects of the Iraq War related media content in New 
Zealand newspapers will help to answer the research questions discussed in Chapter 7. 
The thesis will eventually show how the three largest daily newspapers in New Zealand 
covered the war, the extent of their dependence on foreign news agencies and news 
services, and how such dependence exposes the news ‘retailers’ to propaganda and 
persuasion. The thesis will also highlight the globalised nature of international news and 
the homogenisation of global media discourse by elite news wholesalers. 
 
1.9 Outline of the thesis 
 
The thesis is divided into 11 chapters, with an overview of the research, including the 
theoretical issues, given in the introductory chapter. The introductory chapter also looks 
briefly at how the New Zealand newspapers covered the war, the conflict’s impact on 
the economy, and political debates in New Zealand over the invasion of Iraq. A brief 
outline of the three metropolitan newspapers selected for the study is also given in this 
chapter. 
 
The historical context of coverage of some of the major global conflicts since World 
War II, and issues pertaining to war journalism are discussed in Chapter 2 as part of a 
review of literature. These conflicts were World War II, the Vietnam War, Iraq War I 
(Gulf War of 1990-91), the Kosovo conflict and Iraq War II. These wars have been 
selected to reflect historical developments in war coverage, and the role of world 
powers such as the US and UK in media management and propaganda. The coverage of 
military conflicts by the New Zealand news media is also explored in this chapter. 
 
In Chapter 3, globalisation is evaluated and discussed from a wider perspective, looking 
at factors affecting globalisation, the flow of news products, the political economy of 
news media, and media ownership in New Zealand. 
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International news agencies and the direction of their content are an important focus of 
this research and are discussed in Chapter 4. The role of news agencies in the 
globalisation of news and media content and as agenda setters is discussed. 
 
The news values framework, which is an important guideline for reporters and 
journalists in their selection of news, for coverage and in news production, is discussed 
in Chapter 5. This chapter also looks at how news values and other editorial guidelines 
contribute to news framing. 
 
Another key issue that resonates during military conflicts in particular, concerns the 
often cosy relations that exist between the sources and the news media. The source-
media relationship is discussed in Chapter 6 in the context of media hegemony and the 
indexing hypothesis.  
 
The research questions and the research methods are discussed in Chapter 7.The 
primary method employed in this research is content analysis, while interviews were 
also conducted to ascertain the editorial policies of the newspapers studied. The 
findings of the interviews are outlined in Chapter 8. Editors from The New Zealand 
Herald, The Dominion Post and The Press, as well as the New Zealand Press 
Association, were interviewed. 
 
Chapters 9 and 10 present in detail the empirical findings of the content analysis. 
Among other things, the direction and main themes of coverage, and the direction of 
news agencies and news sources are given in these chapters. Furthermore, the findings 
are discussed in relations to theory and previous research. 
 
The conclusion of the study is given in Chapter 11, with findings put into context within 
the theoretical frameworks and the literature on aspects of war coverage, media 
management, news flows and globalisation.  The coverage of Iraq War II by the local 
daily newspapers, who relied on material furnished by international news agencies and 
other content providers is discussed in the context of theory and the empirical findings. 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION                                                                                                      PAGE 
 
 
  33
1.10 Limitations of the study 
 
If we take the classical definition of  the verbal model of communication: “who says 
what, in which channel, to whom, with what effect”, as enunciated by Lasswell (Cited 
in Severin & Tankard, 1997), this research focuses on  “who says what, in which 
channel”. In this research, the ‘who’ element is attributed to news sources and content 
providers such as news agencies, while the ‘says what’ refers to the direction of sources, 
themes and direction of items, and the ‘channel’ is the print media. This is a media 
content study, not a study of the effects of media content on audiences.  
 
Thus, the focus of this research is on how Iraq War II was covered, and who dominated 
the news agenda and what aspects of the conflict were emphasised in the war journalism 
discourse. This study does not look at how public opinion was affected by the war 
coverage, if at all, nor who relied on which news sources for the social construction of 
Iraq War II. 
 
Study of all the communication processes was not within the purview of this research, 
as the focus of this analysis is on the manufacturing and packaging stages, not on the 
consumption phase of the war content. This limitation was necessitated by the need to 
focus on the relevant research questions and to make the research project manageable. 
 
The impact of war coverage on audiences is also an important area for future research in 
New Zealand, given the lack of academic inquiry in this field and the dramatic shift in 
audience media consumption habits with the rise of alternative sources such as the 
internet. Given the high use of the internet, which facilitates alternative news sources, a 
uses and gratification study in relation to Iraq War II or any other major military 
conflict would be extremely useful to gauge how the global public constructs conflicts 
from various media sources. 
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2.1  Introduction 
 
 
This chapter reviews the literature on war coverage, news gathering and issues such as 
news management and propaganda that journalists and editors have faced in covering 
some of the major military conflicts since World War II. The focus of this research is 
how newspapers in New Zealand covered Iraq War II, looking more specifically at the 
news flows, news agencies and how the official sources, through news management, 
attempted to set the media agenda and influence direction of coverage during military 
conflicts such as Iraq War II. To analyse these aspects of war journalism and media 
discourse, it is important to examine major international conflicts to identify the 
dominant issues pertaining to the media coverage of wars. In this chapter, those aspects 
of media discourse are examined by looking at major military conflicts that involved the 
US and other major powers such as Britain, as they are the major Western military 
powers in the world, and led the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The military conflicts are 
World War II, the Vietnam War, Iraq War I, the Kosovo conflict and Iraq War II. 
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Media coverage of military conflicts increased towards the end of the twentieth century, 
and this can be attributed to developments in telecommunications, transportation and 
globalisation. Technological advancement has “transformed the media’s newsgathering 
capabilities” and has allowed “the media to bring us news live and in colour from 
anywhere on the globe, including frontline, sharpening fears of negative and horrible 
war coverage” (Thrall, 2000, p 65). 
 
Globalisation is also changing the way military conflicts are covered (Seib, 2004), and 
nation states that wage wars are devising new strategies to win the global public opinion 
in favour of wars they conduct. Military success alone does not give victory – national 
and global consent is integral to the complete success of a war. As Eisenhower, 
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe during World War II said, “public opinion wins 
war” (Cited in Knightley, 2000, p 344). 
 
Before military operations are waged, the news media are utilised by the military and 
governments – on both sides of the conflict – to win national and international public 
opinion to achieve political and military goals. Winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of their 
own citizens is necessary before wars can be waged, and, as Hiebert (1993) argues, 
news media have become an integral “part of modern warfare and … public relations is 
a primary weapon of war” (p 30). No longer is national support sufficient but global 
backing has become essential given the nature of the modern international system.  
Justifications for wars are made through the news media and certainly propaganda is 
launched to demoralise the enemy and arouse the passion of others through the media. 
Taylor (1995) notes that news media are not simple observers of wars, “they have 
become participants and sometimes their coverage can even provide a catalyst which 
produces dramatic shifts in political and military decision-making”.  
 
But these dramatic shifts are often caused by a set of events to which governments and 
military are privy, thus as official and exclusive sources for such events they are able to 
influence the way the events are covered and reported by the news media. News media 
which mostly rely on government and military officials for information on political and 
military events become vehicles of propaganda and facilitate ‘primary definers’ to set 
the agenda for national and global audiences. In Iraq War II, the US and Coalition 
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forces managed the media, and attempted to attract positive coverage by embedding 
journalists with them. Through extensive coverage and putting the crisis in perspective, 
“the media can shape the ways in which war itself is waged” (Jeffords & Rabinovitz, 
1994, p 11). 
 
The increase in media attention to wars and military conflicts means that more 
journalists are travelling to the fronts, along with the military as ‘embeds’ or 
independently as ‘unilaterals’. In the D-Day invasion of Normandy, France, on 6 June 
1944, fewer than 30 reporters accompanied the military (Hess & Kalb, 2003). Nearly 47 
years later at the beginning of Iraq War I (Operation Desert Storm) in 1991, more than 
1,600 news media and support personnel were present. And more than 1,700 media 
representatives covered the initial phases of peacekeeping operations in the American 
sector of Bosnia in 1996 (Venable, 2002). With more than 1,000 journalists embedded 
with US and British forces during the invasion phase of Iraq War II, it was “the most 
covered war in history” (Katovsky & Carlson, 2003, p xi). 
 
2.2 Coverage of military conflicts 
 
In a ‘symbiotic relationship’, the military and the media are dependent on each other for 
their success. As Jeffords and Rabinovitz (1994) observe, these two institutions do not 
function in isolation: 
 
The mass media … do not function separately from the government or the military in 
their coverage of wars. In fact, they often reproduce or interpret the government’s and 
military’s war reports as well as their own first and second-hand accounts. Conversely 
the military and the government may censor media reports and repress or reshape what 
is said. During the Persian Gulf War, the government prevented journalists from 
travelling alone in the war zone and denied journalists access to certain areas, thereby 
ensuring a different kind of censorship by restricting visibility of military events 
transpiring and their consequences (Jeffords & Rabinovitz, 1994, p 11). 
 
Hundreds of reporters go along with soldiers, sometimes risking their lives to cover the 
death and destruction and the triumph and tragedy of war. Numerous studies have been 
done on how news media have covered military conflicts around the world.  
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Following a study of news reports and editorials in nine US newspapers for the pre-
World War I period of 1912-1914, Brown (1937) concluded that the press did not 
explain events that would contribute to a better understanding of what was actually 
taking place in Europe. The war coverage was controlled by respective countries and 
content emerging from the fronts was often biased and laced with propaganda. During 
World War I, “News was highly censored and provided mostly favourable coverage of 
Allied efforts” and the coverage was “highly patriotic and supportive” and criticism of 
official policy was rare  (Tuyll, 2002, p 232). 
 
Canham (1943) critically examined wartime reportage by US newspapers in the Second 
World War (1939-1945) and found that sources were the primary problem in restricting 
information. He said, “I was extremely interested to learn that the decision to hold back 
and play down American casualties, subsequently altered, was not an army or navy 
decision but a political or propagandist decision”. The same appears to be true in the 
case of recent wars including Iraq War II, in which the Coalition casualty details were 
delayed or withheld. And journalists were restricted and discouraged from taking photos 
of flag-draped coffins returning to the US from Iraq. 
 
Another study, which shows the passive attitudes of the media, was done by Otsuki 
(1995), who contends that during the invasion of Grenada and Iraq War of 1991, the 
media acted as what he termed ‘cheerleaders’. The danger of newspapers depending on 
military spokesmen and government officials is that objectivity, fairness and 
professionalism in the reporting are compromised. In a content analysis of The New 
York Times coverage of Iraq War I, Morlan (1992) found that the elite US newspaper 
used government administration sources significantly more often during the Desert 
Storm than during Dessert Shield.  
 
Many newspapers rely on international news agencies for news, photos and graphics.  A 
research by Al-Kahtani (1999) found that in the coverage of the Gulf War (1990-1991), 
the Saudi Arabian press depended on foreign news sources such as Reuters, AFP, AP 
and UPI. Given the proximity of Saudi Arabia to Iraq, reliance on international news 
agencies for war coverage shows the high level of dependence on the ‘Big Four’ news 
agencies by the Saudi press.  
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2.2.1 Orientation of war journalism 
 
In military conflicts both the government and military exert pressure on the news media 
so that people at home and the world in general hear a story that is favourable to the 
military and political objectives. To reach such goals, attempts are made to control or 
even suppress oppositional and alternative media, as in the case of Al Jazeera. As 
Stephen Jukes (2004) observed in Under Fire: Untold Stories from the Front Line of the 
Iraq War, “Throughout the history of warfare, generals and political leaders have 
sought to influence and win over public opinion, trying to control the flow of 
information and ensure that their version of events is written in history” ( p vii).  
 
Thussu and Freedman (2003) propose three models of communicating conflict: they see 
the media firstly as critical observer; secondly as publicist, and thirdly the surface upon 
which war is imagined and executed.  
 
As critical observers of military conflicts, news media play an ‘adversarial role’. The 
premise of this narrative is that as “impartial and independent monitors of military 
conduct”, “journalists are prepared to confront the arguments of powerful voices in 
government and the military who are responsible for both strategic and tactical 
decisions” (Thussu & Freedman, 2003, p 4). 
 
History has shown that the news media and the military have cohabited in a cosy 
relationship (Knightley, 2000), although at different stages friendship have become 
acrimonious, most notably witnessed in the Vietnam conflict (Hallin, 1986) and Iraq 
War I and II (Thussu & Freedman, 2003). Thus before becoming critical observers, the 
media often act as publicists for the military and government. According to Thussu and 
Freedman (2003)  “Mainstream media reproduce the frameworks of political and 
military leaders and in so doing provide propaganda rather than ‘disinterested’ 
journalism” (p 4). 
 
The third narrative assumes that the media have become the platform or ‘theatre’ where 
the information war is conducted. The instantaneity of broadcast journalism, with live 
coverage of global events, has strengthened this model of conflict journalism. Thussu 
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and Freedman (2003) argue that “the media constitute the spaces in which wars are 
fought and are the main ways through which populations (or audiences) experience 
war” (p 7). 
 
In war coverage, journalists are faced with distinct issues in their pursuit for news, most 
notably news management and propaganda; organisational matters and national and 
audience interests. According to Seib (2002, p 94), in covering military conflicts 
journalists have to confront and consider the following issues: 
 
1. Journalists have to deal with news management and propaganda strategies 
from various parties including the military, the government, and the political 
elite  
2. Logistical obstacles and safety concerns limit access to news events and 
sources 
3. Governments use patriotism and national interests to ensure that media 
criticism of policies and war strategies is minimal 
 
Covering military conflicts is a challenging task given the organisational and 
ideological factors pulling and pushing journalists into various spheres. Thus, 
maintaining professional integrity in the face of ‘conflicts’ is demanding and 
challenging, as noted by Boyd-Barrett: 
 
Journalists may unthinkingly subscribe to or knowingly comply with the objectives, 
ideologies, and perspectives of one or another side to a conflict. Alternatively, they 
must struggle to make sense of the “big picture” in resistance to information 
monopolies imposed by state and military. Such challenges and difficulties are the 
essence of war reporting, and these attributes figure into the genre of war reporting that 
results (Boyd-Barrett, 2004, p 25). 
 
More than 85 years ago, at the end of World War I (1914-1918), a British observer 
commented: “War not only creates a supply of news but a demand for it. So deep-rooted 
is the fascination in war and all things appertaining to it that … a paper has only to be 
able to put up on its placard “A Great Battle” for its sales to mount up” (Lasswell cited 
in Carruthers, 2000, p 3).  
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Later military conflicts such as World War II, the Vietnam War and more recently the 
conflict in Iraq prove this view.  Media attention given to military conflicts and 
disasters has increased and demand for such content is driven by the appetite of the 
public for sensational content. Media coverage of news events is to a great extent driven 
by market forces. In the Iraq War of 1991, nearly 75 percent of the 25 major 
newspapers in the United States enjoyed an increase in circulation, while CNN recorded 
a ten-fold increase of its audience (Hallin and Gitlin cited in Carruthers, 2000). News 
media’s coverage of wars is also driven by commercial imperatives. Taylor (1995) 
noted that “Despite the excessive costs of sending foreign correspondents to distant 
lands based in expensive hotels using up expensive satellite equipment and air time, 
armed conflict between two or more warring partners is precisely the type of event on 
which the media thrives”. 
 
Another important factor, besides the selective process of reporters and editors, is the 
corporate and commercial interest of news organisations. The political economy 
approach to the issue puts the interests and needs of the commercial sponsors or broader 
economic systems to the forefront of the media organisations (Herman & Chomsky, 
1988). Market forces also drive newspapers to cover issues familiar and relevant to the 
audiences and during military conflicts, war journalism discourse is shaped by national 
interests and political and public consensus on the issues (Bennett, 1990; Hallin, 1986). 
  
Studies have also shown that the media consciously remove material which may 
displease corporate advertisers and sponsors in “a process of filtration which is perhaps 
most noticeable in wartime, when profound disturbance looms” (Kellner cited in 
Carruthers, 2000, p 19). How NBC reacted to Peter Arnett’s interview to Iraq TV in 
March 2003 is an interesting example of how a media organisation reacted to protect its 
interests. The New Zealand-born Arnett, who won a Pulitzer Prize for his Vietnam War 
coverage for the Associated Press, was dismissed by NBC and MSNBC for giving an 
interview to Iraqi TV in which he said the initial US war plan had failed (Morlan, 1992). 
 
Cho and Lacy (1989) contend that international coverage by Western media is heavily 
oriented toward conflicts and disasters. A 1984 study of 114 US daily newspapers 
shows that more than 26 percent of the international stories concerned conflict or 
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disaster compared to 13 percent of the domestic news stories. A study of Norwegian 
newspapers (Galtung & Ruge, 1965) also showed a similar pattern in foreign news 
coverage, with emphasis on conflict-oriented news, while in South Korea (Nam, 1970), 
of the total international news, 72 percent was hard news such as armed conflicts and 
catastrophes. 
 
The increase in war coverage can also be attributed to speedier information 
dissemination, competition among media organisations, and developments in 
communication and printing technologies. Jon Swartz observes in an article in USA 
Today the leaps made by telecommunications technology in the coverage of wars:  
 
Radio had World War II, Television had Vietnam. Cable TV had the Gulf. Now the 
Internet may have the US war with Iraq. … This time, reporters and producers with 
wireless laptops and handheld digital cameras will file reports from the battlefields and 
military installations. Cameras are at key locations for live feeds 24 hours a day (Swartz, 
2003).  
 
Journalists work in an environment of diverse and conflicting messages – official 
reports and public relation spins from governments and anti-war movements, as well as 
public reactions. They are always bombarded with conflicting information and writing 
reports that are ‘objective’ is not an easy task.  Reporters may also have to take into 
consideration the corporate interests and editorial policies of the media organisations for 
which they work. Hence, the concept of objective reporting is often difficult for them to 
adhere to. When objectivity fails, it leads to bias. In the news editing process of 
selecting which stories become news, and how they are reported, news editors and 
journalists inevitably bring their dispositions, beliefs, cultural norms and ethnocentric 
stereotypes to bear (Carruthers, 2000). 
 
Often journalists covering conflicts are caught between the demands of governments to 
be patriotic and the need to be objective and uphold journalistic values. Ideally 
journalists have to report without fear or favour, as Jukes point out: 
 
Journalists have a right to report, without fear of attack or intimidation, whether 
embedded or working independently as free agents. For only by covering all sides of a 
conflict do journalists have a hope of being able to distinguish truth from propaganda 
(2004, p xi). 
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There has been a lot of discussion and debate about the Iraq war coverage in the US 
media. While some commended the coverage, others expressed dissatisfaction on with 
the reporting. In a USA Today opinion poll of the news coverage of the war in Iraq by 
the US media, 52 percent rated the coverage as excellent, 32 percent good, 10 percent 
fair and five percent poor.  On the other side, while some media executives and critics 
argued that television news achieved a spectacular success in Iraq, taking the war 
immediately into American living rooms, others questioned how clear and complete the 
coverage really was, suggesting that the public never received a totally comprehensible 
portrait of what was taking place (Rutenberg & Carter, 2003). 
 
Iraq War I and Iraq War II have seen the military and government managing the media 
and the coverage being questioned by the public for objectivity and fairness.  The media 
consumers have taken a critical view of the coverage. As Snyder (Cited in Greenberg & 
Gantz, c1999) points out, when readers or viewers “do not accept wholesale the content 
of the news to which they are exposed,” they may be said to be critical of the news. 
Woodall et al contend that prior knowledge helps media consumers remember and 
process the news and (Cited in Greenberg & Gantz, c1999) in their study conclude that 
prior contradictory knowledge can become the basis for critical comments. 
 
2.2.2 War coverage in New Zealand 
 
Although New Zealand has not engaged militarily in more recent global conflicts, it has 
played roles in World War I, World War II and in the Vietnam War. Research into 
media coverage of military conflicts in New Zealand is thin. The few studies include 
analysis of the coverage of the Vietnam War (Witte, 1990) and Iraq War  (Comrie & 
Fountaine, 2005). Although not a direct examination of media coverage of conflicts, 
research by Ferguson (2004) looked into “the construction of September 11th and the 
New Zealand response” while Phipps (2004) analysed war and public opinion. 
Extensive researches of war coverage in New Zealand are few and scope study narrow.  
 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW                                                                                            PAGE 43  
 
The study by Witte (1990) shows that some newspapers have been vociferous in their 
opinions of the Vietnam War and New Zealand’s involvement in the conflict. The New 
Zealand Monthly Review, which opposed US intervention in Vietnam, made a major 
issue out of the New Zealand government’s decision to send troops in May 1965 (Witte, 
1990). The newspaper exposed the war by publishing the findings of a group of 
prominent intellectuals known as the ‘War Crimes Tribunal’. The report details the 
injuries suffered by civilians as a result of US bombings of Hanoi, and wounds inflicted 
on people by American anti-personnel bombs. The Tribunal concluded that the United 
States, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand were committing a “violent war of 
aggression against the people of Vietnam” (Witte, 1990). The New Zealand news media 
gave extensive coverage to the Mai Lai massacre and drew criticism from the 
government. Defence Minister Thompson claimed that the New Zealand Broadcasting 
Corporation’s coverage was distorted by the ‘saturation’ coverage (Rabel, 2005) of the 
16th March 1968 incident when US soldiers killed unarmed Vietnamese civilians (My 
Lai Massacre, 2007).  
 
Fewer than 4000 New Zealand military personnel served in Vietnam from 1964 to 1972, 
when the country was “reluctantly drawn into the Vietnam conflict for Cold War 
reasons relating to the perceived threat of communist expansionism in Southeast Asia” 
(Rabel, 2005, p viii). According to Rabel (2005) there was bipartisan support for New 
Zealand’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the Vietnam conflict until 1965, then the ruling 
National government lost the support of Labour in the later stages of the war partly 
because of the growing anti-war movements in New Zealand. Rabel noted the shift in 
public opinion and the Opposition stance over the country’s involvement in the Vietnam 
conflict: 
 
… there was no doubt that the Vietnam conflict assumed a new prominence in domestic 
political debate as protests against combat involvement in the war multiplied in form 
and number. Differences of approach between National and Labour widened to the 
extent that the Opposition was prepared to dissent publicly, if moderately, from a 
decision to send New Zealand soldiers into combat (Rabel, 2005, p 124). 
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The Otago Daily Times, The Tablet and The Truth supported the war in Vietnam mainly 
because they leaned towards the National Government of Prime Minister Holyoake. 
Witte concludes that “the Vietnam conflict was the first foreign policy issue of the post-
war era to be debated in New Zealand’s press in such great depth and for such an 
extended period” (Witte, 1990). The intense debate about the war was mainly due to the 
involvement of New Zealand. The war was of high news interest and had relevance to 
New Zealand thus coverage was extensive. 
 
According to a study of media coverage of Vietnam-related issues, coverage leading up 
to the May 1965 decision to intervene militarily in the conflict, was ‘extensive and 
objective’. The study, conducted by the Tourist and Publicity Department, noted that 
“Of the 27 editorial opinions, just before and after the announcement that New Zealand 
would send a battery to Vietnam, 21 were in favour of the Government’s action, 3 were 
indeterminate and 3 were against” (Cited in Rabel, 2005, p 123). The three newspapers 
that opposed the decision were The Taranaki Daily News, The Waikato Times and The 
Auckland Star – the last commenting that it was not in New Zealand’s interest to get 
involved in “what is basically an Asian civil war” (Rabel, 2005, p 123). Newspapers 
that strongly supported the government included The Dominion, The Otago Daily Times, 
The New Zealand Herald and The Evening Post. 
 
New Zealand’s six-year military engagement in the Vietnam conflict, alongside the US 
and Australia, had cost the country $13 million and 35 lives when in August 1972 Prime 
Minister Keith Holyoake announced that combat forces would be withdrawn by the end 
of the year (Rabel, 2005). New Zealand’s departure from the conflict was hastened in 
December immediately after the Labour government headed by Norman Kirk came to 
power. The New Zealand media were at the beginning divided in their opinions of the 
war – some favouring military engagement in the conflict and others advocating only 
humanitarian assistance. However, by the late 1960s and early 1970s, there appeared be 
a consensus in the press on the de-merits of New Zealand military involvement. This 
change in direction of the press may be attributed to the increasing anti-war protests in 
New Zealand and America, as well as the human suffering the war was causing.   
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A study carried out in New Zealand in the early 1970s found that coverage of wars and 
the armed services was comparatively less prominent compared to focus on economic 
activity, sports, social issues and politics. Of the 23,200 items analysed in the research 
only 734 items (3.16%) were on war (Campbell & Cleveland, 1972). 
 
The situation in New Zealand is very similar to that which Al-Kahtani (1999) found in 
his study of the Saudi Arabian press and their reliance on foreign news services. Both 
print and electronic media rely heavily on foreign media organisations to provide news 
content for international coverage. The heavy reliance on Reuters, AFP, AP and other 
foreign media organisations makes them the agenda setters for the local audiences.  
After a study of how New Zealand media covered the Iraq War of 1991, Mansfield 
noted that New Zealand’s media were “undoubtedly affected by its (sic) reliance on 
foreign sources with unevenness in the reports which came through” (Mansfield, 1991). 
Mansfield further observed that “when a paper lifts articles from another media source 
it takes the risk of publishing an unbalanced story”. 
 
The issue of foreign news written by foreign news agencies creating a different 
perspective through local news media was observed by Tully in 1996, when he said 
“our view of the world is narrowed by the fact that we rely for our international news on 
three or four main news agencies. These three news agencies originate from two or 
three of the world’s most powerful Western nations” (Pauling, 1996, p 6). 
 
Gulf Watch, which was established by a group of working journalists concerned about 
the censorship and bias in the New Zealand media during the Gulf War, also believed 
that heavy reliance on foreign news sources could be unhealthy and lowered the news 
media’s credibility. In a letter to newspaper editors they said: “We feel more could be 
done by the news media to ensure the public is aware of the censorship faced in this war 
– a war widely acknowledged as one of the most censored in history” (Mansfield, 1991). 
 
In the case of Iraq War I coverage in 1991, there were few New Zealand journalists in 
the conflict zone. Hence, media organisations had to rely heavily on foreign agencies 
for editorial content. There were only four New Zealand journalists – Tim Donoghue 
(The New Zealand Herald), Paul Bensemann (NZPA), Roy Newsman (Radio New 
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Zealand), and Ewart Barnseley – covering the Iraq War (Mansfield, 1991). Donoghue 
(1991) observed  the sentiments of many Gulf War journalists when he commented in 
the New Zealand Journalism Review that “journalists arriving in Saudi Arabia during 
the Gulf War were reluctantly resigned to the fact the United States military had already 
won the battle of the right to know versus the right to win”. 
 
As with the earlier Iraq war, academics and commentators were equally concerned 
about the coverage of Iraq War II, mainly because of the complete reliance on the elite 
news sources by New Zealand news media. As there was embedding and other media 
management strategies by US and UK governments, correspondents in the Gulf region 
were vulnerable to propaganda.  
 
Research by Comrie and Fountaine (2005) has shown that editorials and commentaries 
originating from New Zealand were unfavourable towards the US and “overwhelmingly 
critical” of US President George W. Bush (p 248).  Comrie and Fountaine (2005) noted 
that the New Zealand news media depended on international news services and like 
most Western countries the news content was sourced from mainstream news agencies 
thus coverage showed the bias of different media sources: 
 
The resultant coverage reflected the reports of embedded journalists, various biases of 
some media outlets, and mixed attempts to be objective and balanced. This was fed 
through a New Zealand perspective that generally opposed the war but still supported 
its prosecutors  (Comrie & Fountaine, 2005, p 260). 
 
Comrie and Fountaine (2005) argued that despite the opposition to the war from the 
government and the public the war coverage in New Zealand did not “clearly portray 
what opponents believe was the true story of the war and its causes” because of “the 
country’s willing consumption of mainstream Western media and values they espouse” 
(p 260). 
 
Although content from news agencies and other information providers was strongly 
influenced by elite sources, notably military and government officials, the New Zealand 
media attempted to put the conflict into perspective by firstly opposing the mainstream 
views of the US and conforming to New Zealand public opinion that did not support the 
war on Iraq. Iraq War II coverage in the New Zealand news media was extensive and 
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the viewpoints diverse.  Jim Tully, head of Mass Communications and Journalism at the 
University of Canterbury noted in an interview with the New Zealand Press Association: 
 
I have been impressed by the way in which some newspapers have given not just 
extensive coverage but coverage with a variety of perspectives. 
 
Some have made a serious attempt to recognise that we’re usually heavily reliant on the 
western news agencies and have sought to widen the lens a bit … I think people have 
taken to heart some really strong criticism that arose last time about the limited range of 
view points. 
 
I think the public is much more media savvy and sophisticated than they were 10 years 
ago, and more inclined to read and consume critically the news they get. They know the 
coverage is managed and they know propaganda is common, so they have in-built 
cynicism or scepticism of the sort of information flowing out from approved sources … 
People are less likely these days to quietly absorb what is being disseminated by the 
official sources and recognise that games are being played (Cited in Hill, 2003). 
 
There have been strong criticisms of Iraq War II coverage by the press and the alleged 
bias linked to heavy reliance on international news agencies. David Robie (2003) 
pointed out that “the bias and editorialising of much of the NZ media coverage, relying 
heavily as it did on news sources, satellite feeds and wire agencies from Anglo-
American protagonists, was quite significant” (p 4). Although there was dependence on 
news agencies, editorial decisions were made quite independently as shown by the 
publishing of photos of the US soldiers in Iraqi captivity. Despite objections from the 
US, the press in New Zealand carried photos of the US Prisoners of War (POW) 
captured by the Iraqis in the first week of the conflict. This drew criticism from both 
Labour and National parties. 
 
Both the opposition and the government viewed the publication in the New Zealand 
press of POW photos as a violation of international law. The National Party leader Bill 
English urged media organisations not to publish pictures of prisoners of war and asked 
the government why it had allowed TVNZ to do that in its coverage of the Iraq conflict. 
Bill English also called on the Labour government to remind the New Zealand media 
about the rules of covering POWs. He said that “all media outlets, including state-
owned television, should be abiding by those guidelines” (NZPA, 2003b). 
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In Iraq War II coverage the New Zealand media published photos of POWs, as they 
were “driven to show the images by New Zealand’s competitive media climate …It’s 
indicative of the media’s desperation to find a local angle”, according to media 
academic Jim Tully (NZPA, 2003e). Former New Zealand Herald editor Gavin Ellis 
said it was questionable whether, under the Geneva Convention, captive powers should 
parade prisoners before the media: 
 
But having paraded them, I don’t think there are any issues related to the convention 
that bind a news organisation. The Geneva Convention binds sovereign states who are 
signatories to it ... and their treatment of prisoners. It doesn’t relate to corporate entities, 
i.e. news organisations within those states” (NZPA, 2003e). 
 
Prime Minister Helen Clark noted that the war coverage “does cast a new light on world 
journalism so I think there are a whole lot of issues about coverage”. When a New 
Zealand journalist asked her whether she believed journalists were effectively part of a 
propaganda machine, Ms. Clark, said: “Truth is always the first casualty of war … I 
think we’re in a sort of breathless phase of reporting at the moment where we’ll just 
stand back and wait for the dust to settle and see what the real story on both of the sides 
actually is” (NZPA, 2003d). 
 
War reporting in the newspapers was extensive, with emphasis on episodic rather than 
thematic coverage, with news graphics and photos used widely in the construction of 
Iraq War II coverage. With event-oriented coverage and lack of context, media 
consumers are much more exposed to media bias and propaganda from the primary 
sources. Thus as Tully contended it was important that the frontline reports were only 
part of the mix, and that they should be placed in a wider context (Gamble, 2003, p B4). 
 
For the war coverage, none of the mainstream newspapers sent reporters to cover the 
conflict during the major combat period, instead relying heavily on news agencies and 
affiliated newspapers with whom they had clipping rights. As former editor of The New 
Zealand Herald Gavin Ellis said, “we would only send a journalist to Iraq if troops from 
New Zealand are directly involved” (Coates, 2003).  
 
Given the changing nature of media systems, globalisation and intensification of news 
flows as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, a comprehensive analysis of media content in 
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terms of the coverage in New Zealand media of recent global conflicts is needed.  In the 
post-Vietnam era of global conflicts, major powers that are taking military actions are 
also employing propaganda, media management and other strategic communication 
techniques to win national and global public opinion. Thus, the flow of information is 
often influenced by external factors while organisational and structural variables of 
media organisations also influence how and to what extent conflicts are covered. In the 
light of the changes in global media systems and news flows, it is important to analyse 
how a recent conflict such as Iraq War II was covered in New Zealand. 
 
2.3 World War II   
 
Even nearly 61 years after World War II, the jingoism and nationalistic fervour appear 
to linger in the hearts and minds of some people. For the US journalist Ambrose it was 
“the best reported war, ever … The reporters told of what they saw and learned. They 
refused to glorify America or to repeat a propaganda line – here the contrast with 
German and Japanese reporters could not be greater” (Hynes, Matthews, Sorel, & 
Spiller, 2001, p xv-xvi).  
 
This assertion can be contested with evidence of attempts at censorship by the military 
and to a large extent the conciliatory positions taken by some war correspondents in the 
face of excessive media management  by the Allied countries.  
 
2.3.1 Media as instruments of war   
 
In the US, with the lessons learned in the control of public opinion at home and abroad, 
new initiatives in media management and propaganda were taken. The Committee on 
Public Information (CPI), which was set up in World War I was administered by the 
Office of War Information (OWI) set up in June 1942 headed by former New York 
Times staff member Elmer Davis. The OWI, jointly with the news media, engineered 
American public opinion to accommodate the war strategies. The OWI was successful 
in getting the media’s endorsement of the military’s decision to bomb Nagasaki and 
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Hiroshima in Japan in 1945 (Solan cited in Miller, 1995). The Office of Censorship, 
which was also set up in 1942, monitored postal and telegraph communications between 
the US and other countries. Another instrument that limited war journalism was the 
‘Code of Wartime Practices for the American Press’ formulated in January 1942 and 
which was voluntarily adopted by the major media establishments. Among other things, 
the code stipulated rules on the “proper handling of news” and was considered “the 
bible on what and how to report war” (War Stories, 2006). 
 
More than 1,600 journalists were accredited by the US military to cover the World War 
II, and through media management strategies, coverage was controlled in favour of the 
military: 
 
This accreditation is used to control the press, since correspondents need a passport 
from the State Department and a press pass from the War Department. The government 
relies on reporters’ patriotism – asking for self-censorship as outlined by the Office of 
War Information. Reporters for the most part comply (War Stories, 2006). 
 
This system of accreditation, which later was labelled ‘embedding’, was widely used in 
Iraq War II, often with positive results for the US military and government. 
 
In Britain the House of Commons gave the government carte-blanche authority through 
the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, to do what it wanted. Under this legal authority 
“every press, commercial, or private message leaving Britain, whether by mail, cable, 
wireless, or telephone, was censored. Newspaper editors were prohibited from 
‘obtaining, recording, communicating to any other person or publishing information 
which might be useful to the enemy’” (Knightley, 2000, p 238). The British legislation 
shows the extent of information control during World War II. 
 
All the warring countries mobilised their media to achieve military and national 
objectives. Both the Axis and Allied nations controlled the flow of information to 
support military objectives and to create confusion among enemies. The French 
imposed direct censorship in the early days of the war, requiring reporters to make four 
copies of each story.  
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According to Thompson (Cited in Knightley, 2000) the copy was “taken by a dispatch 
rider to army headquarters, which was censored, and then to French general 
headquarters, where it was censored again. From French GHQ it went to the Hotel 
Continental in Paris, where a representative of the British Ministry of Information took 
charge of it and passed it to the British officer responsible for communications, who 
arranged it to be telephoned to London” (p 239).  
 
Unlike Britain and France, Germany took a different approach to media control and 
claimed that their level of censorship was low. What German chief propagandist Dr. 
Joseph Goebbels did was scout for neutral war correspondents through the Foreign 
Press Department of the Ministry of Propaganda. Correspondents were given special 
privileges such as extra rations and a petrol allowance, and the comparative ‘freedom’ 
they enjoyed made a big play with their freie Berichterstattung, or freedom of reporting 
(Knightley, 2000). Apparently, the large presence of about 100 neutral reporters in 
Berlin during September and early October 1939 is attributed to the relatively free 
environment for foreign correspondents.   
 
The German approach appeared to be successful, as they were able to provide content to 
US media through the neutral correspondents. According to Knightley (2000) “in the 
early stages of the invasion of Poland neutral correspondents in Berlin were fed 
photographs, reports and newsreels developed by the Germans. These contents found 
their way into US newspapers and cinemas” (p 241).   
 
With tight censorship guidelines, the British newspapers could be forgiven for foraying 
into falsehood. Britain’s Glasgow Evening News, for example, reported the military 
campaign as a triumph on May 29, just nine days before all the Allied forces in Norway 
were evacuated (Knightley, 2000).  However, Leland Stowe of the US newspaper 
Chicago Daily News, who was a neutral correspondent, covered the war in Norway 
from Sweden to avoid censorship, thus his story was different. Stowe, in one of his 
dispatches wrote:  “They (the British expeditionary force to Norway) were dumped into 
Norway’s deep snow and quagmires of April slush without a single anti-aircraft gun, 
without one squadron of supporting airplanes, without a single piece of field artillery” 
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(Knightley, 2000, p 248). In one of the biggest military bungles in history the British 
were forced to withdraw from Norway. 
 
Correspondents from all sides of the conflict had close relationships with the military 
establishment. Most of them believed in the justification for the war, and were 
nationalistic in their behaviour and outlook. Reporters wore military uniforms, “flew on 
bombing raids over Berlin, dug in with Marines on Guadalcanal, hit the beach at Peleliu, 
waded ashore at Omaha Beach, parachuted into Germany, sailed on ships that fought on 
the great battles of Midway and Okinawa” (Hynes et al., 2001, p xix). German 
correspondents also flew in bombers, jumped with parachute troops, and marched with 
infantry through the abandoned towns of Belgium and northern France (Knightley, 
2000). 
 
As US journalist Daniel Shorr notes, the embedded correspondents were part of the war 
effort. “They would go and ask ‘Would it be harmful if I reported this? Would it be 
harmful if I reported that?’ ” (Cited in Hess & Kalb, 2003, p 18).   
 
The military saw correspondents as members of the war machine. General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, supreme commander in Europe, told a meeting of American newspaper 
editors: “Public opinion wins war… I have always considered as quasi-staff officers, 
correspondents accredited to my headquarters” (Knightley, 2000, p 344). Eisenhower 
also said: 
 
I regard war correspondents as quasi staff officers, and I want to emphasise that in my 
opinion, each newsman has a greater responsibility than that of a competitive newsman. 
I am not prepared to treat you as my enemies. If I thought you were, I tell you here and 
now, I would do nothing for you, I trust you…  As staff officers however your first duty 
is a military duty, and the one fact which you must bear in mind is to disclose nothing 
which would help the enemy (McConnagh cited in Young & Jesser, 1997, p 40). 
 
On December 7, 1941 Japan attacked the US naval base of Pearl Harbour (Pacific Fleet) 
sinking five battleships, damaging three, destroying 200 planes and killing 2344 men. 
The Japanese lost only 29 planes. The American military took steps to ensure that the 
public remained oblivious to the disaster in Hawaii. According to Morris (Cited in 
Knightley, 2000)  “the cover-up began with  an ‘iron curtain’ of censorship that cut off 
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the United Press office in Honolulu from San Francisco in the middle of its first excited 
telephone report. So drastic was the suppression of news that nothing further, except for 
official communiqués, came of Pearl Harbour for another four days” (p 297). With the 
attack American correspondents came under strict censorship (Young & Jesser, 1997) 
and for four days they had to rely on official communiqués that came out of Pearl 
Harbour claiming that only one old battleship and a destroyer had been sunk and other 
ships damaged, and that heavy casualties had been inflicted on the Japanese (Knightley, 
2000).   
 
Although Japanese newspapers accurately mentioned the losses the Americans suffered 
in Pearl Harbour, censorship prevented the American public from learning of the attack. 
Some British newspapers that relied on official American sources reported that the Pearl 
Harbour incident was an American victory. “Jap plane carrier and four U-boats sunk”, 
said the Daily Express headline on December 8. The story reads: 
 
The main US Pacific Fleet is heavily engaged with a Japanese battle fleet, which 
includes several carriers, just off Pearl Harbour, its Hawaii base. Washington reports 
late tonight say that one Japanese aircraft carrier and four submarines have already been 
destroyed by the American forces off Hawaii (Knightley, 2000, p 297). 
 
2.3.2 Media-military relations  
 
There were occasions where correspondents, perhaps under the threat of censors, 
relinquished their professional integrity by colluding with the military. News of 
America’s killing in 1943 of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the man who planned the 
Pearl Harbour attack, was suppressed until after the war. The Americans learned his 
itinerary and Secretary of the Navy Colonel Frank Cox ordered a fighter group at 
Guadalcanal to kill Yamamoto. American fighters shot down his plane near 
Bougainville, Papua New Guinea on April 18 (Knightley, 2000). 
 
Knightley (2000) contends that several correspondents heard of the story, but each time 
a censor stepped in and nothing was published or broadcast until the war was over, 
American POWs had been freed, and censorship had ended, by which time the newness 
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of the event had receded. The military’s justification for the gag was that Yamamoto 
was killed after the Japanese code was deciphered.    
 
The United States army and navy applied ‘censorship at source’ – that is they tried to 
prevent correspondents from learning anything they did not want them to know. 
Correspondents were not allowed in the theatres of war unless they were accredited, and 
one of the conditions of accreditation was that the correspondent must sign an 
agreement to submit all his copy to military or naval censorship (Knightley, 2000).  
 
The interests of the military and those of the war correspondents were diametrically 
opposed. According to Knightley (2000) “correspondents seek to tell as much as 
possible as soon as possible; the military seeks to tell as little as possible as late as 
possible” (p 300). It became an inherent trait of the correspondents to be 
accommodative and, as Knightley observes, nationalistic in their coverage of the war: 
 
War correspondents went along with the official scheme for reporting the war because 
they were convinced that it was in the national interest to do so. They saw no sharp line 
of demarcation between the role of the press in war-time and that of the government, 
and they became so accustomed to censorship that when it finally ended, in 1945, one 
correspondent was heard to say in some bewilderment ‘But where will we go now to 
get our stories cleared?’ (Knightley, 2000, p 300-301). 
 
 
As Young and Jesser (1997) observed, “bound by the patriotic demands and 
expectations of nations fighting for their survival, correspondents on each side had little 
choice other than to support the war aims of their government as they did during World 
War I”. They presented “jingoistic material, for the emerging popular press catered 
directly to the nationalistic and patriotic expectations of the new literate urban classes 
brought into being by industrialisation” (p 41-43). 
 
For the military, it was a strategic move to play down the impact on civilians in wars. In 
every war from World War II to Iraq War II, military authorities took measures to 
minimise coverage of bombing victims and sufferings of civilians due to deliberate or 
unintentional bombing or missile attacks. In World War II, one of the single greatest 
civilian casualties resulted when the US dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima on 6 
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August 1945, and two days later on Nagasaki. It was estimated that the number of 
people who were directly exposed to the atomic bomb in Hiroshima was between 
340,000 and 350,000. More than 70,000 people were killed immediately (Grenville, 
1997) and 140,000 people were estimated to have died by December. Expecting a high 
civilian death toll, the US discouraged and prevented media access to the ground zero 
for a month (Torries, 2002).  
 
General MacArthur had placed all southern Japan ‘off-limits’ to the press and, instead 
of ending the censorship, tightened it. Even three weeks after Japan had surrendered and 
nearly a month after Hiroshima there still had been no account by a Western 
correspondent of the effects of the atom bomb on the two Japanese cities (Knightley, 
2000). 
 
A determined British journalist, however, waded through restrictions and evaded 
censors to reach Hiroshima, nearly a month after the tragedy. After arriving in 
Hiroshima on September 3 and surveying the situation Wilfred Burchett of the London 
Daily Express transmitted his copy through Morse code to Tokyo and London. His story, 
with some of the more horrifying details cut out apparently by his editors, appeared on 
September 5. As expected the American authorities reacted angrily to Burchett’s story, 
which was the first to describe radiation sickness (Knightley, 2000; War Stories, 2006). 
 
When the British forces began to challenge the Germans in North Africa in late 1940, 
there was a handful of correspondents. But one and a half years later there were 92 
correspondents covering the war in the North African desert (Knightley, 2000). At times 
the war correspondents appeared to be more than ‘quasi-staff’. According to Knightley 
(2000), “at a professional level, the correspondents were all absorbed into the military 
machine without much trouble and as what General Montgomery was later to describe 
as ‘an element of my staff’ ” (p 333). 
 
Except for a handful of journalists, most war correspondents served their national 
interests, forced by the media management policies of the countries for which they 
worked. Allegiance was given to national interests, at the expense of journalistic 
principles and values. Literally they became an element of the military.  
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A distinction needs to be drawn between journalists who work for one particular 
publication and those who work for major news agencies. Although the former can 
write and orient stories according to specific editorial policies of the publication, news 
agency journalists, whose copy will be used by thousands of newspapers, have to take a 
very independent and ‘objective’ position in war reporting.  
 
2.4 Vietnam War  
 
The Vietnam War was fought between 1964 and 1975 on the ground in South Vietnam 
and bordering areas of Cambodia and Laos, and bombing runs were carried out over 
North Vietnam. Fighting on one side was a coalition of forces including the United 
States, the Republic of Vietnam, Australia, New Zealand and South Korea. Fighting on 
the other side was a coalition of forces including the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
(North Vietnam) and the National Liberation Front, a communist-led South Vietnamese 
guerrilla movement.  When the US left Vietnam in 1975 more than 58,000 American 
soldiers had been killed. Australia lost almost 500 soldiers and New Zealand lost 38 
(Greenhill, 2005). According to figures revealed by Vietnam in 1995, more than one 
million Vietnamese combatants and four million civilians were killed in the war. 
 
American involvement in Vietnam was a gradual process with a few military advisors 
sent to South Vietnam in the early 1960s for covert operations and training. Media 
involvement was also gradual. In the early 1960s the press corps in Saigon was less than 
a dozen and the world media took most of their news from three wire services, AP, UPI 
and Reuters (Turner, 2003). 
 
The low intensity media coverage at the beginning may be attributed to this low-profile 
involvement. There was no full-scale war, and the guerrilla tactics of the North 
Vietnamese and typology of the region prevented a conventional battle. Correspondents 
were free and they went about in the news gathering process without much obstruction. 
As Hallin (1986) argues “a good deal of the patriotism correspondents displayed in 
covering World War II spilled over into the Vietnam period”. The American military 
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were helpful in providing correspondents with access to battle zones and information 
and logistics at the early stage of the conflict. According to Just, Vietnam was the 
beginning and end of unrestricted access to battlefield for journalists (Just, 2000). 
 
Belknap (2001) argues that “the war in Vietnam was a seminal event in military-media 
relations. It marked the first television coverage of war and a monumental shift in 
relations between the media and the American military. It also marks the last time 
reporters enjoyed unfettered access and no censorship in an American war” (p 3). 
 
There was no military censorship in Vietnam. For most part journalists in Vietnam were 
free to go where they pleased and report what they wished. Vietnam was in this sense 
genuinely an ‘uncensored war’ and the ground rules for journalists were unrestrictive 
(Hallin, 1986; Thrall, 2000). According to Turner, who was Reuters’ bureau chief in 
Saigon from 1962-64, there was no restriction on reporting in Vietnam in the early days 
of the conflict: 
 
It was often suggested by opponents of the war that we were prevented by the US and 
Vietnamese authorities from reporting the truth about what was going on. This was not 
true at all. The American military were in fact incredibly helpful in getting us around 
the country aboard their planes and helicopters. We only had to ask. And there were no 
restrictions on where we went or who we talked to, or on our reporting. It was probably 
the first war in which the media had such freedom (Turner, 2003, p 23). 
 
The policy of the military towards press coverage was relaxed in Vietnam in part 
because war had never been declared. As noted by Barber and Weir (2002) “After much 
debate by the military leaders, it was decided that without a declaration of war, media 
could not be restricted by the US military, and they would be free to move about the 
country at their own expenses” (p 89). According to Hallin, journalists were given a 
free-hand in the gathering and processing news: 
 
The media had extra ordinary freedom to report the war in Vietnam without direct 
government control: it was the first war in which reporters were routinely accredited to 
accompany military forces yet not subjected to censorship, and it was a war in which 
journalists clearly did not think of themselves simply as ‘soldiers of the typewriter’ 
whose mission was to serve the war effort (Hallin, 1986, p 7). 
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Although there was no World War II-style censorship, indirect measures such as 
accreditation were used to control information flow. As journalists were first required to 
agree with a press guideline before accreditation was granted it was certainly a form of 
restriction on the news media. According to Hallin (1986) “correspondents accredited to 
the US forces agreed a set of rules outlining 15 categories of information which they 
were not allowed to report without authorisation. They were forbidden, for example, to 
report troop movements or casualty figures until these were officially announced in 
Saigon. Violation of these rules could result in revocation or suspension of reporters’ 
accreditation” (p 128).  
 
As the 1965 build-up began, the American command tightened restrictions on the media, 
particularly on access to American air bases. This produced a wave of protests from 
news organisations, and the possibility of the old bargain of submitting to censorship in 
return for access was raised (Hallin, 1986). The military did consider the feasibility of a 
formal censorship, but decided that it was not practical.  
 
In the early years of theVietnam War, particularly before the Tet offensive of 1968, 
most news coverage was highly supportive of American intervention in Vietnam, and 
despite occasional crises, Kennedy and Johnson were usually able to ‘manage’ the news 
very effectively (Hallin, 1986). The coverage was also diverse among liberal ‘prestige 
papers’ like The New York Times and conservative papers like The Chicago Tribune or 
The San Diego Union, as well as small local papers which focused on the ‘local boys’ in 
action in Vietnam (Faulkner cited in Hallin, 1986). Someone who followed the war in 
The New York Times and Newsweek got a much more critical view than someone who 
followed it in The Daily News and Reader’s Digest (Hallin, 1986). 
 
The United States officials tried to conceal the full extent of American participation in 
Vietnam in the war against Vietcong. Malcolm Browne of the AP sent a dispatch, which 
appeared in The New York Times on March 24, 1962, complaining that the United States 
officials had concealed from correspondents the extent to which American servicemen 
were performing combat duties (Knightley, 2000). In 1962 and 1963 the Kennedy 
administration “tried to discredit the young Saigon press corps, which was often at odds 
with the generals and ambassadors running the war” (Hallin, 1986, p 4). 
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Despite the appeal by US officials for correspondents’ patriotism and not to damage 
national interest, American correspondents did their best during this period to inform 
their readers of the true nature of the situation in Vietnam.  However they were not very 
successful, because “in the early years of the American involvement, the administration 
misled Washington correspondents to such an extent that many an editor, unable to 
reconcile what his man in Saigon was reporting with what his man in Washington told 
him preferred to use the official version” (Knightley, 2000, p 412). 
 
The slow but steady flow of news to the world from Vietnam forced the US 
administrations to take measures to minimise the information impact on the public. 
President John F. Kennedy’s administration did “everything in its power to ensure that 
the existence of a real war in Vietnam was kept from the people” (Knightley, 2000, p 
412). The infamous Cable 1006, a directive from the State Department to the US 
Information Agency in Saigon, warned against providing transport for correspondents 
on military missions that might result in the correspondents producing undesirable and 
unfavourable stories (Knightley, 2000; Paul, 1996b; Thrall, 2000).  
 
2.4.1 Turning point in Vietnam War coverage  
 
Foreign correspondents wanted a major story that would knock them out of the 
passivity. The mundane reporting got a break with the Tet offensive, when the North 
Vietnamese Army made daring raids to Saigon, including the US Embassy. Fighting 
was brought to the proximity of correspondents and as Williams (1993) notes “Tet 
occurred in front of the reporters’ own eyes” (p 311). Although the NVA was repulsed, 
the NVA claimed a psychological victory. On the eve of the Tet offensive, in January 
1968, there were 179 American journalists accredited by the military command in 
Saigon and the number swelled further with the Tet offensive (Braestrup cited in Hallin, 
1986).  After Tet more attention was given to the civilians caught in the fighting, their 
suffering and predicament. Coverage of atrocities became more prominent. From Tet 
onwards the US media were more critical of the war, but not ‘anti-war’ (Williams, 
1993). 
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Turner (2003) argues that “the battle of Ap Bac, the Buddhist crisis and the Tet 
offensive were landmark events in media coverage of Vietnam, which added to the 
perception that Vietnam was unwinnable and therefore a mistake” (p 24). The American 
soldiers setting village huts on fire “and a police general executing a Viet Cong on a 
Saigon street in particular helped to change the course of the war by contradicting the 
official news briefings held each afternoon in Saigon” (Bates, 2000, p xiii). 
 
Following the Tet offensive media coverage of the conflict increased extensively and 
this naturally soured ties the media had with its elite informants. Many reporters felt 
that they had been deceived (Williams, 1993). But Turner contends that the Tet 
offensive was portrayed as a great victory for the Communists by the media. The brief 
success of the Communists was given immense media coverage and was misleading 
(Turner, 2003).  
 
General Westmoreland, who took command in Vietnam in June 1964 replacing Gen. 
Paul Harkins, was critical of media coverage of the Tet offensive and its aftermath 
when he said that the “… voluminous, lurid and distorted newspaper and particularly 
television reporting of the Tet offensive had transformed a devastating Communist 
military defeat into a ‘psychological victory’ ’’ (cited in Young & Jesser, 1997, p 91). 
Military and government officials were angered by media coverage that depicted the 
savagery of the American soldiers and their destruction of civilian properties.  
 
2.4.2 Mai Lai massacre coverage 
 
Until the Mai Lai massacre, which paradoxically was investigated and published by a 
reporter far away from the scene of the crime,  in the US “American coverage was weak 
on the racist and brutalising nature of the war and the way Americans treated the 
Vietnamese” (Knightley, 2000, p 426). 
 
Knightly argues that it was the racist nature of the fighting that inevitably led to the Mai 
Lai massacre, and “it was the reluctance of correspondents to report this racist and 
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atrocious nature of the war that caused the Mai Lai story to be revealed not by a war 
correspondent, but by an alert newspaper reporter back in the United States – a major 
indictment of the coverage of the war” (Knightley, 2000, p 428).  
 
It is interesting to look at how the Mai Lai story developed and eventually reached the 
public, after the story had been declined by newspapers, and given little prominence in 
terms of coverage.  
 
In the village of Mai Lai on March 16, 1968, US soldiers killed nearly 130 men, women 
and children, acting under the orders of the platoon commander Lieutenant William 
Calley. The incident came to light a year later, when a former door-gunner, who had 
heard about the massacre in Mai Lai, wrote some 30 letters to his mother detailing the 
incident. These letters were sent to President Nixon, various military authorities, 
senators and congressmen. Most of them never replied to these letters but a liberal from 
Arizona initiated the investigation which led to the conviction of Lieutenant Calley for 
the murder of 109 Vietnamese (Knightley, 2000).  
 
The Associated Press filed a small item of less than about a 100 words on September 6, 
1969, which did not say how many murders Calley had been charged with, and gave no 
indication of the circumstances of the incident. The item, according to Knightley, 
passed completely unnoticed. The New York Times carried the story at the bottom of 
page 38 (Knightley, 2000, p 429).  
 
Freelance reporter Seymour Hersh, who covered the Pentagon in 1966-67 for the 
Associated Press, sensed that it could be a major story and started his own 
investigations. In November 11, 1969, he interviewed Calley and prepared the story. 
But the problem now was to get it published. Life magazine did not accept it. Then he 
approached a little-known news agency, Dispatch News Service in Washington.  
Dispatch News Service contacted 50 newspapers and offered the story for US$100, and 
subsequently 36 newspapers, including The Times of London, the San Francisco 
Chronicle, the Boston Globe, and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch ran the story on 
November 13 (Knightley, 2000). 
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The Mai Lai massacre got national coverage in the United States in December with 
Time and Newsweek publishing stories on the incident. The December 8th issue of Time 
called it an ‘American tragedy,’ while the December 5th issue of Newsweek headlined: 
“A Single Incident in a Brutal War Shocks the American Conscience” (Knightley, 
2000). 
 
2.4.3 Publication of the Pentagon Papers 
 
As the intensity of the Vietnam coverage increased at the beginning of the 1970s, the 
relationship between the news media and the government deteriorated. A 1995 study of 
the military-media relationship conducted by Frank Aukofer and Vice Admiral (Retired) 
William P. Lawrence showed sharp differences between the media and the military – 
more than 64 percent of military officers agreed with the statement, “News media 
coverage of the events in Vietnam harmed the war effort” (Venable, 2002, p 66). 
 
The publication of the so-called Pentagon Papers in 1971 by The New York Times 
further accelerated the decline in public confidence in the US government, and the 
justification for intervention in Vietnam. The 4000-page document has a 3,000-page 
analysis that covers the American involvement in Southeast Asia from World War II to 
mid-1968 (Sheehan, 1971). Time magazine described the publication of the classified 
document as the “most massive leak of secret documents in US history” which had 
“suddenly exposed the sensitive inner processes whereby the Johnson Administration 
had abruptly escalated the nation’s most unpopular – an unsuccessful – war” ("Pentagon 
Papers: The Secret War," 1971). Solan, et al (1992) argue that “after the Pentagon 
Papers was published and the Mai Lai massacre became public, American 
disillusionment with the war was irreversible. The Pentagon Papers … indicated that 
the government had not been frank with the American people about its intentions in 
Vietnam” (p 82).  
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2.4.4 Vietnam – the first ‘living-room’ war 
 
Vietnam was the testing ground for the powerful visual medium – the television. 
Developments in broadcasting technology in the late 1960s made it easier for journalists 
to move around with broadcasting equipment, and transmit to their offices footage for 
broadcast. 
 
TV camera crews were limited in their mobility. They had to carry around more than 30 
pounds of equipment. Technical advances in the late 1960s, in particular the 
introduction of new lightweight equipment, meant television was better able to film on-
the-spot reports. However, the most significant technical development was the 
introduction of satellite stations in 1968. This made it possible to screen film [broadcast 
in the US] the same day it was shot in the field. Prior to 1968 film had to be flown back 
to the west coast for transmitting (Williams, 1993). This resulted in it ending up on the 
network news two or more days after the event. Some of the technological 
developments that facilitated better news coverage, especially for television, included 
lightweight sound cameras, jet air transportation and satellite communication (Hallin, 
1986).  
 
Overall the tone of TV coverage up to 1967 was optimistic and supportive; it appeared 
as “an appendage to the war effort or a channel of official reassurance in the face of 
growing frustration” (Entman and Paletz cited in Williams, 1993, p 311). The Broadcast 
organisations were also conciliatory towards the requests from the Pentagon and the 
White House. Williams notes that self-censorship was at work in newsrooms in the US: 
 
The lack of blood and gore was due in part to self-censorship inside network 
newsrooms. There was a policy not to show graphic pictures of American casualties 
unless the families of those concerned had been notified by the Pentagon. Editors were 
instructed to delete excessively bloody bits and they were obliged to give warnings 
before pieces of film likely to cause offence (Williams, 1993, p 310). 
 
In the 1960s television established itself as the main source of information for the 
American public (Williams, 1993) and by the early 1970s, television was the main 
source of news for the Americans. A Nielson rating shows that 35 million TV sets were 
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tuned to evening news shows each night according to a study of Vietnam War coverage 
in 1969 and 1970 (Russo, 1971).   
 
Vietnam was America’s first true televised war and the evidence most often cited for 
the pre-eminent power of television is a series of surveys conducted by the Roper 
Organisation for the Television Information Service. A 1964 survey showed people got 
most of their news from television (58 percent), newspapers (56 percent), radio (26 
percent), and magazines (8 percent) (Hallin, 1986). Although TV presented a sanitized 
picture of combat (Williams, 1993) in the early 1960s, in 1965, CBS enraged President 
Lyndon B. Johnson by showing American marines setting fire to the thatched huts of 
the village of Cam Ne with Zippo lighters. In 1968, when the generals were claiming a 
major victory in the Tet offensive, broadcast journalist Walter Cronkite after a visit to 
Vietnam concluded that the situation in Vietnam had become a ‘bloody stalemate’ 
(Hallin, 1986). 
 
Due to the nature and novelty of the medium, TV became popular in the US, with a 
large percentage of the people tuning to TV to get news on Vietnam. It was timely and 
relevant for Michael Arlen to coin the term ‘living-room war’ (Arlen cited in Williams, 
1993, p 308). The ‘living-room war’ was made possible by technological advances, and 
reporting was immediate.  
 
According to Carruthers (2000), “Vietnam was the first conflict to receive sustained, 
almost nightly, coverage on the US networks over a period of several years. It was the 
first war to benefit from certain technological advances – the use of satellites especially 
– which made reporting more immediate, and this at a time when American network 
news first assumed a half-hour format” (p 108).  
 
After Vietnam became a ‘living-room-war’ print and broadcast media were made 
scapegoats for the failure of the American intervention. According to Schanberg (Cited 
in Patterson, 1995), “many politicians and senior military men cling tenaciously to the 
myth that the press, through pessimistic reporting, tipped public opinion and cost us the 
war in Vietnam” (p 20). Elegant (Cited in Carruthers, 2000) argues that the US military 
had been undermined by America’s own media, who thwarted victory by ‘graphic and 
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unremitting distortion’ of the facts, pessimism, and exaggeration of both  America’s 
youthful casualties and American ‘atrocities’ inflicted on the Vietnamese.  
 
The US government and military squarely blamed the debacle in Vietnam on the media 
for their ‘out of context’ coverage that harmed the war effort. President Richard Nixon 
accused the US news media of not putting the conflict in context, thus not conveying 
the underlying purpose of US involvement. Writing in his memoirs in 1978, Nixon said 
“the Vietnam War was complicated by factors that had never before occurred in 
America’s conduct of war … The American news media had come to dominate 
domestic opinion about its purpose and conduct” (Nixon cited in Hallin, 1986, p 3).  
 
A Trilateral Commission report published in 1975 noted that in the 1960s and 1970s 
media was a strong force within the oppositional institutions in the US. Its author 
Samuel Huntington said in the report that there was “considerable evidence to suggest 
that the development of television journalism contributed to the undermining of the 
governmental authority” (Huntington et al cited in Hallin, 1986, p 4). 
 
For the opponents of the Vietnam War, according to Williams (1993), “the media were 
decisive not because they misrepresented the war but because they reported war as it 
was. The advent of television and the lack of formal censorship allowed media to 
present a vivid and unfettered picture of the carnage and destruction” (p 305).  
 
James Reston (Cited in Hallin, 1986) of The New York Times, writing on the day Saigon 
fell to the Communist forces, said that “maybe historians will agree that reporters and 
the cameras were decisive in the end. They brought the issue of war to the people, 
before the Congress or the courts, and forced the withdrawal of American power from 
Vietnam” (p 3).  
 
The initial phase of the Vietnam conflict saw jingoism in the media, although with the 
Tet offensive in 1968, coverage in the United States took a different perspective. As 
military causalities began to rise, and the impact the war was having on civilians 
became clear with ‘bloody images’ and news footage, the public opinion tilted against 
the war, and so did the war coverage.  
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2.5 Iraq War I  
 
The Gulf War, or Iraq War I, was a US-led response following Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Three days later, the world was witnessing the beginning of 
the most extensive US military mobilisation since the end of World War II. By October 
more than 200,000 US troops were in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf region (Stork 
& Lesch, 1994). Eventually the US troop strength rose to 500,000 while the non-US 
coalition forces equalled about 160,000, which was 24 percent of all forces (Gulf War 
Facts, 2001). The US-led coalition included Britain, France, Italy and Arab countries 
making a total of 34 countries of which 27 provided troops (Watson, 1993). The UN 
ultimatum – Security Council Resolution 678 of November 29, 1990 – stipulated that if 
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein did not remove his troops from Kuwait by January 15, 
1991 a US-led coalition was authorised to drive them out.  On January 17, the US-led 
coalition launched air attacks, code-named Operation Desert Storm, against Iraqi targets 
and on February 24 ground forces began their attack.  Ten days later Kuwait City was 
declared liberated, and with Allied forces having driven well into Iraq a ceasefire was 
declared (Operation Desert Storm Ten Years After, 2001).  
 
As the US government and military planners went into action in preparation for the 
Operation Desert Storm, White House and Pentagon media coordinators were setting 
guidelines for news media to access and coverage of the developing conflict.  As White 
(1994) notes, even before the air war was launched, reports were made about 
coordinated news briefings, pre-selected pools of reporters gaining access to military 
and government officials, and restricted access for the news media to soldiers at the 
front.  
 
2.5.1 Setting the ground rules for Iraq War I coverage  
 
The US, as the principal coalition partner, was at the outset determined to keep the 
media muzzled, and looked at the Vietnam War and the invasion of Grenada for 
‘lessons’ to manage the media. During the invasion of Grenada in October 1983, in the 
first two days of the operation the US did not allow news media to the island. On the 
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third day, a 15-person press pool, out of approximately 600 reporters at Barbados, was 
allowed on the island (Venable, 2002) and micro-managed the news event. The news 
media relied on the footage provided by the Pentagon which showed a positive spin of 
the Grenada invasion, and without access to the battlefield by independent television the 
world did not see the events that killed 29 and wounded 152 US soldiers (Thrall, 2000).   
 
Due to strong protests and criticism by the media about the news blackout in Grenada, 
retired Army Major General Winant Sidle was selected to head a project to find out how 
best the media and military could co-operate in future military conflicts. Sidle formed 
the Military-Media Relations Panel, also known as the Sidle Panel, which made eight 
recommendations, one of them introducing a standing media pool—the DOD National 
Media Pool (NMP)—and another suggesting voluntary media compliance with ground 
rules versus submission to censorship. According to Venable (2002) “the 
recommendations also pointed out the importance of incorporating public affairs 
considerations in operational planning. Interestingly, the final recommendation 
encouraged both the military and the media to improve their understanding of each 
other” (p 67-68).    
 
What emerged out of the Grenada experience was that, through pools, media can be 
controlled. This was the belief with which media coverage of the Gulf War was 
managed: 
 
The US government and military planning to control the media, many years in the 
making, and various of its techniques tested out in the invasions of Grenada and 
Panama, in skyjackings, and in Republican presidential campaigns were indeed 
impressive. On the ground in Saudi Arabia, layers of military control had been inserted 
between the journalists and the ‘action,’ as well as between journalist and his or her 
newspaper or newscast (Engelhardt, 1994, p 81). 
 
Veteran journalist Malcolm Browne (Cited in Engelhardt, 1994) of The New York Times 
argued that “the pool system, developed by the military, essentially turned the 
journalists into an unpaid employee of the Department of Defense, on whose behalf he 
or she prepare the news of the war for the outer world” (p 81-82). 
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The media was managed through a press pool system, and journalists were at all times 
accompanied by military minders (Public Affairs Officers). Access to soldiers and the 
battlefields was restricted (Taylor, 2003). Boyd-Barrett (2004) notes that in the pool 
system “pool reporters were accompanied at all times by military escorts and warned 
pool members against violating guidelines  … and reviewed press stories before 
transmission back to press corps, if necessary passing them up to the military command 
for approval” (p 30).  
 
The Vietnam War failure was to an extent blamed on the news media for their 
aggressive and often anti-US government and military reporting. This attitude created a 
‘moral panic’ in the US administration ensuring that in the future attempts were made to 
control the news coverage of military conflicts involving the US. In Iraq War I, 
measures were taken well ahead to show a clean and bloodless war. Williams contended 
that the US administration sought to prevent Vietnam-type horrific images reaching the 
global audience: 
 
The Gulf War was a deliberate attempt to wash away the stain of Vietnam. George 
Bush and his military commanders had learned the ‘lesson’ of Vietnam and were 
determined the conduct of the war would be affected by adverse public opinion. By 
careful management and control of the news media the Bush administration sought to 
prevent horrific pictures of death and carnage reaching the American public (Williams, 
1993, p 306). 
 
The Vietnam lesson was that unhindered media access to a conflict would cost a nation 
a war. Hence, the thinking among administration officials during the Gulf War was that 
news coverage should be regulated, as in World War II. According to former Pentagon 
spokesman Pete Williams the government looked back over its shoulder for formulating 
ground rules for covering the Gulf War. 
 
In formulating the ground rules and guidelines for covering Operation Desert Storm, we 
looked at the rules developed in 1942 for World War II, at those handed down by Gen. 
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s chief of staff for the reporters who covered the D-Day 
landings, and at the ground rules established by Gen. Douglas MacArthur for covering 
the Korean War. And we carefully studied the rules drawn up for covering the war in 
Vietnam (Williams cited in Morlan, 1992, p 117). 
 
Although in World War II correspondents were subjected to direct censorship, whereby 
copy had to be cleared by the censors, in Iraq War I it was indirect censorship in the 
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form of limited access and managing pools. Williams (Cited in Morlan, 1992) says that 
of the 1,351 print pool reports that were written, “only five were submitted for our 
review in Washington. Four of them were cleared within a few hours” (p 119).  
 
2.5.2 War as media spectacle 
 
With more than 1,600 correspondents from all over the world in Saudi Arabia (Halliday, 
1999), the carefully crafted public relations messages of the coalition spokesmen 
reached the global audience. The instantaneity of the war coverage meant that global 
public opinion had to be taken into consideration. As Halliday (1999) points out “the 
Gulf conflict was a media event in itself, dominating the TV screens and the press for 
months, and providing, in its final few weeks, a topic for intense coverage” (p 129). Of 
the broadcast media, the Atlanta-based Cable News Network reported live from 
Baghdad as the Allied Forces’ bombing of Baghdad began.  
 
Iraq War I was widely considered the first war fought ‘live’ on television, 
differentiating it from the Vietnam War, which was fought on television but on news 
film rather than live. It was also widely known that the news reporting that brought the 
historic Persian Gulf War into American and other homes ‘live’ was highly managed 
and restricted by the US government (White, 1994). 
 
Also distinct was the direct coverage from Iraq, something not seen before. In the 
period of the air war, and again in the final phase of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, 
CNN was able to carry live reporting of the progress of the war itself, lending 
immediacy, and a pressure for political judgement, unprecedented in international 
conflict (Halliday, 1999). Peter Arnett, who was one of three CNN reporters who 
broadcast continuous coverage of the first air raids, noted that “the Gulf War was the 
first to be live from both sides – a unique moment in communications history” as 
coverage was given simultaneously from  American coalition press briefings and on-
the-scene reports in the Gulf itself and from Baghdad (Peter Arnett: A look back at 
Operation Desert Storm, 2001). 
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Operation Desert Storm “was the most widely and most swiftly reported war in history” 
(Hudson and Stanier cited in Belknap, 2001, p 8) and it was also the most ‘censored’ 
war. As Arnett notes, “the media with the coalition forces felt censored because they 
were not given easy access to the troops on the ground and were not able to go with the 
jet bombers bombing Baghdad” (Peter Arnett: A look back at Operation Desert Storm, 
2001). While most of the journalists who covered the war complained of media 
restrictions and deception by information officers, the view of the US government were 
different. Colonel Barry E. Willey, then a public affairs officer, concluded that “most 
military commanders would have to agree that the media coverage of Desert 
Shield/Desert Storm was balanced and generally favourable where cooperation, 
patience and tolerance were evident” (Willey cited in Belknap, 2001, p 9).  
 
The success of media management in generating favourable coverage of the US in Iraq 
War I was noted by former Pentagon spokesman Pete Williams, who said that “the 
reporting has been largely a recitation of what administration people have said, or an 
extension of it” (Cited in Schechter, 2003, p 127).  
 
2.6 The Kosovo conflict   
 
The Western military intervention in the Balkans, through the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO), “was to halt or disrupt a systematic campaign of ethnic 
cleansing” by Serbs of Croats, ethnic Albanians in the crumbled former Yugoslavia 
(The Crisis in Kosovo, 2000). The extensive media attention to the Balkan crisis was 
partly due to NATO military actions, first by air then ground forces. Operation Allied 
Force was initiated on March 24, 1999, after more than a year of effort by the 
international community led by NATO to find a negotiated solution in Kosovo. Of  the 
thirteen (out of nineteen) NATO nations that made aircraft available for the operation, 
aircrafts from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Spain 
conducted bombing against fixed and pre-selected Serbian targets. Long-range cruise 
missiles were fired by the United States and Britain (The Crisis in Kosovo, 2000). 
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Media attention to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia was not great, but from late 1995, 
when violence perpetuated by Serbs escalated against Albanian Muslims, coverage 
began to increase.  As Kozol (2004) observes, “the moment of most intense interest in 
the region came during the NATO bombings, when the United States was directly 
involved in the conflict through its military presence” (p 7).When military are involved, 
news coverage gains momentum, and this trend can also be attributed to the efforts by 
the governments to manage media. Aggressive media management strategies were 
implemented by the US, while the Serbs also tried to “control coverage in ways that 
would influence international opinion” (Seib, 2002, p 96). 
 
In the early 1999, once the decision had been made by NATO, which has headquarters 
in Brussels, to bomb and subdue the Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic, “a 
meticulously prepared system of propaganda and media control – especially in the 
United States and Britain – swung into action” (Knightley, 2000, p 502). As NATO 
spokesman, Jamie Shea, labelled by some war correspondents as ‘NATO’s 
propagandist-in-chief’ had the main duty of relaying “the pre-digested spin that had 
been chewed over at length by a committee of NATO ruminants” (Knightley, 2000, p 
502). News-starved correspondents were “frustrated by daily official briefings that 
provided little information,” hence they tried to get out to the field to get the ‘real story’. 
The gag order slapped on the media created an opportunity for Slobodan Milosevic to 
tell his side of the story (Belknap, 2001). 
 
The spokesmen from the British and the US governments liaised with NATO colleagues 
in Brussels to present a unified message to the world. The US government also hired 
private public relations firms to “spin and distort news stories” and set up the 
International Public Information Group to “squelch or limit uncomplimentary stories 
regarding the US activities and policies as reported in the foreign press” (Knightley, 
2000, p 504). Information about NATO operations was so much controlled that Alistair 
Horne concluded that “Kosovo … turned out to be the most secret campaign in living 
memory” (Cited in Knightley, 2000, p 504).  
 
The Serb authorities in Belgrade were not oblivious to the fact that it was important to 
control and manage media. Sensing that the Western media might play an adversarial 
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role, when NATO launched air strikes, on March 24, government officials rounded up 
29 Western journalists in Belgrade and expelled them from the country. Although some 
reporters were allowed back later, most reported from Montenegro, Albania, and 
Macedonia, where refugees from Kosovo were heading to flee the fighting (Noack, 
1999). For some reporters the expulsion was in their favour, as they were able to cover 
the Serb atrocities without the restrictions of Serbs.  
 
2.6.1 Excessive control of information flow 
 
Like Iraq War I, the Kosovo conflict was similar in terms of media control and 
information management. According to Pentagon spokesman Ken Bacon, US Secretary 
of Defense William Cohen and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Henry Shelton made the 
decision, “in the early days of the war to take a very conservative approach in releasing 
information. They felt we had gotten too lax in dealing with operational security” 
(Bacon cited in Kitfield, 1999, p 2547). Bacon said:    
 
We’re living in an age of multiple 24-hour news networks, all competing for scoops, 
and that’s led to much less respect in the media for protecting operational information. I 
also don’t think the press understood the absolute necessity we felt in terms of holding 
the alliance together. So this was a new kind of war, and it offered new challenges, and 
I’m not sure either the press or the Pentagon is yet up to that challenge (Bacon cited in 
Kitfield, 1999, p 2547). 
 
The excessive control of the information flow in the Balkans conflict led some analysts 
to believe that the Vietnam Syndrome had kicked in. With the military and the 
government blaming the failure in Vietnam mainly on the adversarial press coverage, 
the Balkan war planners and media managers were, it appears, determined to be more 
conservative in their daily rationing of information. Retired Marine Corps Lt. Gen. 
Bernard E. Trainor, an occasional columnist for The New York Times, said “I think this 
is payback time for what the military still believes the media did to it in Vietnam” 
(Kitfield, 1999, p 2546-2547). 
. 
There’s no question [the military’s] grip on essential information is tightening, and 
increasingly, the military's attitude is, ‘we’ll tell you what you need to know.’ The 
media manipulation finally got so transparent that I didn’t believe anything [NATO 
spokesman] Jamie Shea and [Pentagon spokesman] Ken Bacon had to say. … Because 
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they controlled all the cockpit video, however, we couldn’t prove when they were 
wrong (Trainor cited in Kitfield, 1999, p 2546-2547 ) 
 
When there was military engagement, as in the case of NATO bombing of Serbian 
positions, the military were quick to control news flow. However, during the peace 
keeping operations in Bosnia during 1995, the military and media enjoyed a high degree 
of camaraderie. When the Kosovo air campaign was launched by NATO, Supreme 
Allied Commander General Wesley Clark issued a “gag order” (Belknap, 2001) and 
news management strategies were implemented so that popular support for the 
humanitarian intervention in Kosovo could be maintained (Seib, 2002).  For the Bosnia 
operation, reporters travelled to Bosnia with military units and stayed with them for two 
to three weeks. By embedding about two dozen reporters with troops the military hoped 
that this “arrangement would produce positive stories for the Army, thus, generating 
support from the American people while bolstering soldiers’ morale” (Newman cited in 
Belknap, 2001, p 10). 
 
The military found a reason to justify a gag order, at the early stage of the bombing, 
when informal media-military protocol was violated by The Washington Post. The 
paper published a front-page article identifying two air targets in Belgrade that radar-
evading F-117 stealth fighter-bombers failed to reach when they were shot down 
(Kitfield, 1999). Following The Washington Post case, the Pentagon moved without 
mercy to “clamp down, to an unprecedented degree, on the flow of even the most 
fundamental information about the war”  (Kitfield, 1999, p 2548). Gen. Wesley Clark 
issued a gag order on virtually all of his commanders, and the NATO air bases involved 
in the attacks firmly excluded reporters. 
 
Although The Washington Post case may have been the immediate reason for the gag 
order, NATO communication strategists were more concerned that the “changes in the 
nature of modern warfare as well as in the news business are altering some of the old 
rules and bonds governing interaction between the military and the press” (Kitfield, 
1999, p 2547). The lack of news about NATO military operations led Richard J. 
Newman, defense reporter for US News & World Report to admit how some journalists 
covered the issue: “With no quantitative or qualitative information, a lot of us reporters 
bought the official line that this was the ever-intensifying war” (Kitfield, 1999, p 2549-
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2550). This was what the NATO commanders and respective governments involved in 
the Balkan operations wanted – to provide what NATO had prepared for the media for 
public consumption.  
 
2.7 Iraq War II   
 
The media attention and coverage extended to Iraq War II, which was launched by a 
US-led Coalition on 19 March 2003, was extensive. Even before the war began, Jim 
Wilkinson, the US Central Command’s director of strategic communications, observed 
that “this will be the most covered war in history” (Katovsky & Carlson, 2003, p xi).  
 
According to an International Press Institute report the initial phase of the Iraq War was 
covered by more than 3,000 correspondents who were based in seven countries in the 
Gulf region (Leaper, Löwstedt, & Madhoun, 2003). More than 600 journalists were 
embedded with the US forces, and 150 with the British forces. The major TV channels, 
including the BBC, mobilised 200 staff in the region while CNN also used a similar 
number for war coverage. Staff strength of CBS, NBC and ABC amounted to 500 in 
Kuwait alone. Reuters news agency relied on more than 140 journalists, while 55 
journalists including photographers from British national newspapers were embedded 
with UK forces.  There were a further 120 ‘floating’ journalists in northern Iraq, Kuwait 
and Jordan, while, the elite US newspaper The New York Times sent 30 journalists to 
the region (Leaper et al., 2003). There were 200 to 300 foreign journalists  – from North 
America, Europe, Latin America, Asia and mainly the Middle East – in Baghdad when 
the war started (Kaplow, 2003; Johnson, 2003b). Although there was a large number of 
correspondents and support staff in the Gulf, they belonged to only a few media 
organisations and thus the large number cannot be seen as diversity of coverage. They 
only represented the major media corporations who are in a way wholesalers of news to 
clients around the world. 
 
With an army of more than 3000 journalists posted in the Middle East and the Gulf 
during the invasion phase of the military engagement, the war was indeed the biggest 
ever covered. Until a larger and more devastating military conflict is planned and 
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executed, Iraq War II will lead the records. As Jukes observes (2004), “this was 
arguably the most reported war in history” (p viii). The visual medium turned the war 
into a reality show with almost uninterrupted live coverage from the war zones during 
the first days of the conflict, making Iraq War II the “most heavily televised war in 
history” (Rutenberg & Carter, 2003, B15).  
 
The extensive coverage saturated the US audience with sanitised images of the war, 
disconnecting the public from the real world. Orientation of Iraq War II coverage 
differed greatly among countries, mainly owing to political, ideological and cultural 
factors (Bennett, 2003; Cheterian, 2003; Dimitrova, Lynda Lee Kaid, Williams, & 
Trammell, 2005; Ravi, 2005). While the print media in the Middle East and Europe 
showed the brutality of Iraq War II, the US journalists focussed on the hardships among 
the US troops. As noted by Bennett (2003), it was the same war the journalists were 
reporting but “vastly divergent perspectives emerged in the media’s presentation of 
events in Iraq, especially in countries where both populace and politicians vigorously 
opposed the war” (p 62). A study of elite newspapers in the US, UK, India and Pakistan 
shows that coverage of civilian deaths differed remarkably among them. The 
newspapers from India (The Times of India) and Pakistan (Dawn) “gave more 
prominence to accounts of civilian deaths, which fitted in with the image of a harsh and 
cruel war” (Ravi, 2005, p 59). On the other hand the American (The New York Times) 
and British newspapers (The Times of London and The Guardian) highlighted different 
aspects and viewpoints. According to Ravi, coverage in the US and UK was influenced 
by concern on public sensitivity and values over images of death: 
 
To the American and the British public, inflicting civilian deaths would represent a 
callous disregard for innocents and seem out of character with their own notion of their 
countries and their values, and they were not quite prepared to see images of, or read 
about, such killings. This dissonance with popular sentiment—along with a general 
reluctance, on grounds of taste and sensitivity to reader reaction, to show too many 
images of death and injury (Ravi, 2005, p 59). 
 
A study of Iraq War II coverage in 246 news websites, including websites of 
newspapers, TV and radio stations in 48 countries, showed that countries supporting the 
war were focused on more positive news compared to those who opposed the Operation 
Iraqi freedom. In countries that opposed the war, 33 percent of the coverage was 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW                                                                                            PAGE 76  
 
negative compared to 15 percent in countries that were officially supporting the war 
(Dimitrova et al., 2005). 
 
The direction of Iraq War II coverage differed significantly between the two leading 
newspapers of the US and Sweden, The New York Times and Dagens Nyheter, with the 
latter focusing on negative reporting and anti-war stories, while the elite US newspaper  
“focused more on military, conflict issues, ‘scoreboard’ developments and war 
strategies designed to ensure ‘victory’ in Iraq” (Dimitrova & Strömbäck, 2005, p 412). 
 
Tom Patterson, a professor of government and press at the John F. Kennedy School of 
Government at Harvard University, noted that coverage in the US highlighted US 
military casualties while in Germany and France, who opposed the invasion of Iraq, the 
coverage was more on “the devastation of the bombing, and how Iraqi civilians were 
caught up in it” (Patterson cited in Bennett, 2003, p 62). 
 
The mainstream news media in the US “uniformly banged the drums of the war long 
before the onset of the invasion” of Iraq in 2003, thus framing the conflict in line with 
the US government policy that “war was a necessary response to an immediate threat by 
Iraq, justifiable even without UN sanction”. The alternative frame – that Iraq did not 
pose a significant threat to US, the invasion had no UN approval and the resulting death 
and destruction amounted to war crimes – was not given prominence (Boyd-Barrett, 
2004, p 29). 
 
Research has shown that Iraq War II coverage in the US, by broadcast and print media 
has been sanitised, underplaying the negative and underpinning the ‘war on terror’. 
According to a George Washington University research study that analysed 1,820 
stories on the five main US television networks and Qatar-based Al Jazeera, the US 
media played down visuals of US, Coalition, Iraqi military or civilian casualties 
(Rampton & Stauber, 2006). The coverage in the mainstream print media also appeared 
to be similar, but an investigation by The Los Angles Times, in early 2005, put the 
reason for minimal photo coverage of US dead and wounded down due to access, 
logistics and ethics. A review of six leading US newspapers and the two most popular 
newsmagazines during a six-month period revealed that the publication did not carry 
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any photos from the war zone of Americans killed in action, although in that period 
nearly 560 Americans and Western allies died (Rainey, 2005). According to the 
newspaper “many photographers and editors believe they are delivering Americans an 
incomplete portrait of the” (Rainey, 2005). 
 
2.7.1 Mobilising public opinion 
 
A most comprehensive public relations campaign was launched by the United States 
and Britain in the run up to the war. It was aimed at garnering support on the home 
fronts and from the global community for an invasion of Iraq. Different propaganda 
techniques were used to create hatred of the enemy (Iraq and Saddam Hussein), to form 
a fear of the regime in Baghdad, and to mobilise the public against the impending 
dangers.  In a speech in Cincinnati, Ohio on October 7, 2002, President George W. 
Bush said that “the Iraqi dictator must not be permitted to threaten America and the 
world with horrible poisons and diseases and gases and atomic weapons … Iraq’s 
weapons of mass destruction are controlled by a murderous tyrant who has already used 
chemical weapons to kill thousands of people. …  Some ask how urgent this danger is 
to America and the world. The danger is already significant, and it only grows worse 
with time” (President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat, 2002). The online arm of Cable News 
Network, CNN.com, covered the Bush speech, highlighting the nuclear threat, 
headlining an article posted on October 8, 2002, with ‘Bush: Don’t wait for mushroom 
cloud.’ The Boston Herald’s headline was ‘Bush: Iraq poses nuke threat’ (Miga, 2002, p 
1). Two days later the House of Representatives voted overwhelmingly to give 
President Bush “the authorization he sought to wage war if necessary to disarm Iraq, 
while the Senate was poised to pass the measure as well” (Allen, 2002).  
 
In an attempt to justify the war the US and British governments made claims, through 
the news media, that Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) could be ‘ready 
within 45 minutes of an order to use them’. According to a British dossier dated 
September 2002 “Iraq’s military forces are able to use chemical and biological weapons, 
with command, control and logistical arrangements in place. The Iraqi military are able 
to deploy these weapons within 45 minutes of a decision to do so” (Iraq's Weapons Of 
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Mass Destruction: The Assessment Of The British Government, 2002, p 17). In his foreword to 
the 53-page document British Prime Minister Tony Blair said: 
 
… In light of the debate about Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), I 
wanted to share with the British public the reasons why I believe this issue to be a 
current and serious threat to the UK national interest. 
 
Saddam has used chemical weapons, not only against an enemy state, but against his 
own people. Intelligence reports make clear that he sees the building up of his WMD 
capability, and the belief overseas that he would use these weapons, as vital to his 
strategic interests, and in particular his goal of regional domination. And the document 
discloses that his military planning allows for some of the WMD to be ready within 45 
minutes of an order to use them. I am quite clear that Saddam will go to extreme lengths, 
indeed has already done so, to hide these weapons and avoid giving them up (Iraq's 
Weapons Of Mass Destruction: The Assessment Of The British Government, 2002, p 3-
4). 
 
Although these claims later turned out to be false (Rampton & Stauber, 2003b), the 
Western news media prominently covered them, thus strongly influencing and swaying 
public opinion in favour of the US and British governments. According to the BBC, “of 
the nine main conclusions in the British government document, not one has been shown 
to be conclusively true” (Reynolds, 2003).  
 
2.7.2 Information warfare 
 
In order to demoralise the enemy via psychological information warfare the US 
funnelled stories to the news media which were fed to media consumers around the 
world. At the outset of Iraq War II, for example, the US administration created the 
speculation that Saddam Hussein was dead and the Republican Guard was on the verge 
of surrender. These stories were deliberately leaked by US officials, and many of them 
anonymous. Nick Turner (2003) believes that  “by questioning whether Mr. Hussein 
survived the early attacks targeting him, the US can both sow confusion among Iraqi 
soldiers and attempt to flush Mr. Hussein out of hiding, so US forces can get a second 
shot at him” (p 24). Writing in the New Zealand International Review in July 2003, 
Turner (2003) said that stories such as the speculation on the mass surrender of the 
Republican Guard “fit well into the Pentagon’s war plan, by creating the impression that 
Mr. Hussein’s most loyal troops are on the verge of collapse or surrender. So far, it 
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hasn’t happened” (p 24). 
 
According to The New York Times, intensive planning for the ‘Iraq rollout’ began in 
July 2002. To coordinate the US foreign policy messages and supervise its image 
abroad, the White House created the Office of Global Communication (OGC) on 21 
January 2003, which launched a $200 million ‘PR blitz against Saddam Hussein’ 
(Miller et al., 2004, p 45). The OGC published Apparatus of Lies: Saddam’s 
Disinformation and Propaganda 1990-2003, which along with Secretary of State Collin 
Powell’s  speech  at the United Nations in February 2003, was “designed to be the one-
punch of the administration’s justification for taking out Saddam Hussein’s regime” 
(Snow, 1994, p 58). The report was done in consultation with the National Security 
Council, the Department of State and the Defense Department. 
 
The news media were well-used by officials to communicate carefully constructed 
messages to the public. In fact the Apparatus of Lies implicated that the Bush 
administration deliberately deceived the public about the situation in Iraq in order to 
justify a military invasion of that country. News media in the United States, by 
drumming up the war tempo orchestrated by an administration with a political agenda, 
failed to be fair and objective. Attention to anti-war actions was minimal and hardly 
visible in the mainstream news media. As Harvard media analyst Alex Jones argues 
“the media also fell down in not paying closer attention to strong anti-war sentiment in 
Europe, which eventually came to a head at the United Nations”.  The editor of Editor 
& Publisher laments that “the press woefully underplayed the anti-war movement until 
recently”(Cited in Johnson, 2003c, p D4).  
 
2.7.3 Flaws in war coverage 
 
It was more than a year after the attack on Iraq by US-led coalition forces that the news 
media came to realise that their watchdog roles had not been objectively fulfilled. In 
May 2004, both the BBC and The New York Times admitted mistakes over the Iraq 
coverage (Skapinker, 2004, p 12). The New York Times’ ombudsman admitted that 
“institutional failures … allowed The New York Times’ pre-Iraq war coverage to be 
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manipulated by people bent on pushing the United States into war”, while Public Editor 
Daniel Okrent said “Some of The Times’ coverage in the months leading up to the 
invasion of Iraq was credulous; much of it was inappropriately italicized by lavish 
front-page display and heavy-breathing headlines. … The Times’ flawed journalism 
continued in the weeks after the war began, when writers might have broken free from 
the cloaked government sources who had insinuated themselves and their agendas into 
the pre-war coverage” ("NY Times ombudsman prints withering critique of Iraq 
coverage," 2004). 
 
The elite beltway newspaper, The Washington Post also admitted that it was fallible in 
the coverage of Iraq in the months leading up to the war. The newspaper’s editors 
acknowledged that ‘they underplayed stories questioning President Bush’s claims of the 
threat posed by Saddam Hussein in the months leading up to the US invasion of Iraq’. 
An Associated Press dispatch said: 
 
In the year and a half since Saddam was toppled, US troops have yet to discover any 
weapons of mass destruction. In a study published in March by the Center for 
International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland, researchers wrote, 
‘Many stories stenographically reported the incumbent administration’s perspectives on 
WMD, giving too little critical examination of the way officials framed the events, 
issues, threats and policy options.’ In May, The New York Times criticized its own 
reporting on Iraq, saying it found ‘a number of instances of coverage that was not as 
rigorous as it should have been’ and acknowledging it sometimes ‘fell for 
misinformation’ from exiled Iraqi sources ("Washington Post Admits Pre-Iraq War 
Coverage Flawed," 2004).   
 
 
The Washington Post’s senior journalist Bob Woodward, of Watergate fame, also 
expressed reservation about the lack of insight on the part of US news media, arguing 
that “the news media should have been more sceptical of President Bush’s ‘zeal’ to go 
to war with Iraq and the possibly ‘skimpy’ pre-war intelligence Bush used to justify the 
invasion ("Bob Woodward Critical Of US Media's Pre-Iraq War Coverage," 2004). 
According to some critics the media “played lapdog instead of watch dog in covering 
Bush administration justifications for attacking Iraq” (Burress, 2004, p B5).  
 
The situation across the Atlantic was not so different, with Britain also engaging itself 
on the media management front, creating flak on BBC. According to the BBC’s former 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW                                                                                            PAGE 81  
 
director-general Greg Dyke, Prime Minister Tony Blair’s government “systematically 
bullied the BBC over its Iraq war coverage, bombarding it with complaints to try to 
push its own point of view” (Kelland, 2004). Dyke told leading broadcasters and media 
executives in New York in November 2003: 
 
News organisations should be in the business of balancing their coverage, not banging 
the drum for one side or the other. This is something which seemed to get lost in 
American reporting during the war. … For any news organisation to act as a 
cheerleader for government is to undermine your credibility (Burt, 2003, p 6).  
 
The US broadcast media gave ‘a standing ovation’ of positive coverage during the first 
phase of the Iraq invasion. Before the war began, the media created a myth of a Saddam 
demon, a nuclear catastrophe, and chemical disaster that would result if the ‘Free 
World’ remained indifferent about the ‘bully of Baghdad’. A study by the Washington 
DC-based Center for Media and Public Affairs found that while 34 percent of 
comments on ABC’s World News Tonight were positive about the war, other networks 
fared much better in their positive outlook to the war. There was 53 percent positive 
news on NBC Nightly News, 60 percent on Fox News Channel’s Special Report and 74 
percent on The CBS Evening News (Johnson, 2003a).  
 
The news media, particularly from the US and Britain, failed to be fair and objective, by 
avoiding the human costs of the war. As in the Gulf War of 1991, the invasion of 
Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq War II, the US media were unconcerned about Iraqi and 
Afghan casualties (Snow, 2003). Instead the attention was on the touted ‘precision’ 
bombing, ‘surgical strikes’ which ‘minimised’ civilian casualties. At a press briefing in 
the Pentagon on 21 March 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said:  
 
The weapons that are being used today [against Iraq] have a degree of precision that no 
one ever dreamt of in a prior conflict – they didn’t exist. And it's not a handful of 
weapons; it's the overwhelming majority of the weapons that have that precision. The 
targeting capabilities and the care that goes into targeting to see that the precise targets 
are struck and that other targets are not struck is as impressive as anything anyone could 
see’ (Defense Department Briefing Transcript - Operation/Iraqi Freedom, 2003).  
 
But the precision weapons that would take on the Iraqi leader also killed many civilians 
(Guarino, 2003). The myth created for the media was one thing, and the reality of 
indiscriminate killing another. Video footage of laser-guided bombs and missiles hitting 
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targets was good PR material, and by withholding information about the weapons that 
strayed, often onto civilian population, the Pentagon made sure the clean image of the 
war was visible. As Nelson (2003) notes, “clean, surgical videogame images of the 
conflict could convey a sense that the war will be quick and relatively bloodless. But 
everyone also remembers that images of the Vietnam War, the first to be broadcast into 
homes, stoked powerful antiwar sentiment” (p B1). 
 
2.7.4 Localising war coverage 
 
Not every newspaper that depended on news agencies for coverage of the Iraq War 
carried stories as written by the wires. Some newspapers, using information from 
agencies, alternative sources re-wrote content in the war coverage, thus limiting, but not 
eliminating entirely the information coming from military and government officials and 
other actors in the military conflict. 
 
A comparative analysis of Iraq War II coverage among newspapers in five South Asian 
countries showed that of the 442 items analysed more than 71 percent was produced by 
local sources, while international news agencies and news services, which included 
Reuters, AFP, AP, CNN, BBC, USA Today, The New York Times and The Guardian 
accounted for 28.3 items (Maslog, Lee, & Kim, 2006). More than 83 percent of the 317 
locally produced stories were written by the newspapers’ correspondents. Perhaps this 
may be an indication of the reader’s demand for war discourse that was critical of the 
US and UK, and instead of using the wire copy, journalists developed and re-wrote 
news items to cater for the popular war news consumption habits. The study showed 
that locally produced stories were strongly anti-war (18.6%), moderately anti-war 
(64.7%), neutral (1.6%) and moderately pro-war (1.6%) (Maslog et al., 2006).  
 
2.8 News management and propaganda 
 
The enormity and instantaneity of media coverage of military conflicts in the last 20 
years has forced warring states to change their media management policies, as how a 
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war is covered by the media affects victory or defeat on the military and political fronts. 
For example after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States by al-Qaeda, the 
US media were faced with government pressure. One of the most visible and successful 
news management strategies during Iraq War II was embedding, which allowed 
journalists to be placed within frontline troops. Public diplomacy and information 
warfare campaigns were also conducted to manage the direction and flow of 
information so that ‘hearts and minds’ could be won through manufacture of consent. 
Managing the direction and flow of news in wartime is important as “Information 
affects opinion; opinion affects politics; politics affects policy” (Seib, 2006, p 2). Given 
the instant global reach of news via broadcast, internet and print media, news 
management is vital for perception engineering, garnering support and various 
propaganda objectives. 
 
News management also involves spin and propaganda and aims to generate positive 
coverage and minimise negative reporting.  Jowett and O’Donnell (2006) defined news 
management as “a coordinated strategy to minimize negative information and present in 
a favourable light a story that could be damaging to self-interests” (p 3). According to 
Halliday (1999), “news management, that is control by states of coverage of wars, has 
been an element of media work in such conflicts for more than a century: the Gulf War 
was the occasion to put certain well-tried practices into operation” (p 131). 
 
It was the immediacy of news dissemination, most notably the ‘live’ coverage of 
conflicts and more recently live coverage on network news and 24/7 global news 
networks, that pushed military and governments to manage news. During the American 
Revolutionary War as news dissemination was so slow there was no need for censorship 
“Because of the slowness with which news was transmitted during the Revolutionary 
War, censorship was not much an issue. News travelled too slowly from the front to be 
much threat to military security” (Tuyll, 2002, p 230). During World War II, when live 
radio broadcast of the war began, there was direct control of live coverage of events 
such as the Battle of Britain by Edward Murrow for CBS Radio. Torres notes how the 
British military managed the live broadcasts by placing a censor next to Murrow: “If the 
broadcaster started talking about sensitive military information, the censor tapped him 
and Murrow changed the subject” (Torres, 2002, p 243-44). 
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Through public diplomacy, news briefings, un-attributed leaks, and reporting guidelines 
at the war zone, governments manage media and hence slant information in their favour. 
From the World War I to Iraq War II, for example, the US government has very 
effectively managed the media to achieve military and political objectives of the wars. 
Through propaganda and media management the US government were in a position to 
influence public opinion and attract greater public support on the ‘war on terror’ in the 
aftermath of 9/11. As Kull et al (2003) have noted, “What is worrisome is that it appears 
that the [US] President has the capacity to lead members of the public to assume false 
beliefs in support of his position” (p 596). 
 
Boyd-Barrett, noting the attempts by official sources to manage and manipulate the 
news media in their coverage of conflicts from Grenada to Iraq War II said: 
 
The opening gambits of warfare occur when journalist are most vulnerable to 
manipulation by official sources. In contemporary warfare officialdom seeks to 
monopolize communication flow by limiting journalistic access to sanitized information 
from official sources, by rationing transportation and communications facilities, 
excluding non-approved journalists from military protection and facilities, keeping 
journalists out altogether – as in Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989), corralling select 
numbers into press “pools” – as in Falklands (1982), Grenada (1983), Panama (1989), 
Afghanistan (2001), and Gulf War I (1991-2) or “embedding” them with military units 
– as in Gulf War II (Boyd-Barrett, 2004, p 28). 
 
As expected in a highly managed environment, the world media relied has on official 
press releases, well-orchestrated press conferences and handouts. Censorship has played 
a key role, as has denial of physical access to combat sites (Halliday, 1999).  According 
to White (1994) “many of the stories from Riyadh, and other centers of military 
operation in the Middle East were identified as official government press releases, as 
having been cleared by the censor, or as derived from the official designated press pool 
reporter’s account. With all of this visible management of the media, a result of 
cooperation/ collusion between the news media and the US military, the Persian Gulf 
War was represented in carefully pre-selected and regulated terms” (p 123). During Iraq 
War I, the restrictions on news gathering through news management made “independent 
wartime reporting impossible and thus influence the shape of war news” (Thrall, 2000, 
p 196). 
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Besides the issues of censorship and pools, media scholars have been more concerned 
about the way the mainstream media were tamed by the Bush administration into 
compliance. Kellner (1992) contends that the White House and the Pentagon “managed 
a skilful public relations campaign and the compliant media produced a positive image 
of the US military troops, weapons systems and policy” (p 41). Commenting on the 
news spin and puffery, Kellner states: 
 
Disinformation and dissembling was typical of the US military and has been the 
standard practice since Vietnam. The brilliance of the PR campaign of the Gulf War 
was that military lies, especially those of Schwarzkopf, were believed by (people) 
despite their often palpable contradiction by countervailing information. This was in 
part because people were so caught up in the war that they simply believed everything 
that General Schwarzkopf and the military told them and in part because the compliant 
media never criticised the duplicity and lies (Kellner, 1992, 202).  
 
The censorship policies imposed were very effective in that the horrors of the war were 
conveyed in favour of the coalition. The true pictures of carnage in Kuwait and Iraq 
were not seen by viewers until the conflict was over. The Pentagon has achieved both a 
military and media success, and as Norris contends, military censorship was aimed at 
keeping the civilian death toll down: 
 
The unprecedented Pentagon censorship of the press during the Persian Gulf War not 
only limited what North American viewers learned and saw of the conflict: it altered the 
sense of the ‘reality’ (or ‘unreality’) of the war itself. The military censorship was 
patently aimed both at concealing and at making the extent of the dead – both US and 
Iraqi, and particularly the numbers of dead Iraqi soldiers and civilian casualties – 
unknowable (Norris, 1994, p 285). 
  
Through press conferences and official leaks, the Pentagon created an image in the 
public that with high-tech weapons, the war was clean and surgical and with the 
precision of high-precision laser surgery the malignant Iraqi invaders of Kuwait could 
be removed. According to The Wall Street Journal Pentagon officials at a press briefing 
showed pictures of a high-tech bomb destroying a mobile Scud launcher. But an official 
Air Force review found no evidence that any mobile Scuds were destroyed from the air 
(Murray, 2003, p A 4). 
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Interestingly the American public, who were aware of the media control and the 
sanitized nature of the media content in their newspapers and on TV screens, wanted 
increased military control of the media. A 57 percent majority believed that the military 
should increase its control over reporting of the war while 34 percent believed those 
editorial decisions should be left to the media themselves. Nearly eight in ten 
Americans (78 percent) said they believed the military was not hiding bad news from 
them and was telling as much as it could under the circumstances (The People, The 
Press and The War In The Gulf, January 31, 1991). 
 
There were strong protests from media organisations and civil rights groups about the 
measures taken by the US government to control the flow of information. Some news 
organisations, including the Nation, Village Voice, and Harper’s, even sued the Defense 
Department in the US District Court in New York for “imposing unconstitutional 
restriction during the Gulf conflict” (Norris, 1994, p 297-298). 
 
In the process of news management, governments that wage wars also use propaganda 
and public relations strategies to boost morale at home and demoralise the enemy. 
Propaganda, a term that the United States government for the most part eschews, is 
defined by NATO (Cited in Snow, 1994, p 54) as “any information, ideas, or special 
appeals disseminated to influence the opinion, emotions, attitudes or behaviour of any 
specified group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly”. Even 
during peacetime, propaganda is used to change attitudes of people or even countries. 
With the widespread use of different types of media of communication by people 
around the world to meet their information needs, broadcast, print media and the 
internet have been used directly by various countries to spread propaganda and in some 
cases to counter propaganda ‘attacks’. According to Miller (2004b), since 11 September, 
2001 “the propaganda machine of the US and UK has been cranked up to levels not 
seen outside the 1939-1945 war” (p 1). During war time propaganda and “persuasion 
would likely become to important as the final outcome as tanks, aircraft, ships and 
divisions” (Cole, 1990, p 3). 
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2.8.1 From World War II to the Vietnam War 
 
During World War II, the Office of Facts and Figures and later the Office of War 
Information, headed by a former New York Times journalist, was the main establishment 
in publicising the American war effort at home and abroad while the Office of 
Censorship dealt with “censoring all civilian modes of communication: reading millions 
of letters, checking cables and telegrams, tapping telephone calls, vetting films and 
ensuring that newspapers and radio stations followed the Code of Wartime Practices. 
The stated task of the Office of Censorship was to keep from the enemy information 
that might endanger the Allied cause. Even they (Office of Censorship) pressured on 
film producers in Hollywood to introduce certain themes in films intended for the home 
market” (Knightley, 2000, p 299).  
 
Even in the Vietnam War, where correspondents enjoyed a high degree of freedom, the 
US and South Vietnamese governments were able to manage news through official 
press conferences. Official US and Vietnamese spokesmen often gave misinformation 
to reporters at media briefings (Turner, 2003). The deliberate and overt spin by officials 
at briefings led journalists to label daily military briefings as the ‘Five O’ clock Follies’ 
and correspondents relied on the heavily managed news briefings (Thrall, 2000). 
Writing on news management in Vietnam, Williams said: 
 
News management through the daily briefings or the so-called ‘Five O’clock Follies’, is 
often characterised as cut and thrust affairs between military briefers who failed to 
convey the realities of battle, played up enemy losses and minimised United States set-
backs and probing journalists who fought to report the truth in the face of official 
deception. And most journalists wrote straight news out of the briefings. … News 
management is a product of the process of accommodation that occurs between the 
media and the environment within which they have to operate (Williams, 1993, p 313-
314). 
 
Although the news media were not very critical of the war during the first few years of 
the conflict, the US government and military subtly managed the news, through 
directives such as Cable 1006 and daily military briefings in Saigon. The media and the 
public began to lose confidence in the government and military after their revelations 
that their “reports were either inaccurate or misleading”. A 1965 CBS poll showed that 
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67 percent of the public felt that the statements coming from the government were not 
always truthful (Thrall, 2000, p 19).  
 
Hallin (1986) argued that the “Gulf of Tonkin incident in Vietnam was a classic of Cold 
War news management. Through its public statements, its management of information, 
and its action, the administration was able to define or ‘frame’ the situation in such a 
way that its action appeared beyond the scope of political controversy” (p 19).   
 
In the first days of 1964, a crisis in the Gulf of Tonkin off the coast of North Vietnam 
brought the first direct use of American naval power against North Vietnam. In the first 
week two US destroyers reported attacks. In response one of the destroyers, the Maddox, 
opened fire damaging two patrol boats and sinking a third. The President also ordered 
air strikes against selected North Vietnamese patrol boat bases and oil depot (Logevall, 
2001).  The incidents eventually led to the long-prepared Gulf of Tonkin Resolution 
which authorised the president to “take all necessary steps, including the use of armed 
force, to aid any South East Asian state” (US Department of State Bulletin 51, 1313, 
1964, p 268). The resolution was passed in the Congress – by a vote of 416-0 and in the 
House and 88-2 in the Senate. 
 
US Under Secretary of State, George Ball, described the missions in the Gulf of Tonkin 
as “serving primarily for provocation” (Young & Jesser, 1997, p 83). This provocation 
led to the exchange of heavy arms fire, which the Johnson administration capitalised 
through the media to mobilise public opinion in favour of military action. Young and 
Jesser (1997) argue that the government was able to “manipulate the media into 
accepting the patently manufactured Gulf of Tonkin incident – the incident which was 
used as the pretext for the first round of US military escalation” (p 82). As Hallin notes, 
keeping journalists at bay, the US government was able to control and fashion 
information as it wanted: 
 
In the Gulf of Tonkin incident, control of information was clearly an important factor. 
Journalists had no direct access to any of the details of the incident. They could not talk 
with the crew or see the cables. They also had relatively little information about what 
was happening behind the scenes in the administration itself – no way of knowing, for 
instance, that the text of the joint resolution had been written in the spring, as part of a 
scenario for a step-by-step escalation of the war (Hallin, 1986, p 20). 
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The news media, in the early days of the Vietnam War, relied heavily on public officials 
and the military for information (Williams, 1993). This reliance gave the White House 
and the Pentagon the opportunity to manage news agenda until 1968, when the Tet 
offensive pushed the media, the military, the government and the public into 
loggerheads. Observes Williams:  
 
The dependence of the US news media on the executive branch – as well as the faith 
placed on the authority of the White House – enabled the Johnson administration to 
manage the news agenda on the war up until 1968. Tet saw Johnson lose ability; it 
destroyed credibility as a source of information (Williams, 1993, p 321). 
 
Comprehensive research by Leon Sigal on Vietnam news sources found that the 
government dominated the flow of information. He found that of the 2,850 stories that 
appeared on the front pages of The New York Times and the Washington Post in a 
period between 1949 and 1973, public officials were the sources for 78 percent of them 
and the executive branch dominated the news (Sigal cited in Williams, 1993). Williams 
(1993) concludes that “this reflects the expansion of the news-making capacities of the 
presidency in the post war period. As a source the president is now without rival; 
whatever he says, significant or not, true or not, comprehensible or not, is reported” (p 
316). The Sigal study also showed that “most of the information gathered by reporters 
came through routine channels – that is from the press releases, news conferences, daily 
briefings, and official proceedings.” (Williams, 1993, p 316). 
 
2.8.2 From Kosovo to Iraq  
 
In managing local and global public opinion it is important that governments occupy the 
print space and air time with the type of content they want. During the Yugoslav crisis, 
when NATO began bombing Serb positions, the US and the UK managed to a large 
extent to fill the air time with the kind of messages they wanted.  NATO spokesman 
Jamie Shea, noting that the military alliance “deliberately saturated the airwaves with 
successive briefings” to occupy media space with official information, said:  
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One thing we did well during the Kosovo crisis was to occupy the media space. … We 
created a situation in which nobody in the world who was a regular TV watcher could 
escape the NATO message. It was essential to keep the media permanently occupied 
and supplied with fresh information to report on. That way, they are less inclined to go 
in search of critical stories (Cited in Kitfield, 1999, p 2552) 
  
 
In Iraq War I (the Persian Gulf War) the Bush administration’s war proposal was 
marketed by the news media. As Jeffords & Rabinovitz (1994) point out “media 
participation in the promotion of the Persian Gulf War helped to create an atmosphere 
that discouraged questioning the Bush administration’s claims about Iraq, Saddam 
Hussein, or the value of the war itself” (p 12). The daily televised press conferences and 
briefings during Iraq War I, according to spokesman Lieutenant General Thomas Kelly, 
were “the most significant part of the whole operation [because] for the first time 
ever … the American people were getting their information from the government – not 
from the press” (Sharkey cited in Engelhardt, 1994, p 81). The US and Britain restricted 
war coverage through a pool system, which helped to achieve some of their propaganda 
objectives (Jowett & O'Donnell, 2006).  There were 36 pool slots for between 700-1000 
journalists at the beginning of Desert Storm, and when ground war started there were 
192 pool slots for over 1,400 journalists. Although the slots rotated and there were 
permanent slots for major news organisations, many correspondents, especially those 
from smaller media, were not able to get access to the pools (Thrall, 2000). According 
to Thrall: 
 
The pool system made it impossible for journalists to balance the access/ autonomy 
equation to their satisfaction. A journalist could remain independent, free from escorts 
and security review, simply by reporting the war from the hotel and rejecting the pool. 
To do so, of course, meant that a journalist had zero access to the military, to its high-
tech weaponry, or to the battlefield where the biggest story in the world was taking 
place (Thrall, 2000, p 197).  
 
In Iraq War II, the main venue for news management was the US Central Command’s 
Coalition Media Center in Doha, Qatar, described by General Tommy Franks as ‘a 
platform for truth’. The briefing stage designed by a Hollywood art director provided 
journalists “with more polished spin than genuine news” (Chalmers, 2004, p 105). 
London, Washington and Doha coordinated around the clock on the ‘lines to take’ and 
the message of the day, and there was a daily conference call which usually included 
Pentagon spokeswoman Victoria Clarke, the State Department, the White House, 
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Downing Street and the British Foreign Office (Chalmers, 2004). Attempts by the US 
government and military to manage the flow of news from the fronts in their favour 
were noted by Tumber, who contends that “The battle for information and the contest 
over the winning of public opinion” has become an integral feature of all conflicts: 
 
Attempts by the US government and the military to control and manage news during the 
invasion phase of the 2003 Iraq conflict involved a number of different measures and 
procedures. Using familiar techniques of censorship, misinformation, obfuscation, 
psychological operations to varying degrees, the US was able to frustrate journalists and 
news organizations in their search for information (Tumber & Palmer, 2004, p 190). 
 
CNN’s chief international correspondent, Christiane Amanpour speaking on CNBC in 
September 2003 on Iraq War II coverage, noted that the US government officials 
intimidated journalists and that “the press was muzzled”: 
 
All of the entire body politic in my view, whether it’s the administration, the 
intelligence, the journalists, whoever, did not ask enough questions, for instance, about 
weapons of mass destruction. I mean, it looks like this was disinformation at the highest 
levels  (Cited in Allan & Zelizer, 2004, p 9). 
 
2.8.3 Embedding  
 
The embedding concept conceived by the US government, brought some of the 
journalists from key media organisations under military oversight. On February 3, 2003, 
the Department of Defense issued the guidelines for embedding news media that gave 
“minimal restrictive access” to them during military operations, and set clearly the 
reason why media management and positive war coverage was essential for the US and 
international public opinion:  
 
Media coverage of any future operation will, to a large extent, shape public perception 
of the national security environment now and in the years ahead. This holds true for the 
US public; the public in Allied countries whose opinion can affect the durability of our 
Coalition; and publics in countries where we conduct operations whose perceptions of 
us can affect the cost and duration of our involvement (Department of Defense., 2003). 
 
The embedding tool was aimed to maximise perception engineering so that local and 
global public opinion could be mobilised for the war on Iraq. The embedding concept 
was developed to get maximum positive coverage and as Sydney Schanberg, a former 
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New York Times correspondent noted, “It’s hard for any reporter to be aggressively 
critical of someone you’re bonding with” (Cited in Mitchell, 2003, p 34). 
 
 For the Pentagon, embedding “revolutionized media coverage of war” (Murray, 2003, 
p A 4) because under their supervision the journalists were under their supervision. 
Embedding creates a dilemma for the media people. There are psychological and moral 
factors at play when journalists travel, eat, live and share the same lodging with soldiers. 
Journalists inevitably become part of the ‘team’ of soldiers. As Goldsmith  (2003) 
argues, “embedding of journalists among ground troops, [is] seen as effective in 
boosting support in the conflict’s early days” and “some US embeds have clearly 
bonded with their military cohorts, using the personal pronoun ‘we’ when reporting 
about the troops’ progress, there is often more detachment from non-US embedded 
news organizations” (p A 12). Boyd-Barrett (2004) contends that in Iraq War II, news 
management through embedding was aimed “to stifle dissent, garner unquestioning 
support, and rally around a common symbol” (p 30). 
 
As Livingston et al observe, by giving access through embedding, the military was able 
to impose their elite agenda on the media: 
 
The embed programme gave the news organisations what they wanted: access to the 
war from a relatively manageable environment (surrounded by the might of the most 
powerful military in history). As with Cops and other reality television programming, 
access meant hearing and seeing the drama and action almost entirely from the 
perspective of the institutional actors. The gatekeeping hybrid was formed by elements 
of the economically driven and organisationally driven gatekeeping models (Livingston, 
Bennett, & Robinson, 2005, p 50). 
 
The embedding worked well, in that the military and government sources were able to 
saturate media space through news agencies, major broadcasters and newspapers. A 
content analysis of ABC, CBS, NBC, and CNN news during the invasion and 
occupation period of Iraq War II revealed that “embedded network television news 
stories were more favourable in overall tone towards the military, more favourable in 
depictions of military personnel, and featured greater use of episodic frames which, as a 
result, elicited somewhat more positive relational cues”( Pfau, Haigh, Logsdon, & 
Perrine, 2005, p 468). 
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Correspondents who opted to work independently were also required to get 
accreditation from the US authorities, although they were not under the strict media 
guidelines set for the embeds. But ‘independent’ journalists, also known as ‘unilaterals’ 
were  exposed to greater danger as they were not given protection or escorted by the 
military. According to one estimate, during the early stage of the war there were 2,100 
unilaterals, most of them working for European news media (Katovsky & Carlson, 
2003). 
 
Few of the embedded journalists during Iraq War II suffered from overt censorship by 
the Americans or British. But on one occasion a journalist’s description of British 
soldiers ‘running for cover’ was changed to ‘dashing for cover’ because ‘running’ 
sounded cowardly to the military (Jukes, 2004). 
 
Perhaps it was not the direct censorship, but the self censorship journalists imposed to 
comply with embedding rules that threatened the concept of objectivity and freedom of 
expression, as Katovsky & Carlson note: 
 
In this new era of embedded media, however, a tension existed between freedom of 
expression and following the rules. For embeds, the latter was a slack leash, but it was a 
leash nonetheless, leading critics to question the critical distinction between propaganda 
and journalism. Once embedded, ease of movement was drastically curtailed and 
unfettered mobility denied. The trade-off existed between generous access and narrow-
aperture coverage (Katovsky & Carlson, 2003, p xv-xvi). 
 
The Pentagon and the White House touted embedding as a radical step to provide the 
public with the reality of the conflict, thus ending a “long-time distrust between the 
news media and the military” (Steinberg, 2003). Given the pre-war news management 
by the US to justify the war, it was not surprising that the American people accepted 
embedding as a good strategic move by the Pentagon. A public opinion poll by Pew 
Research Center for the People & the Press in April 2003, shows that Americans favour 
“the practice of having reporters travel with US troops in Iraq and file reports from the 
battlefield” and 80 percent think reports from embedded journalists are fair and 
objective while 58 percent  believed that embedded reporters are a good thing (War 
Coverage Praised, But Public Hungry for Other News, April 9, 2003). 
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However some journalists felt that the embedding process undermined their 
professional integrity. As Anthony Lloyd of The Times of London contends, embeds 
become potential tools for the military to communicate propaganda messages to the 
global audience: 
 
… There are the ‘embedded’ reporters, who work within a military unit. Because they 
are potential propaganda tools, subject to limitations dictated by the military, including 
censorship and very little freedom of movement, it was thought that these individuals 
would be of limited value in reporting the war, being denied access to the real fighting 
and hobbled by army authority. Until the end of the Second World War most war 
correspondents were in a similar situation. It was only the disparate nature of 
postcolonial conflicts that created opportunities for journalists to rove, unaligned, 
between opposing sets of fighters (Lloyd, 2003, p 7).  
 
But, on the part of some US media organisations, the attitude towards embedding was 
conciliatory and complacent. Without many complaints or protests the media entered a 
marriage of convenience with the Pentagon, and as Murray observes “the Pentagon is 
happy because it has most reporters covering this war under its thumb, reporting stories 
that are largely sympathetic to the troops and their cause” and “the media are happy 
because they’ve been let inside the war machine, and are getting great images to send 
back home” (Murray, 2003, A 4). A study by Pfau et al (2004)  showed that compared 
to non-embedded reporting, embedded print coverage of ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ was 
more favourable in overall tone towards the military and in depiction of individual 
troops. 
 
The few journalists who ventured out of the embed perimeter were marched out of the 
war theatre. US journalist Geraldo Rivera was airlifted out of Iraq by a US Army 
helicopter for outlining troop movements and locations in the sand while “about two 
dozen journalists were disembedded, forcibly ordered to leave Iraq by their own means 
or escorted with military assistance” (Katovsky & Carlson, 2003, p xvi).  
 
2.8.4 Saving Pvt. Jessica Lynch 
 
The rescue of Jessica Lynch came at a time when the coalition forces unexpectedly 
faced resistance from Iraqi troops in the South and adverse climatic conditions bogged 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW                                                                                            PAGE 95  
 
down the troop advances (Dwyer, 2003). US Army General John Abizaid said that 22nd  
March was the ‘toughest day of resistance’ so far encountered by US-led forces in four 
days of war against Iraq ("Sunday saw toughest Iraq resistance so far - U.S," 2003), 
while Iraqi soldiers offered “fierce resistance” to the British forces fighting for the port 
of Umm Qasr (Litvinenko, 2003).  
 
In the first week of the war, on March 23, 2003, Iraqi soldiers ambushed the 507th 
Ordnance Maintenance Company which was supporting the advancing 3rd Infantry 
Division. The division took a wrong turn near Nasiriyah. More than eight US soldiers 
were killed and Army supply clerk Jessica Lynch, 19, was taken prisoner by the Iraqis 
and held at the Nasiriyah hospital for medical treatment. Two weeks later, after the US 
forces got a tip-off from an Iraqi working at the hospital, Navy SEALS and Army 
Rangers rescued  Lynch and also retrieved 11 bodies (LeDuc, 2003). 
 
Iraqi TV broadcast footage of captured US soldiers to the world, thus sending a 
message that the Coalition forces were in trouble. To avert the negative publicity the US 
and Coalition were waiting for an image that could be turned to a good and emotionally 
involving human interest piece. The successful rescue of Jessica Lynch was, in public 
relations terms, an opportunity that could be used to the full extent, both for boosting 
the morale of the troops in the war theatre and the public at the home front. US 
government officials ‘leaked’ information about the rescue mission stating that Jessica 
Lynch was “fighting to the death” and that “she did not want to be taken alive” 
(Schmidt & Loeb, 2003, p A 1). Lynch’s rescue footage, which was filmed with night-
vision cameras by a Hollywood director (Pilger, 2003), was broadcast by the global 
media, projecting a positive image of the US military.  
 
Government and military officials turned the story into a propaganda tool in favour of 
the US. The news media, quoting unnamed sources, played up the story creating a myth 
of a hero out of the Jessica Lynch incident. According to Reuters correspondent John 
Chalmers, who was based in Doha, Jessica Lynch was turned into a patriotic symbol, 
thus increasing support for the war: 
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Captured on black and green night-vision film, the Special Forces operation was billed 
as a daring and heroic act, and it turned 20-year-old Pfc. Jessica Lynch of West Virginia, 
into an instant symbol of patriotic pride. … Journalists were awakened in their Doha 
hotel beds that night and urged to get down to As Sayliya for some big news. Many of 
us were convinced that Saddam must have been captured. … The reality TV worked. 
Four days later a Los Angeles Times opinion poll, which had been conducted while 
news of the rescue filled the airwaves, showed an upsurge of support among Americans 
for the war and a steep rise in President Bush’s approval rating (Chalmers, 2004, p 112). 
 
Washington Post front-paged, ‘She Was Fighting to the Death’ on 3 April. The 1,104-
word story by its embedded reporters Susan Schmidt and Vernon Loeb said, quoting 
officials, that Jessica Lynch “fought fiercely and shot several enemy soldiers after Iraqi 
forces ambushed the Army’s 507th Ordnance Maintenance Company, firing her weapon 
until she ran out of ammunition” (Schmidt & Loeb, 2003, p A 1). Jim Wilkinson, a 
Central Command spokesman in Qatar, said in an interview with CNN that “America is 
a nation that does not leave its heroes behind”, which many news organisations used as 
their story lead in covering the rescue of Jessica Lynch ("Female PoW rescued by U.S. 
special forces," 2003). Footage of the rescue was aired repeatedly on television 
networks around the world, reporting how a Special Forces team bravely fought into 
and out of the hospital.  
 
The rescue story was a PR victory for the US, as it projected that the US Special Forces 
could operate successfully inside Iraq; that America would never leave its soldiers 
behind enemy lines; that women are also contributing to achieve the US military 
objectives and that they will fight till they run out of ammunition. 
 
The dramatic story later turned out to be a dramatised story. A 15-page military report 
in July 2003 dismissed that Lynch “fought fiercely as her supply convoy was 
ambushed”. It also said she survived “principally because of the medical attention she 
received from the Iraqis” (Rennie, 2003). A BBC documentary on the ‘daring’ rescue 
said that the Lynch rescue was “a script made for Hollywood, made by the Pentagons” 
(Chalmers, 2004, p 113). The Washington Post, which gave extensive coverage to the 
rescue of Lynch, admitted on 23rd May that its coverage had erred. In an editorial, the 
newspaper said: 
 
Pfc. Jessica Lynch’s capture and rescue was certainly a dramatic affair – particularly in 
The [Washington] Post. This newspaper told its readers that she had been shot and 
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stabbed, that she had fought off her Iraqi attackers – her gun blazing – until she went 
down and was taken prisoner, hospitalized and then rescued eight days later. Trouble is, 
much of that may be false. … Lynch apparently was not shot. Lynch was not stabbed. 
Lynch may not have put up much of a fight, maybe none at all (Cohen, 2003, p A 25).  
 
A New York Times correspondent who visited the hospital in Nasiriyah in June 2003, 
said in a report he filed from there:  
 
… the first accounts of the rescue were embellished, like the imminent threat from 
W.M.D., and like wartime pronouncements about an uprising in Basra and imminent 
defections of generals. There’s a pattern: we were misled. …  As a citizen, I deeply 
resent my government trying to spin me like a Ping-Pong ball.  
 
… My guess is that ‘Saving Private Lynch’ was a complex tale vastly oversimplified by 
officials, partly because of genuine ambiguities and partly because they wanted a good 
story to build political support for the war – a repetition of the exaggerations over 
W.M.D. We weren’t quite lied to, but facts were subordinated to politics, and truth was 
treated as an endlessly stretchable fabric. The Iraqis misused our prisoners for their 
propaganda purposes, and it hurts to find out that some American officials were 
misusing Private Lynch the same way (Kristof, 2003, p 23). 
 
Lynch also admitted in her authorised biography, in November 2003, contrary to early 
Pentagon reports which suggested that she heroically resisted capture, that she never 
fired a shot, because her M-16 jammed and she did not kill anyone (Colford & 
Siemaszki, 2003). She also accused the Bush administration of “manipulating her story 
for propaganda” ("America's reluctant hero exposes the Pentagon's spin," 2003). The 
Lynch case illustrates how real-life events from the war zones were manipulated to 
create the images the Pentagon or the White House wanted to convey to the American 
people and the world. The case also demonstrates the vulnerability of the news media, 
as they are easily used as a vehicle to convey messages by the authorities. And given 
the media routines and news production structures, embedded journalists choose to 
churn out information from primary definers into publishable copy.  As had been the 
case in the New Zealand press, the rescue of Lynch was utilised by the US to create 
positive spin for the war to oust Saddam Hussein. 
 
Compton argues that “spectacular narrative forms” such as “Shock and Awe,” and the 
“Saving of Pvt. Jessica Lynch,” were “fully integrated into military and corporate public 
relations campaigns along with the daily production regimes of 24-hour cable news 
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channels” (Compton, 2004). Indeed as a BBC documentary declares, the Lynch strategy 
was “one of the most stunning pieces of news management ever conceived.” 
 
Noting that the Jessica Lynch story originated from official sources, British 
Broadcasting Corporation’s John Simpson remarked that “it was all the invention of the 
US Army spinners, and a credulous press desperate for some genuine heroics in a war 
which seemed disturbingly short of gallantry” (Cited in Allan & Zelizer, 2004, p 8).  
 
2.8.5 Propaganda and public relations 
 
The way US officials managed the Lynch story shows that the event was used to a great 
extent to shape the public perception of the conflict and to garner political support for 
the war (Kristof, 2003). Thus the story was used for propaganda purposes to strengthen 
the US and Coalition war policies. 
 
The systematic use of propaganda techniques is nothing new. Both covert and overt 
propaganda campaigns have been carried out by countries in war and peace, but always 
more extensively at times of military conflicts. Propaganda has been  defined by Jowett 
and O’Donnell (2006) as  “the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, 
manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the 
desired intent of the propagandist” (p 7).  
 
A more classical definition was given by Lasswell (1927), who argued that  
“propaganda refers solely to the control of opinions by significant symbols, or, to speak 
more concretely and less accurately, by stories, rumours, reports, pictures and other 
forms of social communication. Propaganda is concerned with the management of 
opinions and attitudes by the direct manipulation of social suggestion rather than by 
altering other conditions in the environment or in the organism” (p 9). He noted that the 
use of propaganda becomes important during war time and to rally the nation behind the 
war the minds of the people had to be controlled: 
 
During war much reliance must be placed on propaganda to promote economy of food, 
textiles, fuel, and other commodities, and to stimulate recruiting, employment in war 
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industries, service in relief work, and the purchase of bonds. But by far the most potent 
role of propaganda is to mobilize the animosity of the community against the enemy, to 
maintain friendly relations with neutrals and allies, to arouse neutrals against the enemy, 
and to break up the solid wall of enemy antagonism. 
 
International war propaganda rose to such amazing dimensions in the last war (World 
War I), because the communization of warfare necessitated the mobilization of the 
civilian mind. No government could hope to win without a united nation behind it, and 
no government could have a united nation behind it unless it controlled the minds of its 
people. The civilians had to be depended upon to supply recruits for the front and for 
the war industries. The sacrifices of war had to be borne without complaints that spread 
dissension at home and discouragement in the trenches (Lasswell, 1927, p 9-10). 
 
 
Lasswell (1927, p 195) identified four major objectives of propaganda: 
 
1. To mobilize hatred against the enemy 
2. To preserve the friendship of allies 
3. To preserve the friendship and, if possible, to procure the co-operation of 
neutrals 
4. To demoralise the enemy 
 
When the US, then following a strictly isolationist policy, entered World War I in 1917, 
the government resorted to propaganda to change public opinion. After hiring journalist 
George Creel, President Woodrow Wilson “wanted to generate support from the 
isolationist camp to intervene in the war in Europe”. The Committee on Public 
Information (later known as the Creel Commission) was tasked to do propaganda work 
to spread anti-German sentiment (Covert Propaganda, War, Journalists, Etc., 2005). 
The CPI had two sections – the Foreign Section which handled propaganda matters 
overseas, and the Domestic Section which worked on mobilising public opinion in the 
United States (Solan et al cited in Miller, 1995, p 18). The Creel Commission was also 
the chief government censor in World War I and “it originated news favourable to the 
war effort and blacked out that which was not” (Knightley, 2000, p 299).  
 
According to Chomsky, the Creel Commission was successful in creating a hysterical 
Red Scare and changing the public opinion of the war: 
 
The Creel Commission succeeded within six months, in turning a pacifist population 
into a hysterical, war-mongering population which wanted to destroy everything 
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German, tear the Germans limb from limb, go to war and save the world. That was a 
major achievement, and it led to a further achievement. Right at that time and after the 
war the same techniques were used to whip up a hysterical Red Scare, as it was called, 
which succeeded pretty much in destroying unions and eliminating such dangerous 
problems as freedom of the press and freedom of political thought. There was very 
strong support from the media, from the business establishment, which in fact organized, 
pushed much of this work, and it was in general a great success (Chomsky, 1991). 
 
The same technique of propaganda was used in justifying the US involvement in 
Vietnam, Iraq, and the Balkans. Every military action was preceded by extensive 
propaganda or public relations. The public’s inhibitions against military interventions 
were removed through opinion engineering. As Chomsky observes, “it is also necessary 
to whip up the population in support of foreign adventures. Usually the population is 
pacifist, just like they were during World War I. The public sees no reason to get 
involved in foreign adventures, killing, and torture. So you have to whip them up. And 
to whip them up you have to frighten them” (Chomsky, 1991). The whip the US and 
British governments used comprised propaganda arms such as the BBG (Broadcasting 
Board of Governors) and the mainstream media. 
 
Since 11 September 2001 both the US and UK governments have comprehensively 
overhauled their internal and external propaganda apparatus. These have been globally 
co-ordinated as never before to justify the ‘war on terror’, including attacks on 
Afghanistan and Iraq (Miller, 2004a). 
 
Another propaganda technique or device was the use of psychological operations 
(psyops), which, according to NATO’s (Cited in Snow, 1994, p 54) definition are 
“planned psychological activities in peace and war directed at enemy, friendly and 
neutral audiences in order to influence attitudes and behaviour affecting the 
achievement of political and military objectives”. News is one of the vital elements in 
psychological warfare (Mathews, 1957). 
  
Examples of psyops include US military aircraft Commando Solo dropping leaflets over 
Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Middle East Radio Project that included Radio Sawa 
broadcasting to the Middle East and Radio Farda targeting Iran  (Snow, 1994). These 
two radio stations were part of the much larger broadcasting entity of the US 
government – the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), which on October 1, 1999 
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became the independent, autonomous entity responsible for all US government and 
government sponsored, non-military, international broadcasting.  As part of a psyops in 
Iraq War II, coalition aircraft dropped 439,000 ‘capitulation leaflets’ on Iraqi troops at 
more than 10 locations in southern Iraq, detailing instructions on what they should do to 
avoid attack (Mannion, 2003). 
 
According to the BBG website, the BBG is “a Federal entity encompassing all US 
international broadcasting services”,  and “the day-to-day broadcasting activities are 
carried out by the individual BBG international broadcasters: the Voice of America 
(VOA), Alhurra, Radio Sawa, Radio Farda, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), 
Radio Free Asia (RFA), and Radio and TV Martí, with the assistance of the 
International Broadcasting Bureau” (BBG, 2005).  
 
The BBG claims that it has “advanced the cause of freedom and democracy by 
broadcasting uncensored, accurate and objective news and information to millions of 
people around the world in their own languages” and in this process of public 
diplomacy has “expanded audiences in key target areas, including the Middle East, 
Central and Southeast Asia, Iraq, Iran, North Korea and Cuba, as well as in major 
markets such as China, Russia and Africa  …  The Voice of America (VOA), Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free Asia (RFA), Radio/TV Martí, Radio 
Sawa and Radio Farda were at the center of the world’s news events—from the war in 
Iraq and the capture of Saddam Hussein to the SARS epidemic in China and the 
Columbia Space Shuttle disaster” (BBG, 2003). 
 
The BBG also established the Middle East Television Network, which on 14 February 
2004 launched Alhurra, “a full-service satellite television channel with newscasts, 
current affairs talk shows, news updates and other information programming” (BBG, 
2003). The Virginia-based channel is geared to counter anti-American media content in 
the region, improve America’s image and win the Arab hearts and minds. The reception 
to Alhurra has been poor in the target audience, with some saying that “the station could 
not improve America’s image until Washington changed its policies – which Arabs 
regard as biased toward Israel” (Karam, 2004). As a propaganda tool of the US 
government Alhurra’s selective broadcast to the Middle East was biased against the 
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Arabs. When most of the main Arab TV channels were covering Israel’s assassination 
of Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, Alhurra broadcast a cooking show, 
and when violence erupted in Fallujah, Iraq, the channel neglected to cover the conflict, 
instead showing a documentary on monkeys (Al-Arian, 2004). 
 
By way of marketing the ‘positive image’ of America abroad and winning the hearts 
and minds of the young people, the US government in July 2003 launched Hi, an 
Arabic-language glossy news magazine to be sold in the Middle East.  Published by the 
State Department, the monthly magazine – targeting young people with a mix of 
features, celebrity profiles and music – was available for the equivalent of about US$2  
in Lebanon, Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza, Israel, Algeria, Egypt, Cyprus and several 
Gulf states. While it had an annual budget of $4.2 million the magazine was just part of 
a broader media attack on the Middle East (Buncomb, 2003).  
 
During Iraq War I, the propaganda and public relations arms of the US government and 
military fully exploited the Lasswellian view of propaganda as being to “mobilise the 
hatred of the people against the enemy; represent the opposing nation as a menacing, 
murderous aggressor; represent the enemy as an obstacle to the realisation of the 
cherished ideals and dreams of the nation as a whole, and of each constituent unit” 
(Lasswell, 1927, p 195). In the public opinion engineering process, even institutions 
such as the Congress were duped and manipulated, a good example of which was the 
exaggeration of Iraqi atrocities in Kuwait in September 1990.  
 
In October 1990, testimony before the US House of Representatives Human Rights 
Caucus told of Iraqi atrocities, particularly how Iraqi soldiers had removed babies from 
incubators in a Kuwaiti hospital and taken the incubators back to Iraq, leaving infants to 
die on the hospital floor. California Democrat Tom Lantos and Illinois Republican John 
Porter introduced a 15-year-old Kuwaiti girl named Nayirah, who described a horrifying 
scene in Kuwait City. “I volunteered at the al-Addan hospital. …  While I was there I 
saw the Iraqi soldiers come into the hospital with guns and go into the room where 
babies were in incubators. They took the babies out of the incubators, took the 
incubators, and left the babies on the cold floor to die.” Seven pro-war senators brought 
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up the baby-incubator allegations to argue for an invasion of Iraq, leading to a narrow 
five-vote win (Chatterjee, 2004).  
 
The story about the alleged Iraqi atrocities was disseminated by the mainstream media 
and circulated quickly around the country. It became a justification cited by many 
people for going to war against Iraq. The story was eventually revealed as a well-
orchestrated propaganda campaign engineered by the public relations firm of Hill and 
Knowlton, then the world’s largest PR firm (Jeffords & Rabinovitz, 1994). The 15-year-
old Kuwaiti girl, who was coached by Hill & Knowlton’s vice president Lauri Fitz-
Pgado, was a member of the Kuwait Royal Family. Her father was Saud Nasir al-Sabah, 
Kuwait’s ambassador to the US. Hill & Knowlton produced dozens of video news 
releases (VNRs) at a cost of well over half a million dollars and world “TV stations and 
networks simply fed the carefully-crafted propaganda to unwitting viewers, who 
assumed they were watching ‘real’ journalism” (Stauber & Rampton, 1995). 
 
The incubators were found in Kuwaiti hospitals after the war and medical personnel 
there denied that the Iraqis had killed the premature babies as claimed by the Hill & 
Knowlton-coached ‘eyewitness’. Kellner illustrates this incident as a classic case of 
propaganda: 
 
This baby atrocity story was, therefore, a classic propaganda campaign to manufacture 
consent for the Bush administration policies. It was part of an elaborate web of 
deception, disinformation, and Big Lies to sell the war to the public. It revealed the US 
president and vice-president and the top US military leaders to be propagandists who 
did not hesitate to repeat Big Lies over and over in order to win support for the war 
effort. The media which repeated these lies without scepticism or inquiry also revealed 
itself to be a naïve instrument of US propaganda (Kellner, 1992, p 71). 
 
Although journalists eventually revealed that the incubator incident was propaganda, 
their articles did not appear until long after the war was over (Jeffords & Rabinovitz, 
1994). Carl Nolte, who covered the Persian Gulf War for the San Francisco Chronicle, 
commented: “The Pentagon in my opinion played the news organisations, particularly 
television and to a lesser extent newspapers, like a violin” (Nolte cited in Engelhardt, 
1994, p 93-94). 
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There were other cases of outright lies and deception by the US military, the 
government, and the PR and propaganda firms entrusted to manufacture consent to 
promote and justify the war. The myth of the precision Patriot missile was exaggerated, 
with footage of the missile hitting targets in the air. Claims about Patriot anti-missiles, 
footage of which was shown allegedly shooting down incoming Scud missiles over 
Saudi Arabia or Israel, were exaggerated; of the 86 Scuds fired in the war, only 10 were 
destroyed by Patriots (Halliday, 1999). In Iraq War I, false information was deliberately 
injected into the news cycle, as noted by Halliday: 
 
A different form of distortion, again one common to all modern war, was that of 
disinformation, or the provision of information known at the time to be false. On their 
side, the Iraqis were not slow to put out their own side of the case, beginning with the 
claim, made immediately after the invasion of 2 August, their forces had been ‘invited’ 
into Kuwait by a friendly, popular uprising (Halliday, 1999, p 134). 
 
When Iraqi soldiers withdrew from Kuwait they set fire to many oil wells, causing an 
environmental catastrophe in the Gulf. But Western bombing of oil storage tankers in 
the Gulf also caused an ecological disaster, the news of which was deliberately 
minimised while the Iraqi actions were extensively covered (Kellner cited in Halliday, 
1999). The deliberate disinformation on military matters was also evident in the way in 
which, prior to the launching of ground war, TV crews were allowed to film 
preparations for seaborne landings along the Kuwait coast (Halliday, 1999). Such 
landings were not to be part of the land assault on Kuwait, but suggestion that they were 
formed part of an attempt to deceive the Iraqis about where the main brunt of the final 
attack was to come.  
 
The Freedom Promotion Act 2002 in the US instructs the secretary of state “to make 
public diplomacy an integral component in the planning and execution of foreign 
policy” (Rampton & Stauber, 2003b, p 10). Given this legitimacy the US government in 
recent times has embarked on more aggressive PR campaigns, as a means of ‘public 
diplomacy.’ A Washington DC-based PR firm, the Rendon Group, was hired by the 
Pentagon to “win over the hearts and minds of Arabs and Muslims worldwide” (Miller 
et al., 2004, p 42). The firm, which has a successful track record of running overseas 
propaganda opera rations, claims in its website that it has worked in 80 countries ‘and 
has more than 20 years’ experience assisting governments, organizations and 
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corporations in the development of overall communications and public relations policies 
utilizing state of the art technological tools as well as traditional public relations tools” 
(The Rendon Group Website, 2001). 
 
During the 1990s, the CIA hired the Rendon Group, whose motto is ‘information as an 
element of power,’ to wage a PR war against Saddam Hussein, spending a reported $23 
million. According to Meyers, “some of the disinformation efforts, such as fake radio 
newscasts making fun of Hussein and beamed into Iraq, were produced in Boston. John 
Rendon helped create and promote the Iraqi National Congress, the exile group headed 
by Ahmed Chalabi, a one-time Bush administration darling who now faces criminal 
charges in Iraq” (Meyers, 2004, p 2). In 1991, a few months after the end of Operation 
Desert Storm, then-president George H.W. Bush signed a presidential directive ordering 
a CIA covert operation to unseat Saddam Hussein, for which the CIA turned to Rendon 
to do the PR work (Rampton & Stauber, 2003a). The Rendon Group also got a 
multimillion dollar contract from the Kuwaiti government for a PR campaign against 
Iraq’s 1990 invasion and to mobilise public support for Operation Desert Storm (Miller 
et al., 2004). 
 
In preparation for Iraq War II, public diplomacy was given an additional boost with 
huge funding by the White House. In 2002 the White House created an Office of Global 
Communications (OGC) to coordinate the administration’s foreign policy message and 
supervise America’s image abroad. In September The Times of London reported that the 
OGC would spend US$200 million on a “PR blitz against Saddam Hussain” aimed “at 
American and foreign audiences, particularly in Arab nations sceptical of US policy in 
the region” (Miller et al., 2004, p 45). 
 
In Iraq War II, disinformation was spread through the media to achieve military and 
political objectives. According to an analysis by The Daily Mirror, in the first week of 
the 20 March 2003 attack there were 13 separate cases of deception, including the 
alleged firing of Scud missiles, the ‘discovery’ of a chemical warfare factory, the 
liberation of Umm Qasr, the uprising in Basra and others (Smith cited in Miller, 2004b).  
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In Iraq War II coverage, in the rush to break the story first, some rolling networks 
sidestepped from the professional norms of verification and objectivity and thus 
sacrificed accuracy. According to Allan and Zelizer (2004) notable examples of such 
stories that were not grounded on facts but rather on claims include the alleged 
discovery of WMD; claims that Iraq planned to dispatch drones with biological agents 
in the US; claims that the Republican Guard was planning to use chemical weapons in 
the defence of Baghdad; the fall of Umm Qasr; the discovery of biological weapons and 
weapons-grade plutonium and the defection of Iraq’s Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. All 
these claims were later proven to be false. 
 
The US military played down the human cost of the war to Iraq by deliberately keeping 
the enemy death toll low. During Iraq War I, General Norman Schwarzkopf, the 
American field commander, informed the Congress that at least 100,000 Iraqi soldiers 
had been killed but gave no estimate of civilian deaths. But a study by the Medical 
Education Trust in London found out nearly a year later that up to a quarter of a million 
men, women and children were killed or died in the aftermath of the American-led 
attack (Pilger, 2004). The deliberate attempt by the US to minimise civilian deaths in 
Iraq led veteran war correspondent John Pilger (2004) to conclude that “the Gulf War 
[of 1991] was the most ‘covered’ war in history; it was also the most covered-up. With 
honourable exceptions, the massacre of so many human beings was not considered 
news” (p 19).  
 
Propagandists strongly believe that manipulated messages are no less integral to 
subduing the enemy than military hardware. According to Lasswell (1927) “it is 
possible to employ propaganda as a weapon of direct attack against the morale of the 
enemy by seeking to break up or divert the hatred of the enemy from belligerent” (p 
161). He said: 
 
In World War I, Americans spent most of their energy advertising America’s strength. 
Little leaflets with a row of soldiers, whose size varied with the monthly increase in the 
number of American soldiers, were distributed over the German lines. The card said 
that more than one million Americans are now in France and more than 10 times as 
many stands ready in America. The extent of German casualties and tonnage losses 
were also emphasised (Lasswell, 1927, p 165).  
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Similar methods were used by the Allied coalition in Iraq War II. In the run up to the 
conflict, information about military strength and the technology was publicised.  
 
Even embedded reporters were intimidated by soldiers when they tried to cover stories 
that may have shown US troops in a negative light. As Rozen (2004 ) observes, “when 
US Central Command has good news to report in Iraq, as it did after troops from the 
Fourth Infantry Division captured Saddam Hussein on December 13, it adores the 
media. But formalists say that when there’s bad news — a helicopter crash, a mortar, 
attack they are increasingly being blocked from covering the story by US soldiers, who 
frequently confiscate and destroy their film disks and videotapes” (p A4). 
 
2.8.6 A propaganda model 
 
Within war journalism discourse, where the key three players are the military, 
government and the media, the propaganda model framework can be used to study 
source-media relations and the news product that is filtered out to media consumers. 
Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model thesis was built on the premise that the 
powerful institutions such as the government, military, and the corporate sector “are 
able to filter out the news fit to print, marginalise dissent, and allow the government and 
dominant private interests to get their messages across to the public” (Herman & 
Chomsky, 1988, p 2).  The set of five news filters that make up the propaganda model 
are: 
 
1. The size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth, and profit orientation of 
the dominant mass-media firms 
2. Advertising as the primary income source of the mass media  
3. Reliance of the media on information provided by government, business, 
and ‘experts’ funded and approved by these primary sources and agents 
of power 
4. ‘Flak’ as a means of disciplining the media  
5. ‘Anticommunism’ as a national religion and control mechanism (Herman 
& Chomsky, 1988, p 2) 
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These filters enter the news gathering and processing stages, and exert varying levels of 
influence in the US and Western news media institutions. The raw news resources are 
filtered through “leaving only the cleansed residue fit to print” (Herman & Chomsky, 
1988, p 2). However, the degree of influence and the mesh size of the filters varies 
depending on the news events. The third and fourth and fifth filters are important within 
the larger US foreign policy dimension, as government and military become the primary 
news sources. When some media outlets have generated content that has undermined 
US foreign policy and national interest, quite often direct and indirect methods of 
‘disciplining the media’ have been employed. The vacuum created by the demise of 
communism has been filled by an equivalent ‘Red’ scare in the form of Islamic terror. 
Especially after 9/11, Islam and Muslims are seen as perilous to the US and Western 
democracies.  
 
The recent US foreign policy drives against Afghanistan and Iraq, supported by military 
actions, can be seen as equivalent to anticommunist actions taken by the West during 
the cold war in Korea and Vietnam. The threat of communism has been replaced by 
‘extreme Islam’, ‘jihadists’ and ‘Al Qaida cells’ both active and sleeping. These are 
largely cultural constructs that have been used to justify offensive actions, both military 
and political by the US and Western allies.  
 
With the end of the bi-polar world after the break up of the Soviet Union in 1984, the 
fifth filter can be replaced with larger ideological and cultural conflicts (Huntington, 
1996) such as the threat of terrorism from Muslim extremists and Islam’s alleged 
dominance (Wagner, 2004; Tibi, 2002). In post 9/11 media-military-government 
relations the ‘war on terror’ can be equated with the fifth filter and, given the fear 
generated by the September 11 attacks, Al Qaeda and other extremist groups have 
become symbols of militant Islam. According to Israeli (2003) “a new type of terrorism 
has emerged over the past two decades, triggered and nurtured by a certain 
interpretation of the creed of Islam, usually dubbed ‘fundamentalist’, which has lent 
new twists to the entire idea of terrorism” (p 4). 
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The tripartite relations between media, military and government during military 
conflicts create a web of interrelatedness and connections, and as articulated by Herman 
and Chomsky (1988) “the mass media are drawn into a symbiotic relationship with 
powerful sources of information by economic necessity and reciprocity of interest” (p 
18).  Furthermore, the corporate sector and other influential institutions generate ‘raw 
material for news’, which media practitioners use to fill the daily newshole. In the US, 
the White House, Pentagon and State Department are key news beats, and by extension 
during Iraq War II, the Coalition Media Centre in Qatar, as well as Downing Street was 
part of the news beats.  
 
Flak, which is the fourth filter in the propaganda model, has not gone out of fashion. 
Governments, military and the power elite have used flak to counter and challenge 
media content that may undermine their interests. According to Herman and Chomsky 
(1988) flak is “negative responses to a media statement or program” which may come 
from “letters, telegrams, phone calls, petitions, lawsuits, speeches and bills before 
Congress, and other modes of complaint, threat, and punitive action” (p 26). Illustrating 
how flak is constructed to undermine and subjugate the media, Herman and Chomsky 
write: 
 
If flak is produced on a large scale, or by individuals or groups with substantial 
resources, it can be both uncomfortable and costly to the media. Positions have to be 
defended within the organization and without, sometimes before legislatures and 
possibly even in courts. Advertisers may withdraw patronage. Television advertising is 
mainly of consumer goods that are readily subject to organized boycott. During the 
McCarthy years, many advertisers and radio and television stations were effectively 
coerced into quiescence and blacklisting of employees by the threats of determined Red 
hunters to boycott products. Advertisers are still concerned to avoid offending 
constituencies that might produce flak, and their demand for suitable programming is a 
continuing feature of the media environment. If certain kinds of fact, position, or 
program are thought likely to elicit flak, this prospect can be a deterrent (Herman & 
Chomsky, 1988, p 26). 
 
During the Vietnam War, US presidents Kennedy and Johnson tried to minimise 
negative and damaging coverage from Saigon and gave flak when administration 
officials made “angry calls to newspapers to complain about biased coverage” (Thrall, 
2000, p 18). 
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Perhaps one of the most contemporary examples of flak was that produced against the 
Qatar-based Al Jazeera television network. During the US-led attack on Afghanistan to 
destabilise Taliban and Al Qaeda in 2001, Al Jazeera refused to concede to US demands 
to sanitise the war footage. Instead the network focussed on the impact on civilians with 
footage of villages flattened by US carpet bombing. According to Kikhia (2003) 
“presenting these images for the world to see did not sit well with the Bush 
administration” (p 128) and thus preventive measures were taken to neutralise the Al 
Jazeera coverage and its office was bombed by the US for broadcasting the 
humanitarian disaster in Afghanistan (Miladi, 2003; Jasperson & Kikhia, 2003). For 
taking a similar editorial stance in Iraq War II coverage, and for broadcasting footage of 
US prisoners of war, two of Al Jazeera’s correspondents were barred from covering the 
New York Stock Exchange. Then US Secretary of State Collin Powell made clear the 
US anger over Al Jazeera coverage when he met with Qatar’s monarch when he visited 
Washington (Salhani, 2003).   
 
Boyd-Barrett (2004) believes that the propaganda model “fits well with the sociology of 
mediated communication” (p 30) where the key elements are corporate ownership; 
advertisers’ influence on media content; dependence on official sources, media 
reporting routines; fear of ‘flak’ by elite sources and the common ideological 
orientation of journalists.  
 
2.9 Discussion   
 
This chapter has shown that media coverage of global conflicts has increased and when 
major powers such as the US and UK are involved the media attention is greater. In the 
past 61 years since the end of World War II, two major issues in conflict coverage have 
emerged. Firstly, developments in telecommunications, transportation and globalisation 
are changing the way wars are covered. Gone are the days when it took several days for 
news copy or footage to be sent to the newsroom for publication or broadcast. Since 
Iraq War I, war coverage has become almost instantaneous with live coverage on 
multiple media channels, from broadcast to web cast and blogs. As noted by Thrall 
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(2000) communications technology has enhanced the news gathering capabilities of the 
news media and thus they are able to provide live coverage from anywhere. 
 
With these dynamics of instant coverage and reach to audiences, governments and 
military authorities are concerned about the impact the flow of news might have on 
public opinion and thus the conduct of wars. Public relations and media management 
have become integral (Hiebert, 1993) strategies to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the 
people during conflicts. Tactical success on the battlefields is not sufficient to guarantee 
victory as national and global public opinion also needs to be considered given the 
dynamics of globalisation and international relations. As one senior military 
commander said during World War II, “public opinion wins war” (Cited in Knightley, 
2000, p 344).  
 
Military conflict coverage has become an important feature of mainstream newspapers 
around the world. Coverage is also driven by commercial imperatives (Taylor, 1995). 
Dramatic stories of human tragedies and triumphs relating to the home country or 
culturally affiliated peoples make good stories. During major military conflicts such as 
the Iraq War, newspapers bring out special sections, allocate more pages and source 
exclusive contents for coverage. When Iraq War II started on 20th March 2003, the New 
Zealand Herald advertised on its front page that readers would be rewarded with 
comprehensive coverage and insight into the actions in Iraq: “As war unfolds in Iraq 
The Herald will bring readers the most comprehensive coverage available in New 
Zealand. Our aim is not merely to relate what happens but to explain events and give 
their context, as only a good newspaper can.”  
 
Coverage of military conflicts has a direct impact on national and international public 
opinion and countries that wage wars resort to various public relations and propaganda 
techniques to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people. Media management of wars by 
the military and government has often returned premium results, with messages being 
mediated to a global audience, thus affecting global public opinion. As Halliday (1999)  
notes, control by states of  news coverage of wars has a century-long history. From 
World War I to the recent Iraq war, countries involved in conflict have managed news 
coverage and information dissemination and used various propaganda techniques to 
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affect public opinion. Since the adverse coverage of the Vietnam War, which has been 
blamed for the failure of the conflict, the US has taken measures to control media 
coverage of conflicts, from Grenada to Iraq. Based on the experiences of the US in 
Vietnam, embedding and other media management strategies have been planned and 
implemented. Given the constraints journalists face, covering military conflicts is a 
challenging task as they also have to contend with professional integrity and journalistic 
ethics and values.  
 
When journalists rely on official sources during military conflicts they become 
vulnerable to manipulation, resulting in unverifiable and embellished information. 
Disinformation at source means that those journalists who report, quoting military and 
government officials, mediate the spin to the public. In the first week of  Iraq War II 
there were 13 separate cases of disinformation often made up of more than one 
deception, which included the alleged firing of Scud missiles, the ‘discovery’ of a 
chemical warfare factory, the liberation of Umm Qasr, the uprising in Basra and others 
(Smith cited in Miller, 2004b, p 2). Another major story that made global headlines was 
that of Jessica Lynch, which later turned out to be laced with propaganda (Rennie, 2003; 
Chalmers, 2004). Most of these stories made headlines in the global media, thus serving 
the objectives of those officials to manufacture consent. 
 
The direction of  war coverage is dependent upon factors such as the political, 
ideological and economic interests of the countries and their standings on the conflicts 
(Bennett, 2003; Cheterian, 2003; Dimitrova et al., 2005).  The way Iraq War II, for 
example, was covered in the US and Middle East during the initial phase of the conflict 
differed greatly from country to country. For example a review of six leading US 
newspapers and two popular newsmagazines during a six-month period revealed that 
they did not carry any photos from the war zone of Americans killed in action, although 
in that period nearly 560 Americans and Western allies died (Rainey, 2005). This shows 
that the mainstream US media were in a way sanitising the war. The US media were 
highlighting that “war was a necessary response to an immediate threat by Iraq” (Boyd-
Barrett, 2004, p 29), while ignoring alternative frames such as the humanitarian impact 
and the fact that the invasion had no UN approval. In contrast, newspapers in India and 
Pakistan highlighted the humanitarian impact of the war (Ravi, 2005). 
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As the military and governments control the information flow they are able to cultivate 
and propagate media messages to affect public opinion. Through embedding of 
journalists and pool systems, access to military actions and battle fronts is controlled. In 
such an environment, news reports filed by journalists are likely to be limited in their 
‘objective’ analysis and reporting of the events.  Heavy reliance on news sourced from 
military and government officials would make news media vulnerable to propaganda.  
 
This chapter has shown how war journalism has changed over the years – from World 
War II to the invasion phase of Iraq War II. The literature clearly shows that in more 
recent wars, especially since the Vietnam War, journalists have become more critical of 
official sources, as propaganda and media management strategies are being extensively 
used by countries waging wars. There is also an increase in global media attention to 
conflicts, although not all major conflicts are covered proportionately. Several factors, 
such as news values, discussed in Chapter 4, determine the intensity and depth of 
coverage. What is apparent from this chapter is that in conflicts where major military 
powers such as the US and UK are involved media attention increases, as shown by the 
extensive coverage given to the war in Iraq. 
 
The increasingly important role of news agencies in the globalisation of news, added to 
the wider globalisation process, has increased the demand for news; and war journalism 
is a key component of the news hole. Globalisation is changing the way military 
conflicts are covered (Seib, 2004). Globalisation has intertwined global economies, 
nation states, resources, financial markets and cultures so that much news and 
information is now of relevance to the whole world. The high demand for conflict news 
is shown in the increase in number of journalists covering major wars such as the Iraq 
war.  
 
However the large number of media personnel mobilised for coverage of the invasion 
phase of the Iraq conflict came from only a few major media establishments. This is an 
indication of the powerful role these establishments have in the commodification of war 
news, as content from them is sold to news retailers as well as used by media consumers 
around the world. There are also significant implications when global news media 
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completely rely on news agencies and other content providers for war coverage. From 
this chapter it emerges that globalisation has a bearing on international news coverage, 
thus relevant aspects of globalisation will be examined in Chapter 3, while the role of 
international news agencies is dealt with in Chapter 4.  
 
From this chapter it is clear that research into media coverage of military conflicts in 
New Zealand is few (Comrie & Fountaine, 2005; Witte, 1990) compared to the US and 
the UK. Given the role of media and communication in the globalised world and the 
impact of conflicts on societies, research into the nature of war journalism discourse in 
New Zealand, the role of news agencies and news flows and how military and 
government sources attempt to dominate the news agenda is needed. This research into 
Iraq War II coverage aims to fill the gap that exists in New Zealand in military conflict 
coverage. The need for more recent analysis is warranted given the globalisation of 
media and the changing nature of media consumption, news flows and the role of global 
news providers.  
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 3: THEORISING GLOBALISATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter looks at the process of globalisation, in particular the globalisation of 
media and cultural products. The institutional factors of globalisation, media ownership 
and how these dimensions push towards a globalised world are also dealt with in this 
chapter. One of the key institutions of globalisation is the news agencies, whose role as 
content providers and agenda setters is discussed in greater detail in the following 
Chapter 4. In the context of this thesis, news agencies and other content providers for 
global news media, including that of New Zealand, are seen as manufacturers of 
cultural products. The comodified news and information is sold to retailers, who in turn 
through press systems sell to media consumers. 
 
The role of news agencies and other content providers has increased partly due to trade 
liberalisation and communications technology. International communication has 
significantly contributed to the rise of globalism in the economic, political and cultural 
arenas  (Tehranian, 1999). In New Zealand the deregulation and liberalisation of the 
news media led to the dominance of broadcast and print media by major global firms – 
print media is now controlled by Dublin-based Independent News & Media and Fairfax 
Australia. Canada’s CanWest Global Communications own several radio stations 
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including the commercial television channel TV3. Foreign ownership and the highly 
profit-oriented nature of these transnational companies are likely to influence the 
editorial content of the news media.   
 
3.2 Defining globalisation  
 
According to Tabb, globalisation is a process that reduces barriers between countries 
and encourages closer economic, political, and social interaction  (Cited in Mittelman, 
2000). For Waters (1995), globalisation is “a social process in which the constraints of 
geography on social and cultural arrangements recede and in which people become 
increasingly aware that they are receding” (p 2). 
 
Giddens (1991) sees globalisation as the “intensification of world-wide social relations 
which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events 
occurring many miles away and vice versa” (p 64). This intensification of social 
relations is attributed to modern telecommunication and transportation systems. While 
telecommunication and transportation are factors accelerating globalisation these factors 
also cause problems. Tehranian (1999) observes that global communication undermines 
traditional boundaries and sovereignties of nations. Furthermore, the flow of cultural 
products also impacts societies and cultures within the nation state system. In the 
context of this research, the larger issues of globalisation are the flow of news and 
information, and the media system that is dominating the global agenda. 
 
McChesney argues that globalisation is misleading, and thus in lieu of that term 
neoliberalism would be a more ‘superior term’ (McChesney, 2002). For him the notion 
of globalisation is better understood and appreciated as the global emergence of neo-
liberalism as a dominant system. 
 
Defining neoliberalism he also noted that the world media system was mainly a result of 
that doctrine: 
 
[Neoliberalism] refers to the set of national and international policies that call for 
business domination of all social affairs with minimal countervailing force. 
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Neoliberalism not only explains the rise of the global media systems, but it highlights 
the severe fault lines in the world media and political economy for any viable theory of 
participatory democracy (McChesney, 2002, p 149). 
 
Attributing the development of global media systems mainly to neoliberalism, 
McChesney (2002) noted that communications technology made “global media empires 
feasible and lucrative” (p 152). However, he contends that “the real force has been a 
shift to neoliberalism which means the relaxation and elimination of barriers to 
commercial exploitation of media and concentrated media ownership” (p 152). 
 
According to Hamelink (2002), a commercially oriented neoliberal agenda “proposes 
the liberalization of national markets, the deregulation of capital flows, the lifting of 
trade restrictions based on environmental or human rights concerns, and the 
strengthening of the rights of investors”. 
 
McQuail (2005, p 252) notes that owing to media globalisation, the following issues can 
be identified: 
 
• Media are increasingly owned by global media firms 
• Media systems become increasingly similar across the world 
• The same or very similar news and entertainment products are found globally 
• Audiences can choose media from other countries 
• Cultural homogenisation and westernisation 
• Decontextualisation and reduction of time-space differences 
• Reduction in national communication sovereignty and more free flow of 
information 
 
Due to the globalisation and intensification of social relations, facilitated by modern 
communications, media attention to international issues and conflicts can be seen as 
consequences of the globalisation process. The extensive coverage of the Vietnam War 
by the US media changed public attitudes in the early 1970s. More recently, coverage of 
the Iraq War of 1990 and Iraq War II by media organisations such as CNN and BBC 
has illustrated how news agencies have shaped events across the world.  
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3.3 The processes of globalisation  
 
The globalisation process has undergone several evolutionary stages, and according to 
Robertson, the global community is currently in the uncertainty phase which began in 
the late 1960s (Robertson, 1997). Of the five phases outlined by Robertson (1997), the 
uncertainty phase (from the late 1960s to the 1990s) saw the number of global 
institutions and movements increase and a sharp acceleration in the means of global 
communication.  
 
In an interdependent world where resources are in various geographic and political 
locations, the advantages of global trade are many. This process of economic 
‘globalisation’ is a historical process, the result of human innovation and technological 
progress, and refers to the increasing integration of economies around the world, 
particularly through trade and financial flows (IMF, 2002).   
 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), which strongly believes that “globalisation 
offers extensive opportunities for truly worldwide development”, acknowledges that it 
is not progressing evenly. While countries that have been able to integrate with the 
global economy are seeing faster growth and reduced poverty  (IMF, 2002), others are 
left with mounting social and economic problems, partly blamed on reluctance to 
welcome economic, political and social reforms. 
 
The role of international institutions in the globalisation process has made them central 
actors. The WTO, IMF and the World Bank have been part and parcel of the political 
and economic process that has ushered in neoliberalism as a global order. To the extent 
that political and economic processes themselves thrive on functional informational and 
cultural components, the global media has become implicated in the globalisation 
process. 
 
The development of the world economy and the gradual economic globalisation has 
been driven by economic, ideological and technological factors. The driving ideological 
dimension was, as described earlier, neoliberalism, which, according to McChesney 
(2004) “refers to the set of national and international policies that call for business 
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domination of all social affairs with minimal countervailing force” (p 7-8). To 
materialise these values, regional and global institutions were created to further the 
globalisation objectives. McChesney observes how two trade and economic institutions 
were tasked to consolidate regional and global markets: 
 
Once the national deregulation of media took place in major nations like the United 
States and Britain, it was followed by transnational measures like the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), all intent 
on establishing regional and global marketplaces. This has laid the foundation for the 
creation of the global media system, dominated by the … conglomerates (McChesney, 
2004, p 11).  
 
Of these international institutions, the WTO commands “immense power on economic 
matters and impinges more and more on the media, as they become bigger business and 
more commercialised”, and, as McQuail (2005) notes, “free trade and protection, with 
implications for limits to national sovereignty in relation to media policy” (p 269) are 
key central issues.  
 
In the consensus formation process by the “caretakers of the global economy”, 
guidelines are transmitted into the policy-making channels of national governments and 
big corporations (Cox, 1994). Such consensus formation goes through unofficial forums 
like the Trilateral Commission, the Bilderberg Conferences and through official bodies 
such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the 
Bank for International Settlements, the IMF and the G-7 (Cox, 1994). Thus 
international agencies such as the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO play “catalytic 
roles in the globalization process” (Giffard, 1998, p 192) and are thus at the forefront of 
the globalisation drive. 
 
Many nations opened up their markets in the early 1990s and began exploiting available 
resources through foreign direct investment and joint ventures. These changes were also 
in line with capitalist globalisation views. According to the WTO, capital flows, in 
particular foreign direct investment, increased sharply in the second half of the 1990s 
not only in absolute terms, but also relative to the global GDP. The ratio of gross capital 
flows to the GDP rose for the developed countries to more than 15 percent in 1999/2000, 
more than three times the level recorded at the beginning of the nineties (WTO, 2002). 
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Despite the world’s diversity of political and economic systems, the differences have 
over time been narrowed to accommodate modern capitalist economic mechanisms. 
China, which was a communist country, has adapted capitalism, and as former leader 
Deng Xiaoping said it has followed a ‘one country, two systems’ approach (Whiting, 
1995; Xinhua, 2004; Holliday & Wong, 2003 ).   
 
The capital flows have been facilitated by government policies to attract foreign 
investment. Such measures have included creating a good legal system that would give 
guarantee to foreign investors. In industrialised countries governments have facilitated 
large Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows by privatising state-owned companies, thus 
sprouting private enterprises (Tussie & Woods, 2000). The inflow of investments has 
also strengthened economies in host countries. According to the United Nations 
Development Programme  “International trade has been one of the most powerful 
motors driving globalization” (UNDP, 2005, p 9). 
 
The globalisation process is indeed transforming societies across the globe. Social, 
economic and cultural differences are receding in the process, thus shifting globalisation 
to top gear for most countries.  Advances in communication technology and 
affordability, and its diffusion across the world have made time and space less relevant. 
Economic integration across the globe and international trade have given people access 
to distinct and diverse consumer and cultural products.  
 
3.4 Globalisation and nation states   
 
The rise of international and non-governmental organisations and global capitalist 
economies has made the role of national governments less significant, not by choice but 
by the inevitable realities set in place by globalisation forces. The movements of capital, 
goods and services across national boundaries, further accelerated by 
telecommunications and transportation services, have to a large extent weakened state 
authority. As noted by Castells  (1997), “state control over space and time is 
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increasingly bypassed by global flows of capital, goods, services, technology, 
communication and information” (p 243).   
 
Globalisation of media, strengthened by communication technology, has impacted on 
state sovereignty such that states’ decisions are now influenced by foreign states or 
institutions. Thus in market economies, where the media industries are deregulated, the 
flow of media and cultural products is likely to affect what Waisbord and Morris (2001) 
call the communication sovereignty of states, referring to the “states’ exercise of 
authority over flow of ideas and information inside their territories” (p viii).  
 
In New Zealand, as is the case in most countries today, the impact of globalisation on 
the sovereignty of the nation state has less extended to what used to be seen as national 
institutions. For all practical purposes commentators could talk of New Zealand media 
15 or 20 years ago. In those days it only required a New Zealand governmental 
authority to regulate and provide directions to such media. In the era of neoliberal 
globalisation however, broadcasting in New Zealand is largely foreign owned and the 
entire broadcasting landscape is one operating on terms set by foreign or global 
broadcasters. With the exception of TVNZ and Radio New Zealand, much New Zealand 
broadcasting is private and foreign owned and it is this that leads the competition in the 
market. 
 
The newspaper industry in New Zealand has associated its ownership with private 
interests for a long time. What has occurred in the era of neo-liberal globalisation is a 
further concentration of such ownership into fewer and bigger financial hands, thereby 
making competition difficult if not impossible. The power and independence of the 
New Zealand state to protect citizens by altering the current arrangement is limited in 
this era of neoliberal globalisation in which policies no longer operate or get formulated 
at the national level only. Regional and international bodies as well as multilateral 
institutions such as the WTO, the World Bank, IMF, and the UN all combine to limit or 
usurp state authority. 
 
As Zolo (2004) argues, the “sovereignty of nation states is being suffocated by the 
power of supranational authorities,” (p 30-31) and as a result nation states seem to have 
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lost the functions, for which they were created, of controlling and rationalising 
economic, social and technological forces.   
 
What are nations and states, whose characteristics combine to form the nation states? 
Paul (1996a) contends that “states govern a territory with boundaries and have laws, 
taxes, officials, currencies, postal services, police and (usually) armies and wage war, 
negotiate treaties and regulate life within the territorial jurisdiction”.  Nations are 
groups of people with a common language, culture and historical identity (Paul, 1996a).  
 
These traits are inherent in modern nation states although they are not exclusive. The 
ethnic Chinese or Indians can be seen as a nation, but they are spread around the world. 
The territories within which the various ethnic groups have been historically living and 
rooted have significantly changed over the time, and the movements of people across 
political borders have changed the characteristics of nation states. Migration and 
adoption of other citizenships are some of the changes altering the nation state map. 
These changes have been due mainly to the forces of globalisation.  
 
According to Harvard University professor Marcelo Suarez-Orozco, immigration is 
changing the world more than at any other time in history, opening up business 
opportunities and also new challenges.  With over 175 million people worldwide who 
are transnational migrants, immigration and globalisation are pushing nation states in 
ways the nation states don’t like to be pushed (Lagac, 2003).  United Nations  figures 
show that the number of people around the world who were living in a country other 
than the one in which they were born rose from 75 million in 1965 to 120 million in 
1990 (Hatton & Williamson, 2002, p 2). 
 
The migration of people creates various ethnic communities within the nation states. 
Every country is not always a melting pot of immigrants, but ethnic diversity and 
differences are evident. With time, ethnic minorities emerge as formidable political and 
economic forces, and seek equal rights for themselves. The ethnic Indians and Chinese 
were taken by the British to Malaya (present Malaysia) in the late 19th century to work 
in plantations and mining. As the 19th century ended, the Malays found themselves 
becoming a minority in their own country. As one European observer noted, if the 
CHAPTER 3: THEORISING GLOBALISATION                                                                            PAGE 123  
 
Chinese immigrants had brought women with them, they would have completely 
absorbed the Malay population within a few generations (Kimball, 2003).  Indians (7.7 
percent) and Chinese (26 percent) represent a sizable component of the 24.5 million 
people in Malaysia. The Malays and other indigenous people form 65.1 percent of the 
population (Wikipedia, 2002). The Indians and Chinese enjoy almost all the rights the 
Malays enjoy and have political and social economic interests in the state system. The 
vernacular press is supplemented by Chinese and Indian language newspapers and 
programmes on the broadcast media cater to the diverse ethnic groups.  
 
The Indian Diaspora around the world numbers 20 million and they manifest deep 
commitment to cultural identities. According to a report on the Indian Diaspora, the 
ethnic Indian media in foreign countries reflects the diversity of regions, languages and 
opinions of India (The Indian Diaspora, 2001, p xi, xxix).   
 
While the migration of people changes ethnic boundaries of nations, “globalization and 
the new technologies have contributed to the shrinking of state authority and the 
explosion of a whole series of new actors engaged in governance activities” (Sassen, 
1999).  
 
While Ohmae (2000) sees nation states as local authorities of the global system, Hirst 
and Thompson (1999) contend that the nation states can no longer independently affect 
the levels of economic activity or employment within their territories. According to 
them, “the job of nation states is like that of municipalities within states heretofore: to 
provide the infrastructure and public goods that the business needs at the lowest 
possible cost” (p 176). 
 
Although Holton (1998) doubts that states hold the monopoly of power within the 
politics of globalisation, he argues that many aspects of globalisation are changing the 
roles and relationships of nation states to each other and to other organised interests 
within the global political system. Such changes may involve the decline of absolute 
state sovereignty.     
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Nation states have become inescapably vulnerable to the disciplines imposed by 
economic choices made elsewhere by people and institutions over which they have no 
practical control (McNeely, 2000). But not every country is vulnerable to such 
disciplines, and the developed countries which are members of the OECD and G-7 are 
unlikely to be forced to make choices as they are economically strong and politically 
developed.  
 
Strong states have a capacity to influence the rules of the international economy and to 
control their own integration into the world economy (Woods, 2000). Industrialised 
countries such as the United States’ decision to deregulate and liberalise in various 
ways instigated the flows of currency, goods, services and multinational activity across 
borders (Woods, 2000). 
 
As members of the international community, nation states are bound by international 
conventions, charters and principles formulated by such institutions like the UN, 
UNESCO and IMF. If a nation state neglects to adopt world approved policies, 
domestic elements will try to carry out or enforce conformity (Meyer, Boli, Thomas, & 
Ramirez, 2000). It is world pressure that has led many states to establish environmental 
protection agencies, and where states have not heeded world opinion local actors such 
as schools, scout troops and religious groups are likely to practice environmentalism 
and call for national action (Meyer et al., 2000). National environmental policies are 
strongly influenced by international institutions, such as the UNEP, the United Nations 
Environmental Programme. But as, Hironaka (2002) observes the less developed 
countries are more influenced by the international organisations with respect to 
environmental protection policies.  
 
The intensification of economic activities globally has been the major factor in 
undermining state authority. Both Castells (1997) and Ohmae (2000) argue that global 
economic activities have undermined the authority of nation states. According to Hirst 
and Thompson (1999) “states are less autonomous, they have less exclusive control 
over economic and social processes within their territories, and they are less able to 
maintain national distinctiveness and cultural homogeneity” (p 263).   
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3.5 Political economy of the news media   
 
The changing relations between states, between businesses and between individuals are 
particularly significant for the news media. Here, many critics point to globalisation as a 
political-economic phenomenon. The globalisation of media and concentration of media 
ownership can be examined through a political economy model. According to 
McChesney (2003), political economy of communication involves the examination of 
the structures of media industries including the questions of ownership and market 
structure and “how these affect media content, performance and impact” (p 27). Thus 
political economy is concerned with how corporate control affects and usually limits 
what journalists can do in their professional work of news gathering and processing 
(McChesney, 2003). 
 
An analysis of the ownership and structure of the media in the US would show why the 
mainstream news media often support military intervention by the US in foreign 
countries, there being a tripartite relationship between the government, the military 
industrial complex and the media industrial complex.  
 
There is an interlocking connection, as Henson (Cited in Kellner, 1992) points out, 
between the military and television networks. For example in 1989 General Electric 
(GE), which owns NBC, derived US$9 billion of its US$54.5 billion in revenues from 
military contracts. GE, as a leading arms manufacturer and contractor, “designed, 
manufactured or supplied parts or maintenance for nearly every major weapon system 
employed by the US during the Gulf War … In other words, when correspondents and 
paid consultants on NBC television praised the performance of the US weapons, they 
were extolling equipment made by GE, the corporation that pays their salary” (Lee and 
Solmon cited in Kellner, 1992, p 59-60). Many GE board members sit on the boards of 
other corporate media like The Washington Post and are connected with US government 
agencies and oil corporations as well (Kellner, 1992). 
 
Global media ownership is dominated by a few media conglomerates, whose main 
stakeholders are US firms. The global media market is dominated by nine transnational 
corporations – General Electric (owner of NBC), AT&T/ Liberty Media, Disney, AOL-
CHAPTER 3: THEORISING GLOBALISATION                                                                            PAGE 126  
 
Time Warner, Sony, News Corporation, Viacom, Vivendi and Bertelsmann 
(McChesney, 1997; McChesney, 2004). With liberalisation and opening markets, major 
media corporations are vertically and horizontally integrating with take-overs and 
acquisitions. The global media system, which began to emerge 20 years ago with 
neoliberal globalisation, is now dominated by 8 to 10 transnational conglomerates. At 
the second-tier level are about 60 to 80 regional media firms (McChesney, 2003). 
 
Time Warner, with over 80,000 staff globally, is the leading global media and 
Entertainment Company has in its stable America Online, Time Inc., Time Warner 
Cable, Home Box Office, New Line Cinema, Turner Broadcasting System and Warner 
Bros (Time Warner., 2006a).  According to Time Warner, revenues rose five percent 
over 2004 to US$43.7 billion, reflecting increases in the company’s Cable, Networks, 
Publishing and Filmed Entertainment reporting segments (Time Warner., 2006b). 
 
News Corporation, which operates in nine different media on six continents, in 1995 
recorded its revenues were distributed between filmed entertainment (26 percent), 
newspapers (24 percent), television (21 percent), magazines (14 percent) and book 
publishing (12 percent). Its holdings include the US Fox broadcasting network; twenty-
two television stations (the largest US station group); a 50 percent interest in several US 
and global cable networks; a 50 percent stake in Fox Kids Worldwide; ownership or 
major interests in satellite services; Twentieth Century Fox; some 130 newspapers 
(including The Times of London and the New York Post); twenty-five magazines, 
including TV Guide; book publishing interests, including HarperCollins; and the Los 
Angeles Dodgers baseball team (Walsh, 2000). 
 
Media concentration at national and global levels, when seen through a political 
economy perspective, appears to favour corporate interests and market considerations. 
In this regard the media system becomes ‘manipulative’, as termed by Trowler (Cited in 
Abel, 2004)  as the media owners appropriate content to favour corporate interests. 
Noting the influence on content by the corporate owners, Abel said: 
 
News proprietor use their position to exert influence over their editorial staff, and so 
over the actual content of the news. The views of this group are given a privileged 
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position over other viewpoints. As a result, the hearts and minds of the audience are 
also manipulated (Abel, 2004, p 186). 
 
A similar outlook is given by Bagdikian (2004), who argues that major media 
corporations “have dominant influence over the public’s news, information, public ideas, 
popular culture, and political attitudes” (p 5).  As mass media have become important 
economic and political institutions, “The dominant media have the power to set political 
agendas and shape the cultural landscape” (Steven, 2003, p 37). The roles of the news 
media are underpinned by media concentration, corporate interests and institutional 
factors. These serve not only to set news agendas, but to further corporate interests. 
 
3.6 Media ownership and flow of cultural products 
 
Corporatisation of the news media began as the news media moved from direct or 
partial state control to private ownership with neoliberalism and globalisation (Castells, 
1997; McChesney, 2002). Castells (1997) notes that until the early 1980s,  with the 
major exception of the United States, most television in the world was government 
controlled, and radios and newspapers were under the severe potential constraint of 
government good will, even in democratic countries. According to McChesney (2002), 
“prior to the 1980s and 1990s, national media systems were typified by domestically 
owned radio, television and newspaper industries”  and from a national media system “a 
global commercial media market has merged”(p 149-150). 
 
Globalisation of media has developed highly commercialised and concentrated media 
systems at the first-and second-tier levels. This has led to less competition, more 
monopoly, and thus to “a shrinking of the marketplace of ideas, but it serves powerful 
commercial interests tremendously” (McChesney, 2003, p 37).  
 
One of the biggest impacts on the global audience is made by Western media companies. 
The Cable News Network based in Atlanta, USA, is able to affect the opinions of 
viewers in a remote country in Africa. Television channels such as CNN and BBC have 
global audiences and their content is syndicated to TV channels in various countries, 
thus giving them a wider coverage. In a way CNN and BBC could be described as 
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leading agenda setters for global audiences. CNN has gained some exclusivity with 
coverage of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre in China and the 1990 Persian Gulf 
War (Iraq War I), and with over 33 million viewers in 138 nations (Friedland, 2000) it 
is a strong cultural force to reckon with. Paterson (1997) argues that television news 
plays a substantial role in shaping public perception of international crises. TV 
broadcasters and news agencies such as Reuters Television, ABC, WTN and APTV 
(including CNN and BBC) to a considerable degree set the agenda for what 
international stories broadcasters choose to carry in their newscasts through the choice 
of stories , amount of visuals, texts and other information provided to clients (Paterson, 
1997).  
 
The world’s print and broadcast media rely heavily on three news agencies – Associated 
Press (AP), Reuters, Agence-France Presse (AFP) – for content, which again illustrates 
that the flow of international news is dominated by the West. Boyd-Barrett (1999) 
argues that “news agencies are a part of modernisation and link it with globalisation” (p 
300). Following are some of the key points he identified as to how news agencies play a 
pivotal role in the globalisation process (Boyd-Barrett, 1999, p 300-301). They are: 
 
• Contribute to internationalisation, constructing influential news agenda and act 
upon retail media, government and finance 
•  Develop technologies to improve global telecommunication networks 
• Bring the global to the local and incorporate the local within the global in their 
day-to-day news gathering and news dissemination 
• News agencies such as Reuters facilitate global financial transactions; provide 
data that enables news commentators to think globally  
•  Contribute to the homogenisation of global culture in their distribution of 
certain influential kinds of political, economic, and sports discourse  
 
It is clear that as dominant news suppliers to the global media market, the mainstream 
news agencies and news providers are in a strong position to influence global culture 
and as Boyd-Barrett (1997) argues, news agencies contribute to the processes of both 
national consolidation and globalisation and to the homogenisation of global culture.  
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AP produces about two million words a day in English and 50,000 in other languages, 
while Reuters, the world’s biggest news provider, processes up to five million words a 
day. AFP has five news sites in English and each carries between 50,000 and 120,000 
words a day (Elliot, 1998). According to its website, Reuters is the world’s largest 
international multimedia news agency, providing information tailored for professionals 
in the financial services, media and corporate markets. Reuters supplies news – text, 
graphics, video and pictures – to media organisations and websites around the world. 
The company operates in 200 cities in 94 countries (Reuters, 2004). AP is a cooperative 
owned by its contributing newspapers, which both contribute stories to it and use 
material written by its staffers. AP has 242 bureaus worldwide with 1,700 US daily, 
weekly, non-English and college newspapers. Nearly 5000 radio/TV outlets use AP, 
while 330 international broadcasters receive AP’s global video news service. There are 
8,500 International subscribers who receive AP news and photos in 121 countries (AP, 
2004). AFP’s worldwide network takes in 165 countries, of which 110 are home to 
bureaus. According to the agency it continues to expand operations worldwide, reaching 
thousands of subscribers (radios, TV stations, newspapers, companies) from its main 
headquarters in Paris and regional centers in Washington, Hong Kong, Nicosia and 
Montevideo (AFP, 2004). 
 
While millions of words, thousands of photos and hours of video footage are channelled 
by these agencies to subscribers around the world for publications and broadcast, 
equally visible as channels of Western cultural flow are the numerous publications 
being exported from the developed countries. News magazines such as Time and 
Newsweek, and fashion magazines such as Cosmopolitan and GQ are read in far corners 
of the world.   
 
The world print and broadcast media heavily depend on the few larger news agencies – 
The Big Three – for content. As wholesalers of news, these institutions have become 
dominant players in the news and information business, attracting a large global market 
and audience for the content they manufacture and commodify. The news wholesaling 
business is dominated by the AP, Reuters, and AFP, currently the “The Big Three” 
international news agencies (Thussu, 2002).   
 
CHAPTER 3: THEORISING GLOBALISATION                                                                            PAGE 130  
 
Research has shown that world newspapers depend on major news services and this 
dependence results in agencies dominating the foreign news agenda in world 
newspapers (Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1985). This dependence is seen to create an 
imbalance in that the information flow is one way and as Musa (1997) notes, the 
unidirectional tendency in the news flows reflects the hegemonic status of the news 
wholesalers. 
 
While globalisation has made local events global (Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1996) and 
vice-versa, developed countries get more coverage and there is a gap between the ‘rich 
and poor’ in terms of news flows. This was an issue raised in the 1970s by the 
UNESCO (MacBride Report, 1984). Jinquan  et al (2002) argue that “strong nations 
control media resources, news agendas, and ideological fora, often to the exclusion of 
the poor and the weak” (p 179). The imbalance in news flows and the dependence on 
Western news agencies for global news coverage is noted by Devereux, as follows: 
 
The global media industry has immense power in terms of how it covers events outside 
the developed world. Global news agencies and major broadcasting organizations are 
primarily responsible for the selection and packaging of news from the Third World. 
Third World countries have an obvious dependence on the global media industry, and 
especially in times of crisis when news has to travel fast. In this light media coverage of 
Third World issues sustains the unequal relations of power that exist between the West 
and the Third World  (Devereux, 2003, p 46). 
 
Being able to dominate the whole media content spectrum – from text to visuals – the 
world’s leading news agencies are able to construct and manufacture news according to 
their news values. Their global dominance through the social construction of world 
events, such as military conflicts, via news text and television footage can “also shape 
the wider view of a war” (Thussu, 2002, p 205). 
 
In setting the global news agenda, the major wire services “contributed to 
internationalization, constructing influential international news agendas that acted upon 
retail media, governments and finance” (Boyd-Barrett, 1997, p 143). It is apparent that 
the flow of news content and media products is clearly in favour of the industrialised 
countries. This imbalance leads towards a Western cultural hegemony. 
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The concentration of media ownership is seen to minimise the role of the fourth estate 
as ‘the market place of ideas’ given the conflicting corporate interests, with the latter’s 
priority on maximisation of profit rather than providing forums for public discussions 
and debates affecting people. Winter (1997), following a comprehensive study of media 
ownership in Canada, concluded that owners of media companies exert pressure on 
editorial content of the news media, affecting fair discussions of public issues. 
 
The second tier of media corporations, controlling much of the global media, according 
to McChesney (2002) “resemble a cartel”, and “with hypercommercialism and growing 
corporate control comes an implicit political bias in media content” (p 158). Such bias 
is more apparent when international conflicts, involving major Western powers and 
weaker states, are covered. In the contest for the global media discourse the powerful 
sources are able to dominate. Thus, with a highly concentrated and foreign-owned press 
system in New Zealand, implications of globalisation of media are likely to be 
significant.  
 
3.7 Media ownership and concentration in New Zealand 
 
Formerly controlled by family shareholdings, the New Zealand print media began to 
corporatise in the 1960s, and by the end of the decade nine firms controlled 75 of the 
100 publications in New Zealand (Starke, 2004). One of the first foreign acquisitions of 
a newspaper was The Dominion in 1964 by Rupert Murdoch, at a time when there was 
no restriction on foreign ownership (Norris, 2002). A year later the Media Ownership 
Act – which aimed to control foreign ownership of newspapers – was established only 
to be repealed 10 years later. From then on New Zealand became one of the most open 
countries in terms of foreign ownership in the media industry (Norris, 2002; McGregor, 
1992). The Commerce Act 1975 (which has now been repealed) took into consideration 
public interest when dealing with the foreign acquisition of local print media. 
According to McGregor (1992), “successive amendments to the Commerce Act have 
watered down the checks and balances necessary to prevent newspaper gobble-up. … It 
is significant to note that the dilution of legislative protection has roughly paralleled the 
concentration in newspaper ownership” (p 36). Without any legal constraints on foreign 
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media ownership, the overseas share of the print media began to increase. By 1985, 
three firms – New Zealand News, INL and Wilson and Horton – controlled 76 percent 
of the daily newspaper circulation (McGregor, 1992). Nearly 50 percent of INL was 
owned by News Corporation, while Independent News Media has had a 100 percent 
share of Wilson and Horton since 1998 (Norris, 2002).  
 
Today the two major companies controlling the print media are Fairfax and APN News 
& Media (ANM). According to Rosenberg (2004), in the near duopoly environment 
John Fairfax Holdings Ltd owns newspapers which in 2003 had nearly half (47.4%) of 
the daily newspaper circulation, while ANM had 43.8 percent of the daily newspaper 
circulation.  In the same year Fairfax and ANM owned 87.4 percent of the audited daily 
press circulation of provincial newspapers (those with under 25,000 circulation), and 
92.2 percent of the metropolitan readership (those newspapers with more than 25,000 
circulation). 
 
Little has changed. In 2006, of the eight daily newspapers with a daily circulation of 
over 25,000, Fairfax newspapers represented more than half (51%) of the combined 
daily circulation of more than 559,000, while ANM’s share was 41 percent. New 
Zealand’s Allied Press stood at a mere eight percent. 
 
Table 3.1 Ownership of daily newspapers with circulation of over 25,000  
Ownership Share of 
circulation 
Newspaper ANC to 31/03/2006 
Fairfax 51% Dominion Post  98,251 
  Press  92,465 
  Waikato Times   41,083 
  Southland Times    29,571 
  Taranaki Daily News    26,506 
    
ANM 41% New Zealand Herald 200,309 
Allied Press 8% Otago Daily Times 43,246 
    
Source: Newspaper Audit Results, Audit Bureau of Circulation, Wellington 
 
Fairfax owns five metropolitan daily newspapers that have a daily circulation of more 
than 25,000 (Table 3.1). ABC figures released in May 2006 show that Fairfax 
newspapers accounted for a daily combined circulation of more than 287,876, while 
ANM’s share was 228,346 (from two newspapers) and Allied Press 43,246 (from The 
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Otago Daily Times). The Press, which has a near monopoly in Christchurch, and The 
Dominion Post are the two largest newspapers owned by Fairfax. In 2003 the 
Australian-listed company bought Independent Newspapers Limited (INL) from News 
Corporation for $NZ1.188 billion ("Fairfax proves itself in the first year," 2004; 
Louisson, 2003). Accordingly, INL’s extensive New Zealand newspaper, magazine and 
distribution interests were sold to Fairfax New Zealand Ltd (History of INL, 2003).  
 
According to Nielsen, based on a combined average issue readership of its newspapers 
and magazines Fairfax New Zealand’s stable of newspapers and magazines reach   84.3 
percent or 2,677,000 New Zealanders 15 years and over (Fairfax Media., 2006b). 
 
Prior to 2003, INL, which was 45 percent owned by Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp had 
major news media publishing business which included The Dominion Post, The Press, 
The Sunday Star-Times, Sunday News, seven regional dailies and 61 community 
publications, 13 magazine titles ("Murdoch to sell New Zealand publishing interests to 
Australian rival," 2003). 
 
ANM owns eight provincial dailies and its flagship newspaper is The New Zealand 
Herald. The company also owns, through Community Newspapers Ltd, at least 30 
community newspapers covering Auckland, Hamilton, Bay of Plenty, Hawke’s Bay, 
Wellington, and Christchurch (Rosenberg, 2004). 
 
Of the mainstream broadcast and print media, TVNZ is the only institution out of reach 
of foreign media control. The state-owned broadcaster had a narrow escape from 
foreign takeover when in 1999 the new Labour government prevented the National 
government’s decision to sell TV One and TV2 (Horrocks, 2004).  
 
Now TVNZ is run through a charter which identifies its role of public service 
broadcasting. According to the TVNZ Charter which was implemented on 1 March 
2003, through free-to-air broadcasting it should “provide independent, comprehensive, 
impartial, and in-depth coverage and analysis of news and current affairs in New 
Zealand and throughout the world and of the activities of public and private 
institutions” (Television New Zealand., 2006). Under the charter, introduced by the 
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Labour-led government, the state-broadcaster receives annual government funding of 
NZ$36 million ("Nats would scrap TVNZ charter " 2005). While the public service 
broadcasting has been formalised in the TVNZ charter, like most other media they have 
not escaped foreign influence through programming and news values. 
 
TVNZ operates two channels, TV1 and TV2. TV3 is their main competitor, with 
popular news and current affairs programmes, and is owned by Canada’s biggest TV 
broadcaster CanWest Global Communications Corporation through CanWest 
MediaWorks NZ. CanWest MediaWorks  NZ, through its wholly owned subsidiaries, 
CanWest TVWorks Limited and CanWest RadioWorks Limited, owns and operates the 
TV3 and C4 television networks, national radio brands The Edge, The Rock, More FM, 
Kiwi FM, Radio Live, Radio Pacific/Radio Trackside, Solid Gold and The Breeze and 
several local radio stations (Canwest Mediaworks Reports Strong Trading Results, 
2005). 
 
Prime TV channel is a free-to-air network which began broadcasting in New Zealand on 
30 August 1998. SKY television, of which Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp owns 40 
percent, bought Prime Television New Zealand Ltd in February 2006 for NZ $30 
million. SKY estimates that its 20.5 per cent audience share will jump to 26 per cent, 
leaving TVNZ with 52 per cent and CanWest with about 21 per cent (Dacruz, 2005). 
 
There was strong criticism of INL’s direction of coverage in its media in New Zealand. 
In the 1997 Roger Award for the worst transnational corporation in New Zealand, a 
judge observed that “The day in and day out publishing of INL’s biased view of the 
world can be equated to a dangerous propaganda machine which deeply influences the 
hearts and minds of New Zealanders” (Cited in Rosenberg, 2004, p 14). INL’s 45 
percent is owned by News Ltd, the Australian branch of US-based News Corporation 
where Rupert Murdoch, owns 29.8 percent of the voting shares (Rosenberg, 2004). 
 
Media owners and management can influence content through ‘allocative’ or 
‘operational’ control. The allocative level is concerned with the “overall allocation of 
resources such as hiring and firing of editors” while the operational level is about the 
routine news production activities “such as what stories to cover, what to print and 
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where stories should go and the headlines” (McGregor, 1992, p 34). The editorial stance 
and orientation of coverage of different issues can be influenced by the newspaper 
owners through organisation and management measures. Controlling the news gathering 
resources, by such measures as using wire copy instead of assigning own staff 
correspondents to cover news events, can be also seen as influencing news discourse. 
 
3.7.1 Implications of media ownership and concentration 
 
There is concern in New Zealand regarding the impact concentration of media 
ownership would have especially on media content. Starke noted that one of the 
concerns is “the risk of impacting negatively on the content of newspapers and the 
quality of information, by reducing its diversity, reliability, accessibility and 
meaningfulness” (Starke, 2004, p 15). 
 
Starke (2004) argued that one of the key changes from concentrated corporate media 
ownership is “a much higher amount of shared content, which does pose a significant 
threat to diversity of views and identity of the daily newspapers” (p 123). Noting the 
implications of news media concentration and the “demands to cut costs to improve 
profits” Norris wrote: 
 
A chain of newspapers offers opportunities to recycle stories and articles from one 
paper to another, given that they each serve a different geographical market. Readers of 
The Press in Christchurch will be unaware that they are reading an article published the 
day before in The Dominion, or that a number of stories have been written by The 
Dominion reporters. From a national perspective, it can be argued that there is less 
diversity and a diminished range of opinion (Norris, 2002, p 48). 
 
Through media concentration, diversity of content and view points is reduced when 
publications, in order to reduce costs and increase profit, begin to share copy across the 
various newspapers. It is much like newspapers running a common news agency story. 
Among Fairfax newspapers in New Zealand The Press and The Dominion Post share 
copy, while these publications also source content from Fairfax newspapers in Australia 
(Interview with Thompson, February 23rd, 2006).   
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Starke (2004), who conducted , research on media concentration in New Zealand and 
how this might impact content, noted that with the increasing concentration of media 
ownership “there is no empirical evidence” that suggests owners of media companies 
influence the editorial stance of the foreign-owned daily newspapers. In discussing the 
issue of foreign ownership, she noted the following: 
 
The professionals interviewed did not regard increasing foreign ownership as negative 
development. They regard it as widely positive because it brings benefits such as size, 
management know-how and investment into the market. The other side to this is … that 
what is best for the interests of the shareholders of a foreign company may be at odds 
with what is best for the interest of New Zealand. As mentioned before, foreign 
shareholders are presumed not to care about New Zealand’s national identity and 
culture. Therefore, if the media here are under financial pressure, the amount of money 
spent on New Zealand content could be reduced since it is the most expensive to 
produce. Content that is bought in from overseas is cheaper, and if part of a 
multinational corporation, easy to access (Starke, 2004, p 123). 
 
Starke’s findings were based mainly on interviews with senior editors and journalists of 
newspapers which are already foreign owned. It is unlikely that they would agree on the 
proposition that owners influence the editorial direction of newspapers. But Starke 
raised the alarm when she acknowledged the potential for influence on content by 
owners, and in the case of foreign owners or shareholders in New Zealand: 
 
It can be said that no matter whether strong influence by the owners or the management 
of the media enterprise exists or not, the possibility that there could be direct 
interference should make daily newspaper journalism in New Zealand subject to 
constant public scrutiny. In any case, if private media remain in the hands of a few 
foreign owners they need to be counterbalanced by a strong public broadcasting media 
such as Radio New Zealand, TVNZ and Maori TV (Starke, 2004, p 127). 
 
Without the existence of perfect competition in the media industry, the “watchdog” 
function the news media are ideally required to perform in a democracy cannot be 
achieved. With corporate influence on editorial policies news media’s role as a 
marketplace of ideas and forum for diverse views will become insignificant. 
Concentration of ownership of media gives the power to a few to control content and 
direction of news coverage. According to Rosenberg: 
 
Concentration of ownership, as in any industry, increases the political and commercial 
power of the owners – in this case at both national and international levels – and 
delivers to them the ability to fix prices, control coverage, and undermine the conditions 
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that give journalists the strength to resist improper pressures on what they report: strong 
unions, secure jobs, the ability to change employers, and good working conditions 
(Rosenberg, 2004, p 27). 
. 
The news media as a marketplace of ideas, as viewed in the liberal pluralist model, is 
far outpaced by neoliberal media ownership. Indeed the main concern is about the 
impact on media content. As noted by Abel (2004), “Of particular concern is the 
increasing concentration of media ownership (in New Zealand), which means that the 
opportunity for diverse voices diminishes and power to control the news is vested in 
fewer and even more powerful people” (p 186) hence the undermining of the free flow 
of news. The issue of lack of media diversity was also noted by a Paris-based media 
watchdog, which in its 2004 report noted that in New Zealand “the concentration of 
media ownership in a few hands threatens diversity” (Reporters Without Borders., 
2004). 
 
The main concern in New Zealand in the context of foreign control of broadcast and 
print media is that the New Zealand perspective is being narrowed by the global and 
corporate interests of the owners. A recent advertisement by Fairfax for its newly re- 
launched newspaper The Financial Review shows how the local news agenda could be 
influenced from overseas. The advertisement said that “working from offices in 
Auckland, the Editor will cooperate closely with Fairfax’s other business titles in New 
Zealand and Australia, including Business Day and the Australian Financial 
Review”(Fairfax Media., 2006a). The impact foreign ownership would have on local 
news media content was observed by New Zealand media analyst Wayne Hope in an 
interview with TV One: 
 
It is a funeral for the New Zealand media and we have been colonised by the Australian 
media for some time… [If we look at] Business news as a case study, what you are 
finding is that Australian perspectives are crowding out local perspectives. Business 
news comes from an Australian perspective. We get very little New Zealand business 
news from New Zealand. This is because it is cheaper to do that. The Australian 
Financial Review is the mother ship for all the business news coming through the 
Fairfax empire (TV One., 2006, 24 May ). 
 
Even on the day INL shareholders voted to sell its New Zealand publishing business to 
Fairfax, concern about the impact this might have on editorial content was raised by 
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some associated with INL. Marjie Robson, widow of the former INL managing director 
Mike Robson, said on 31st June 2003, after attending the shareholders meeting:  
 
My personal hope is that the new owners of the publications will not turn the New 
Zealand papers into a branch of the Sydney Morning Herald and Australian Financial 
Review – that they will stay strong and reflect New Zealand and New Zealanders. …I 
hope Fairfax will respect the fact that New Zealanders have their own views and readers 
are interested in our country, our sports, our finances, our own columnists and our 
features - that we do not want to be Australians (Cited in Louisson, 2003). 
 
Claims of editorial independence from the vested interests of the corporate sector have 
been many, but the opposite has also been found to be alarmingly true, given the 
concentration of media ownership. Media owners have two kinds of control over the 
media – direct personal control over the organisation and operation of the media 
interests and influence on their competition through concentration and amalgamation 
(Murdock, 1996). Campbell argues that a privately owned media company belongs to 
the owner who may control the content through employees such as journalists and 
editors. He contends that: 
 
At the end of the a day privately owned news organisation is the de facto ‘private 
property’ of the editor (acting on behalf of their employer) who has the right to choose 
who has access to the newspaper. … Depending on the level of influence owners thus 
have on the editorial content of the news organisation’s output, one could argue that 
journalists in privately owned news organisations are not ‘free’ but instead are subject 
to the authority of the editor, and ultimately the owner of the organisation (Campbell, 
2004, p 64). 
 
In Iraq War II coverage, Murdoch explicitly backed the US invasion, and this was seen 
most notably on the US network channel Fox News, which took a pro-war stance 
(Rutenberg, 2003; Morris, 2005).  
 
The duopoly in the media industry in New Zealand is likely to have an impact on the 
direction of editorial content, given the nature of media ownership. The tendency for 
local news media to source content from overseas newspapers means that news agencies 
have an impact on the discussion and deliberation of world issues. The concentration of 
media ownership, a result of profit maximisation and market domination drive by 
transnational companies, affects media content.  A New Zealand opinion poll by Roy 
Morgan Research showed that the public were concerned about the market-oriented 
CHAPTER 3: THEORISING GLOBALISATION                                                                            PAGE 139  
 
nature of media organisations. The poll, conducted in December 2005, showed that 65 
percent thought media organisations were interested in making profits rather than 
informing the public. Roy Morgan Research noted that “The Media never stops 
‘talking’ about the financial performance and profits of Media companies. It is no 
wonder that 65 percent of New Zealanders are concerned that Media organizations are 
more interested in profit than information” (Roy Morgan Research., 2005). 
 
3.8 Discussion  
 
It emerges from this chapter that the globalisation process has brought about changes to 
the economies of nation states through investments and trade by transnational 
companies. As Tehranian  (1999) noted, global communication has significantly 
contributed to the rise of globalism in the economic, political and cultural arenas.   
 
The commodification of cultural products, which include news, and the 
internationalisation of news through news agencies and other wholesale content 
providers have further strengthened the media and cultural imperialistic model. The 
flow of news and information still appears to be unidirectional, from centre to periphery. 
The issue of media dependency on major media corporations in the global press systems 
is a significant issue during military conflicts, when key actors attempt to influence the 
media discourse. The contest for media space between ‘authorities’ and ‘challengers’ 
has global implications as the internationalised press systems act as channels for 
communicating the media (messages) products. By virtue of their strong news 
production positions, major media corporations influence public opinion and political 
attitudes  (Bagdikian, 2004).  
 
Furthermore the commercial imperatives and profit maximisation drive of concentrated 
media firms influence the allocation of media resources for news gathering and 
processing. Sometimes by taking the least-cost approach, the diversity of the media is 
compromised and the news media’s role in a democratic society as the marketplace of 
ideas undermined. As Starke (2004) noted, the newspaper industry, controlled by 
Fairfax and ANM, has “the risk of impacting negatively on the content of newspapers 
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and the quality of information, by reducing its diversity, reliability, accessibility and 
meaningfulness” (p 15). Given the market forces and commercial imperatives of the 
concentrated media, it is not surprising that New Zealanders think that major media 
organisations are more interested in maximising profit than informing the public.  
 
The greatest impact of globalisation in New Zealand has been on the country’s media 
system, with the print media industry now controlled by a foreign-owned duopoly. In 
this liberal and open market devoid of any legislation to control foreign ownership, the 
debate about the merits and demerits of the status quo is extensive. Media practitioners 
from the industry generally view foreign ownership and concentration as good for the 
media, while some others are concerned about the lack of diversity and the profit 
maximising nature of the media outlets.    
 
While the media globalisation has been realised through the internationalisation of 
global economies and the deregulation and policies formulated by institutional actors 
such as IMF, WTO and the World Bank, news agencies and major US and UK 
newspapers also play a globalisation role through their commodification of news and 
information for global consumption. In this process they also impact or set the global 
news agendas (Boyd-Barrett, 1997; Boyd-Barrett, 1999). As news agencies are so 
important to world news coverage in New Zealand newspapers, especially in Iraq War 
II, it is important to examine their roles in the globalised media system. Thus, in the 
following Chapter 4, news agencies, their roles as agenda setters and international news 
flows are discussed. 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 4: NEWS AGENCIES AND NEWS FLOWS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines international news flows, the position of news agencies in the 
international news coverage and their agenda setting roles for the world news media.  
 
The rise of international news agencies in the 19th century pushed the globalisation 
process, as news was one of the first media products to be comodified for international 
trade (McQuail, 2005). Nowadays the network of global media agencies has become 
dominant not only in the sale of news products but also to a great extent in determining 
the direction of news coverage and setting news agendas. 
 
The demand for news and information from the news media, economic and political 
institutions has increased the demand for international news, and provided opportunities 
for news agencies to become wholesalers of news to a diversified market – news media, 
business and political institutions. A handful of Western news agencies emerged as 
major stakeholders in a global news business. The news wholesaling business is 
dominated by the Associated Press (AP), Reuters, and Agence France-Presse (AFP), 
currently “The Big Three” international news agencies, although in the 1980s Reuters, 
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UPI, AP and AFP were the dominant creators and gatekeepers of international news, 
then known as “The Big Four” (Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1984; Thussu, 2002).   
 
What mainly determines and shapes news coverage is economic interest, information 
availability, and the production cost of international news (Wu, 2000). As major global 
media institutions are commercial enterprises aiming to maximise profit, these factors 
have become more relevant in recent times given the globalisation of media firms, the 
concentration of media ownership and the commodification of media products. The 
market forces are determining news coverage and use.  
 
Studies have shown that world newspapers depend on international news agencies and 
this dependence results in agencies dominating the foreign news agenda in world 
newspapers. As one international study concluded, the news agencies are “rather 
powerful agenda-setters for the press of many nations”(Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1985, p 
94).  
 
Being able to dominate the whole media content spectrum – from text to visuals – the 
world’s leading news agencies and other content providers are able to construct news 
according to their news values. Their global dominance through the construction of 
world events such as military conflicts can “also shape the wider view of a war” 
(Thussu, 2002, p 205).  
 
4.2 International news flows 
 
In the 1970s there was a major debate on the international news flow imbalance, most 
notably criticized for the unfair and often biased representation of the developing or 
‘Third World’ countries (Carlsson, 2003; Boyd-Barrett, 1997) by the then dominant 
news agencies – AFP, AP, Reuters and UPI. Of these, UPI has now been relegated from 
the elite club, due to economic crises in the 1980s, and is no longer considered to 
control one of the world’s major subscriber bases. These agencies which have been 
major players in the global news system since the mid 19th century “contribute to both 
processes of national consolidation and to globalisation” (Boyd-Barrett, 1997, p 132). 
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As discussed in Chapter 3, global news wires and more recently the news services 
contribute to the globalisation of news media. And as Boyd-Barrett argues, news 
agencies construct global and national and “Contribute to internationalisation, 
constructing influential news agenda and acting upon retail media” (Boyd-Barrett, 1999, 
p 300-301). 
 
The debate over the ‘free flow’ of information resulted in the United Nations 
Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) creating a panel to study 
the issue. The MacBride Commission report which outlined the main points of the New 
World Information Communication Order (NWICO), recommended that “the utmost 
importance should be given to eliminating imbalances and disparities in communication 
and its structures, and particularly in information flows” and  that “developing countries 
need to reduce their dependence” on international news content flowing from the major 
news agencies (The MacBride Report, 1980). The developed countries opposed the 
recommendations and undermined the imbalance of news flows issue by “a new phase 
of accelerated liberalization of communication, nationally and internationally”, and 
“other geopolitical changes largely closed down the debate” (McQuail, 2005, p 262). 
 
The free flow argument can be explored through an economic and financial framework 
to determine why global news media are dependent on a handful of news agencies for 
international news coverage. Smaller newspapers cannot afford to have their own 
correspondents in world hot spots, thus opting to depend on news wires. Subscribing to 
a major news agency, which provides news text, photos and graphics round the clock, 
costs about US$1500 a month for a medium-circulation daily newspaper. Thus “using 
news copy or footage provided by news services is much more economical than sending 
correspondents to investigate issues or cover incidents that take place on the foreign 
soil” (Wu, 2000, p 127). Even in established, larger media companies foreign 
departments, with a significant team of foreign correspondents, make up a large chunk 
of their total expenses to the tune of US$2 million per year for a single foreign 
television bureau (Tunstall, 1992). Thus, for the majority of world newspapers, the best 
and most economically efficient source for foreign news is news agencies and news 
services. Even for major global news events that may have a higher level of news value, 
CHAPTER 4: NEWS AGENCIES AND NEWS FLOWS                                                                PAGE 144  
 
few newspapers can send reporters to foreign locations, employing stringers or 
freelancers. News agencies are thus ideal information and news sources. 
 
According to Skurnik (1981), although most newspapers rely more on news agency 
copy to fill the daily foreign newshole, larger newspapers such as The New York Times 
can depend on its foreign correspondents for coverage of global events and thus “it can 
choose what it prints” (p 99). However, smaller newspapers with few resources have to 
depend on news agencies and few can afford to subscribe to several news agencies, let 
alone send reporters on foreign assignments such as to cover the war in Iraq. The news 
agency dependency model was observed by Tunstall (1992), whose worldwide research 
revealed that  “it is often the countries least capable of collecting their own foreign 
news that are most inclined to use a high proportion of foreign material in their news 
output” (p 86).  
 
How foreign correspondents of major newspapers such as The New York Times, The 
Washington Post or The Guardian work in news gathering is interesting. Normally they 
are based in important capitals as bureau chiefs, and are assigned to cover the region 
and neighbouring countries. In South Asia, those newspapers have bureaus in New 
Delhi, from where the journalists telephone sources in neighbouring countries to find 
information on news events that are newsworthy for them. And occasionally, say once a 
year, they visit those countries to write some human interest features, with more 
thematic coverage. When in November 1988 a Sri Lankan Tamil rebel group tried to 
overthrow the Maldives government in a dramatic fire fight (Operation Cactus, 2004), 
the conflict became top news in the world media. First, the newspapers relied on agency 
copy, which was filed from neighbouring Colombo. The major news agencies – Reuters, 
AP and AFP – filed stories on the event from Colombo or New Delhi. Within a few 
days, parachute journalism took hold, with correspondents from major newspapers and 
news agencies flocking to the Maldives to cover the developing story.  
 
When news events are covered from an overseas location, verification of information is 
also a major issue that journalists have to contemplate when filing under deadline 
pressure. A Reuters item, filed on 3rd November, datelined Colombo, said that up to 200 
residents of the capital Male may have died due to the clash between Maldives security 
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forces and Tamil guerrillas, although the death toll was in fact 19 Maldivians. The main 
sources for the news item were the Maldives High Commissioner in Colombo and 
residents of Male, who were contacted by telephone (Silva, 1988). 
 
The New York Times carried eight stories on the attack between 3rd November and 18th 
December.  The first story credited to AP appeared on the day of the Peoples Liberation 
of Tamil Elam (PLOTE) attack on 3rd November ("Coup Is Reported in the Maldives," 
1988) and another 804-word item was filed by one of  The Times correspondents, 
Sanjoy Hazarika, who later arrived in Male to cover the conflict (Hazarika, 1988).  
Another senior Times correspondent Barbara Crossette also filed a story which said that 
the mercenaries hired to overthrow the Maldives government were from a Tamil 
guerrilla group (Crossette, 1988).   
 
In the case of The New York Times, as the attack in the Maldives was an unexpected 
event, they had to rely on AP for the first day’s coverage, but were able to mobilise 
their regional correspondents to cover the event, both from Male and New Delhi. And 
for those newspapers that had no regional correspondents or saw no high news value in 
the incident news agencies were the only sources. In New Zealand, The Press carried 
three news items on the attack between November 4th and 10th, all credited to Reuters. 
None of the items originated from Male, where the news event occurred, but from New 
Delhi, Colombo and Singapore. 
 
A study of Malaysian newspapers’ coverage of Iraq War I shows that the print media 
heavily depended on international agencies for news. Of the 1,463 news items analysed 
from four leading newspapers, from January 17 to February 28, 1991, 85.7 percent 
(1,151 items) were of foreign origin (Nain, 1992).  
 
During Iraq War I, the Coalition Media Center was based in Saudi Arabia. However, 
the Saudi press sourced more content from international news agencies than their own 
staff, which is an indication of the level of dependency on the ‘Big Four’ news services. 
Research by Al-Kahtani (1999) found that in the coverage of Iraq War I (1990-1991), 
the Saudi Arabian press depended on foreign news sources such as Reuters, AFP, AP, 
UPI.  
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News agencies have become the main players in the international news business (Boyd-
Barrett, 1997), as only a handful of larger newspapers can afford to cover global 
conflicts by their staff reporters. In the market driven media industry, sourcing world 
news content from the ‘news wholesalers’ is more economical than posting reporters to 
conflict zones. Lee’s examination of Iraq War II coverage shows that larger newspapers 
depend more on their own staff for coverage of the war compared to smaller 
publications, which rely on news agencies (Lee, 2004). Nearly 90 percent of the 
editorial content on the conflict in The New York Times was attributed to their staff, 
while the Arab News and the Middle East Times depended heavily on news agencies 
with 57 percent and 88 percent respectively. 
 
During international conflicts, news agencies are still major suppliers of war news to 
world news media with a sudden increase in demand from global retailers (Rantanen, 
2004). Noting the significance of news agencies during military conflicts, Rantanen 
(2004) contends that global news media source news from news agencies mainly 
because “the costs of sending and maintaining one’s own correspondents become very 
high” (p 304). He adds that smaller news media are likely to depend more on the news 
agencies than larger media companies. As observed by Rantanen, smaller newspapers 
would find it economically prohibitive to send their own journalists to cover conflicts 
and if the event is of no direct relevance to audiences then sourcing content from the 
wires and other media outlets seems more appropriate. In the coverage of Iraq War II, 
mainstream daily newspapers in New Zealand opted to use news wires and other news 
services.  
 
Since Iraq War I, New Zealand newspapers have been using more foreign news sources, 
which are mainly US and UK newspapers and mainstream news agencies. As shown in 
Table 4.1, in Iraq War II coverage the three largest metropolitan newspapers used 15 
different news sources, while the figure for the Kosovo War was five.  
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Table 4.1 News agencies and other news sources used by leading New Zealand daily newspapers for 
coverage of major military conflicts 
Military conflicts News sources 
1. Vietnam War (1965-1975) Reuters, NZPA 
2. Iraq War I (Jan 1991) Reuters, AP, AFP, NZPA, AAP, Press Association, KRTN 
3. Kosovo War (March 1999) Reuters, AP, AFP, AAP, NZPA 
4. Iraq War II (March-May 2003) Reuters, AFP, AP, AAP, NZPA, Press Association, 
Bloomberg, KRT, New York Times, Washington Post, Los 
Angeles Times, Newsweek, Times of London, Independent, 
Observer, Telegraph, The Age 
Note: The news sources for the Vietnam War, Iraq War I and the Kosovo conflict were identified after analysing the 
selected newspapers for the first month of the conflicts. News items related to the specific conflicts were thus 
recorded. For Iraq War II sources were from the content analysis carried out for this research. 
 
For coverage of the 1991 Iraq War, seven sources were used, while during the Vietnam 
War Reuters was the main source. Use of US and UK newspaper content for military 
conflict coverage is a more recent development, and is an indication of the attempts by 
newspapers to present diverse views. In Iraq War II coverage, The New Zealand Herald, 
The Dominion Post and The Press extensively used content from non-news agency 
sources. The use of more sources is also an indication of the globalisation of media, 
both in terms of content and affiliation. What can be seen from Table 4.1 is that in a 
span of some 40 years there has been a definite pattern of news flows from a few 
Western countries to the rest of the world thus confirming the complaints of Non-
Aligned countries in the famous NWICO debates in the 1980s. However, what is also 
clear from the above table is that rather than a change in this flow there has been an 
intensification of the flow as additional major news content providers from the Western 
countries of the world have entered the news flow traffic. 
 
An earlier study of news content of 16 New Zealand daily newspapers, during the 
period May 1, 1965 to April 20, 1966, shows that content from international news 
agencies dominated the foreign news hole (Cleveland, 1970). More recent research 
reveals that major news agencies dominated international coverage in newspapers. 
Reuters, AP, AAP and AFP accounted for nearly 70 percent of the international news in 
a study of five New Zealand metropolitan newspapers in 2002. News content from 
Reuters, which is one of the largest news agencies, accounted for 35.7 percent (Taira, 
2003). 
 
The major world news agencies in their coverage concentrated most heavily on political 
actors, and there was a reliance on official sources. As the UNESCO report notes: 
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There appears to be a reliance on ‘officialdom’ for news, clearly reflected in the 
concentration on politics and political actors. Equally strong, though, is a reliance on 
the exceptional event, as indicated by the frequent reporting of terrorism and military 
actions (Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1985, p 94). 
 
The information imbalance, in terms of news flows, has created two major issues. 
Firstly news sources from the developed world, through their sheer dominance and 
influence are able to dominate news agenda in the world and limit and impede the flow 
of news from developing countries. As Thussu (2002) notes, “the imbalance in the flow 
of cultural products can affect the understanding of the South in the North and among 
the countries of the South, since most media flow continues to be from North to South 
and limited South– South exchange takes place” (p 205). The second issue is the role of 
sources as primary definers of news. In times of war, such as Iraq War II, British and 
United States officials were able to affect content and news flow through media 
management.  
 
The intense coverage given to military conflicts by news agencies is an indication of the 
global demand for military conflict news. Compared to locally generated content on the 
Iraq War in four South Asian countries, content attributed to international news 
agencies showed stronger war journalism framing and stronger support for the US and 
Britain, the principal partners in the war against Iraq (Maslog et al., 2006). 
 
4.3 The major news agencies  
 
International news content in world newspapers is mainly attributed to a few news 
agencies, headquartered in Western Europe or North America. Ever since news 
agencies emerged to commodify and trade in news in the early 19th century, the key 
players have remained the same. The major agencies remain major content providers for 
the global news media market, and thus “exercise a great deal of control over what 
international news reaches people around the world” (Shulman, 1994, p 108). In New 
Zealand, most of the international wires are channelled to news media organisations 
through NZPA, whose own wire provides news text and images of local events. 
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The news wholesaling business is currently dominated by AP, Reuters, and AFP, the 
“The Big Three” international news agencies. Of these Reuters and AP are the two 
dominant news agencies, the latter being the main news agency in the US domestic 
market. The three news agencies continue to dominate the global flow of news, with AP 
alone putting out 20 million words per day (Thussu, 2002). Reuters, which dominates 
markets in Europe, Africa, and much of Asia, has become the leading provider of 
financial-data-on-screens around the world, while its news operations are seen as a 
secondary activity (Tunstall, 1992).  
 
Although the news agencies began as providers of news text and still photos, the advent 
of television and the need for multimedia have diversified these media wholesalers. 
Reuters and AP provide content for television through Reuters Television and 
Associated Press Television News (APTN), which are the other major suppliers of news 
footage to worldwide subscribers. These two news agencies – from the UK and US – 
from a near duopoly in the world news agency business, thus dominating “the news 
agendas and news flows of the world” (Tunstall & Machin, 1999, p 88).  
 
With a staff of over 15,000 in 91 countries Reuters provides news and real-time 
financial data to a large global market. Reuters, founded in 1851, claims in its website 
that it is the “world’s largest international multimedia news agency – 2,300 editorial 
staff, journalists, photographers and camera operators in 196 bureaux serving 
approximately 130 countries” (Reuters., 2006b). In 2004 the news agency filed over 
two and a half million news items, including 440,000 alerts, from 209 countries around 
the world and published in 18 languages (Reuters., 2006b).  
 
The US-headquartered AP, established in 1846, serves 121 countries. Nearly 8,500 
international subscribers receive AP news and photos while in the US, 1,700 daily, 
weekly, non-English and college newspapers use AP. According to AP, it is “the 
backbone of the world’s information system serving thousands of daily newspaper, 
radio, television and online customers with coverage in all media and news in all 
formats” (AP., 2006b). 
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AFP, which is the world’s third largest news agency, currently generates around 10 
percent of its revenues on the web (Daily Times., 2006). AFP produces each day 
400,000 – 600,000 words in text, 1000 photos and 50 news graphics through a 
worldwide network that spans 165 countries, with nine bureaus in North America, 21 in 
Latin America, 25 in Asia-Pacific, nine in the Middle East, 36 in Europe and 16 in 
Africa (AFP., 2006b). The news agency was founded in 1835 and its worldwide 
operations reach thousands of subscribers via radio, television, newspapers and 
companies (AFP., 2006a).  
 
International news agencies that have become major sources for news media are also 
exploring other niche markets such as internet-based alternative media, thus further 
strengthening their hold on the international news market. Reuters, AP and AFP provide 
content to online news media, which include news text and multimedia. With this 
diversification of products and services, these news agencies and other news content 
providers are integral parts of the international news system. According to ‘Trends in 
Newsrooms 2006’, published by the World Association of Newspapers (WAN), the 
business model of news agencies is changing with the availability of new media such as 
the internet: 
 
Today, the advent of internet and mobile news has only exacerbated the prominence of 
news agencies and has possibly caused more problems for newspapers. Instead of 
having to distribute their content through newspapers or television stations, news 
agencies can directly contact the consumer through new media (World Association of 
Newspapers., 2006). 
 
News agencies have becomes retailers of news by providing content to internet-based 
media and also through their websites (Rantanen, 2004). Communications technology 
has contributed to the decentralisation of news as not only are news agencies able to 
disseminate news to various channels, but the public are also empowered to inject 
content into the global news flow through alternative websites, blogs and other forms of 
new media. With this, according to Gurevitch (Cited in Rantanen, 2004), the 
globalization of news has started. However, how news agency and news service content 
is reported in news media such as newspapers differs with every publication. In the 
context of foreign news coverage in newspapers in New Zealand, the selection and 
framing of news by editors reflects the local news values and framework. Thus when 
CHAPTER 4: NEWS AGENCIES AND NEWS FLOWS                                                                PAGE 151  
 
local news retailers collate news from external sources they also attempt to put them in 
the local context.  
 
The traditional role of news agencies has been to provide content to news media, who 
retail news, but with the internet and the developing markets for online news, news 
agencies are also attracting audiences directly to them, bypassing the traditional retailers 
of news. Both Reuters and AP have websites that provide news items and videos for 
readers, the same as those which appear on the mainstream news media. The Associated 
Press provides news and information to commercial web sites, wireless services, 
corporate and government intranets and desktops using XML and other Web-ready 
formats, which customers can integrate with their own websites or applications (AP., 
2006a). Reuters (Reuters., 2006c) and AFP also provide content to web-based and 
mobile media. Reuters also carry most of the news stories with photos and videos on its 
website, updated regularly, while its feed is also carried in news portals such as 
YahooNews (Reuters., 2006a). The YahooNews website sources content directly from 
news agencies and provides options for readers to choose from the three major news 
agencies – Reuters, AP and AFP – simply with a mouse click.  
  
However, the major market for global news agencies are the print media around the 
world, who rely on wire services mainly for foreign news, for economic and 
organisational reasons. 
 
In New Zealand, the newspapers receive wire services such as Reuters, AP, AFP and 
AAP through the New Zealand Press Association. According to NZPA, it “operates a 
24 hour, seven-day-a-week service providing national and international news” to local 
news media. Its own wire provides general, political, business, sport, and entertainment 
news stories and information and pictures and graphics of news, sport and entertainment 
events in New Zealand (NZPA., 2006a). As the national news agency, owned by the 
daily newspaper industry, NZPA distributes international and domestic news to the 
daily and Sunday newspapers and their websites, as well as providing a domestic news 
service to radio and television networks, and international news agencies Reuters, 
Associated Press, Australian Associated Press and Agence France-Presse (Brown, 
2006).   
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The NZPA provides national and international news to subscribers via a data link from 
its main newsroom in Wellington. According to NZPA its “newsroom sends out about 
1000 different pieces of information every 24 hours, compiled from the news resources 
of its own staff, the daily newspapers, overseas wire services and other sources like The 
New Zealand Stock Exchange” (NZPA., 2006b).  
 
Some of the foreign news wires that pass through NZPA are also edited before the 
content reaches the subscribers.  According to NZPA editor Nick Brown, “some 
newspapers have direct feeds of the Reuters wire, but they largely rely on international 
agency copy that has been ‘filtered’ by NZPA staff who do some editing of the stories 
and sometimes combine stories from different agencies” (Interview with Brown, 13th 
July 2006). 
 
International coverage by NZPA is primarily focused on the Asia-Pacific region and the 
service sends reporters throughout this region to cover major events. It relies on 
freelance correspondents in other parts of the world. Although NZPA did not send a 
journalist to cover the recent war in Iraq, it did after the 1991 Gulf War. Besides 
distributing the agency copy on the latest Iraq conflict, NZPA has occasionally phoned 
New Zealanders on the ground for stories (Interview with Brown, 13th July 2006). 
 
4.4 International news agencies as agenda setters 
 
The news agency dependency model was observed by Tunstall after world-wide 
research that revealed that “it is often the countries least capable of collecting their own 
foreign news that are most inclined to use a high proportion of foreign material in their 
news output” (Tunstall, 1992, p 86).  
 
According to Musa (1990), who studied the impact of international news agencies on 
Third World news agencies, the former play an agenda setting role for the latter. As 
most readers of international news are outside the direct experience of the events, they 
rely on the news that is reported to them in the news media through the wire services. 
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Thus, as Wanta et al argue, “media coverage of international news …  plays an 
important agenda-setting function” (Wanta, Golan, & Lee, 2004, p 367). The news 
agencies, who supply media content, be that video, audio or news text, are agenda 
setters as “they make the first decisions on how and if international stories – particularly 
those from the news flow fringes of the non-industrialized world – will be covered” 
(Paterson, 1998, p 82).  
 
The same appears to be true whether it is in the developed or least developed world. If 
international news agencies and other news services become the dominant source for 
national and local newspapers, then the agenda is being set by these sources. In New 
Zealand all the international news agencies are channelled through the New Zealand 
Press Association, akin to a national news agency. In the coverage of recent military 
conflicts such as Iraq War I and Iraq War II newspapers relied on international news 
agencies and the negative implication of this dependence on content has been criticized 
by academics and media analysts (Robie, 2003; Pauling, 1996; Shulman, 1994). In 
commenting on Iraq War I coverage by the New Zealand press, Jim Tully noted that 
“our view of the world is narrowed by the fact that we rely for our international news on 
three or four main news agencies. These three news agencies originate from two or 
three of the world’s most powerful Western nations” (Pauling, 1996, p 6).  In the 
coverage of Iraq War II, the New Zealand news media depended heavily on mainstream 
global news agencies (Comrie & Fountaine, 2005). 
 
The widespread coverage given to military conflicts such as the war in Iraq by news 
media of countries that are not directly involved in the conflicts is due to an increase on 
the supply side by global news agencies. Rantanen (2004) argues that this is an 
indication of  “the power of global news: to set the agenda for news around the world” 
(p 302). 
 
According to Abel, news media in New Zealand depend heavily on major international 
news agencies, thus limiting the diversity of views on international issues: 
 
Almost all international news in the New Zealand media comes from overseas news 
agencies such as Reuters and Associated Press, while the New Zealand Press 
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Association is a major source of domestic news. As a result the number of voices being 
heard on any issue is not as wide as it might be” (Abel, 2004, p 190). 
 
After a study of international news coverage in five New Zealand metropolitan 
newspapers, Taira  (2003, p 147) concluded that the dynamics of news flows and 
globalisation has a profound impact on the New Zealand press in the following ways: 
 
1. Except for stories that affect New Zealand directly, the world news agenda 
for the New Zealand metropolitan press is set by the international news 
wires 
2. New Zealand news media receive the majority of foreign news through the 
news wires and as there is a mass of news from the news agencies, the New 
Zealand newspapers do not send reporters overseas unless the news issue 
involves New Zealand or is in close geographic proximity. 
3. The dependence on international news agencies results in ‘standard Western’ 
ways of seeing global issues. 
4. Even in the coverage of overseas news events, New Zealand correspondents 
‘provide supplementary material to stories which rely, principally, if not 
exclusively on standard news feeds’. 
 
The near total dependence on international news wires is mostly due to economic and 
management reasons, as the cost of sending staff to cover an event such as the war in 
Iraq would be enormous. Newspapers are profit oriented commercial enterprises, and as 
such using news wires – which are inexpensive news sources – would be in the best 
interests of the management, although copy generated by newspaper staff, with their 
own perspectives, would stand out as being more relevant to the newspapers’ audience, 
from the journalistic point of view. The direction of foreign news coverage is to a great 
extent determined by the news agencies, as the newspapers become dependent on them.  
 
The immediacy of information delivery is another factor in the reliance of news media 
on news agencies. A UNESCO commissioned report on foreign news coverage in 29 
countries concluded, “it is likely that one of the main reasons for the widespread use 
and influence of the big four Western news agencies is their ability to provide timely 
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reports of important events around the world for a reasonable price” (Sreberny-
Mohammadi, 1985, p 94). 
 
The total dependence on news agencies for world news coverage leads to these sources 
affecting the direction of coverage. The newspapers have to rely on wire copies to fill 
the foreign news pages, and this reliance leads them to become agenda setters. There is 
not much change in the wire copies, except the re-writing of headlines and occasionally 
the combining of items from different news agencies (Interview with Gardner, 8th 
March, 2006; Interview with Thompson, 23rd February, 2006). However the main 
content remains as structured by the news agencies, and the same emphasis is given 
when those items are published by the newspapers.   
 
The  New Zealand news media, according to Thompson, “republishes whatever 
information has been supplied to them off the satellite and over the wires from what are 
almost exclusively US and UK news sources” (Interview with Thompson, 23rd 
February, 2006). During Iraq War II this tilted coverage in favour of the US-led 
coalition. Publishing news that has been written for other publications also has some 
other implications. For example, what is written in The New York Times or The 
Independent by their staff reporters is aimed at their specific audiences and reflects the 
newspapers’ editorial stance. Thus, when an article that appeared in The Independent on 
an Iraq War-related issue is published in The New Zealand Herald, how the New 
Zealand newspaper readers decode the messages in the context of their own news 
frames of the conflict would be different from that of the British readers. 
 
In the construction of global events for local audiences, journalists and editors are 
influenced by the larger global issues and events being covered and presented by the 
news agencies. As Stevenson and Cole (1984) noted, “it is often argued that the wire 
services set the media agenda by telling local editors (and their readers, in turn) what 
parts of the world and what issues they should think about” (p 48) in the news selection 
and processing stages. Research has shown that news agencies also affect the news 
agenda of the media (Whitney & Becker, 1982). 
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After a study of foreign news coverage in 17 countries, Stevenson and Cole concluded 
that there was evidence to suggest that Western news agencies influenced what parts of 
the world and what kinds of news the national media should focus on in covering 
international news (Stevenson & Cole, 1984). Thus news agencies and other content 
providers are in a more powerful gatekeeping position for world news retailers in that 
the former make choices in selecting what events to cover, which angles to focus on and 
what visuals or images to accompany the item. The news ‘wholesalers’ are well 
positioned to be the agenda setters for the media clients in the world. In setting the 
global news agenda, the major wire services “contributed to internationalization, 
constructing influential international news agendas that acted upon retail media, 
governments and finance” (Boyd-Barrett, 1997, p 143).  
 
Besides the influence of news agencies in setting the media agenda, news media are 
also affected by coverage in other often larger news media. This is actually what media 
scholars refer to as inter-media agenda setting, where elite mainstream news 
organisations set the agenda for smaller news organisations (Lopez-Escobar E., Llamas, 
McCombs, & Rey, 1998; Reese & Danielian, 1989). For example, coverage of larger 
issues in The New York Times might be ‘mirrored’ by other, smaller news media.  
 
Foreign news selection and editing is based on the news values and editorial policies of 
the newspapers. In these gatekeeping processes of selecting, editing and arranging news 
in a format that gives emphasis to certain items, the newspapers construct the news 
discourse according to their judgments and values. These operations of reorganisation, 
deletion, addition and substitution (van Dijk, 1988) do not entirely change the theme 
and direction of items, but still convey the message as constructed by the news agencies. 
  
The news media and specifically the news gatherers at the frontlines of conflicts – elite 
newspapers, news agencies – rely on official or ex-official sources, thus exporting the 
elite-dominated content to the news retailers – the global media who rely on them for 
war coverage. Research has shown that in the two military conflicts in the Gulf 
involving major powers – Iraq War I and Iraq War II – official sources dominated news 
and the US press relied on official or ex-official sources, while only a small minority of 
content originated from alternative sources (Bennett, 1994; Tumber & Palmer, 2004). 
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Of the major news agencies, Reuters and AP also provide content for broadcast media, 
and function as global television news services. As a visual medium, television news 
plays a very powerful role in affecting public the perception of events, sometimes 
influencing public and foreign policies of countries (Hess, 2002; Robinson, 2003). 
Indeed broadcast media play a major role in the developed world where dependence on 
television news is high. This dependence leads to the news agencies becoming the 
agenda setters for the audiences. When news agency coverage is not representative of 
the real event, then the audience is left with the image constructed by journalists. Often 
this image is the result of journalists having encountered logistical and even political 
obstacles in their news gathering.  
 
Looking at the way the news agencies covered war in the Balkans, Paterson observed 
the constraints journalists face and noted their agenda-setting impact: 
 
International news agencies created the dominant image of the Bosnian civil war, an 
image highly distorted by the structural constraints inherent in television news agency 
coverage routines. Further the coverage shaped by those constraints has an ongoing 
agenda-setting impact across all media, making the distorted image the guide for 
coverage by all media (Paterson, 1997, p 151). 
 
A study of how the local newspapers in Northern Ireland covered Iraq War II shows a 
heavy reliance on news agencies for content, although attempts were made to localise 
the news coverage (Rolston & McLaughlin, 2004). However, without many local angles 
available, the public discourse was determined by wire copies. The study concluded that 
the dependence on foreign wire services by the Belfast dailies meant that “much of the 
coverage of the war in Iraq was determined from outside the local society” (Rolston & 
McLaughlin, 2004, p 200).  
 
Recent research on the coverage of Iraq War II in four Asian countries – India, Sri 
Lanka, Indonesia and the Philippines – shows that foreign news agency items have 
stronger war journalism framing than stories written by newspapers’ correspondents 
(Maslog et al., 2006). Of the 125 news agency items 64 percent were framed as war 
journalism and 29 percent peace journalism compared to 59 percent as peace journalism 
in the locally-produced content. For a newspaper whose audience favours a peaceful 
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resolution of a conflict such as the Iraq War, complete dependence on news agencies 
would result in the war being framed differently.  
 
News agencies have indeed become powerful institutions, being able to set the news 
agenda in a globalised world where economic and organisational factors have, 
influenced international news coverage and reliance on the few content providers. As 
Ossokina (2003) argues, international news agencies have become major political actors, 
as most of the “press organisations, governments and individuals depended on news 
agencies” for news and information. Given their dominance, wire services are in a far 
stronger position to influence foreign policy and public opinion through the agenda they 
set with both news text and video footage. When dependence on wire services is high 
and local input low, the likely result is a ‘news agency effect’ on the power elites and 
the global public. Agenda setting research has shown that there is a relationship 
between the “order of importance  given in the media to ‘issues’ and the order of 
significance attached to the same issues by politicians and the public” (McQuail, 2005, 
p 512). 
 
The news media, including news agencies, have to make choices based on several 
factors, in the news selection process. There are many thousands of possible news 
events occurring around the globe on any given day. A news agency or a newspaper or 
any other media outlet has to select the events and issues to be covered based on news 
values, organisational and logistical factors. It is not possible to cover every news event, 
thus the gatekeepers – reporters, editors – resort to the news selection processes that 
ultimately give salience to certain events within the framework of news journalism. 
Through the news gathering and processing and eventually packaging and presenting, 
media practitioners set the news agenda for the public, by extrapolating from several 
thousand possible news items some that they think are of relevance to readers.  
 
4.5 Discussion 
 
International news reporting began to change with the developments in communications 
technology, globalisation, and the demand for information in global economic and 
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financial systems. The international news agencies, which have been instrumental in the 
push towards the globalisation of news by commodifying news as a product (McQuail, 
2005), have become dominant. A few news agencies dominate the content and direction 
of world news in thousands of print and broadcast media outlets throughout the world, 
thus vesting in them the ability to manipulate or control global opinion through their 
news products. According to Sreberny-Mohammadi (1985) who was the lead author of 
a UNESCO report on international news flows, the news agencies are “rather powerful 
agenda-setters for the press of many nations” (p 94).  
 
International journalism – the reporting of global events for local consumption – by 
news agencies has changed over the past 22 years and the notion that news agencies are 
powerful agenda setters can be contested. At present there are many news sources in the 
once ‘monopoly market’ of the few elite news agencies, such as major US and UK 
newspapers and alternative news agencies. Thus editors are able to make news selection 
choices from a myriad of copy to accommodate their own agendas. International news 
in the New Zealand print media is dominated by Reuters, AP, AAP and AFP, while in 
the past five years content from other sources such as major US and UK publications is 
also being used more frequently. With the increase in more non-news agency content 
for world news coverage, the agenda is also being set by major US and UK newspapers.   
 
With a global media market dominated by three major news agencies, the flow of news 
and information is likely to impact media consumers, as the news generated by the wire 
services is based on general news values, not those specific to any of the world’s 
diverse cultures. Without local input into the news agency copy, a story such as the 
Reuters story on the alleged finding of a chemical weapons factory in the Iraqi city of 
Najaf  ("Chemical weapons "factory" overrun," 2003) might have a similar impact 
whether it is published in newspapers in Britain, New Zealand, Fiji or the Maldives.  
The main sources in the news item were the US military, US government and the 
Pentagon. The media audience in those countries may be diverse, with different world 
views and opinions about the US-led invasion of Iraq, but they are exposed to the same 
content and thus the same news agenda. Unless the wire copy is re-written, or filed by 
the newspaper staff, the news agencies have the opportunity to set a common news 
agenda for the world audience.  
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The potential influence of news agencies in dominating the news agenda is apparent, 
but with more news agencies and news services at the disposal of foreign news editors, 
news media could determine the orientation of coverage by using multiple sources 
which would give more choices in news selection. The news angles or framing used by 
journalists from The New York Times and The Independent writing about civilian deaths 
due to Coalition bombing of an Iraq village might well be different. And the thematic 
focus of coverage of the bombing, for example, might differ between several news 
sources or agencies. Hence, with more news resources, news media could have the 
opportunity to frame the Iraq War in a way that would reflect the audiences’ interests 
and political debates. However, if the newspapers used their own correspondents to 
cover the bombing, the coverage could be developed to reflect exactly the news values 
and interests of the newspapers. 
 
News agencies and the newspapers follow several criteria in judging the 
newsworthiness of an event or a news story, based on the editorial policies of the media.  
The news values framework helps reporters and editors in the selection of news, but 
several internal and external factors influence the priorities given to different news 
values. Reporting and publishing news are thus very much influenced by news values 
and news selection processes. These aspects of journalism are explored in the next 
chapter. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 5: NEWS VALUES, NEWS SELECTION AND FRAMING  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter aims to explore the critical perspectives on news values, news selection 
processes and how media content is framed to construct coverage of news events. There 
are several variables influencing the news selection and processing equation, which the 
gatekeepers have to consider in all stages of the news production. 
 
In reality, every news item that is fit to print does not get past the gatekeepers to media 
consumers. Journalists and editors have to subject the news content to selection and 
filtering based on a set of news values or a news selection framework that takes into 
account several factors. In the selection of national and international news for 
publication or broadcast, news judgements are made based on the news values and other 
professional considerations. McQuail identifies seven factors that affect the selection 
and flow of international news (McQuail, 2005) while Galtung and Ruge (1965) suggest 
a dozen factors that contribute to events to becoming news.   
 
According to Golding and Elliott (1979), news values are used in the selection of items 
for inclusion in the final news product and as a guideline for presentation of the items. 
In the news selection and processing stages, journalists and editors frame the news and 
make certain aspects of the event more salient (Entman, 1991). In the news selection 
and framing processes journalists and editors use news values frameworks and 
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audience-oriented routines (Shoemaker & Reese, 1991). With military conflicts 
commanding a high news value (Schechter, 2003), wars such as Iraq War II are seen 
important and newsworthy news beats for countries that are directly involved in the 
conflict. And even in New Zealand, which is geographically far removed from the 
conflict, the war in Iraq (at least the invasion phase) was an important news event. One 
factor that has made coverage important is globalisation, as discussed in Chapter 3, and 
the high news values which are discussed in this chapter. 
 
5.2 News values 
 
News coverage, whether it is local, national or foreign, in the news media in any 
country is shaped by the news values. The news values help journalists and editors to 
make the news judgements and determine what is newsworthy. As noted by Hall et al  
(1978), “News is the end product of a complex process which begins with a systematic 
sorting and selecting of events and topics according to a socially constructed set of 
categories” (p 53). In judging what is newsworthy, media practitioners use such values 
as conflict, frequency, intensity, meaningfulness, proximity, scarcity, and reference to 
elite nations among many others. The priority given to news values and thus the 
selection of conflicts for coverage is highly selective in the news media, as evidenced 
by the threat posed by North Korea as the US prepared to invade Iraq in March 2003. 
According to Boyd-Barrett (2004) despite the threat and hostile nuclear capability, 
“North Korea reporting was completely overshadowed by Iraq” (p 26-27).   
 
Although not every conflict gets extensive coverage, when major world powers are 
directly involved in military conflicts the aggregate news values of conflicts increase. 
Media consumers are drawn to conflict news, mainly because of the drama, magnitude, 
relevance and impact. As noted by Boyd-Barrett (2004), war coverage is “commercially 
rewarding for the media, since its threat and unfolding ignite insatiable audience 
appetite for news” (p 26). Furthermore war journalism discourse is “high in tension and 
drama, with complex main plots and sub-plots played out within traditionally binary 
oppositions of aggressor and victim, winner and loser” (Boyd-Barrett, 2004, p 26). 
According to Webster (2003), widespread coverage of conflicts is also due to the 
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“compelling interest” of the media in war, as “War is dramatic, attention-grabbing” (p 
58). Webster writes: 
 
There are clearly other factors involved such as the scale and intensity of the conflict, 
its location, where the participants come from, as well as its strategic implications. 
However, the inherent newsworthiness of war remains and increases the likelihood of it 
receiving prominent and sustained attention (Webster, 2003, p 58). 
 
Conflict has a high news value, which is why global military conflicts get wide 
coverage. That does not mean every conflict is given the same level of prominence. 
Different news media in different countries may treat coverage of conflicts differently, 
as other news values also determine the news selection and thus coverage. For example, 
news values of Iraq War II for the US and UK news media may be different from those 
of the New Zealand press.  At the very obvious level, the US and UK are directly 
involved in the conflict while New Zealand is not at all involved in the invasion of Iraq. 
Several factors have made Iraq War II of high news value to many nations irrespective 
of levels of involvement. 
 
Unanimity among global media outlets regarding the newsworthiness of major world 
conflicts would be more likely compared to that regarding a much localised conflict in a 
non-elite nation. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 by the US and Coalition forces attracted 
more coverage in more countries than the Sri Lankan government offensive against 
separatist Tamil guerrillas in the north and east of the country which has claimed more 
than 70,000 lives since 1983 (Fair, 2006). 
 
Military conflicts also attract widespread media attention because they have “all the 
ingredients by virtue of combining essential elements of news values such as 
unusualness, drama, episode and event orientation” (Musa, 2007, p 14). Any direct 
association of major powers in military conflicts would have a multiplying effect in 
terms of the intensity of the coverage.    
 
Although conflict and drama are seen as high news values, the combination of elite 
nations and military conflicts attracts intense media coverage by mainstream global 
news media. However, when conflicts involve non-elite actors such as a Third World 
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country media attention is significantly lower. Noting this imbalance in coverage, Musa 
said: 
 
Whereas Africa is home to over 60 percent of world ethnic conflicts, the global media 
have underreported such conflicts with serious implications for their perception and 
resolution. Yet the underreporting of African conflict … is a manifestation of the 
asymmetries of globalisation” (Musa, 2007, p 14). 
 
During a recent meeting of The Press staff with its readers, some readers noted the 
tendency of the newspaper to focus on elite nations and major powers such as the US, 
while larger humanitarian crises are given less prominence. One reader noted that the 
“International section lacks depth and real ‘news’ and Iraq is given more 
coverage/prominence than Sudan. More on international conflict is required not just if 
America is involved” ("What readers said about The Press," 2006). 
 
A study of international news coverage showed that the US was dominant in almost all 
foreign news items and powerful countries such as Russia and France were also 
prominent. In a 1985 study of print and broadcast media in 38 countries, the US 
accounted for about 18 percent of the entire world’s media space devoted to foreign 
countries during the two weeks of study (Wu, 2000). One in five items dealt with the 
US, which “vividly indicates that international news coverage is uneven not only at the 
level of each individual country, but also at the level of the world” (Wu, 2000, p 121).  
 
Those countries with enormous economic and political clout tend to be emphasised in 
the press. Trade volume and presence of international news agencies are two principal 
predictors of news coverage, while physical distance plays a minor role (Wu, 2000). 
 
There are several factors that determine coverage of international news. It is not only 
the conflict, but also economic and political relations, and geographic and cultural 
proximity which ultimately determine which foreign news events are covered. Another 
key factor is the desire of media consumers to know about powerful countries (McQuail, 
2005), whose action could affect them. McQuail (2005, p 263) identifies seven factors 
that affect the selection and flow of international news:  
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• The nature of news as an event occur 
• Timing of events and news cycles 
• Reporting and transmitting resources available 
• The operation of international news agencies 
• News values 
• Geography, trade and diplomacy 
• Cultural affinity and language 
 
Almost all of the points identified by McQuail are relevant in the New Zealand context 
in relation to the war in Iraq. As a major military conflict in recent times, involving 
major powers and a Gulf state, the news values of the conflict were high for every news 
media. With modern communications technology there was no shortage of news 
resources for news retailers, thus international news flows were high. News agencies, 
and other media outlets comodified news for the global news media market and New 
Zealand was one such consumer. Though geographically distant, culturally New 
Zealand is closer to key actors, notably Australia and Britain, which makes the case for 
extensive coverage justified.  
 
One of the reasons why the conflict in Rwanda did not get extensive coverage was due 
to the lack of news gathering resources directed at the country (Pottier, 2002). Thus 
coverage from international news agencies and other news gatherers and disseminators 
has been minimal in the case of Rwanda. The result of  “media’s failure to adequately” 
cover the Rwandan genocide of 1994, was that slaughter was “wrongly portrayed as 
ancient tribal hatred” (Pottier, 2002, p 56). And with the departure of foreign personnel 
working in Rwanda, media coverage also declined. According to a UN report, “When 
the genocide was accelerating, the Western press virtually ceased to report Rwanda” 
(Cited in Pottier, 2002, p 56). 
 
The difference between Rwanda and the Kosovo conflict was that elite actors were 
involved in the latter, while in the former the genocide was by domestic actors. 
Furthermore, Rwanda is in Africa, a region that is not economically and politically very 
important to the developed countries, thus the crisis did not attract much media attention 
compared to Kosovo, which is located in the heart of Europe. 
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According to Galtung  (2002), in war journalism the news media “sees a conflict as a 
battle and the battle as sports arena and gladiator circus”, thus focusing on wining, as in 
sports reporting where “winning is not everything, it is the only thing’ ”. He noted that 
war journalism is oriented in four key directions – it is violence oriented, propaganda 
oriented, elite oriented, and victory oriented (Galtung, 2002). The orientation of war 
coverage is also influenced by the prevailing public opinion of the audiences and 
government policies towards the conflict. Noting these factors, Boyd-Barrett (2004) 
argued that war journalism is often one sided, as “The media typically cover war from 
the point of view of the country in which they and their owners and readers are based, 
reflecting the point of view of that country’s government and its foreign policy elites” 
(p 29). 
 
Bell (1991) suggested three more news values – competition, predictability and 
prefabrication – which can be applied in the context of both news agencies and other 
news media. As profit-making enterprises, media outlets are always in competition, thus 
they report exclusive stories and related issues as major stories. The predictability factor 
becomes relevant as journalists tend to cover expected and pre-scheduled events, while 
ready-made content, such as media releases and news agency copy has a greater chance 
of being published (Bell, 1991).   
 
Golding and Elliott (1979) suggested a number of key news values – drama, visual 
attractiveness, entertainment, importance, size, proximity, brevity, negativity, recency, 
elites and personalities – most of which also have been suggested by other scholars 
(Harcup & O’Neill, 2001; McGregor, 2002; Galtung & Ruge, 1965). But, Golding and 
Elliott noted that any news value is used in two ways in the news processing by 
journalists or editors:  
 
News values are used in two ways. They are criteria of selection from material available 
to the newsroom of those items worthy of inclusion in the final product. Second they 
are the guidelines for the presentation of items, suggesting what to emphasise, what to 
omit, and where to give priority in the preparation of the items for presentation to the 
audience. News values are thus working rules, thus comprising a corpus of occupational 
lore which implicitly and often expressly explains and guides newsroom practice 
(Golding & Elliott, 1979, p 114). 
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A study of British national newspapers by Harcup and O’Neill has shown, in 
conformity with Galtung and Ruge, that for news story to be selected, one or more news 
value requirements has to be met. Based on their research, they proposed the following 
set of news values (Harcup & O’Neill, 2001, p 279): 
 
1. Power elite. Stories concerning powerful individuals, organisations or 
institutions. 
2. Celebrity. Stories concerning people who are already famous. 
3. Entertainment. Stories concerning sex, show business, human interest, animals, 
an unfolding drama, or offering opportunities for humorous treatment, 
entertaining photographs or witty headlines. 
4. Surprise. Stories that have an element of surprise and/or contrast. 
5. Bad news. Stories with particularly negative overtones, such as conflict or 
tragedy. 
6. Good news. Stories with particularly positive overtones such as rescues and 
cures. 
7. Magnitude. Stories that are perceived as sufficiently significant either in the 
numbers of people involved or in potential impact. 
8. Relevance. Stories about issues, groups and nations perceived to be relevant to 
the audience. 
9. Follow-up. Stories about subjects already in the news. 
10. Newspaper agenda. Stories that set or fit the news organisation’s own agenda. 
 
Harcup and O’Neill’s study examined the news values currently operational in British 
newspapers and critically evaluated Galtung and Ruge’s (1965) seminal work on 
foreign news selection and values, proposing more contemporary news values (Harcup 
& O’Neill, 2001).  
 
According to Schechter (2003), the news values of military conflicts is high and thus 
“war is often the ‘big story’ (when sex isn’t) and a defining moment for many 
journalists. It’s the story that permits news departments to mobilise their ‘troops’ – 
that’s what ABC called employees when I worked there” (p 128). With conflict and 
drama judged as high news values, news content is likely to be more event-oriented 
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than issue-oriented as the latter needs context and often in-depth analysis (Shoemaker, 
1987).  
 
5.3 News selection 
 
In the news selection process editors do not pick content blindly, instead working within 
the larger news values framework where market forces and audience interest determine 
the relevance and significance of the world news items under consideration. Although 
the New Zealand news media relied on mainstream international news outlets for Iraq 
War II coverage, through rigorous news selection processes a ‘balanced’ approach to 
war reporting was taken. Comrie and Fountaine (2005), argued that this “Balance was 
present on two levels: in the media’s attempt to be generally even-handed in selection of 
‘pro’ and ‘anti’ articles” (p 245). 
 
From a structural and sociological perspective, the news media can be seen to operate in 
relation to other societal institutions. And as they are bound by political and economic 
considerations, the news selection, processing and publication are influenced by the 
societal variables. Looking at these dimensions, Herman  (2002) contended that “the 
media comprise numerous independent entities that operate on the basis of common 
outlooks, incentives and pressures from the market, government and internal 
organizational forces” (p 64). 
 
Noting that institutional factors play a significant role in the news selection process, 
Knight (1982) argued that “The selectivity of news … is institutional rather than 
personal. Its effect, nonetheless, is that news accounts are partial accounts, structured 
according to the regnant rules of newsworthiness and format, rules which 
‘automatically’ include certain data and exclude other” (p 33). According to McQuail, 
internal processing of content furthers the selection bias and organisational routines are 
aimed to support the media organisation’s interests. On this matter, McQuail notes: 
 
Media organisations tend to reproduce selectively according to criteria that suit their 
own goals and interests. These may sometimes be professional and craft criteria, but 
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more weight is usually given to what sells most or gets highest ratings (McQuail, 2005, 
p 329). 
 
As noted by Skurnik (1981), “newspapers tend to select, from the myriad [of] available 
news, that which harmonizes to which they subscribe” (p 100). Based on the news 
values framework, journalists and editors make the news judgement to develop the story, 
and choose the news angle to highlight, as well as the placement and priority of the 
article. Shoemaker and Reese (1991) point out that “news judgment is the ability to 
evaluate stories based on agreed-on news values, which provide yardsticks of 
newsworthiness and constitute audience-oriented routines” (p 90). 
 
Even though newspaper editors try to balance coverage of events through the selection 
of content from multiple sources (Interview with Thompson, 23rd February, 2006; 
Interview with Gardner, 8th March, 2006) these processes must still posit the 
publications in a particular direction as international news has already been processed 
through news selection and news values frameworks by news agencies and foreign 
newspapers. Moreover, newspapers cannot be purely objective as “the very process of 
selecting the words or images, their inclusion or omission and even their location on the 
page or the screen, is part of the process of persuasion that is propaganda” (Taylor, 
1992a). 
 
While news media receive thousands of foreign news items daily (from the wires and 
news services), the factors and criteria in news selection are varied, depending on the 
editorial policies of the media organisation. The news selection choices are influenced 
by the audiences and market considerations. However, there are also certain 
fundamental concepts and attributes associated with the professional values of 
journalism that determine the selection of news.  
 
A set of news values guides gatekeepers in determining selection, emphasis and 
placement of news. Galtung and Ruge (1965) suggested a dozen factors that cause 
events to become news, which include threshold, frequency, intensity, meaningfulness, 
proximity, continuity, scarcity, reference to elite nations and people.  
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In the news selection process, these values are not applied in isolation; rather several 
key factors are looked at in making editorial choices, such as selection, placement and 
priority of the news items. The more the news values are associated with a particular 
news event, the more likely that it will be chosen as a news item (Galtung & Ruge, 
1965). News values are used by reporters in covering events and by editors in selecting 
wire or staff copies for publications. If a newspaper’s sole source of foreign news is 
news agencies, then that newspaper is dependent on the agencies’ editors’ who 
influence journalists in their decision to cover and report news events. There is no 
relationship between the news agency journalists and the newspaper editors who 
subscribe to their stories. On the other hand, if a newspaper sends staff to cover a global 
news event such as the war in Iraq, the editor has much editorial control in directing 
their staff to report certain events that meet the newspaper’s set of news values, 
audience and market considerations.  
 
A news agency reporter will be responsible to the news values and other professional 
guidelines of the agency while the news media, which subscribe to the agency news, do 
not have any editorial influence on the news agency editors or reporters. And the 
influence on editorial decisions from the readers is very minimal. It is the editors who, 
as gatekeepers, decide on what is newsworthy and ‘fit’ for publication. Meadows and 
Ewart (2001) have noted that reporters from both news agencies and newspapers get 
their reporting cues from the management rather than the audience. However, this does 
not mean that in making editorial choices, audience and market considerations are 
completely ignored. News media, whether print or broadcast, have to orient the news 
product according to the demands and tastes of the audiences.  
  
When Galtung and Ruge analysed the structure of foreign news in 1965, the main news 
media was print, and television journalism was still at infancy and limited to the 
developed countries. The impact of  today’s instant and live coverage of news events 
was not foreseen during the 1960s, and as such in forming the news selection factors, 
the Swedish researchers did not take into account the visual medium. McGregor thus 
suggested a revision of Galtung and Ruge, to accommodate additional news values – 
visualness, emotion, conflict and ‘clebrification’ of the journalist – to reflect the strong 
impact of visual news coverage on television (McGregor, 2002).  While, visualness of 
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news events is vital for television journalism, modern design trends, which call for 
photos and graphics to enhance news reading, have become essential for print media as 
well.  
 
National interest plays a significant role in the news selection process. According to 
Skurnik (1981), “newspapers select information in accordance with their nation’s 
interests … [and in the selection process] concentrate on the more salient aspects of  
foreign developments, usually those which affect them most” (p 101).  In the news 
gathering, writing and editing processes, editorial decisions such as news selection, 
priority and placement are made by reporters and editors, whose personal characteristics 
and political orientation also affect the media routines (Shoemaker & Reese, 1991). 
 
Where newspapers have to depend completely on a few news agencies for world news, 
the general direction of coverage can be changed by developing the items in-house and 
using alternative sources. During Iraq War II, some newspapers in South Asia 
developed war-related news stories, with local perspectives (Maslog et al., 2006). 
According to Skurnik (1981), who studied the dependence of African newspapers on 
wire services in the 1980s, many African journalists “supplement western wire service 
copy with other sources, such as foreign radio broadcast and African newspapers and 
magazines they subscribe to” (p 100).  
 
Even if newspapers depend heavily on foreign news agencies, their direction of 
coverage of global events can be tilted in favour of the dominant cultural and political 
discourses in respective countries. The gatekeepers can employ several methods in the 
news selection and processing to orient coverage according to the editorial standing of 
the newspapers. However such systematic selection, based on certain values, might 
create a bias and weaken professional values such as objectivity and fairness. A study of 
newspapers in Bangladesh showed that in an effort to harmonise coverage of the Iraq 
War with public opinion, newspaper editors employed a news selection process where 
content unfavourable to the audiences was edited or omitted, while highlighting content 
that reflected public and audience sentiments was highlighted (Zaman, 2004). War 
coverage in the Bangladesh newspapers was biased against the US and UK through 
“deliberate omission and commission of information”, so that items favouring Iraq and 
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Saddam Hussein were given prominence, and reports “supporting the West  were 
accompanied by adverse comments” (Zaman, 2004, p 92). More than 44 percent of the 
items were against the US and UK, only 8.3 percent were against Iraq. 
 
A study of the print media of four countries in South Asia shows that Western news 
agencies – Reuters, AFP and AP – were the dominant news sources (Zaman, 2004).  
These news agencies accounted for 39.6 percent of items published in the 11 
newspapers sampled for the research from Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka. Sources 
credited to the staff writers were 14 percent, followed by local writers (12.6%), 
broadcasters and the internet (9.1%), and foreign newspapers and overseas writers 
(8.6%).  
 
Although, Reuters, AFP and AP were dominant news sources in the South Asian media, 
through the news selection and framing, consistent with cultural and political values, the 
war coverage was unfavourable to US and UK. In framing the war news, media 
practitioners highlight and give more salience to certain aspects such as military 
strategies, anti-war protests, civilian causalities or environmental problems, to name a 
few themes.  
 
Tankard (2001) proposes frame study through the identification and content analysis of 
11 framing mechanisms which include headlines, subheads, photos, leads, selection of 
sources and quotes, logos, pull quotes, concluding statements or paragraphs of articles.   
 
Catch phrases, words and symbols can be analysed to measure framing. To analyse the 
humanitarian and military frames in the coverage of the Operation Restore Hope in 
Somalia by The New York Times and The Guardian, Bantimaroudis  and Ban (2001) did 
a quantitative content analysis of the use of the terms ‘peacekeepers’ and ‘humanitarian’ 
to measure the humanitarian frame, while ‘military’ and ‘intervention’ were used to find 
the military frame. 
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5.4 News framing 
 
One of the editorial processes that has a far reaching impact on media consumers is 
news framing, where a chosen news angle is highlighted through news text, visuals and 
presentation. In this process, editors may set a certain news agenda for the public, while 
equally important issues may be marginalised in the process of giving salience to the 
topic the journalists and editors, through their news judgements and cultural framework, 
may consider more relevant. Framing is relevant in all stages of news production, from 
news gathering, news selection and news processing and packaging, and is shaped by 
individual schemas of media practitioners, journalistic routines and socio-political 
issues (Shoemaker & Reese, 1991). From the multistage perspective, framing involves 
two stages – the ‘general level of framing’ where news selection is made and the 
‘second level of framing’ which is the final stage of news production when the news 
item is processed, packaged and presented for the audiences (Ruigrok, Ridder, & 
Scholten, 2005).  
 
In the process of making particular news events more salient, using editorial and design 
techniques journalists “reinforce common ways of interpreting developments” (Norris, 
Kern, & Just, 2003, p 11).  According to Norris et al (2003) “The essence of framing is 
selection to prioritize some facts, images, or developments over others, thereby 
unconsciously promoting one particular interpretation of events” (p 11). While for 
Entman (1991) to frame means “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make 
them more salient in a communicating text” (p 52). Gamson and Modigliani (Cited in 
Carragee & Roef, 2004) defined frame as  a “central organizing idea … for making 
sense of relevant events” (p 214). Tankard et al (Cited in Tankard, 2001) defined the 
news media frame as “a central organizing idea of news content that supplies a context 
and suggests what the issue is through the use of selection, emphasis, exclusion, and 
elaboration” (p 100-101). 
 
Although the news sources or the primary definers control the ‘news capital’, how a 
news story is produced by media professionals is more likely to be influenced by the 
ethical and journalistic guidelines which have to be followed in the mainstream news 
media. The news media in the process of news reproduction translate the news 
CHAPTER 5: NEWS VALUES, NEWS SELECTION AND FRAMING                                           PAGE 174  
 
resources from the primary definers into ‘public idioms’  thereby “translating a news 
item into a variant of the public language” that makes it more comprehensible to the 
audiences (Hall et al., 1978, p 61). According to Hall et al, the various editorial 
processes help to produce the statements of news sources according to the editorial 
policies of the newspapers: 
 
Not every statement by a relevant primary definer in respect to a particular topic is 
likely to be reproduced in the media; nor is every part of each statement. By exercising 
selectivity the media begin to impose their own criteria on the structured ‘raw materials 
– and thus actively appropriate and transform them (Hall et al., 1978, p 60). 
 
Hall et al’s argument is less relevant in Iraq War II coverage in New Zealand 
newspapers, as the local news media depended on third parties for content, who made 
the very first choices of news selection and thus what aspects to highlight and which 
angle to lead. The few framing choices available to New Zealand editors were re-
writing headlines, priority and placement on the page, including visuals (photos, 
graphics) to accompany the stories and the writing of photo captions. 
 
In coverage of military conflicts, where there are several sides to the conflict, contesting 
interpretations and frames can also emerge. The invasion of Iraq in March 2003 by a 
US-led Coalition force was seen differently in the US than in other countries, and issues 
made salient differed considerably. Norris et al (2003) note that “there can be 
dissonance between the predominant frames offered by leaders and the news media on 
different sides of any political conflict” (p 11). Reviewing how contesting and 
conflicting frames emerge in war coverage, a group of researchers noted that “the media 
can select to focus on the destruction of war as opposed to freedom from tyranny, can 
frame the event as an invasion versus attack, can emphasize the victims versus invaders, 
and can highlight a positive versus negative attitude toward the war” (Dimitrova et al., 
2005, p 26). In Iraq War II coverage in New Zealand, the three leading metropolitan 
newspapers – The New Zealand Herald, The Dominion Post and The Press – used 
positive and negative dichotomy in labelling the initial phase of the conflict. For 
example, the logos used in the war coverage included “attack on Iraq”, “war on Iraq” 
and “war in Iraq”. 
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Framing is not static but rather a dynamic process, and with a changing socio-political 
environment and the media perception of a news event, and thus the ‘news frame’, may 
change (Bantimaroudis & Ban, 2001; Chyi & McCombs, 2004; Hallin, 1986). In the 
coverage of the Vietnam War, the general direction of the war frames changed from a 
pro-administration position to a more adversarial position after the 1968 Tet offensive 
(Hallin, 1986). The frame changing can also be attributed to the indexing hypothesis, 
where political divisions between government and opposition emerge on a given issue 
and news media become more critical observers. In the indexing hypothesis, which is 
discussed in Chapter 6,  the news media “‘index’ the range of voices and view points in 
both news and editorials according to the range of views expressed in mainstream 
government debate about a given topic” (Bennett, 1990, p 106). 
 
According to Chyi and McCombs (2004), “During any news event’s life span, the news 
media often reframe the event by emphasizing different attributes of the event – 
consciously or unconsciously – in order to keep the story alive and fresh” (p 22). In the 
coverage of the crisis in Somalia in 1992, The New York Times and The Guardian used 
the humanitarian frame, but this declined throughout 1993 and 1994. This may have 
been due to the operational and tactical changes in the intervention (Bantimaroudis & 
Ban, 2001).  
 
In the coverage of global news events, newspapers seek to relate to their local audiences 
and often seek to localise through a process of ‘domestication’ where possible.  
According to Jinquan  et al (2002), “the conversion of a global agenda into a home 
agenda … starts out with selective framing of issues or topics through the lens of 
professional norms, national interest, cultural repertoire, and market dynamics” (p 17). 
However not every news event covered in the local or national media is localised, as 
organisational and cultural factors limit a ‘home dimension’.  Moreover, the 
globalisation of news has exposed people to news events far away both geographically 
and culturally and the need for localisation is not always necessary.  
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5.3.1 Episodic and thematic framing 
 
Coverage of news events can be divided into two categories – event oriented and 
context oriented. Straight news is often event oriented as it answers the traditional ‘W’ 
elements in a news story, often leading with ‘what’, ‘when’ and ‘where’, while the 
‘why’ element that would give context to the event is usually examined separately in 
features and news analyses. International news events are often covered through event-
oriented frames and especially in the coverage of global conflicts. According to Iyengar 
(1991), while event-oriented coverage of terrorism is high, an equal emphasis is not 
placed on contextualising the events through examination of the “historical, economic, 
or social antecedents” ( p 15) that underpin them. Studies have shown that in the 
coverage of Iraq War II, episodic framing was the rule and context-oriented coverage 
the exception (Lee, 2004; Pfau et al., 2004). Lee examined the war coverage in three 
daily newspapers – The New York Times, Arab News and Middle East Times – and 
found that more than 88 percent of the sampled items (n=502) were episodic. Analysis 
by Pfau et al of four major US daily newspapers also showed that coverage was event 
oriented. Iyengar and Simon (1994), who studied the television news coverage of Iraq 
War I, concluded that episodic framing dominated the war discourse. In war coverage, 
where events unfold, episodic frames are more common and as such, during the 
invasion phase of Iraq War II, episodic frames dominated (Dimitrova et al., 2005).   
 
According to Iyengar (1991) episodic framing personalises the issues while thematic 
framing examines the “collective or general evidence” for the news events. More “in-
depth, interpretive analysis” (Iyengar, 1991) is available when news events are 
thematically framed. For military conflicts such as Iraq War II, which raised questions 
about the legitimacy and moral basis of the US-led invasion, thematic framing is 
important so that the war could be contextualised.    
 
After a comprehensive study of the news framing by television, Iyengar (1991) 
concluded that  framing impacts how media consumers “assign responsibility for 
political issues” and “episodic framing tends to elicit individualistic rather than societal 
attributions or responsibility, while thematic framing has the opposite effect” (p 15-16).  
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Clearly, thematic coverage of news events is more complex than episodic coverage, as 
contextualisation requires research and analysis. Organisational and journalistic routines 
would also impact on how a media organisation frames events. With tight deadlines to 
consider and competition from others, news organisations would find the episodic frame 
the most convenient. According to Iyengar and McGrady (2005), “Market pressures on 
news organisations have created a bias in favour of episodic framing. The constant 
pursuit of high ratings means that the news must capture and hold the attention of the 
audience” (p 234). As episodic coverage focuses on concrete incidents and events, the 
visual appeal of such framing is high and thus “captures people’s attention”  as such 
stories are also more “emotionally involving” (Baum, 2003, p 235) than the opinionated 
analyses. Norris (1997) argues that “the use of episodic rather than thematic frames may 
lead to less effective public deliberation about the serious policy problems facing the 
United States”(p 13). 
 
4.2 Discussion 
 
It is clear from this chapter why military conflicts such as Iraq War II are given media 
attention, not only in New Zealand but in the news media in most countries of the world. 
While the involvement of elite nations, the tension and drama of the conflict has high 
and uniform news values among the global media, coverage around the world has 
differed significantly. Both internal and external factors have shaped how different 
media outlets in different socio-political settings have oriented the coverage. 
 
Media scholars have identified several news values, many of which focus on similar 
concepts (Harcup & O’Neill, 2001; McGregor, 2002; Galtung & Ruge, 1965). For a 
news story to be selected by reporters or editors one or more requirements of the news 
values has to be met. The attributes and importance of the news values vary depending 
on the item type, origin and in which medium or channel the item is published. 
However certain items of very high news values may have a universal dimension in the 
news values attributes.   
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News values may vary depending on the cultural and ideological context in which it is 
applied. As Golding and Elliott (1979) have argued, news values are used in the 
selection of the final product and as  a guideline for presentation of the items for public 
consumption. In the gatekeeping process, at all levels of news gathering, writing, 
editing and publication, journalists apply the news values framework, and make the 
news judgement, which gives them “the ability to evaluate stories based on agreed-on 
news values, which provide yardsticks of newsworthiness and constitute audience-
oriented routines” (Shoemaker & Reese, 1991, p 90). 
 
In the context of war coverage in New Zealand, the final news product served to 
newspaper readers has passed through several complex gates, some managed by 
external media agents. At the very formation of the news resources, news agency 
journalists (who have a global audience) select and cover news events based on their 
organisational guidelines and news values. Finally the agency product reaches not only 
the news media in New Zealand, but the same copy is part of the global newsfeed that is 
received in every newsroom in the world. In the case of US and UK elite newspapers 
such as The New York Times and The Independent, when writing stories their journalists 
apply their internal news values framework which is strongly influenced by their 
immediate readership and audience (Shoemaker & Reese, 1991). These journalists 
would not consider that their readership is in New Zealand. This is not a very ideal 
situation for editors in New Zealand. Given the constraints of assigning staff to cover a 
conflict in a distant country, New Zealand editors use news agency and news service 
copy to construct the coverage of international events. With the availability of sources, 
editors are able to frame the coverage in the cultural and ideological context of the 
audiences. Perhaps when editors used ‘pro’ and ‘anti’ articles (Comrie & Fountaine, 
2005) in the coverage of Iraq War II in New Zealand newspapers, they were trying to 
make the war frames relevant to their audiences.  
 
In the news production processes, journalists and editors subject news copy at first to a 
general level of framing, then to a second level of framing (Ruigrok et al., 2005), thus 
giving salience to  the news through editorial and design decisions. News events are 
framed differently by different media (Hall et al., 1978; Entman, 1991 ; Norris et al., 
2003), and are shaped by organisational, political and market forces. Often contesting 
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and conflicting frames emerge in war coverage. How Iraq War II is covered in the US 
may be different from its coverage in the Middle East, Iraq or New Zealand, as cultural 
and political factors influence how media professionals give salience to news issues and 
thus frame the news. 
 
 CHAPTER 6: MEDIA-SOURCE INTERACTIONS   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In the analysis of military conflict coverage, where sources attempt to heavily manage 
news and thus influence public opinion, it is important to explore the source-media 
interactions. As discussed in Chapter 2, military and government sources embark on 
public diplomacy or propaganda campaigns and through media management strategies 
attempt perception engineering in order to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the national 
and global public. This is important for the strategic success of military engagements. In 
the case of Iraq War II, the US-led Coalition forces implemented media management 
strategies in which they attempted to influence the news agenda through the source-
media interactions. 
 
Thus, this chapter aims to look closely at source-media relations, how they interact and 
why they at times exist in a ‘symbiotic’ relationship. Sources provide the raw material 
for news, and thus news media maintain close relationship with established sources 
such as government and corporate sectors. For the institutions the media are integral to 
the political communication process and they therefore have vested interests in 
supplying the news raw material, which may be information about a planned space 
project, military operation or aid to a Third World country. The media, as commercial 
enterprises, need to fill the news hole, and in competition with others seek to get the 
scoop and provide exclusive coverage. Herman & Chomsky (1988) have argued in their 
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proposition of the propaganda model that there exists a “symbiotic relationship” 
between the elite sources and the news media. When such relations exist, the sources 
are able to manipulate and set the media coverage perspectives through news 
management and propaganda.  
 
In the war on Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States set the media agenda through 
public relations strategies and media management. As Schechter (2003) observed, 
“government sources increasingly set the agenda [in the battlefields] and help frame the 
issues from which the news is constructed” (p xxvi). While ideally journalism seeks to 
balance news items through different sourcing and perspectives, not always does the 
normative function become a reality. Especially during military conflicts, when faced 
with propaganda, censorship and limited access to news events and news actors, 
journalistic ‘objectivity’ is compromised.  
 
Media-state relations can also be analysed from a hegemonic perspective which 
encompasses culture, power, ideology and the ‘index’ model. According to Bennett 
(1990), who proposed the ‘indexing hypothesis’, “mass media professionals … tend to 
‘index’ the range of voices and view points in both news and editorials according to the 
range of views expressed in mainstream government debate about a given topic” (p 
106). However, consensus on topics changes over time, as shown very clearly in the 
case of the Vietnam War and Iraq War II, when at the beginning of these conflicts both 
the opposition and the public supported the US government’s policies. 
 
The hegemonic control of the media is rather through the cultural and ideological 
constructs of the state and the power elite. The state is able to exert hegemonic control 
through ideological and cultural constructs to influence public consent when media 
practitioners index the political discourse. The so-called ‘war on terror’ of US President 
George Bush is an ideological construct to exert hegemonic control over the people, 
change their perceptions and thus garner support for executing foreign policy, most 
notably the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq two years later.   
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6.2 Source-media relations 
 
Without sources news would be a scarce commodity and without journalists and media 
institutions to gather and process news, news sources and actors would have limited 
avenues for political communication. Both have institutional and organisational reasons 
to communicate, inform or sell news and information.  As Williams (2003) noted, 
“sources are central to the news production” and it is important to establish contacts 
with sources “for a reliable flow of newsworthy information” (p 115). During military 
conflicts the news media, the government and the military work together closely and the 
former relies on the official sources for news raw material in the process of war 
reporting.  
  
In defining sources, Shoemaker and Reese (1991) describe them as “external suppliers 
of raw materials”,  while for Gans (1980) sources are “the actors whom journalists 
observe or interview, including interviewees who appear on the air or who are quoted in 
articles… and those who only supply background information or story suggestions” (p 
80).  
 
News media, as sellers of news and information, are always competing for exclusivity 
of news, and thus heavily depend on news sources. And as sources realise the media 
dependency on them, they are often able to dictate and manipulate the way news is 
covered and reported. The dependence of journalists upon sources also affects how a 
story is covered (Palmer, 2000). Institutional sources need to use the media to influence 
public opinion, promote views and manufacture consent. In this regard they “employ 
news managers and ‘spin doctors’ whose task is to maximise the favourable 
presentation of policy and action and minimise any negative aspect” (McQuail, 2005, p 
325). While the sources aim at getting maximum positive exposure in the media, access 
to media depends on several factors. According to McQuail (2005), source accessibility 
to news media depends on the “Efficient supply of suitable material; power and 
influence of source; good public relations and news management; dependency of media 
on limited source; mutual self-interest in news coverage” (p 326). 
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The dominance of military and government sources in war journalism discourse is due 
to their authority and influence and the dependency of media on the few official sources 
in the reporting of conflicts. 
 
Both the source and media benefit from one another, and the symbiotic relationship is 
always maintained in the journalistic routines of news gathering and processing. 
Describing source-journalist relations as a dance, Gans (1980) said that “sources seek 
access to journalists, and journalists seek access to sources. Although it takes two to 
tango, either sources or journalists can lead, but more often than not, sources do the 
leading” (p 116). Taking a similar view, Shoemaker (1987) argued that “news comes to 
journalists primarily from institutional sources who exert pressure of various kinds on 
journalists and the news process” ( p 14).  The newsgathering and reporting routines 
serve to frame within the dominant interpretations and thus give leverage and 
preference to ‘primary definers’ or institutional sources who ‘cue in’ the media to 
specific news topics (Hall et al., 1978, p 57).  Two fundamental aspects of news 
production – deadline pressures and professional values such as impartiality and 
objectivity – create a structured media-source environment where “preference given in 
the media to the opinions of the powerful is that these ‘spokesmen’ become what we 
call the primary definers of topics” (Hall et al., 1978, p 58).  
 
Herman & Chomsky (1988), in discussing the source-media relationship pointed out 
that the “media need a steady, reliable flow of the raw material of news” thus drawing 
both institutions into “a symbiotic relationship with powerful sources of information by 
economic necessity and reciprocity of interest” (p 22). Such a relationship may 
compromise the key journalistic principles of truth, objectivity and fairness unless 
media practitioners stay loyal to their professional values.  
 
According to Goldman (1999), “sources also exploit this dependency relationship by 
‘managing’ the media, by suggesting the sort of ‘spin’ on events that favours their own 
interests though it may be at odds with the truth” (p 186).  So heavily do journalists 
depend on some sources for information that as Sigal observes: 
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Reporters will go a long way for authoritative sources, not only more readily accepting 
their versions of reality, but also acceding to the rules of disclosure they may set, 
embargoing stories until a release time they find convenient, cloaking their identities, at 
times even killing a story outright at their request. Tacit alliances form between 
reporters and officials on the beat, as each uses the other to advantage within his 
organisation. Officials exploit reporters’ need for news to deliver messages to target 
audiences in an effort to muster and maintain support, both in and out of government … 
(Sigal, 1986, p 22) 
 
A key factor that influences journalists to use government and military sources is “the 
convention of authoritative sources”, and they seek to establish and inform their news 
gathering routines around the government or military (Sigal, 1986). Government and 
institutional sources, according to Hall et al (1978), are placed at the apex of a 
“hierarchy of credibility”  which gives them the advantage over other or “less credible” 
sources. 
 
In the reporting of the wars in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), Western journalists 
constructed coverage using “Western political and military sources, mainly about 
Western  military personnel, strategies, successes, and, less often, backed with 
comments from (often vetted) Western military ‘experts’” (Boyd-Barrett, 2004, p 29-
30). This dependence on Western official sources illustrates a Western-centric approach 
according to which the Afghanistan or Iraqi sources were seen as ‘unreliable’, 
‘censored’, or ‘unverifiable’. This biased Western position is “blind to media 
dependence on government or military sources of their own side for their most regular, 
professionally scripted, and above all safe information, disinformation or lies” (Boyd-
Barrett, 2004, p 30). The coverage of the invasion phase of Iraq War II in the Swedish 
newspaper Dagens Nyheter and The New York Times showed that the latter relied more 
on official sources (Dimitrova & Strömbäck, 2005).  
 
According to research into Iraq War II coverage by the Danish media in March and 
April 2003, there was heavy dependence on British, US and Danish military sources, 
and the focus was on war strategy, weapons and battlefield developments rather than the 
humanitarian issues of the conflict. Stig Hjarvard, one of the authors of the research, 
noted that “The dependence on military sources was surprising. Danish media could 
have found more independent sources in their description … The media coverage of the 
political debates between opponents and supporters of the war was balanced. But after 
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the invasion, it changed course, focusing on the armed intervention and relegating 
debate on the justification of the war and the reasons for the war to the back burner” 
("Report accuses Danish media of bias in Iraq war coverage," 2004). 
 
Knight (1982) contends that in the selection of news sources, media practitioners take a 
“double-edge filtering” approach where “access to news media is structured differently 
in favour of the powerful and bureaucratically organized” while at the same time the 
news media approach “powerful and bureaucratic sources of news more actively and 
persistently than other sources” (p 20). 
 
Becker’s model of the hierarchy of credibility places official sources as the most 
authoritative  and suggests that ‘‘any tale told by those at the top intrinsically deserves 
to be regarded as the most credible account . . .Thus, credibility and the right to be 
heard are differentially distributed through the ranks of the system’’ (Cited in Atton & 
Wickenden, 2005, p 348). Official sources, from within the government, command 
more power than other elite actors and thus dominate the news agenda with their ability 
to use state and government instruments in the conduct of state affairs. In the post 9/11 
world, the US government has been able to manufacture consent, and as ‘primary 
definers’, in the construction of the news events, “preference is given to the opinions of 
those in authority” (Williams, 2003, p 115).  
 
During the initial phase of Iraq War II, the Coalition Media Centre in Doha, from where 
senior military and government officials gave press briefings, was an important and 
authoritative news beat.  The news routines resulting from media management through 
the Coalition Media Centre and the practice of embedding influenced the journalists’ 
use of official sources. Given the saturation of official information made available by 
military and government officials, coverage emerging from these media centres was 
likely to be oriented towards the US and Coalition.  
 
From a cultural structural perspective, media practitioners are drawn to government and 
institutional sources as “such sources are in a position of power, draw legitimate support 
from the public, and are expected to provide expert knowledge” (Davis, 2003, p 34).  
 
CHAPTER 6: MEDIA-SOURCE INTERACTIONS                                                                          PAGE 186  
 
The extent of official source use in the news media was analysed by Sigal (Cited in 
Bennett, 1988) in a study of The New York Times and The Washington Post – two 
liberal and leading newspapers in the US that are said to be independent and often 
critical of the US government. Both have legacies of reporting major issues and 
exposing the government, notably the Watergate coverage (The Washington Post) and 
publication of the Pentagon Papers (The New York Times). Sigal found that government 
sources were the main sources in nearly 47 percent of the items. And foreign news also 
reflected a similar direction with 27.5 percent (Sigal cited in Bennett, 1988).  
 
Sigal (1986) noted that certain sources were able to dominate news because of the social 
location of journalists or routines. The study shows that as a result of reporters’ social 
location, news gathering routines, and journalistic conventions, nearly half of the 
sources of all national and foreign news on page one of The New York Times and The 
Washington Post were US government officials (Sigal, 1986). Commenting on the 
extensive use of official sources in the two newspapers, Bennett (1988) concluded that 
“Even the best journalism in the land is extremely dependent on the political messages 
of a small spectrum of ‘official sources’” (p 96). 
 
In military conflict reporting, relying on only official sources while neglecting or 
limiting alternative sources results in biased reporting. Ideally, journalists should verify 
information from independent sources. In Sweden, journalism tradition strongly calls 
for balancing sources and it is “considered especially important in times of crises, wars, 
or other instances in which the news might otherwise be biased toward one side or the 
other in a conflict” (Nord & Strömbäck, 2003, p 61). 
 
While verification of claims by sources is an important professional value in journalism, 
there have been cases during Iraq War II when some media organisations have treated 
claims made by military officials as facts. This attitude towards official sources has led 
“prominent American journalists into embarrassing errors in their coverage of the US 
invasion of Iraq, particularly in relation to claims that proof had been found that Iraq 
possesses banned weapons” (Lack of Skepticism Leads to Poor Reporting on Iraq 
Weapons Claims, 2003). In one incident Fox News Channel and Philadelphia Daily 
News on 24th March 2003 described an alleged discovery of chemical weapons in Najaf 
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as “biggest find of the Iraq war”, which a day later turned out to be false. When news 
leads and leaks originate from government and official sources, journalists tend to 
accept the information as authoritative and true. In crises where government and 
military have opportunities to make gains through disinformation, the news media are 
likely to be channels for propaganda as journalists do not always verify news 
information that originates from officials (Fishman, 1980). 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2 the news management strategies of the US in Iraq, during the 
invasion phase, were aimed at gaining more positive coverage for them, while 
disinformation campaigns were conducted to discredit the enemy (Iraq). The 
propaganda campaigns were conducted through different media including military and 
government officials providing an ‘information subsidy’ to news media at the official 
news briefings at the Coalition Media Center in Doha.  
 
A study of media coverage in Sweden of the 9/11 attacks against the US, and the US 
attacks in Afghanistan, showed that elite US and Swedish sources were frequently used, 
while Afghani elite sources were used less. In the coverage of the US attacks in 
Afghanistan, 35 percent of the news articles were derived from US elite sources, 
namely military and government officials (Nord & Strömbäck, 2003). And in news 
features the figure was 46 percent.  In the coverage of the 9/11 attacks US elite sources 
accounted for 40 percent of the news articles and 42 percent of the news features. Thus 
the heavy reliance on elite US sources “indicates that there was a bias in the media 
coverage of these two events, which ultimately favoured the American side of the 
conflict” (Nord & Strömbäck, 2003, p 63). 
 
Journalistic routines of news gathering and processing can be analysed within the 
context of media sociology, and as Manning (2001) has noted, in the social construction 
of events journalists work with each other and sources. Journalists have very close 
working and informal relations with government officials and, power elites as this 
ensures raw material that can be churned out to develop news stories. Journalists’ 
association with and use of these sources in the news process might, however, be 
affected by several factors. In the selection of sources, journalists are involved in 
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journalistic routines and media practices, interacting with a unique political, economic 
and societal culture (Shin & Cameron, 2003). 
 
Even in international news coverage, the news makers are government officials with 
“the activities of ordinary citizens – particularly those who do not act in exceptional 
ways – are not news in any part of the world” (Stevenson & Cole, 1984, p 56). 
 
With the increase in public relations and media management, journalists’ dependency 
on PR ‘information subsidies’ has grown. According to Davis (2003), this is an 
indication of the powerful impact of public relations on the media and “the traditional 
hierarchies of media-source relations are being altered significantly in the new PR-
saturated media environment” (p 27). Resource-rich institutions are able to saturate the 
news space and set the media agenda.  
 
With dependency on official sources alternative perspectives are limited and non-elite 
viewpoints are excluded from the mainstream news discourse (Stech, 1996). Elite 
source domination occurs mainly within the mainstream news media while in general 
alternative media use more non-elite sources. And the reason for using non-elite sources 
may be to give a forum for “those marginalised by the mainstream media” (Atton & 
Wickenden, 2005, p 349). Research by Atton and Wickenden on source use in the 
British alternative publication SchNEWS  shows that in contrast to elite source 
domination in mainstream news media, the alternative press give ‘‘ordinary people’’ 
privileged media access. Their study shows that SchNEWS used protesters and activists, 
who represented “a counter-elite that dominates an alternative hierarchy of sources” 
(Atton & Wickenden, 2005, p 357). As the metropolitan newspapers in New Zealand 
rely completely on mainstream news sources, the opportunities for alternative voices 
during the Iraq conflict is were limited if not non-existent. The ‘Big Three’ news 
agencies and elite US and UK newspapers have been the main content providers, who 
in turn relied on dominant official sources in their war coverage. 
 
When institutional sources are able to manage and control the flow of information in 
their favour they are able to set the public agenda, while the less influential unofficial 
sources have fewer options and opportunities to influence the public through the news 
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media. The consequence of giving preference to official sources is that the discussion of 
diverse issues is limited and thus the ideals of the free press as a ‘marketplace of ideas’ 
are far from reality. The market is dominated by official products, and choices given to 
consumers are limited, thus narrowing the perspectives on societal issues. Bennett 
(1988) has argued that when information is controlled by government officials, it must 
“limit the range of problems, solutions, values and ideas” (p 96) that the public has in 
hand to discuss and debate. 
 
Looking at the media-government relationship, Thrall argued that there are three 
competing theories of media-state relations – the ‘watchdog’, the ‘lapdog’, and the 
‘attack dog’. According to Thrall (2000), the lapdog theory is more appropriate to 
describe the media-government relationship as “journalists rely so heavily on official 
and elite sources for information and opinion that the press does not operate as a 
watchdog, but instead serves to promote the interests and policy positions of those in 
power at the expense of others” (p 250). 
 
6.2.1 Military sources and the media 
 
During military conflicts from Bosnia to Iraq, military and government officials have 
taken every possible measure to win the information war, and have fed information to 
the news media to set national and global news agenda that has favoured the US and 
Western alliance. Military and government sources try to gain access to the “news 
encoding process” (Manning, 2001) to garner favourable public opinion for military and 
political actions. 
 
From the frontlines, official sources control the way information is channelled, through 
media management. According to Schechter (2003) in the battlefields “government 
sources increasingly set the agenda and help frame the issues from which the news is 
constructed” (p xxvi) by journalists, who may be embedded or have access to carefully 
prepared press releases and media conferences. And the belief that “deviation from 
official sources might compromise security, aid and comfort the enemy, divulge 
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military secrets” (Stech, 1996, p 242) also helps to strengthen and in a way legitimise 
the extensive use of military and government officials during military conflicts.  
 
The news media’s dependence on the military for news raw material on military 
operations and strategies, and their often unquestioning acceptance of claims as facts 
have given rise to the opinion that wars are conducted by information strategists. In the 
reporting to US-led wars, media dependency has undermined the objective reporting of 
events and minimised the room for context and issue-oriented reporting. The 
relationship between the military and the news media can be characterised as one of 
interdependency (Allen, 1996). According to Reese and Buckalew (1995), who studied 
news framing of Iraq War I, in a tripartite relationship “the news media and corporate 
needs work together to further a culture supportive of military adventures such as those 
in the Gulf” (1995).  
 
Another key issue that arises in war journalism is its specialised nature. Unlike regular 
beat reporting or general assignment work, coverage of military conflicts such as the 
war in Iraq is more complex and thus reporters with a background in military and 
defence aspects will be in a more advantageous position. When at press conferences 
given by military officials, for example, they will be able to raise technical questions 
and be proactive rather than reactive. When journalists are not well aware of the issues 
of international conflicts, the sources are also likely to dominate the news agenda of the 
journalists. As Taylor (2003) notes “Most of the 1,500 journalists in Riyadh were not 
specialised defence or foreign correspondents; this provided the military with another 
opportunity to dominate the news agenda with their own” (p 76). 
 
A study of coverage of US-China relations in The New York Times and People’s Daily 
by Xigen Li showed that government officials were used as major sources in both 
publications. In The New York Times, 57 percent of the sources cited were US officials, 
thus Li concluded that his research “provided support to source dependency in 
international news coverage” (Li, 2004). 
 
Another study of how AP, Agence France Presse, Xinhua, ITAR-TASS and Inter Press 
Service used official sources in the run-up to Iraq War II, showed that US officials 
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dominated the news. Of these AP, Inter Press Service and Xinhua most frequently cited 
US officials. AFP cited US officials more than any other nation’s source, but if all 
Western European officials were considered together, then the AFP cited a slightly 
higher percentage of Western European officials, 21 percent, than US officials, 19 
percent. Inter Press Service cited Asian officials almost as often as it cited US officials. 
More than 70 percent of ITAR-TASS’ sources were Russian officials, and 24 percent 
were US officials (Horvit, 2004). 
 
There are several factors that cause news media to rely on official sources, which 
include news gathering routines, organisational factors, media management and 
audience and advertiser expectations. Especially in breaking news events, when factors 
such as copy deadline and verification impose pressure on the journalist, source 
diversity and accuracy becomes limited. Noting these journalistic hurdles, Offley (2002) 
said that a “combination of military secrecy, dispersed forces and physical danger in 
Afghanistan has forced American military reporters to rely almost exclusively on their 
sources within the US military and intelligence community for coverage of the war, and 
as a result, the possibility of inaccuracy and error has increased” (p 10). 
 
In the US, government-media relations have in recent times increased, and within the 
wider military conflicts involving the US, jingoism has created a ‘Post Vietnam 
Patriotic Syndrome’ that needs to be reviewed. Schechter (2003) believes that “it is not 
too late for the US media establishment to get the message, distance themselves from 
‘official sources’ and ‘coded’ propaganda, and seek out more diverse sources of 
information” (p 129). 
 
Jingoism was so strong in the media after 9/11 that some senior journalists were even 
seen crying on TV, which undermined journalistic values. Referring to CBS anchor Dan 
Rather, O’Brien (2002), who covered the Vietnam War, noted that “He’s not supposed 
to do his job differently because his country is at war. While the rest of his countrymen 
may feel a desire to proclaim allegiance to the nation and the government, he’s 
supposed to more stringently criticize and question. Putting political decision-makers’ 
feet to the fire, that’s what he’s supposed to do” (p 14).  
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6.3 Media hegemony 
 
When countries are at war, with foreign nations or groups, and there is a demand from 
the public to ‘rally around the flag’, as was the case in the US during the initial phase of 
Iraq War II, the hegemonic role of the news media becomes very visible. In the case of 
Iraq War II, in the US the mainstream news media supported the established power 
system and projected the arguments of the Bush administration while excluding or 
minimising the oppositional view points (Berman, 2003). The news media framed the 
US-led invasion of Iraq as a ‘war on terror’ and did not fully question the legitimacy of 
waging a war on Iraq, given the unsubstantiated evidence of  an Iraq and Al Qaeda link 
and or WMD programmes. 
 
According to the media hegemony theory, which is rooted in Marxist ideology, the 
mass media work in the interests of the ruling class in society. The globalisation of 
media through media concentration and ownership supports the hegemony theory, 
which was formulated by Italian socialist Antonio Gramsci, in the early 20th century. 
The concept of hegemony or domination, as articulated by Gramsci encompasses 
culture, power and ideology, and how these components are invoked and executed 
depends on the type of political and cultural system (Croteau & Hoynes, 2003; 
Devereux, 2003) . As discussed in Chapter 3, it was neoliberalism that globalised the 
media systems through transnational corporations and other institutional instruments. 
Thus globalisation facilitates the developed nations, where the ownership of global 
media systems is based, to create consensus and consent. 
 
According to Devereux (2003), “Hegemony … may be achieved through the use or 
threat of force or more typically through the creation of consensus. Domination of the 
latter kind in capitalist society comes about by means of  the powerful being able to 
fashion a consensus between those in power and those with little or no power” (p 100-
102).   
 
In an authoritarian country such as Iraq under Saddam Hussein, force may be the main 
method of social control, while in liberal democracies such as the United States and 
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Britain, the ruling authorities may instead use cultural and ideological constructs to 
create consent and exert power. 
 
Bublic (1997) believed that “the news media help perpetuate a structure of dominance 
and the status quo”, which is an argument that reflects how the media content in the US 
is  ‘manufactured’ to the needs and wants of the corporate (capitalist) sector. Indeed, 
with such media concentration in the developed countries, the dominant capitalist 
ideologies are sure to be reflected in the mainstream news discourse. Looking at the 
hegemonic approach, Altheide (1984, p 476) proposed three assumptions about the role 
the media play in the construction of events in conformity with ‘ruling class’ ideology: 
 
1) The socialization and ideology of journalists (Journalists promote an 
ideological hegemony using cultural categories and symbols)   
2) The tendency of journalists and their reports to support and perpetuate the 
status quo (Journalists tend to cover topics and present news reports that are 
supportive of the status quo, as in the index model) 
3) The negative character of foreign news coverage, especially that of Third 
World countries (Taking a pro-American approach in their coverage, 
journalists tend to focus on negativity such as crime and political problems 
in Third World countries) 
 
In democratic societies, the news media are not under direct control of the state or 
government, and function under the framework of a libertarian model of free press and 
free market economy. The hegemonic control of the media and the public is rather 
through cultural and ideological constructs of the state and the power elite. Within this 
theoretical framework, the ‘war on terror’, ‘Iraq and WMD’, ‘Iraq and Al Qaeda’, ‘Iran 
and nuclear weapons’ could be seen as cultural and ideological constructs.  
 
Soon after the plans were laid to invade Afghanistan in 2001, US President George 
Bush  tagged the mission a ‘crusade’, after which it became a ‘War for Civilization’, 
followed by a ‘War against Global Terror’, then a ‘Titanic War on Terror’ (Ahmed, 
2003). As such, in the aftermath of 9/11 the US government used different constructs 
and appeals to ‘manufacture consent’. 
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Using such constructs the state can engineer opinion and manufacture consent instead of 
using overt ‘force’ on the news media. According to Gill and Law (1989), Gramsci’s 
concept of  “a hegemonic order was one where consent, rather than coercion, primarily 
characterised the relations between classes and between the state and civil society” (p 
476). Elaborating on how hegemony operates in democratic societies, where the press is 
technically detached from the state and function as the ‘Fourth Estate’, Croteau and 
Hoynes say: 
 
In liberal democratic societies such as the United States, force is not the primary means 
by which the powerful rule. … Gramsci’s work suggests that power is wielded in a 
different arena – that of culture, in the realm of everyday life – where people essentially 
agree to current social arrangements.  
 
Consent, then, is the key to understanding Gramsci’s use of hegemony, which is 
exercised through a kind of ‘cultural leadership’. Consent is something that is won; 
ruling groups in a society actively seek to have their worldview accepted by all 
members of the society as the universal way of thinking (Croteau & Hoynes, 2002, p 
166). 
 
In liberal democracies power is amalgamated through a process of consent rather than 
force. In the manufacture of consent, governments embark on public relations strategies 
and direct propaganda, both of which were very well utilised following the 9/11 attacks 
on the US. Ideological and cultural constructs were used by the US to get public consent 
on the war against Afghanistan and later Iraq. The extensive propaganda and public 
relations strategies used to underpin the ‘war on terror’ construct turned the US public 
opinion towards the belief that Iraq played a role in 9/11. A CNN/USAToday/Gallup 
poll found in March 2003 that 88 percent believed that “Saddam Hussein is involved in 
supporting terrorist groups that have plans to attack the United States” and 51 percent 
also agreed that “Saddam Hussein was personally involved in the September 11th 
terrorist attacks” (Fried, 2005, p 126). 
  
6.4 Indexing hypothesis 
 
After the 9/11 attacks on the US, the government and political elites were able to reach 
consensus on the need for punitive military actions against threats to US security, and 
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thus to mobilise public opinion on the larger ‘war on terror’. In times of crisis such as 
post 9/11, when extensive support from political opposition and the public was given to 
the government, “news media will tend to support government policy” (Cottle, 2003, p 
14) and use sources that are congruent with the overall government policies.  US war 
coverage, from Afghanistan to Iraq, has reflected the growing audience-centred 
direction and national interest. The news media have thus served the audience and 
national interests, but compromised the professional journalistic values that call for 
objectivity and fairness.   
 
After a study of press coverage of the US policy in Central America, Bennett (1990) 
formulated a model on press-state relations showing that the news media take a 
conciliatory approach in supporting the government when the political elites and 
opposition appear to approve the government foreign policy. Bennett (1990), in his 
‘indexing hypothesis’, argued that “mass media professionals … tend to ‘index’ the 
range of voices and view points in both news and editorials according to the range of 
views expressed in mainstream government debate about a given topic” (p 106). After 
analysing coverage in The New York Times of US funding of the contra rebels in 
Nicaragua, Bennett concluded: 
 
The overriding norm of contemporary journalism seems to involve compressing public 
opinion to fit into the range of debate between decisive institutional power blocs. In this 
ironic twist on the democratic ideal, modern public opinion can be thought of as an 
‘index’ constructed from dominant institutional voices as recorded in the mass media  
(Bennett, 1990, p 25). 
 
Other scholarly research (Hallin, 1994; Bennett & Paletz, 1994) on coverage of military 
conflicts such as the Vietnam War and Iraq War I have supported the index model of 
Bennett. And Mermin (1999), whose  findings regarding media coverage of eight post-
Vietnam US military interventions supported Bennett’s thesis, describes the hypothesis 
as follows:  
 
If there is debate inside the American government over US policy, critical perspectives 
appear in the news. If government policy has bipartisan support in Washington, 
however, critical perspectives expressed outside the government are not reported 
(Mermin, 1999, p 5). 
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During the first four years of the Vietnam conflict there was bipartisan consensus about 
the need to pursue a foreign policy that called for containing communism, hence the 
press was not adversarial towards Kennedy and later Johnson, until the Tet Offensive in 
1968 (Thrall, 2000).  
 
In the run-up to Iraq War II, the mainstream news media in the US supported the Bush 
administration’s policy towards Iraq, and few questioned the merits or de-merits of 
waging a war for which government justifications were weak. The extensive public 
relations and public diplomacy efforts by the US government have altered the US media 
attitude towards the Saddam Hussein regime, and garnered support for a pro-war stance 
(Fried, 2005). According to a EWP survey of the top 50 US daily newspapers, none 
were strongly ‘antiwar’. Newspapers that leaned towards a military engagement with 
Iraq include include The Wall Street Journal, The Los Angeles Times, The Washington 
Post, the New York Post, and Newsday (Berman, 2003). Of the top 10 newspapers, only 
the USA Today and The New York Times expressed the view that the US government 
needs to be restrained.   
 
The change in public attitude, political opposition and media discourse in favour of the 
US government is noted by Ravi, who observed that eventually there was unequivocal 
support for the war on Iraq from all quarters: 
 
In the United States, elite opinion was divided a year before the war started, and well 
into the fall of 2002 and there was a vigorous public debate on the case for the war. The 
New York Times, too, opposed going to war at this stage. However, after the Congress 
passed a resolution authorizing the use of force and when it became clear that war was 
inevitable, the dissenting voices among the elite—the congressional leaders, in 
particular—fell silent and opposition to the war was virtually pushed to the margins. 
Yet The New York Times did not join the silenced elite but kept up its opposition to the 
war till it actually began. Only after the war began did it stop raising questions on the 
justification for the war” (Ravi, 2005, p 60). 
 
Recent research on the coverage of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal in Iraq showed that 
the sampled news media – The Washington Post, CBS Evening News and a sample of 
national newspapers – used a defensive reporting style in the coverage of Abu Ghraib 
(Bennett, Lawrence, & Livingston, 2006). 
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The framing of events at Abu Ghraib by the mainstream press followed the predictable 
pattern of indexing. … At the height of attention to the Abu Ghraib story, when public 
opinion was in the formative stage, the mainstream media allowed the administration’s 
‘‘isolated abuse’’ frame to dominate the news and declined to offer the public a 
coherent alternative frame. …  
 
Even when provided with considerable photographic and documentary evidence and the 
critical statements of governmental and nongovernmental actors, the nation’s leading 
media proved unable or unwilling to construct a coherent challenge to the 
administration’s claims about its policies on torturing detainees. As it turned out in this 
case, the photos may have driven the story, but the White House communication staff 
ultimately wrote the captions (Bennett et al., 2006). 
 
The news media, as key institutions in society, have to consider audience pressure, and 
public opinion and other domestic political factors when covering issues. According to 
McQuail (1994), “The media are by origin, practice and convention very much national 
institutions and respond to domestic political and social pressures and to the expectation 
of their audiences. They reflect, express and sometimes actively serve the ‘national 
interest,’ as determined by other, more powerful actors and institutions” (p 121). 
 
Given that public opinion in New Zealand was not favourable towards a US-led 
unilateral military action against Iraq (Cone, 2003a; Roy Morgan Research Polls., 2003; 
Phipps, 2004), it is important to see how the three metropolitan newspapers in New 
Zealand covered the war. 
 
6.5 Discussion 
 
In the very first stages of news gathering and production, when journalists and sources 
interact, the latter attempt to influence the news agenda. As discussed in Chapter 2, in 
military conflict coverage official sources (government and military) attempt to 
influence the war journalism discourse in order to sway public opinion. Given the 
globalisation of media, the instantaneity of war coverage and the immediacy of impact 
on national and global publics, influencing the news agenda has become a top priority 
of official sources. Thus at the very first stage of news production, the primary definers 
attempt to influence the media through their interactions with journalists. Sources also 
use strategic communications and outright propaganda to influence the direction of 
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media content. Iraq War II has shown that military and government sources of the US 
and UK were successful in dominating media agenda. 
 
While journalists and editors have choices in framing news stories, their quest for 
sources, or as Shoemaker and Reese (1991) call them, “external suppliers of raw 
materials”,  influences the news agenda.  When the media have few choices, and rely on 
certain sources such as government and military officials, these are able to affect the 
direction of the coverage. As Palmer (2000) argued, dependence of journalists upon 
sources affects how a story is covered. Thus, in Iraq War II, , through embedding and 
official news briefings at CENTCOM media centre, Coalition sources were able to set 
the media agenda for journalists.  
 
As pointed out by Shoemaker (1987), most news originates from institutional sources 
and as ‘primary definers’ (Hall et al., 1978), these sources try to influence the direction 
of reporting. The close media-source relationship, described as “a symbiotic 
relationship” (Herman & Chomsky, 1988, p 22), leads to a state of dependency for the 
media. When there is a strong relationship, sources are able to capitalise on the situation 
and manage the media. A good example of such media dependency on sources can be 
seen in military conflicts such as Iraq War II, where US government and military 
officials have been able to manipulate information and orient the news coverage 
through public relations strategies. 
 
Source-media interactions can also be seen through the hegemony and index models. In 
democratic societies, as in the US and UK, the authorities dominate the media discourse 
through ideological constructs to sway the media and thus public opinion. In this 
process, too, the institutional sources use public relations strategies to popularise 
ideological constructs – most notable among them in recent times have been the ‘war on 
terror’ and Iran and its nuclear threat. When authorities are able to dominate the media 
agenda, and thus silence or relegate alternative views, it leads to indexing.  
 
The index hypothesis is based on the premise that the news media favours the 
government on foreign policy issues when political elites and opposition appear to reach 
a consensus on the government’s position. As discussed in previous chapters, during 
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major conflicts such as the Vietnam War and Iraq War II the media supported the 
government when the opposition and the authorities appeared to reach consensus on 
foreign policy.  And when divisions emerge between the government and the opposition, 
the media also change direction. Similarly in military conflict coverage the changing 
dynamics of source-media interactions are also a reflection of the larger political 
debates and even public opinion.  
 
However, in New Zealand, which has not in any way been involved in Iraq War II (at 
least in the invasion phase), the situation may be different. One important reason is that 
the war journalism discourse in the mainstream newspapers is manufactured by foreign 
sources. The newspapers’ ability to make direct choices in the initial stages of news 
production – news gathering and processing – is limited. As discussed in chapter 5, 
news agencies and elite US and UK newspaper journalists use their own news values 
and framework for news production. Thus the newspaper audiences in New Zealand are 
in fact served with content shaped and moulded for a totally different audience based 
mainly in the US and UK. These factors are likely to have influenced how Iraq War II 
has been covered in the metropolitan press in New Zealand. 
 
 
  
CHAPTER 7: RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHOD  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the research questions central to this study and the research 
methods employed to address them. The study primarily focuses on the way the larger 
New Zealand newspapers reported Iraq War II, in terms of thematic coverage, news 
sources and direction. The reliance on news agencies and other content providers is also 
analysed, together with an exploration of the extent to which official sources dominate 
the war journalism discourse. While the main method of research is content analysis of 
the sampled newspaper content, qualitative interviews with newspaper editors were also 
used to determine the internal and organisational processes involved in the news 
production of New Zealand newspapers. 
 
Given the aim of the research was to analyse the war journalism content in the 
metropolitan press, content analysis was deemed the most appropriate method to answer 
the research questions. Content analysis is a popular mass media research method as it 
“provides an efficient way to investigate the content of the media” (Wimmer & 
Dominick, 1997, p 111). 
 
As the primary research methodology adopted for this study is content analysis, a 
multistage sampling procedure was used, with (1) selection of the content sources or 
titles, (2) sampling frames and dates and (3) selection of content through identifying the 
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units of analysis and categories. The criteria and procedures employed in the selection 
of sources or newspapers are discussed later in the chapter. 
 
7.2 Research questions 
 
The following questions will be answered through content analysis, to assess the 
international news flows, the orientation of military conflict coverage and the extent of 
the media management. 
 
1. How did the New Zealand metropolitan newspapers cover Iraq War II? 
 
2. To what extent did the New Zealand metropolitan newspapers depend 
on global news agencies, and other content providers, for the coverage 
of Iraq War II? 
 
3. To what extent did the US and Coalition dominate the news agenda? 
 
 
RQ1. How did the New Zealand metropolitan newspapers cover Iraq War II? 
 
In the coverage of military conflicts, the direction of the national media depends on 
whether the country is directly or indirectly involved in the war, as well as on foreign 
policy and public opinion. A comparative study of Iraq War II coverage in The New 
York Times, Arab News and The Middle East Times shows that the elite US newspaper 
emphasised US war efforts, used mainly US official sources and was opposed to 
Saddam Hussein’s regime. On the other hand, the Arab newspapers in their coverage 
used more Arab sources and raised more antiwar voices (Lee, 2004). The main themes 
of coverage, emphasis and placement of stories were evaluated to see how The New 
Zealand Herald, The Dominion Post and The Press covered Iraq War II for local 
audiences. The major themes explored included the process of combat, the impact of the 
war, debate about the war, casualties of the war, the military build up and the context of 
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the war. The location of stories, emphasis and priority given to stories are also analysed 
to find out how the newspapers reported the war. 
 
  
RQ2. To what extent did the Zealand metropolitan newspapers depend on global 
news agencies, and other content providers, for the coverage of Iraq War II?  
 
Within the globalisation framework, the role played by global news media outlets such 
as the news agencies in news ‘wholesaling’ has become extensive, with print and 
electronic media ‘retailing’ that content for domestic consumption. Events that are 
prioritised within the newspapers’ news value judgement system are instantly 
channelled to consumers, thus accelerating the globalisation of news. International news 
business is dominated by the Associated Press, Reuters and AFP, who have between 90 
and 100 bureaus around the world and file between 400 and 500 news items every day 
(Moisy, 1996). These news agencies are also the main news content providers for New 
Zealand newspapers. Furthermore, news services from major US and UK newspapers 
have also become content providers to global media outlets. Use of content from elite 
US and UK newspapers by newspapers in New Zealand also reflects the growing 
globalisation of media. Newspapers in New Zealand, which are owned by foreign media 
companies, with interests in the US, UK and Australia show the trend in globalisation 
and internationalisation of media content as well. 
 
To answer this research question, news content providers and news agencies were 
analysed. The extent to which the newspapers were able to generate their own content 
was also evaluated.  
 
Within the globalisation paradigm, two facets of international news agencies are 
apparent – the ownership of media corporations across national boundaries and the 
globalisation of news. The news agencies are injecting news content into global news 
media outlets in a process of turning global to local, and international news agencies 
contribute to the globalisation process (Boyd-Barrett, 2000).  
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RQ3. To what extent did the US and Coalition dominate the news agenda? 
 
The media management practices of US and Coalition forces during Iraq War II were 
organised to give the maximum positive exposure to the military operations, thereby 
swaying national and global public opinion in their favour. Through meticulously 
designed public relations strategies, the 24-hour news cycle was “saturated by content 
from the Pentagon, Qatar based CENTCOM Media Centre, and embedded journalists”. 
More than 3000 journalists were based in the region, 500 of whom were embedded with 
various military units (Tumber & Palmer, 2004). Thus the US military and government 
controlled the representation of the conflict in the global media (Quenqua, 2003). 
 
The public relations and media strategies paid off, at least in the initial phase of the war 
when the media were upbeat about a swift victory in Iraq. A good example of how the 
US military and government were able to set the news agenda for global audiences was 
the story of the rescue of Jessica Lynch by US Special Forces. The story, which claimed 
she was “fighting to the death” (Schmidt & Loeb, 2003), later turned out to be false 
(Rennie, 2003; Colford & Siemaszki, 2003). 
 
Thus the military and government sources dominated the news, setting the agenda for 
audiences around the world.  This research question seeks to determine the extent to 
which the US and the Coalition countries dominated the news, and the relationship 
between news sources and directions of coverage.   
 
It appears that, especially in times of military conflict, news media and the government 
and military authorities have a symbiotic relationship, in that each need the other to 
survive. The government and the military involved in the conflict need the news media 
to ‘saturate the news agenda’ so to influence public opinion, while news media need 
information for coverage of the conflict. Numerous studies have shown that media rely 
on elite sources, such as government and the military and other official sources, for war 
coverage (Carruthers, 2000; Taylor, 1992b).  
 
In the US, Iraq War I coverage was dominated by official sources (Bennett, 1994) and 
nearly 10 years later, in Iraq War II, the US press extensively used official or ex-official 
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sources (Tumber & Palmer, 2004). A comparative study of Iraq War II coverage by The 
New York Times and Egypt’s leading daily Al-Ahram shows that the newspapers’ 
cultural and political affiliations influenced the use of sources. More than 70 percent of 
the sources in The New York Times were US, while in Al-Ahram US sources accounted 
for 29 percent (Ghanem, 2005). 
 
This research explores the primary sources in the news and their direction, and analyses 
how the use of primary sources varied with story origin. If US and Coalition sources 
dominated the news, then, as Herman and Chomsky (1988) articulated in the 
‘propaganda model’, production and dissemination of news is controlled by profit-
oriented mass media firms and political elites. When elite sources are able to dominate 
the news, through various strategies, they are able to manufacture consent. 
 
The research questions are concerned about the content of the newspapers, and as this 
study does not in any way aim to make claims or generalisations about media effects, 
content analysis is seen as the most appropriate method of research. Previous media 
research into war journalism content in the news media has widely used content 
analysis, which is clearly an indication of the suitability of the method in a research 
topic like this. 
 
7.3 Content analysis 
 
Content analysis can be defined as a research technique for the systematic classification 
and description of communication content, which may involve quantitative or 
qualitative analysis, or both (Berger, 2000). For Holsti  (1969) it is “any technique for 
making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified 
characteristics of messages” (p 14). 
 
Krippendorff (1980) defined content analysis as a research technique for making 
replicable and valid inferences from data to their context. It is a media content research 
methodology that “entails a systematic reading of a body of texts, images and symbolic 
matter” (p 3). Berelson (1971) defined the concept as “a research technique for the 
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objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of 
communication” (p 18). He contends that content analysis is a systematic, replicable 
technique for compressing many words of text into fewer content categories based on 
explicit rules of coding, which is a scientific method for describing various facets of 
communication content in a summary fashion (Berelson, 1971).  
 
Kerlinger (1986) also defined content analysis as a method of studying and analysing 
communication content in a systematic, objective and quantitative manner. Holsti, 
Krippendorff and Berelson, who are considered authoritative on the discipline of 
content analysis in social science research, were unanimous regarding the need for 
content analysis to be systematic and objective.  Indeed without such a rigorous 
approach, the validity and replicability of the findings cannot be achieved. Hence, 
explicit and consistent guidelines were set up for selecting samples and coding. These 
guidelines are discussed later in the chapter. 
 
Berelson has pointed out that content analysis mainly focuses on the manifest content, 
rather than the latent content, thus increasing the reliability of interpretation and coding 
of messages in the text. Manifest content is “the meaning that is easily understood or 
recognised” while latent content is “meanings that are present (in a text) but that have 
not yet emerged or become visible” (McMurray, Pace, & Scott, 2004, p 207-208). 
Noting that manifest content is what the researcher could easily see and count on the 
surface (of the content) being analysed, Stacks (2002) said that “Manifest content may 
be the number of times specific financial figures are given in an annual report … the 
number of times a particular client is mentioned in the mass media, or the size of 
photographs used in a magazine or number of column inches published about your 
client” (p 109). 
 
Latent content, however, can be interpreted and deconstructed through prior knowledge 
and the research context. As there was the need for thematic analysis of the content in 
this research, latent content, which is “more qualitative and deals with the underlying or 
deeper meanings” (Stacks, 2002, p 109) of the editorial content, is also used. For 
example in this thesis the thematic coverage explores the direction of news sources, 
whether the sources were favourable or unfavourable towards any key actor in the Iraq 
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War. Once clear definitions of the directions have been arrived at, the latent content in 
the story can be coded.  
 
7.3.1 Content analysis as a method for war coverage research 
 
Numerous studies investigating print media coverage have employed content analysis as 
the main method of inquiry to analyse the editorial content of the news media.  Such 
studies have included a focus on the coverage of the American Civil War (Hamilton, 
1988), World War II (Yoshimoto, 1994), the Korean war (Kim, 1991), the Algerian 
civil war (Khane, 1993; Ghodbane, 1985), Vietnam War (Hoang, 2005; Flowers, 1996; 
Peterson, 1994; Patterson, 1982; Holk, 1979; Showalter, 1975), Middle East conflicts 
(Batarfi, 1999; Salamon, 1989; Buelkeshk, 1985; Husni, 1980), the Gulf War (Willcox, 
2004; Alruwaitea, 1997; Keeble, 1996; Al-Kahtani, 1999; Chrisco, 1995; White, 2004), 
and the Iraq War of 2003 (Barker, 2004; Lee, 2004).  
 
Several recent inquiries into the news media coverage of Iraq War I (Alruwaitea, 1997; 
Keeble, 1996; Al-Kahtani, 1999; White, 2004), and Iraq War II (Barker, 2004; Lee, 
2004) used content analysis, applying the techniques and methods that are also used in 
this research. Keeble (1996) examined the British and US press coverage of the 1991 
Gulf War, using quantitative content analysis, in relation to the propaganda model 
formulated by Herman and Chomsky, while Al-Kahtani (1999) analysed the 
performance of the Saudi Arabian press and their agenda-setting capacity during the 
same conflict, using content analysis and interviews with Saudi media, academics and 
journalists. Alruwaitea (1997) studied how the elite US newspapers, The New York 
Times, The Washington Post and The Los Angeles Times constructed the Arab image 
during the Gulf War and Intefada. The Gulf War was analysed in the context of state-
media relationships.  
 
While White (2004) conducted comparative framing study of seven US newspapers 
during Iraq War I and Iraq War II, Barker (2004) studied the cultural influences on the 
news in the coverage of Iraq War II in Swedish and American news media. Lee in his 
content analysis of the coverage of Iraq War II by The New York Times, The Arab News 
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and The Middle East Times sampled content sources from the start of war on March 20 
to May 1, when the US made the official declaration of the end of war (Lee, 2004). He 
used a sample of 502 stories, which included news articles, editorials and opinions, to 
find out the direction of the war coverage. However, in this research, all the editorial 
content – news, features, news analysis, opinions, editorials and letters to the editor – 
was scrutinised. Unless newspaper content is analysed in its totality, it is unlikely to get 
the clear direction of coverage.  
 
7.3.2 Advantages and limitations of content analysis 
 
According to Stacks (2002), one of the key advantages of content analysis is “its ability 
to objectively and reliably describe a message or group of messages” (p 108). However 
this can only be achieved if relevant procedures such as developing clear categories, 
coding units and sampling frames are followed. Content analysis is also objective in the 
sense that if another researcher conducted the analysis, using the same categories and 
coding instruments, the findings would be similar if not the same. But for that 
objectivity to be realised “a clear set of criteria and procedures … that fully explains the 
sampling and categorization methods” (Wimmer & Dominick, 1997) should be 
formulated. The findings of a content analysis are quantifiable and thus the method 
“aids researchers in the quest for precision” (p 112). 
 
One of the limitations, however, is that different researchers may use different coding 
categories and definitions, thus findings are “limited to the framework of the categories 
and definitions used in the analysis” (Wimmer & Dominick, 1997, p 115). According to 
Wimmer and Dominick  (1997), “content analysis alone cannot serve as a basis for 
making statements about the effects of content on an audience” (Wimmer & Dominick, 
1997p 115). However, the findings of a content analysis could be used with research 
that examines the audience. By analysing media content causes (or inputs) can be 
determined, while research focused on the audience would uncover effects (List, 2002). 
Another limitation of content analysis is that the actual processes of news production 
cannot be understood from a textual analysis. Through a content analysis the intentions 
of the media practitioners cannot be judged. Thus the researcher has to rely on previous 
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literature to make inferences. Therefore in this study qualitative interviews with New 
Zealand newspaper editors were conducted to explore the news selection and processing 
decisions and the criteria used in the international news processing and production. 
 
7.4 Qualitative interviewing 
 
The aim of conducting qualitative interviews with editors of the three major New 
Zealand newspapers – The New Zealand Herald, The Dominion Post, The Press – was 
to identify the editorial policies in relation to international news, Iraq War II coverage, 
and news selection and editing processes. Understanding these dimensions would help 
in the final analysis of media content.  
 
Qualitative interviews, also known as intensive or in-depth interviews, are different 
from survey interviews. In survey interviews, conducted using a fixed set of questions, 
all the respondents are asked the same questions and in the same order, while in 
qualitative interviews the researcher uses semi-structured questions (List, 2002) and not 
necessarily in the same order. Follow up questions may also be asked to clarify an 
answer given by the interviewee. A key advantage of qualitative interviews is the 
extensive details they provide, while on the negative side “generalizability is sometimes 
a problem” (Wimmer & Dominick, 1997, p 100). Due to the informal nature of the 
interview some respondents may answer briefly while others may discuss a question in 
greater detail. These shortcomings can be minimised if the interviewer is well prepared 
and is able to manage the interviews in such a way as to extract information on the 
previously identified topics. 
  
7.5 Sampling 
 
As the focus of this research is the study of mainstream New Zealand daily newspapers, 
the criterion for the selection of the sample was the circulation of these publications.  
The New Zealand Herald, The Dominion Post and The Press are considered the top-
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selling newspapers of New Zealand, with a combined audited newspaper circulation 
(ANC) of more than 397,000 in 2004.  
 
According to the Audit Bureau of Circulation (ABC) there are eight daily newspapers 
with a circulation of more than 25,000. ABC figures for 30th September 2004, (Table 
7.1) show that the top three newspapers were The New Zealand Herald (208,419), The 
Dominion Post (98,229) and The Press (90,828) (ABC, 2004). These three metropolitan 
newspapers command more than 70 percent of the gross circulation of all newspapers 
with a daily circulation of over 25,000. The eight newspapers have a combined 
circulation of 571,271 and The New Zealand Herald, The Dominion Post and The Press 
accounted for a gross circulation of 397,476. These newspapers represent three distinct 
geographic, economic and political regions, with The New Zealand Herald being 
published in Auckland, which is the main business and financial centre of New Zealand, 
while The Dominion Post comes out from the ‘beltway’ of New Zealand, Wellington, 
and The Press from Christchurch, located in the predominantly agricultural South Island. 
 
Table 7.1 Daily newspapers with circulation of over 25,000 copies 
Publications ANC to 
30/09/2002 
ANC to 
31/03/2003 
ANC to 
30/09/2003 
ANC to 
30/09/2004 
ANC to 
31/03/2004 
The New Zealand Herald  211,246  210,910  207,299  208,419   211,490   
The Dominion Post 101,511  99,089  98,107  98,229   99,123   
The Press  90,759  91,111  90,394  90,828   92,436   
The Otago Daily Times    44,099  44,546  45,143  44,849   45,400   
The Waikato Times    41,983  40,972  41,783  41,849   41,009   
The Hawkes Bay Today    30,912  30,079  30,056  31,233   30,197   
The Southland Times    29,830  29,928  29,369  29,371   29,557   
The Taranaki Daily News    26,783  26,687  26,660  26,493   26,749   
Source: Newspaper Audit Results, Audit Bureau of Circulation, Wellington  
 
Even the latest figures released by ABC, on 11th May 2006, show that the circulation of 
these newspapers remains much the same as it was in 2004. In the six months to March 
31, 2006 The New Zealand Herald sold an average of 200,309 copies a day ("Herald 
maintains title as biggest selling daily " 2006),  while the figure for The Dominion Post 
("Dompost numbers increase," 2006) was 98,251 and  92,465 for The Press ("Press 
circulation," 2006). 
 
The New Zealand Herald, published since 1863, is now owned by Australia’s APN 
News Media Limited, which publishes 24 daily and more than 90 non-daily newspapers 
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in Australia and New Zealand (2004). The other two newspapers, The Dominion Post 
and The Press, were bought from Independent Newspapers Limited on 1 July 2003 by 
Fairfax New Zealand. According to Fairfax, the company has under its umbrella nine 
daily newspapers and two national Sunday papers, a stable of magazines with particular 
strength in the lifestyle category, a magazine publishing business and an internet 
operation.   
 
7.6 Time period and sampling frame 
 
The invasion of Iraq by the US-led Coalition began on 20th March 2003 with aerial 
attacks on Baghdad, and the city was captured by 1st May. On that day US President 
George Bush declared that “major combat operations in Iraq have ended” (Kornblut, 
2003, p A1). However, the war continued even after that date, with Saddam loyalists 
and other insurgents resisting the US and Coalition forces. Following are some of the 
key dates in the first two months of the war (more detailed timeline of the invasion 
phase of the war given in Appendix 2): 
 
March  20 The war against Iraq begins 5:30 am Baghdad time when the US launches 
Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
March  24 US troops march within 60 miles of Baghdad. 
March  27 Iraq says 350 civilians have died in air raids since the conflict began. 
April  5 US tanks roll into the Iraqi capital and engage in firefights with Iraqi troops 
April 7 British forces take control of Basra, Iraq's second-largest city. 
April 9 US forces take control of Baghdad; US marines help crowds to topple a giant 
statue of Saddam Hussein and widespread looting breaks out unhindered in the 
Iraqi capital. US vice-president, Dick Cheney, says the Iraqi regime is collapsing, 
and that military progress shows criticism of the war was misguided. 
April 14 Major fighting in Iraq is declared over by the Pentagon 
May 1 The US declares an end to major combat operations 
May 22 UN Security Council approves a resolution lifting the economic sanctions against 
Iraq 
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A sampling frame was systematically selected beginning with 21st March 2003 and 
finishing on 22nd May 2003. Although the war started a day earlier on 20th March at 
about 5:30 am (Iraq time) Thursday, New Zealand newspapers began to cover the US 
attack on Iraq the following day, from 21st March. From the sampling period (21 
March-22 May 2003), 21 sampling dates were selected, starting with the first date and 
selecting every third day (21 March, 24 March, 27 March … 13 May, 16 May, and 22 
May). There were 54 publication dates in the sampling frame of 63 days and 22 
publication dates were thus selected for content analysis. 
 
As the focus of the research is the actual war coverage in the three largest New Zealand 
newspapers, the time frame is deemed appropriate. A high degree of accuracy in this 
systematic sampling has been maintained by the sampling frame, which was selected to 
begin with an obvious starting point (beginning of the war) and until 22nd May, which 
was nearly three weeks after the 1st May, the date of the official end of major combat 
operations by the United States. 
 
The three newspapers – The New Zealand Herald, The Dominion Post and The Press – 
published combined editions for Saturday and Sunday, as their weekend issue. If the 
sampling date fell on either Saturday or Sunday, the weekend edition was selected for 
analysis.  There were 600 items in the sampled dates, with 346 items in The New 
Zealand Herald, followed by 186 in The Dominion Post and 168 in The Press. 
 
7.7 Reliability 
  
In any research, consideration should be given to attaining the highest levels of 
reliability, and this is particularly essential to content analysis. As Wimmer and 
Dominick (1997) point out, “if a content analysis is to be objective, its measures and 
procedures must be reliable” (p 126). To achieve reliability, Wimmer and Dominick 
(1997) suggest that categories be defined clearly, coders trained and a pilot study be 
conducted. In this study these steps were taken, although training of coders was not 
necessary as the author was the sole coder. To test the reliability of coding, intra-coder 
reliability was conducted instead of inter-coder reliability. 
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To achieve a higher level of reliability, before the content analysis was conducted, 
categories were defined in maximum detail so that they were mutually exclusive and 
did not overlap. The author coded all the content himself, as the sample size was 
manageable for one person to do the coding. Due to the nature of the content being 
studied, training others to a satisfactory level would have taken a lot of time and 
resources. Thus, the author, having undertaken extensive research on content analyses 
of media coverage found it deemed it appropriate to code the content himself. 
Furthermore, coding consistency is higher if one person does the coding (List, 2002), 
thus in this research the high level of reliability is attributed to the author being the sole 
coder. The reliability can be tested even if one person does the coding. According to 
Wimmer and Dominick (1997), in such situations where one person codes all the 
content, “to test intracoder reliability, the same individual codes a set of data twice, at 
different times, and the reliability statistics are computed using the two sets of results” 
(p 131). 
 
To increase reliability, a pilot study was conducted, for which a sub-sample of the data 
was content analysed. The sampled dates for the pilot study were 21 March, 24 March, 
27 March and 30 March.  A total of 310 items, which included news, features, news 
analysis, editorials, news briefs and letters to the editor were coded. This procedure 
showed the need for further explanation of the categories for the efficacy and accuracy 
of the research. Extensive efforts were  taken to clearly define the categories as “precise 
category definitions generally increase reliability” (Wimmer & Dominick, 1997, p 121). 
 
To test the reliability of the coding, after the total sample of 600 items was coded, 125 
items (25 percent) were recoded to ascertain the coding reliability coefficient. 
According to Wimmer and Dominick (1997), a sub-sample of data between 10 percent 
and 25 percent can be reanalysed to measure the reliability. As the author is the sole 
coder, the intracoder reliability coefficient was calculated using the following formula, 
which determines the reliability of nominal data in terms of the percentage agreement. 
 
 
CHAPTER 7: RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHOD                                                              PAGE 213  
 
Reliability = 
21
2
NN
M
+  
 
In the above formula, M is the total number of coding decisions made in the two coding 
sessions, while N1 and N2 are the number of coding decisions made in the two different 
coding sessions. 
 
Table 7.2 Reliability coefficients 
Categories Intra-coder 
agreement 
Reliability 
coefficient 
Type of item 125 1.000 
Section 125 1.000 
Item origin, location 124 0.992 
Headline size 123 0.984 
Priority 123 0.984 
News agencies/ newspapers 122 0.976 
Episodic/Thematic framing 117 0.936 
Direction of primary source 114 0.912 
Primary source 113 0.904 
Main theme 113 0.904 
Direction of item 112 0.896 
Note: For reliability test 25 percent (125 items) of the total sample (n=600) was analysed 
 
An acceptable level of reliability coefficient was reached in the reliability test with 1.00 
for item type, .98 for headline sizes, .99 for item origins, .90 for directions, .98 for 
priority of item, .90 for themes, and .90 for primary source. The strength of this 
reliability is high as the coefficients are higher than .80. According to Lombard et al 
(2005), coefficients of .90 or greater are always acceptable, .80 or greater is acceptable 
in most situations, and .70 may be appropriate in some exploratory studies for some 
indices. 
 
7.8 Categories and units of analysis 
 
Within the scope of the study and the research questions, several categories were 
identified for coding, mainly to answer the research questions and also to put the war 
coverage in context. There were categories that were of direct relevance to the research 
questions and others that provided background information in the search for answers to 
these questions. 
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The coding guide was developed to provide a clear and concise definition of categories, 
for which data were coded through content analysis. The categories were clearly 
formulated so that they were mutually exclusive, exhaustive and reliable. The units of 
analysis were any news content -- this included news, features, editorials, opinion, and 
letters to the editor -- that was related to the Iraq conflict. That may have been an item 
about the launch of area attacks on Baghdad by the Coalition forces, or anti-war 
demonstrations in Australia, or the reaction of New Zealand Prime Minister Helen 
Clark to the US-led attack on Iraq.  
 
In determining if the item was related to Iraq War II, the first several paragraphs of the 
item were checked to see if they were related to the conflict directly or indirectly. There 
were stories, for example, that were not related to the Iraq issue, but which at the very 
end briefly mentioned the crisis as background information. Such items were not coded. 
The only exceptions were the brief news items or News in Brief. These are indeed very 
brief items, often a sentence long. A preliminary examination of editorial content also 
revealed that these short items did not have source, and only sometimes news agency 
attributions, thus making them less important for evaluation in answering the research 
questions that are raised in this thesis. 
 
A comprehensive guideline is necessary for accurate and consistent coding, thus 
achieving a higher level of reliability. After the sample dates were selected, all the 
relevant items were electronically copied from microfilm archives of The New Zealand 
Herald, The Dominion Post and The Press, available at the University of Canterbury in 
January-February 2005. There were no missing copies and all the sample dates were 
available, thus achieving a 100 percent count. Coding was carried out on four sampled 
dates, beginning 21 March, as a pilot study to assess the validity and reliability of the 
techniques being employed. The research procedures and coding categories were 
revised, and final coding of content was carried out by the author between September 
and December 2005. The final coded data were analysed using Statistical Package for 
Social Sciences (SPSS).  
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7.9 Definitions of categories 
 
A comprehensive coding guideline and clear definitions of categories are important in 
order to attain a high level of validity. Thus major categories and their definitions as 
used in the content analysis are given below: 
 
1. Headline size: Headline size was measured, as it shows the emphasis editors place 
on the news story. Normally important stories are given larger headlines. Headlines 
were coded under one column, two columns, three columns, four columns, five 
columns, six columns, seven columns and banner headlines. The three newspapers 
mainly used a seven-column format in the layout. Banner headlines are headlines 
that are written across the page in very large and bold fonts. Such headlines mostly 
appear on the front pages, although occasionally in other sections. 
 
2. Type of item: The content was categorised according to its type under news, news 
analysis, feature, editorial, opinion/column and letter. News or straight news is an 
item that presents the facts, mostly answering the When, Where, How, Who 
questions, without putting forward the opinion of the writer. Such stories are written 
in inverted pyramid style and the writer presents most important facts at the 
beginning of the item. Feature articles are human interest narratives where sources 
are also cited, but the writer may also suggest views and opinions. The style of 
writing is different from that of straight news. News analysis is analytical and 
interpretive and explanatory. The editorial or the leader is the item that sets the 
views and policies of the newspaper. Opinions, columns, mostly published on the 
Op-ed page, articles or columns by specialist writers or contributors that express 
their opinions. Letters are the feedback of readers, and may represent individuals or 
organisations.   
 
3. Item origin/ location: The three newspapers followed different styles in their war 
coverage, with some items carrying datelines and bylines while others did not 
mention the origin of  the item. If there was no dateline, the item’s origin was 
determined by reading the first few paragraphs. Items for which the origin was not 
clear were categorised as ‘unclear’. 
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4. Direction of the item: All the different items were analysed for their direction. 
After reading the entire item, the coder made the judgement whether the item was 
favourable to the US, unfavourable to the US, favourable to the British, 
unfavourable to the British, favourable to Iraq, unfavourable to Iraq, unfavourable to 
both the US and Iraq, neutral or the direction is unclear. An example might be a 
news item titled, “Anti-war movement killing itself”, which informs readers that the 
number of people attending anti-war demonstrations has been on the decline since 
January 2003. Although a story about anti-war movements and demonstrations 
staged by them might be seen as unfavourable to the US, this item should be coded 
as favourable since the item indirectly claims that opposition to the US-led war is 
declining; or rather support for US military actions is gaining. In all the items the 
direction was determined from the contextual messages, and both the headline and 
the body of the article were evaluated to determine the direction. The item was 
coded as being neutral if it was neither favourable nor unfavourable to any of the 
major actors in the conflict. 
 
5. Section: The items were also coded for their location within the newspaper, as this 
is also an important criterion for deciding the level of importance given to items. A 
story on the front page would be more important than an item in the World News 
section. The newspapers under study are divided into a main section (A) and a 
World section (B). By this very hierarchy, section A is the most important and 
normally reserved for national or local news. But during the first week of Iraq War 
II, the newspapers moved most of the war coverage to the main section. The 
editorial page is where the newspaper’s editorial is published, and often opinion and 
letters to the editor appear on this page. The page opposite this page is known as the 
Op-ed page, where opinions and columns are also published.  
 
6. Priority of the item: The prominence given to the item on the page is also 
identified by assessing the size of the headline and the inclusion of photos or 
graphics. Only three variables were marked: these were lead story, second story or 
third story. A pilot study of a small sample of newspapers showed that it was 
difficult to determine the priority level of more than three items. If the page 
CHAPTER 7: RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHOD                                                              PAGE 217  
 
contained about seven items, normally about two to three items were distinct while 
the rest may have been given the same headline size and text space. Items that did 
not fall into the categories were marked as ‘other’. 
 
7. News agencies and other content providers: News items were coded to identify 
the news agency or other content provider from which they derived. News items that 
were written by the newspaper staff of The New Zealand Herald, The Dominion 
Post and The Press were normally given by-lines at the beginning of the item. Such 
items were coded as content generated by the newspaper. Likewise, news agencies, 
normally credited at the end of articles, were also coded. If there was no source 
credited, the item was coded under ‘no source cited’.    
 
8. Primary sources in the item: All the news items, news features and news analyses 
were studied to determine the most important or primary source. The other editorial 
content such as editorials, opinions and letters were excluded from this, as in these 
items writers present their own views, based on background information, facts and 
personal judgements rather than attributing to news sources. Straight news, on the 
other hand, was attributed to various sources and as news stories often contained 
more than one source only the main or primary source was coded. This was 
determined by identifying the amount of space and priority given to the source. For 
example, a story about the launch of air strikes against Iraq might have quoted US 
president George Bush (US government source), provided an assessment of the 
damage by a Pentagon official (US military source), and finally quoted the angry 
reaction from Iraqi president Saddam Hussein (Iraqi government source). In this 
case there were three main sources, but which is primary or secondary is determined 
by the prominence and amount of space given to the sources.   
 
9. Main theme of the item: This is the main topic of the editorial content. There were 
more than 50 themes identified for coding, which came under nine major categories: 
1. Military build-up/ technology (Where the story focuses on the military 
build-up, such as sending troops and hardware to the theatre of conflict, 
or on the military technology that is being used in the war) 
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2. Impact of war (The economic, environmental and humanitarian impact 
of the war) 
3. Debate about the war (Anti-war and pro-war demonstrations, criticisms 
of Iraq, US and its Coalition, antiwar reactions and responses) 
4. New Zealand and Iraq War II (Support or criticism of New Zealand 
government policy towards Iraq War II) 
5. Casualties of war (Both military and civilian casualties on all the sides) 
6. Diplomacy (Diplomatic efforts by the UN, US and Coalition and other 
countries) 
7. Prisoners of war (POWs from any of the countries involved in the war) 
8. Process of combat (News about the combat operations by infantry, air 
force and other engagements) 
9. Context of war (Stories that put the conflict into context through giving 
the background to the conflict or Iraq history and culture) 
10. Other (Some other themes that were not in the main categories) 
 
10. Episodic/ Thematic coverage: All the editorial items (except letters to the editor) 
were analysed for their direction in terms of episodic or thematic coverage. Episodic 
items are event oriented, reporting what happened without contextualising the issue 
or news event.   
 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 8: INTERVIEW WITH NEW ZEALAND EDITORS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the editorial policies of the New Zealand 
newspapers vis-à-vis Iraq War II coverage, international news, news values and news 
selection. As this research focuses on the war coverage in three leading New Zealand 
daily newspapers – The New Zealand Herald, The Press and The Dominion Post – it 
was considered important to interview the editors of the three publications in order to 
qualitatively analyse the editorial policies. Interviews were conducted with senior 
editors of The New Zealand Herald, The Dominion Post and The Press in 2006 and 
2007. As the New Zealand Press Association (NZPA) is the leading news agency in 
New Zealand, editor of NZPA was also interviewed to assess how the agency covered 
international news events such as the war in Iraq and other major stories.  
 
As these interviews were semi-structured, some key questions were formulated and all 
the editors were given the questions in advance before the actual interviews were 
conducted. Interviews were conducted in person, by telephone and email (see Appendix 
CHAPTER 8: INTERVIEW WITH NEW ZEALAND EDITORS                                                      PAGE  220  
 
4 for the questionnaire). A face-to-face interview with the editor of The Press, Paul 
Thompson, was conducted at his office and lasted nearly one and a half hours. The 
interviews with The New Zealand Herald Assistant Editor John Gardner and Patrick 
Piercy, Chief sub-editor of The Dominion Post were conducted over the phone. The 
interviews lasted about 45 minutes. The editor of NZPA answered the questions through 
e-mail. All the interviews were conducted between March 2006 and February 2007.  
 
This chapter presents excerpts from these interviews and discusses the international 
news coverage, news selection and other editorial policies of these newspapers and the 
news agency within the theoretical issues outlined in Chapters 4 and 6. These include 
the news values, news selection and international news flows through news agencies 
and other content providers such as major US and UK newspapers. 
 
8.2 International news and Iraq War II coverage 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the mainstream New Zealand press gave extensive coverage 
to Iraq War II, sourcing editorial content mainly from major news agencies and some 
leading newspapers of the UK and US. The New Zealand newspapers appeared to be 
capitalising on Iraq War II as a major news event, with The New Zealand Herald 
promising its readers the “most comprehensive coverage” while The Dominion Post 
intended to cover news from any location with “expert analysis”. For the 
comprehensive war reporting published by the newspapers, the major sources were 
foreign news agencies and newspapers, while a few opinion articles originated from the 
New Zealand newspapers themselves.  
 
Although Iraq War II has a high news value, the New Zealand newspapers did not send 
their journalists to cover the conflict from Iraq or the Gulf, mainly for economic reasons. 
While noting the reasons for not sending newspaper staff to cover the war, The New 
Zealand Herald Assistant Editor John Gardner, said “the answer is quite simple, it is (an) 
economic” consideration (Interview with Gardner, March 8, 2006). Like The New 
Zealand Herald’s editor, of The Press Paul Thompson also cited economic reasons for 
not sending staff journalists to report from the Gulf region. However, he noted that if 
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New Zealand had a direct news interest in the war, the newspaper would have 
considered sending journalists to Iraq as the New Zealand news value would be higher. 
He said that “If New Zealand became engaged in a conflict (such as Iraq War II) and 
regular troops became involved … we would need to go and cover it” (Interview with 
Thompson, February 23, 2006). Expressing similar views, Patrick Piercy, Chief sub-
editor of The Dominion Post said that it was “predominantly economic” reasons that 
prevented a newspaper staff journalist being sent to cover the war. However, he also 
noted that “If New Zealand had a significant military presence in the Gulf we may well 
have sent someone” as the news values for local audiences would have become 
significantly higher (Interview with Piercy, February 13, 2007). 
 
The initial coverage of Iraq War II was focussed on the invasion and military operations 
and both Gardner (Interview with Gardner, March 8, 2006) and Thompson agreed that 
coverage was more event-oriented. In this regard, Thompson said: 
 
When the air strike on Iraq began and the drive to Baghdad was happening we began 
focusing very much on the process of military operations. Subsequent to that our 
coverage has focused on the insurgency, the ongoing democratic processes, 
humanitarian crisis, and US failure to do the job properly. At different phases you focus 
on different things. … Main news was around invasion, but since then coverage has 
been less comprehensive, simply because less is happening in terms of what our readers 
are interested in (Interview with Thompson, February 23, 2006). 
 
Both The New Zealand Herald and The Press sourced content from affiliated 
newspapers and through partnerships, which illustrates the globalised nature of news 
production and dissemination. As discussed in Chapter 3, The New Zealand Herald, The 
Dominion Post and The Press are owned by two foreign media companies, and thus 
have access to news copy generated by affiliated publications. During Iraq War II, The 
Dominion Post and The Press were owned by Independent Newspapers Limited, 45 
percent of which was owned by Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation. The New 
Zealand Herald was owned by Dublin-based Independent News and Media (Rosenberg, 
2004; "Murdoch to sell New Zealand publishing interests to Australian rival," 2003).  
 
Gardner noted that although The New Zealand Herald has some foreign correspondents, 
none were based in Iraq during the war. However he said that “We have a relationship 
with leading world newspapers and magazines such as The Independent, Newsweek, 
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The Economist and Observer. We have other news agencies that provide content on an 
ad hoc basis” (Interview with Gardner, March 8, 2006).  
 
According to The Dominion Post, their main foreign news sources are mainstream 
international news agencies such as Reuters, AP and AFP and some overseas 
newspapers such as The Times and The Daily Telegraph from London, The Washington 
Post and The Los Angeles Times, The Sydney Morning Herald and The Age in 
Melbourne (Interview with Piercy, February 13, 2007). 
 
According to Thompson “through our relationship with Fairfax Australia we have 
access to their foreign correspondents’ copy” and thus are assured of a steady flow of 
international news to their main newsroom in Christchurch. Thompson noted that 
overseas wire services are their main news sources, although occasionally reporters are 
sent overseas on special assignments (Interview with Thompson, February 23, 2006). 
He further said: 
 
We do not have any permanent overseas correspondents, we often send reporters to the 
events. We did send reporters to Iraq in 2004 to visit the New Zealand contingent in 
Basra and also a reporter last year (2005) to cover tsunami commemorations. He went 
to Thailand and Banda Ache (Indonesia). We sent a reporter to Sri Lanka during the 
tsunami (Interview with Thompson, February 23, 2006). 
 
For coverage of the tsunami, The New Zealand Herald and The Press sent journalists to 
the affected region as the news values for New Zealand audiences were high due to 
several New Zealanders being reported missing or dead. Thus, sending their own 
journalists would assure newspapers of more localised and relevant stories. 
 
New Zealand army engineers were sent to Iraq in September 2003 to assist the country 
in the reconstruction under a UN mandate (NZDF deployment to Iraq 2003). With this, 
news values for local media increased and provided greater opportunities for 
localisation of the war coverage. Hence in July 2004 The Press sent a reporter and a 
photographer to Basra to cover the work of New Zealand army engineers (Beynen, 
2004), and like all other embedded journalists they also had to follow strict media 
guidelines that restricted reporting.  Thompson noted that although “there was no 
vetting of copy” or “editing of the stories by the minders”, The Press journalists “were 
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controlled” (Interview with Thompson, February 23, 2006). Thompson believed that 
coverage of the humanitarian works carried out in Basra by the New Zealand army 
engineers by journalists from New Zealand newspapers would have been different from 
copy from news agencies: “Coverage of events will be different if we have reporters in 
the field, definitely. We can get a lot of local angles, talking to the Kiwis, and looking at 
what they were doing”( Interview with Thompson, February 23, 2006). He also noted 
that the coverage will give readers an “in-depth perspective on the work our troops are 
doing in Iraq” (Beynen, 2004, p 16) . Such a localised New Zealand perspective would 
not be available from international news agencies or newspapers. 
 
Sharing similar views with Thompson, The Dominion Post Chief sub-editor Piercy said 
that it was possible that his newspaper’s coverage would be different if their staff 
journalists were covering the conflict from the Gulf region or Iraq. He further noted that 
content in foreign publications is written for the publications’ audiences and thus the 
orientation of stories on the conflict would be different among newspapers: 
 
We also have to bear in mind that the opinions of our readers are likely to be different 
from those of the readers of, say, The Times [of London] or The Telegraph. Our 
readership covers a wider political spectrum, largely because we are the only newspaper 
in Wellington, and New Zealanders are more likely to be opposed to the Iraq War than 
readers of The Times. This is partly because New Zealand has no troops in Iraq, and 
partly because its readership is likely to be more left-leaning (Interview with Piercy, 
February 13, 2007). 
. 
Although NZPA sent a reporter to cover Iraq War I, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, in the 
recent Iraq conflict the coverage has been carried out from New Zealand, when “NZPA 
has occasionally phoned New Zealanders on the ground for stories”. According to 
NZPA Editor Nick Brown, for international coverage it relies on freelance journalists, 
but when major regional news events develop journalists are occasionally sent to cover 
those stories. He said: “NZPA has two full-time correspondents in Sydney and some 
freelance correspondents in other parts of the world. Occasionally we send journalists 
on overseas assignments from NZ, particularly to the Asia-Pacific region” (Interview 
with Brown, February 13, 2007). 
 
The editors of The New Zealand Herald, The Dominion Post and The Press noted that 
they were concerned that during Iraq War II the information flow was controlled and 
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thus the end users of the news, which come from news agencies and other content 
providers, were vulnerable to propaganda. There was not much they could do except be 
conscious of the war reporting coming from the Gulf region (Interview with Gardner, 
March 8, 2006; Interview with Thompson, February 23, 2006). Gardner said that “in 
their coverage of the Iraq War, they were aware of the issues of facing reporters on the 
fronts, and also the conflicting views among media organisations. In military conflicts 
journalists are exposed to propaganda and spin. To address these issues we tried to 
provide a diverse coverage from different sources. We carried, for example, stories 
from Robert Fisk (The Independent), and used content from The New York Times” 
(Interview with Gardner, 8th March, 2006). Acknowledging that stories from the wires 
and foreign newspapers that were used in The Dominion Post during the invasion phase 
of Iraq War II might have been favourable towards the Coalition forces, Piercy said that 
they took steps to ensure coverage was even. He said, “We have a wide variety of 
sources and were conscious of the different biases of all those sources. We tried very 
hard to vary our coverage of the war” (Interview with Piercy, February 13, 2007).  
 
Noting these issues of propaganda and news management, Thompson said: 
 
During the Iraq War, information flow was highly controlled. I think over time we got a 
good mix of stories and reflected things evenly. But you are always vulnerable, on any 
given story there will be spin and there will be propaganda and over time we managed 
to balance that out. It is very difficult for editors to get through this because you want to 
get the stories in the papers. And you want to keep readers informed, and you don’t 
want to be saying no to every story. But the wire services, given the constraints they 
faced, did a good job of reporting the main news. But there is always going to be the 
odd story which is questionable (Interview with Thompson, February 23, 2006). 
 
One such ‘questionable’ story The New Zealand Herald, The Press and The Dominion 
Post prominently covered was that of the rescue of Jessica Lynch by US Special Forces. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the rescue story was used as a PR tool to boost the US’s 
image (Compton, 2004) and world press “desperate for some heroics” in the war fell for 
the propaganda coming from the US government and military sources (Allan & Zelizer, 
2004). The Lynch story shows how vulnerable the news media are in military conflicts 
where information is heavily managed. As noted by Thompson, it was not an easy task 
for editors to sift through the war news items flowing from wires and positively identify 
the propaganda-laced content. Thus the newspapers, as admitted by the editors, were 
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exposed to spin and propaganda from the primary definers of news (Interview with 
Gardner, March 8, 2006; Interview with Piercy, February 13, 2007; Interview with 
Thompson, February 23, 2006). 
 
Another key feature in the publishing of international news in New Zealand is the 
common outlook shared by newspapers on the selection of news. This was illustrated by 
the Lynch case, where each of the three newspapers saw the story as the most 
newsworthy item. The set of criteria or news values the newspapers use are similar, 
shaped as they are by professional journalism values, as well as cultural and market 
considerations. The fact that the Lynch story was given the same treatment on the front 
pages of the three largest newspapers in New Zealand shows that these newspapers 
subscribe to common news values and thus apply common news selection criteria. The 
story was full of drama and human interest, with the “heroic rescue” of a young woman 
who “fought off her Iraqi attackers … until she went down” (Cohen, 2003, p A 25). 
Like many other world news media, the press in New Zealand were also looking for 
“some heroics” from the war (Allan & Zelizer, 2004), and in the Lynch drama they 
found what they were looking for. 
 
8.3 News values and news selection 
 
With a large supply of international news, especially during major military conflicts 
such as Iraq War II, newspaper editors have many choices in the selection of items for 
publication. The editorial decisions are made based on the dominant news values the 
news media subscribe to. As noted by Golding and Elliot (1979) news values are the 
guidelines used to determine which items will be selected for the final news product. 
During Iraq War II key news values included conflict and major powers. According to 
The New Zealand Herald Assistant Editor Gardner, if the key actor in the story is the 
US it is of greater public interest. He said that “what the readers are interested in is big 
powers such as the US, China. If the story does not involve the US it will be of less 
interest to the public”. Thus, as both the US and Britain were involved in this major 
world conflict, stories about Iraq War II were of high news value. When major powers 
such as the US and Britain are the main actors in news events, news values such as 
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“reference to elite nations” (Galtung & Ruge, 1965) or “power elite” (Harcup & O’Neill, 
2001)  become very significant in the news selection. Acknowledging that influential 
world powers such as the US and UK attract media attention, especially when they are 
engaged in military actions, Piercy noted that extensive coverage of Iraq War II was a 
manifestation of this. He also noted that war journalism has a high news value and thus 
“war makes for good copy, particularly when its progress can be followed on 
television” (Interview with Piercy, February 13, 2007). 
 
The Press editor Thompson also viewed relevance to the readers and impact of the news 
event as major news values that determine the newsworthiness of an item. To illustrate 
the news values and selection criteria used by The Press, Thompson said: 
 
What we are looking for is stories about significant events that matter, that have an 
impact on the world, New Zealand and our readers. That’s everything from a story 
about HIV spreading through the Pacific, unrest in the Solomon Islands, obviously the 
war on terror (Iraq War), terrorist attacks, freedom fighting. All those are stories we are 
interested in on any given day (Interview with Thompson, February 23, 2006). 
 
Although the war in Iraq was geographically far from New Zealand, the conflict’s great 
impact and the involvement of major powers increased its news values. Equally 
important, however, were issues closer to New Zealand. As Thompson noted, unrest in 
the Solomon Islands, in close proximity to New Zealand, was also as important as the 
so-called ‘war on terror’. 
 
According to Thompson, besides the impact of a story, newspapers have to consider 
publishing stories that would inform and educate the public. He said that The Press does 
not look at every story and assume that it will have a direct impact on its readers. 
Thompson said: “It’s more about our readers’ need to understand the world, that these 
stories are the big stories and that is reflecting how the world operates. It could mean 
anything from bird flu to Hurricane Katrina” (Interview with Thompson, February 23, 
2006).   
 
In giving prominence to news values such as impact, elite nations and relevance to 
readers, the newspaper editors agreed that journalistic professionalism was given a high 
priority in the news selection processes. According to Gardner, in the news selection 
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processes a high professional standard is maintained, and there is a clear distinction 
between the editorial position of the newspaper and the publication of news. The 
newspaper’s editorial position does not influence the news selection. In this regard, 
Gardner noted: 
 
News coverage and editorial stance would be separate. Suppose we were hostile to the 
(Iraq) war, we would have covered the war in the same way. Even if we had an editorial 
position that is supportive of war we would have run Robert Fisk (Interview with 
Gardner, March 8, 2006). 
 
Thompson also maintained that the newspaper’s editorial stand on the war in no way 
influenced the coverage. He said that The Press argued that the UN had failed and that 
the US should go to war even though it was a drastic action. Thompson said: 
 
The Press editorial position was in favour of the war. Editorials argued for the war, but 
news coverage was from every angle. I think we are the only newspaper that said war is 
justifiable. Our news coverage made sure we balanced things and provided every aspect 
to our readers. And a lot of that was bread and butter reporting of what was going on 
(Interview with Thompson, February 23, 2006). 
 
In both The New Zealand Herald and The Press foreign news is discussed at the daily 
editorial or budget meetings, as is normal for larger newspapers. Decisions as to 
whether a story should be placed on the front page or in the world news section are 
made at the meetings. However, Piercy said that foreign news is discussed at the 
editorial meetings “especially when a significant story” such as the invasion of Iraq is 
running (Interview with Piercy, February 13, 2007). According to Gardner, “All is 
discussed at the editorial meeting. If the story is a contender for the front page it will be 
decided by the front page editor or whoever is responsible for the front page or Section 
A. And for the world section it is decided by the world section editor” (Interview with 
Gardner, March 8, 2006).  
 
In The Press, world news is closely followed by the World News editor, who presents 
the key stories at the editorial meetings. According to Thompson: 
 
The World News editor goes through the wires and tries to produce a compelling and 
comprehensive world news section everyday which covers the key stories. … We have 
a structured news planning process throughout the day. World news is discussed in all 
our meetings (Interview with Thompson, February 23, 2006). 
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The newspapers generally do not edit or change the content of the stories received from 
the wires or other content providers. According to Gardner of The New Zealand Herald, 
the only modifications are changing the headlines and combining stories from different 
sources:   
 
We never attempt to change the meaning of the story. But certainly in terms of length, 
page design, there is substantial modification done. And it may well be that we may 
change the emphasis of the story to make it more relevant to our readers. We don’t 
change the content of the story. We do combine stories from different wires. We often 
do that because there may be more details in one wire item that may not be in the other. 
Always the headlines are re-written. We never use wire copy headings. It is very 
unlikely that wire copy headlines are used (Interview with Gardner, March 8, 2006). 
 
Thompson also noted that at The Press the foreign news copy is not modified or content 
changed other than in the re-writing headlines, the changing of news angles or lead and 
the combining of details from different news sources: 
 
We often compile stories, so we may take a story from AP, add a bit from Reuters. 
Then we might change the intro or the angle. In the end we have a combined story that 
gives all the main points, contains the latest development. That’s very common for us to 
do. We don’t grab a story and put it blindly. We are often integrating, mixing, 
combining, sharpening and obviously cutting (Interview with Thompson, February 23, 
2006). 
 
 
In The Dominion Post foreign news is edited to make the items comprehensive, while 
headlines are re-written to suit the newspaper’s style. In this regard the newspaper’s 
Chief sub-editor Piercy said: 
 
All copy in The Dominion Post is edited, either for newsworthiness or purely for length. 
But it would be extremely rare for them to be edited for ‘political’ reasons; occasionally 
they might be edited to make them less judgemental, but never to make them more 
judgemental. … It is rare that we would use a wire agency heading. In my opinion, they 
are generally not of the standard we require. Occasionally we may repeat a heading 
from a foreign paper if we think it is a good one (Interview with Piercy, February 13, 
2007). 
 
With the availability of many news sources and professionally written stories, the New 
Zealand newspapers do not see the need for editing, except re-writing headlines or 
changing news angles. This shows that the New Zealand newspapers have similar news 
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values to those of other media organisations and thus subscribe to universal news values 
rooted in the Western journalistic tradition.  
 
8.4 Discussion  
 
In the coverage of international events, such as the war in Iraq, New Zealand 
newspapers have relied on major wire services and elite US and UK newspapers 
(Interview with Gardner, March 8, 2006; Interview with Piercy, February 13, 2007; 
Interview with Thompson, February 23, 2006). As noted by Comrie and Fountaine 
(2005), the mainstream news media in New Zealand  “relied heavily on international 
news providers” for the coverage of Iraq War II. Thus the steady flow of news from the 
mainstream global news players to periphery countries not only commodifies global 
news, but also helps to set a common global news agenda. As manufacturers of news, 
thus, international news providers are able to influence what global topics and issues 
national media are to cover (Stevenson & Cole, 1984). In this process of news 
wholesaling to global retailers, such as the news media in New Zealand, major wire 
services “contributed to internationalization, constructing influential international news 
agendas that acted upon retail media, governments and finance” (Boyd-Barrett, 1997, p 
143).  
 
Not many newspapers could afford to send reporters to cover Iraq War II, unless their 
audiences had direct interests in the conflict and news values far outweighed economic 
factors. As noted by editors of The New Zealand Herald and The Press, if New Zealand 
was involved in a military conflict, they would have to send their own reporter to the 
war zone to cover the conflict. As direct news relevance was low in Iraq War II, the 
New Zealand newspapers found it more economical to source content from major wires 
and other content providers. The high cost of sending journalists to foreign countries 
(Tunstall, 1992; Wu, 2000), thus market considerations, leads to heavy reliance on 
cheaper sources of world news – news agencies. Given the global ownership of New 
Zealand newspapers, mostly affiliated to major media companies such as APN News & 
Media, INL and Fairfax Australia, the New Zealand newspapers had access to copy 
filed by journalists from Iraq or the Gulf region, thus the need for sending their own 
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staff became less important. Hence, the key news providers for New Zealand 
newspapers were major global newspapers and news agencies. 
 
Furthermore, the power of the global news providers in New Zealand is also 
accentuated by the fact that the New Zealand newspapers share common professional 
journalistic values with news media organisations world wide.  The New Zealand 
newspapers do not need to edit or re-write wire copy, as it is already compatible with 
their news values and professional guidelines (Interview with Gardner, March 8, 2006; 
Interview with Piercy, February 13, 2007; Interview with Thompson, February 23, 
2006). Thus, the process of international news publication is simple – choose from a 
myriad of sources, select the story that is relevant to the readers, sub-edit the headlines, 
change the lead if necessary and publish. The newspapers do not consider it important 
to verify news content coming from international sources, as they expect the news 
agencies to be professional in their work (Interview with Thompson, February 23, 2006). 
 
The fact that New Zealand newspaper editors find stories from overseas news media 
easily usable points to three developments: 
 
First, to be able to rely on news stories from such overseas media outfits indicates some 
level of confidence in the promptness and regularity of such supply. Consequently one 
can argue that this is confirmation of the growing sophistication of news gathering and 
dissemination technologies, which today have made it possible for distant events to be 
circulated around the world with ease. Second, one can argue that the Iraq War is no 
longer a local or regional affair but a global one. Hence the story is understandable 
globally and that explains its ‘ready-made’ nature wherever it is disseminated. Third, 
and very importantly too, minimal gatekeeping on such news stories from overseas 
news media, as confirmed in these interviews, points to the emergence of common 
values, and common tastes in news processing and dissemination. The coverage of 
Jessica Lynch is a good example of the common outlook on news values.   
 
It is certainly not mere coincidence that editors in New Zealand will arrive at the same 
opinion regarding the usability of news stories from Reuters and The Times based in the 
UK, and AP and The Washington Post located in the US. For, the interviews in this 
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chapter show that the criteria of news selection, especially regarding global events, are 
based on global news selection processes and news values. 
 
In sum, therefore, global interdependence (Tehranian, 1999) as some globalisation 
theorists argue, or its variation that points to the dominance of Anglo-American 
institutions (Boyd-Barrett, 1999; McChesney, 1997; Musa, 1990) including the media, 
are both evident in the kind of relationship existing between the New Zealand press and 
overseas (Anglo-American) news media. How this relationship is manifested in 
concrete or material terms will be analysed in Chapter 9, where a detailed content 
analysis of the three largest newspapers of New Zealand is made. 
 
What is clear at this point, however, is that structural factors of practical economic 
realities as well as institutional ones associated with the globalisation of news values are 
at play in so far as the dependence of New Zealand newspapers on overseas news media 
is concerned.  
 
From the interviews with the editors, the following conclusions can also be made about 
the nature of Iraq War II coverage, news selection and news values in New Zealand 
newspapers: 
 
• The newspapers opted to rely on news agencies and other content providers for 
the coverage of Iraq War II for economic reasons. 
• If the conflict involved New Zealand the newspapers would be very likely to 
cover the news events with their own staff, as local news values would be higher. 
• The New Zealand newspapers subscribe to common news values. 
• Iraq War II coverage was more event-oriented than context-oriented. 
• The newspapers were aware that the US, Coalition and Iraq sources managed 
news and used propaganda. To minimise spin and propaganda, the editors used 
content from different news providers.  
 
The information obtained from the interviews with editors will help contextualise the 
findings of the quantitative content analysis. The results of the content analysis are 
presented in the following two chapters.   
  
 
 
CHAPTER 9: THEMES AND ORIENTATION OF WAR COVERAGE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter reports on the empirical findings of the content analysis related to the 
direction, orientation and main themes of Iraq War II coverage. The findings presented 
in this chapter, along with information obtained from interviews with newspaper editors, 
as discussed in Chapter 8, answer the first research question – “How did the New 
Zealand metropolitan newspapers cover the Iraq War?” This chapter reports on and 
discusses the content analysis of Iraq War II coverage by the three leading metropolitan 
newspapers of New Zealand – The New Zealand Herald, The Dominion Post and The 
Press. 
 
These newspapers extensively reported the developments leading to the political and 
military confrontation between the US and Iraq. War coverage in New Zealand 
newspapers started on March 21st with 81 items on the conflict. News graphics and 
photos were widely used to cover the war stories. The extensive coverage given by The 
New Zealand Herald to the war led one of its readers to complain in a letter to the editor: 
“… Each day I hope for a picture on the front page that is not the Iraq War. Each day I 
am disappointed” (The New Zealand Herald, 2003, p A22). 
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Coverage gradually declined after April 4, with 45 items on this day, and on May 22 
there were only two items on Iraq War II in the three newspapers (Figure 9.1). Of the 
600 items analysed in total, 55 percent were news items, followed by letters to the 
editor (19%), features (13%), opinion (7.3%), news analysis (4.5%) and editorials (1%). 
The coverage of Iraq War II was extensive, with the front pages generally being 
dominated by news on this topic. The main source of foreign news was Reuters, with 
17.1 percent (n=486) deriving from this agency. This is consistent with a recent study of 
foreign news content in four New Zealand newspapers (Taira, 2003). The amount of 
coverage given to the war by The New Zealand Herald was 41 percent, followed by The 
Dominion Post (31%) and The Press (28%).  
 
Figure 9.1 War coverage during the sampled period (March 21- May 22) by The New Zealand Herald, The 
Dominion Post and The Press (n=600) 
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Until April 16, Iraq War II news occupied prime space on the front page or the main 
sections of the three newspapers. Although occasionally Iraq War II news made it onto 
front pages after that date, invariably coverage was relegated from the main section 
(Section A) to the World News section.  From March 21 until April 16, the war 
coverage had presence on the front page and the main section. After May 1, there were 
no Iraq War II-related items on the front page of any newspaper. The coverage 
continued, at a declining rate, in the World sections. The decline in coverage may have 
been due to the fall of the Iraqi Government with the takeover of Baghdad by the US 
forces on April 10.  
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The findings show that the newspapers focused on covering the developments in the 
Gulf region, with more attention to event-oriented news than in-depth analysis of the 
events unfolding in and around Iraq. Straight news accounted for 55 percent of all the 
items that appeared in the three newspapers. 
 
More than 37 percent of the 246 items that appeared in The New Zealand Herald were 
straight news (discussed in detail below), while for The Dominion Post it was nearly 65 
percent and for The Press 69 percent (Table 9.1). News analysis accounted for only 4.5 
percent while the figure for editorials and opinion and comments were 1.2 percent and 
7.3 percent of the total sample. This is an indication of the priority given by the 
newspapers to event-oriented coverage rather than discussion and contextualisation of 
the war in Iraq. The focus of  the war coverage by the newspapers was, as Thompson 
acknowledged (Interview with Paul Thompson, 2006) “on the process of military 
operations” during the invasion phase of the war.  
 
Table 9.1 Content type (n=600)  
 NZ Herald Dominion Post Press  Total 
News  92 (15.3%) 122 (20.3%) 116 (19.3%) 330 (55.0%) 
  within content type 27.9% 37.0% 35.2% 100.0% 
  within newspaper 37.4% 65.6% 69.0% 55.0% 
News analysis 16 (2.7%) 6 (1.0%) 5 (.8%) 27 (4.5%) 
  within content type 59.3% 22.2% 18.5% 100.0% 
  within newspaper 6.5% 3.2% 3.0% 4.5% 
Feature 46 (7.7%) 16 (2.7%) 16 (2.7%) 78 (13.0%) 
  within content type 59.0% 20.5% 20.5% 100.0% 
  within newspaper 18.7% 8.6% 9.5% 13.0% 
Editorial 2 (.3%) 2 (.3%) 3 (.5%) 7 (1.2%) 
  within content type 28.6% 28.6% 42.9% 100.0% 
  within newspaper .8% 1.1% 1.8% 1.2% 
Opinion, comment 29 (4.8%) 9 (1.5%) 6 (1.0) 44 (7.3%) 
  within content type 65.9% 20.5% 13.6% 100.0% 
  within newspaper 11.8% 4.8% 3.6% 7.3% 
Letters 61 (10.2%) 31 (5.2%) 22 (3.7%) 114 (19.0%) 
  within content type 53.5% 27.2% 19.3% 100.0% 
  within newspaper 24.8% 16.7% 13.1% 19.0% 
Total 
 within content type 
 within newspaper 
246 (41.0%) 
41.0% 
100.0% 
186 (31.0%) 
31.0% 
100.0% 
168 (28.0%) 
28.0% 
100.0% 
600 (100.0%) 
100.0% 
100.0% 
x2= 58.162 df=10, ρ=.<.05  
 
As noted above, however, when the three newspapers were compared, The New 
Zealand Herald appeared to report more news analysis, opinion and comments. News 
accounted for only 37.4 percent of the total items carried in The New Zealand Herald. 
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As shown in Table 9.1, news analysis accounted for 6.5 percent of the total content in 
The New Zealand Herald, while for The Dominion Post and The Press the figures were 
3.2 percent and 3 percent respectively. Regarding opinion items, The New Zealand 
Herald stood much higher at 11.8 percent compared to 4.8 percent for The Dominion 
Post and 3.6 percent for The Press. The findings suggest that The New Zealand Herald 
appeared to give more analysis and thus context to the conflict. 
 
The intensity of coverage was high in the main section (Section A) of the newspapers, 
which indicates the editorial importance given to the conflict, with 46 items (7.7%) on 
the front page and 189 items (31.5%) in the main section, with a combined total of 235 
items (39.2%) in the main section. The rest of the items were in the world news section 
(31.8%), editorial and Op-Ed pages (26.3%), business section (2.5%) and other pages 
(.2%). 
 
Readers’ feedback and reaction on the war coverage was given prominence, with the 
three newspapers publishing 114 letters, which represented 19 percent of the total items 
(n=600) studied.  Letters to the editor accounted for 10.2 percent for The New Zealand 
Herald, 5.2 percent for The Dominion Post and 3.7 percent for The Press. Within the 
newspapers, letters were the second dominant content type after news. Of the 114 letters, 
23 (20.2%) were disapproving of New Zealand’s stand on the war, while 16 (14%) were 
in favour of it. However most of the letters expressed criticism of the US Government’s 
actions and policies towards Iraq, with 40 items (35.1%) being unfavourable to the US 
and only 16 (14%) supporting the US. The difference by newspapers was statistically 
significant (x2= 58.162 df=10, ρ=<.05). 
 
Each of the three newspapers also emphasised the visual coverage of the war, with 
extensive use of photos and graphics. Of the 283 photos which were used alongside 253 
items, 128 photos (45.2%) were published in The New Zealand Herald, 71 (25.1%) in 
The Dominion Post and 84 (29.7%) in The Press. There were 35 graphics, which 
included news graphics about weapons and maps showing the location of fighting in 
Iraq. The New Zealand Herald used 15 graphics (42.9%), followed by The Dominion 
Post 12 (34.3%), and The Press eight (22.9%). 
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9.2 Direction and orientation of Iraq War II coverage 
 
The New Zealand Herald, The Dominion Post and The Press reflected the general 
public’s view of the Iraq War. A National Business Review opinion poll in 2003 showed 
that opposition to unilateral action in Iraq without UN approval grew from 67 percent in 
October 2002 to 86 percent in February 2003. Only 12 percent of those polled 
supported New Zealand troops being involved in a military invasion of Iraq without UN 
sanctions, while 86 percent opposed it and two percent were unsure (Cone, 2003b, p 16). 
Another poll conducted by UMR Research for The National Business Review in April 
2003, showed that 56 percent of those polled said that it was wrong for the US to invade 
Iraq without UN approval, while only 31 percent said they approved of the US decision 
and 13 percent were unsure (Cone, 2003a). 
 
To study the direction and orientation of the sampled items, all the editorial content was 
analysed to determine if an item was favourable or unfavourable towards the 
governments of the US, UK, any other Coalition member and/or Iraq. The items were 
also analysed to see if they were favourable or unfavourable towards New Zealand’s 
policy on the Iraq conflict. Items that were not oriented towards any of the above 
positions were seen as neutral. The direction of most items was very clear with regard to 
the above categories, from the manifest content, although there were some items where 
coding required careful and systematic analysis. One such item was titled, “Anti-war 
movement killing itself” which informed readers that the number of people attending 
anti-war demonstrations had been on the decline since January 2003. Although it might 
be assumed that a story about anti-war movements and demonstrations by them would 
be unfavourable to the US, this item was coded as favourable since it indirectly 
projected that opposition to the US-led war was declining; or rather support for US 
military actions was gaining. When there were multiple directions, the primary and 
most prominent position was coded. 
 
The strong anti-war stance taken by the local news media (Cone, 2003a) as reflected in 
the content analysis shows that the direction of the coverage was not in favour of the 
war.  There were 184 items (30.6%) that were unfavourable to the US, Britain or other 
Coalition countries. Of these 167 items (27.8%) were unfavourable to the US. 
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Table 9.2 Direction of item (n=600) 
 NZ Herald  Dominion Post  Press  Total  
Neutral 58 (9.7%) 62 (10.3%) 68 (11.3%) 188 (31.3%) 
Unfavourable to US 72 (12.0%) 58 (9.7%) 37 (6.2%) 167 (27.8%) 
Favourable to US 42 (7.0%) 19 (3.2%) 17 (2.8%) 78 (13.0%) 
Unfavourable to Iraq 28 (4.7%) 23 (3.8%) 24 (4.0%) 75 (12.5%) 
Unfavourable to NZ  19 (3.2%) 8 (1.3%) 3 (.5%) 30 (5.0%) 
Favourable to  NZ  13 (2.2%)  5 (.8%) 4 (.7%) 22 (3.7%) 
Favourable to Iraq 3 (.5%) 3 (.5%) 6 (1.0%) 12 (2.0%) 
Unfavourable to Coalition 3 (.5%) 4 (.7%) 2 (.3%) 9 (1.5%) 
Unfavourable to British 3 (.5%) 2 (.3%) 3 (.5%) 8 (1.3%) 
Favourable to Coalition 1 (.2%) 2 (.3%) 2 (.3%) 5 (.8%) 
Favourable to British 2 (.3%) 0 (.0%) 1 (.2%) 3 (.5%) 
Unfavourable to US, Iraq 2 (.3%) 0 (.0%) 1 (.2%) 3 (.5%) 
 Total  246 (41.0%) 186 (31.0%) 168 (28.0%) 600 (100.0%) 
x2= 36.621 df=22, ρ=.026 
 
there were 78 items (13%) that were favourable to the US (Table 9.2). The number of 
items that were favourable to Iraq was 12 (2%), while 75 items (12.5%) were 
unfavourable to Iraq. Interestingly more than 31 percent of the items were neutral, 
meaning that they were not slanted against the US or Coalition or Iraq. However, if 
newspapers are looked at individually, in The New Zealand Herald the number of 
neutral items – 58 (9.7%) – was outweighed by the number of those unfavourable 
towards the US – 72 (12%). In The Dominion Post and The Press there were 66 (11%) 
and 60 (10%) neutral items against 64 (10%) and 35 (5.8%) items that were 
unfavourable to the US.  
 
On 21st March The New Zealand Herald carried a feature on page 3 which combined 
several items from The New York Times. The headlines had been changed, which made 
the whole item unfavourable towards the US. The original New York Times headline 
was “Watching Intently as a War Is Born 6,000 Miles Away”( Kelley & Gootman, 
2003). However in The New Zealand Herald it appeared under the main headline, “City 
somber as first shots fired.” And the sub-headline (“From bars, lounges and parks, the 
people who suffered the Trade Centre bombing watch as another city comes under 
attack”) appears to draw a parallel between the Twin Towers bombing by Al-Qaeda and 
the attack on Iraq by the US-led Coalition ("City sombre as first shots fired," 2003). An 
anti-war protest photo of New Zealanders in front of the American consulate in 
Auckland was also carried along with the story although it was not at all relevant to the 
feature.  
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The editing and re-writing of headlines by New Zealand editors of content from news 
services and news agencies illustrate the way the editors are able to frame news stories 
in order to represent different perspectives.  
  
On the back page of Section A, on March 24th, The New Zealand Herald published five 
anti-war protest photos from England, Brazil, Japan, South Korea and Scotland. The 
photos showed antiwar protesters demonstrating in those countries, holding placards 
which read “Don’t Attack Iraq”, “Not in my Name”, “Not in our name Mr Blair”. 
 
Although the newspapers varied in the direction and orientation of coverage, with The 
New Zealand Herald being the most unfavourable towards the US (12%), followed by 
The Dominion Post (9.7%) and The Press (6.2%), the difference by newspapers is not 
statistically significant (x2= 36.621 df=22, ρ=.026). 
 
The direction of the items was also cross-tabulated against the content type, after 
removing the letters to the editor, to assess how editorial content such as news, features, 
analysis and opinion stood out. It showed that news and features were more favourable 
to the US and Coalition compared to other content types. While 26 percent of the news 
and features were unfavourable to US and Coalition, the figures were comparatively 
higher for news analysis (44.4%), editorials (42.9%) and opinion (47.7%). Of the 330 
news items, 14.5 percent were favourable to the US and Coalition, 2.4 percent 
favourable to Iraq, 14.2 percent unfavourable to Iraq, while 40 percent were neutral. 
Likewise, regarding features, the percentage of neutral items was higher, with 39.7 
percent, compared to unfavourable items towards US and Coalition at 26.9 percent. 
However, in all other content types, the percentage of neutral items was lower than the 
percentage of those with an unfavourable direction towards the US and Coalition. Only 
22.2 percent of news analysis was neutral, while the figures for editorials and opinion 
were 28.6 percent and 20.5 percent respectively. These figures show that in the debate 
over the conflict in Iraq, the newspapers took an unfavourable position towards the US 
and Coalition, while straight news and features were more neutral. The overall direction 
of items towards Iraq was less significant than those directed towards the US and 
Coalition. The number of items that were either favourable or unfavourable towards 
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Iraq was small compared to the number that expressed an opinion towards the US and 
Coalition. For example, only 9.1 percent of opinion pieces were against Iraq, while the 
figure for those against the US and Coalition was 47.7 percent. Similarly 14.8 percent 
of the news analysis was unfavourable to Iraq, while 44.4 percent was unfavourable 
towards the US and Coalition. These figures also show that the coverage in the New 
Zealand newspapers was more focussed on what the US and Coalition were doing, and 
that various issues related to the invasion of Iraq were editorialised and debated. 
 
The findings show that The Dominion Post and The Press carried more neutral items 
than of The New Zealand Herald in the coverage of the Iraq conflict. As shown in Table 
9.3, in The Dominion Post neutral items accounted for 33.3 percent (62 items) of its 
content, while in The Press it was 40.5 percent (68 items). However, 29.3 percent (72) 
of The New Zealand Herald content were items that were unfavourable to the US, while 
neutral items accounted for 23.6 percent (58). 
 
Table 9.3 Direction of items within newspapers (n=600) 
 NZ Herald Dominion  
Post 
Press  Total 
Favourable to US, Coalition 45 (18.3%) 21 (11.3%) 20 (11.9%) 86 (14.3%) 
-Favourable to US 42 (17.1%) 19 (10.2%) 17 (10.1%) 78 (13.0%) 
-Favourable to British 2 (.8%)  0 (.0%) 1 (.6%) 3 (.5%) 
-Favourable to Coalition (other) 1 (.4%) 2 (1.1%) 2 (1.2%) 5 (.8%) 
Unfavourable to US, Coalition 78 (31.7) 64 (34.5%) 42 (25%) 184 (30.6) 
-Unfavourable to US 72 (29.3%) 58 (31.2%) 37 (22.0%) 167 (27.8%) 
-Unfavourable to British 3 (1.2%) 2 (1.1%) 3 (1.8%) 8 (1.3%) 
-Unfavourable to Coalition (other) 3 (1.2%) 4 (2.2%) 2 (1.2%) 9 (1.5%) 
Favourable to Iraq 3 (1.2%) 3 (1.6%) 6 (3.6%) 12 (2.0%) 
Unfavourable to Iraq 28 (11.4%) 23 (12.4%) 24 (14.3%) 75 (12.5%) 
-Unfavourable to US and Iraqi 2 (.8%) 0 (.0%)  1 (.6%) 3 (.5%) 
Neutral 58 (23.6%) 62 (33.3%) 68 (40.5%) 188 (31.3%) 
-Unfavourable to NZ Iraq policy 19 (7.7%) 8 (4.3%) 3 (1.8%) 30 (5.0%) 
-Favourable to  NZ Iraq policy 13 (5.3%) 5 (2.7%) 4 (2.4%) 22 (3.7%) 
 Total 246 (100%) 186 (100%) 168(100%) 600 (100%) 
x2= 36.621 df=22, ρ=.026 
 
The New Zealand Herald carried more items that were unfavourable to the US and its 
Coalition members, with 78 items (31.7%) that were unfavourable compared to 45 
items (18.3%) that were favourable. The newspaper did not, however, favour Iraq in its 
coverage, with only three favourable items, accounting for 1.2 percent of all the content 
in The New Zealand Herald, while 28 items (11.4%) were unfavourable to Iraq. With 
regard to the New Zealand Government’s policy towards the Iraq conflict, 7.7 percent 
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of The New Zealand Herald’s were unfavourable to the government, while 5.3 percent 
were favourable. 
 
While more than 33 percent of the 186 items published by The Dominion Post were 
neutral, 64 items (34.5%) were unfavourable to the US and its Coalition partners. 
Within this, more than 31 percent were unfavourable to the US. On the other hand, 
items that were favourable to the US and its Coalition forces were comparatively few, 
with only 21 items (11.3%). Like The New Zealand Herald, only three items (1.6%) in 
The Dominion Post were favourable, while 23 items (12.4%) were unfavourable to Iraq. 
There were eight items that were unfavourable to the New Zealand Government’s 
policy vis-à-vis the Iraq War compared to five items (2.7%) that were favourable. 
Although not statistically significant, the unfavourable direction of coverage taken by 
the The New Zealand Herald and The Dominion Post is an indication of how systematic 
news selection processes slanted the coverage. A study of Iraq War II coverage in 
Bangladesh has shown that the news media took an unfavourable position towards the 
US and Coalition by giving prominence to news favouring Iraq and Saddam Hussein, 
while reports that favoured the US and Coalition were edited with negative comments 
(Zaman, 2004). In the New Zealand newspapers’ coverage, however, news content that 
were unfavourable towards the US and Coalition were given prominence.   
` 
Similar to the other two newspapers, The Press also carried more items that were 
unfavourable to the US and its Coalition partners than favourable ones. There were 42 
items (25%) that were unfavourable, against 20 items (11.9%) that were favourable. Of 
these 37 items were unfavourable and 17 items favourable to the US in particular. 
Regarding the Iraqi Government, 24 items (14.3%) were unfavourable and six items 
(3.6%) were favourable. There were only three items (1.8%) that were unfavourable to 
the New Zealand Government’s position on the war, while four items (2.4%) were 
favourable to that stance. 
 
While 188 (31.3%) of the 600 items carried by the three newspapers were neutral, an 
equally large number of items were unfavourable to the US and Coalition. There were 
184 items (30.6%) that were unfavourable, against 86 items (14.3%) that were 
favourable. 
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The New Zealand Herald and The Dominion Post gave substantial coverage to the 
humanitarian crisis arising from the conflict. Opinions regarding the necessity of 
invading Iraq were diverse and all the newspapers opened the opportunity for discussion 
from various viewpoints. In an op-ed piece, a New Zealand Herald columnist said that 
“invasion of Iraq is fully justified, whether Saddam has weapons of mass destruction or 
not” (George, 2003, A 13). But columnist Gordon McLauchlan, questioned the 
legitimacy of the US-led attack on Iraq in his op-ed column titled “… But war in Iraq 
certainly doesn’t”: 
 
And why Iraq, when there are many regimes around the world as bad as or worse than 
Saddam Hussein in their treatment of their citizens – some of them supported in the 
recent past by the US?  
 
… The US Administration has actually said that it plans to keep its economic and 
military advantage over the rest of the world as an instrument of foreign policy. In other 
words might will be right. That is not only deeply amoral, it is frightening (McLauchlan, 
2003, p  A23). 
 
Another columnist, Gordon Roughan (2003), on the same op-ed page, questioned the 
moral basis for attacking Iraq (A 23): 
 
Whatever mistakes the US made in the Middle East, I argued, could not justify an 
attack like that (Sept 11). There was no moral equivalence. But as I watch this 
obscenity in Iraq, the events of September 2001 suddenly seem a long time ago and less 
exceptional. Can one unprovoked attack justify another? (Roughan, 2003, p A23) 
 
The New Zealand foreign policy vis-à-vis Iraq was scrutinised by the three newspapers 
through reader feedback. Of the 30 items that were unfavourable, 23 (76.7%) were 
letters to the editor; and of the 22 items that were supportive of the government’s Iraq 
War policy, 16 (72.7%) were letters from readers. The newspapers’ editorial position 
was not very clear from the letters, as there were few news items that were either 
favourable or otherwise towards the government. There were only two editorial/opinion 
pieces against the New Zealand Government, while four items favoured the Labour 
Government’s position. 
 
When the direction and priority of all the items were analysed, neutral items were found 
to be the lead items. The priority of an item is determined by identifying headline and 
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item size and location of the item on the page. An item placed on the top of the page 
with larger headlines than the other stories would be coded as the main or lead story on 
the page. For this analysis, letters to the editor were not included as some letters did not 
have headlines and their placement did not indicate levels of importance attached to 
them. Newspapers’ editorials were also not included in the analysis of item priority as 
they are always consistent, placed on the editorial page and generally without other 
competing headlines.  
  
Table 9.4 Direction and priority of item (n=478) 
 Lead (First) Second  Third  Other Total 
Neutral 68 (14.2%) 53 (11.1%) 33 (6.9%) 23 (4.8%) 177 (37.0%) 
Unfavourable to US 59 (12.3%) 39 (8.2%) 23 (4.8%) 5 (1.0%) 126 (26.4%) 
Unfavourable to Iraq 28 (5.9%) 26 (5.4%) 9 (1.9%) 3 (.6%) 66 (13.8%) 
Unfavourable to US Iraqi 0 (.0%) 2 (.4%) 0 (.0%) 1 (.2%) 3 (.6%) 
Favourable to  NZ  1 (.2%) 1 (.2%) 1 (.2%) 1 (.2%) 4 (.8%) 
Favourable to US 40 (8.4%) 19 (4.0%) 2 (.4%) 0 (.0%) 61 (12.8%) 
Favourable to British 1 (.2%) 2 (.4%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 3 (.6%) 
Unfavourable to British 4 (.8%) 2 (.4%) 1 (.2%) 0 (.0%) 7 (1.5%) 
Favourable to Iraq 6 (1.3%) 3 (.6%) 2 (.4%) 0 (.0%) 11 (2.3%) 
Favourable to Coalition 2 (.4%) 3 (.6%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 5 (1.0%) 
Unfavourable to Coalition 2 (.4%) 5 (1.0%) 2 (.4%) 0 (.0%) 9 (1.9%) 
Unfavourable to NZ  3 (.6%) 2 (.4%) 1 (.2%) 0 (.0%) 6 (1.3%) 
Total 214 (44.8%) 157 (32.8%) 74 (15.5%) 33 (6.9%) 478 (100.0%) 
X2= 51.017 df=33, ρ=.023 
  
As shown in Table 9.4, of the 214 lead stories, which included news, features, news 
analysis and opinion, 68 items (14.2%) were neutral while 59 items (12.3%) were 
unfavourable to the US (n=478). The number of favourable items to the US was 40 
(8.45) (n=478). There was a similar pattern in the second level of items, with neutral 
items (11.1%) followed by unfavourable (8.2%) and favourable (4%) items to the US.  
 
The news content was also analysed to see if there was a relationship between the 
direction and origin of the item. Of the 68 items that originated from the US, 23 items 
(33.8%) were favourable to the US and 18 items (26.5%) were unfavourable. There 
were nine (13.2%) items that were unfavourable to Iraq and none that favoured Iraq. 
However, 22 percent of the 177 items that originated from Iraq were unfavourable to 
the US, while only 16 items (2.7%) were positive towards the US. Most of the items 
that originated from New Zealand were unfavourable to the US, with 69 items (11.5%) 
in that direction. There were 19 items (3.2%) that were favourable to the US. There was 
only one item (.2%) that favoured Iraq, while 10 (1.7%) items were critical of Iraq.  
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In any newspaper, the editorial emphasis and priority is reflected in the size of the 
headline, especially the banner headlines. These are bold and large headlines written 
across the page, which indicate that the story is the most important item on the page. 
The three newspapers are set to seven columns. Of the 46 banner headlines, 17 (36%) 
were unfavourable and 11 (23.9%) favourable to the US, compared to two (4.3%) that 
were favourable and six (13%) that were unfavourable to Iraq. Items with headline sizes 
in the range of one to seven columns and neutral items dominated, followed by items 
unfavourable to the US. Items that were unfavourable to Iraq scored lowest among the 
eight headline sizes, which indicate that news content favourable to Iraq were not given 
prominence in the newspapers. 
 
9.3 Direction of content originating from New Zealand   
 
A lot of editorial content related to the Iraq War also originated from New Zealand, 
which indicates the level of importance given to war journalism discourse in this 
countries, and attempt by editors to localise the conflict and to make the coverage 
relevant to New Zealand audiences. The Iraq War related coverage from New Zealand 
included political debates about the conflict and op-ed pieces by academics, readers and 
journalists. There were also news and features on how Iraqis living in New Zealand saw 
the war and how it was impacting on them and their relatives living in Iraq. 
 
Of the total sample (n=600), 31 percent (186 items) originated from New Zealand. 
More than half of these were letters to the editor (59.7%), followed by news (22.6%), 
opinion (11.8%), editorial (3.2%), features (2.2%) and news analysis (.5%). The number 
of news items originating from New Zealand was relatively high, standing at second 
after Iraq (40.3%), and at the same level as the US (12.7%). It is interesting to note that 
exactly half of all the comments and opinions (44 items) carried in the three newspapers 
originated from New Zealand, indicating that emphasis was given to the discussion of 
the conflict. Half of these comments and opinions were mainly unfavourable towards 
the US and Coalition, with only 9.1 percent that favoured the US and Coalition.  
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The content analysis also shows that of all the items that originated from New Zealand, 
38.2 percent were unfavourable towards the US and Coalition, against 10.2 percent that 
were favourable (n=186). As shown in Table 9.5, The Dominion Post published more 
items that were unfavourable to the US and Coalition, with 64.4 percent of all the items 
carried in the newspaper fitting this category, while the figures for The New Zealand 
Herald and The Press were 34.5 percent and 34.9 percent respectively. The direction of 
The Dominion Post and The Press Compared towards the US and Coalition differed 
greatly from that of The New Zealand Herald. There were relatively few items that were 
favourable towards the US and Coalition in The Dominion Post (5.4%) and The Press 
(7%) compared to The New Zealand Herald’s 14.9 percent. Items that were not 
favourable to the US and Coalition in The New Zealand Herald accounted for 34.5 
percent of the items that originated from New Zealand. However in The Dominion Post 
and The Press the figures were 46.4 percent and 21.1 percent respectively.  
 
Table 9.5 Direction of item originating from New Zealand, by newspapers (n=186) 
  NZ Herald Dominion Post Press Total 
Favourable to US, Coalition  13 3 3 19 
 within direction of item  68.4% 15.8% 15.8% 100.0% 
 within newspaper  14.9% 5.4% 7.0% 10.2% 
Unfavourable to US, Coalition  30 26 15 71 
 within direction of item  42.3% 36.6% 21.1% 100.0% 
 within newspaper  34.5% 46.4% 34.9% 38.2% 
Favourable to Iraq  0 0 1 1 
 within direction of item  .0% .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 within newspaper  .0% .0% 2.3% .5% 
Unfavourable to Iraq  4 3 3 10 
 within direction of item  40.0% 30.0% 30.0% 100.0% 
 within newspaper  4.6% 5.4% 7.0% 5.4% 
Neutral  12 11 14 37 
 within direction of item  32.4% 29.7% 37.8% 100.0% 
 within newspaper  13.8% 19.6% 32.6% 19.9% 
Unfavourable to NZ Iraq policy  17 8 3 28 
 within direction of item  60.7% 28.6% 10.7% 100.0% 
 within newspaper  19.5% 14.3% 7.0% 15.1% 
Favourable to  NZ Iraq policy  11 5 4 20 
 within direction of item  55.0% 25.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
 within newspaper  12.6% 8.9% 9.3% 10.8% 
Total  87 56 43 186 
within direction of item  46.8% 30.1% 23.1% 100.0% 
within newspaper  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
The second biggest category, after unfavourable items towards the US and Coalition, 
was neutral, which accounted for 19.9 percent of all the items originating from New 
Zealand. The overall direction towards Iraq was relatively insignificant, with 0.5 
percent favourable and 5.4 percent unfavourable (n=186).  
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9.4 Main themes of coverage 
 
The publicly declared reason of the United States for declaring war on Iraq was Iraq’s 
alleged link with al Qaeda (Pender, 2005; Miniter, 2005) and procurement and 
development of weapons of mass destruction (Pillar, 2006; Bush, 2003 ). However, 
focus on these aspects in the coverage of the conflict was very minimal, with only three 
items (.5%) about Iraq-al Qaeda connections and 10 items (1.7%) on weapons of mass 
destruction. As shown in Figure 9.2, the main themes of war coverage in the New 
Zealand newspapers were process of combat (13%), debate about the war (18%) and 
impact of war (11%). 
 
Figure 9.2 Main themes of coverage (n=600) 
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The three newspapers placed equal emphasis on the process of combat, with The New 
Zealand Herald publishing 25 items (4.2%), The Dominion Post 31 (5.2%) and The 
Press 26 items (4.3%) on this theme.  Within the newspapers the process of combat 
accounted for 10.2 percent for The New Zealand Herald, 15.5 percent for The Dominion 
Post and 13.7 percent for The Press. Of the 246 items about the Iraq conflict carried in 
The New Zealand Herald, 24 items (9.8%) expressed criticism of the US while only two 
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items (.8%) were critical of Iraq. The space given by each of the newspapers to the 
debate about the war was similar. Of the 113 items, The New Zealand Herald carried 47 
items (5.5%), The Dominion Post 36 items (4.8%) and The Press 30 items (3.2%).  
 
A marked difference was evident, however, in terms of coverage of military build-
up/technology, where The New Zealand Herald and The Dominion Post stood close at 
22 (3.7%) and 19 (3.1%) items, while for The Press the figure was nine items (1.6%). 
 
The debate about the war was vociferous among the newspapers, with 113 items (18.9%) 
that included criticism of  the US and Iraq and anti-war reactions and responses.  
Criticism of the US was stronger than that of Iraq, with 57 items (9.5%) in the former 
category while the figure for the letter stood at only 10 items (1.7%). Of the three 
newspapers, The New Zealand Herald published 47 items (7.8%) that fell within the 
purview of the debate about the war, while The Dominion Post and The Press remained 
at a similar position with 36 items (5.9%) and 30 items (5.1%) respectively.  
 
As shown in Table 9.5, more than 13 percent (82 items) of the total number of items 
under study were on the process of combat, followed by criticism of the US (9.5%), the 
humanitarian impact (7.2%) and the US military build-up (4.7%). The coverage was not 
put into context by the New Zealand newspapers, as there were few items giving 
historical and background information (.8%) on the conflict. 
 
Table 9.5 Main theme of items (n=600) 
 NZ Herald Dominion Post Press  Total 
Process of combat 25 (4.2%) 28 (4.7%) 29 (4.8%) 82 (13.7%) 
Military build-up/technology 22 (3.7%) 19 (3.1%) 9 (1.6%) 50 (8.4%) 
-US Military build-up 11 (1.8%) 11 (1.8%) 6 (1.0%) 28 (4.7%) 
-US Military hardware-technology 6 (1.0%) 2 (.3%) 1 (.2%) 9 (1.5%) 
-Iraq military build-up 4 (.7%) 3 (.5%) 1 (.2%) 8 (1.3%) 
-Iraq military hardware-technology  0 (.0%) 1 (.2%)  0 (.0%) 1(.2%) 
-Coalition military build-up 1(.2%) 2 (.3%) 1(.2%) 4 (.7%) 
Impact of war 21 (3.6%) 16 (2.7%) 27 (4.5%) 64 (10.7%) 
-Economic impact 7 (1.2%) 3 (.5%) 10 (1.7%) 20 (3.3%) 
-Environmental impact 1 (.2%)  0 (.0%)  0 (.0%) 1 (.2%) 
-Humanitarian impact 13 (2.2%) 13 (2.2%) 17 (2.8%) 43 (7.2%) 
Casualties of war 11 (1.9%) 9 (1.5%) 7 (1.2%) 27 (4.6%) 
-US military casualties 1 (.2%) 1 (.2%) 2 (.3%) 4 (.7%) 
-Iraq military casualties 1 (.2%) 1 (.2%) 1 (.2%) 3 (.5%) 
-Iraq civilian casualties 9 (1.5%) 5 (.8%) 2 (.3%) 16 (2.7%) 
-Coalition military casualties  0 (.0%) 2 (.3%) 1 (.2%) 3 (.5%) 
-Coalition civilian casualties  0 (.0%)  0 (.0%) 1 (.2%) 1 (.2%) 
Prisoners of war 0 (.0%) 7 (1.2%) 2 (.4%) 9 (1.5%) 
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-US POW 0 (.0%) 2 (.3%) 1 (.2%) 3 (.5%) 
-Iraq POW 0 (.0%) 4 (.7%) 1 (.2%) 5 (.8%) 
-UK POW 0 (.0%) 1 (.2%)  0 (.0%) 1 (.2%) 
Debate about the war 47 (5.5%) 36 (4.8%) 30 (3.2%) 113 (18.9%) 
-Anti-war demonstrations 5 (.8%) 2 (.3%) 3 (.5%) 10 (1.7%) 
-Criticism of US govt 24 (4.0%) 23 (3.8%) 10 (1.7%) 57 (9.5%) 
-Criticism of Iraq govt/ military 2 (.3%) 3 (.5%) 5 (.8%) 10 (1.7%) 
-Criticism of US/Iraq govts 1 (.2%)  0 (.0%)  0 (.0%) 1(.2%) 
-Criticism of other Coalition members 1(.2%) 1(.2%) 1(.2%) 3 (.5%) 
-Anti-war responses, reaction 6 (1.0%) 5 (.8%) 7 (1.2%) 18 (3.0%) 
-Pro-war responses, reaction 8 (1.3%) 2 (.3%) 4 (.7%) 14 (2.3%) 
New Zealand and Iraq war 32 (5.3%) 15 (2.5%) 5 (.9%) 52 (8.6%) 
-Criticism of NZ govt Iraq policy 15 (2.5%) 7 (1.2%) 4 (.7%) 26 (4.3%) 
-Support for NZ govt Iraq policy 17 (2.8%) 8 (1.3%) 1(.2%) 26 (4.3%) 
Diplomacy, peace journalism 8 (1.3%) 5 (.9%) 2 (.4%) 15 (2.5%) 
-Diplomatic efforts by UN  0 (.0%) 1(.2%)  0 (.0%) 1(.2%) 
-Diplomatic efforts by US  0 (.0%)  0 (.0%) 1 (.2%) 1(.2%) 
-Diplomatic efforts by others 1(.2%) 1(.2%)  0 (.0%) 2 (.3%) 
-Political/ diplomatic mobilisation for 
war by US 
5 (.8%) 3 (.5%) 1(.2%) 9 (1.5%) 
-Political/ diplomatic mobilisation for 
war by Coalition 
2 (.3%)  0 (.0%)  0 (.0%) 2 (.3%) 
Context of war 14 (2.2%) 3 (.5%) 5 (.8%) 22 (3.7%) 
-Background to conflict 5 (.8%) 0 (.0%)  0 (.0%) 5 (.8%) 
-Iraq history, culture 2(.3%)  0 (.0%) 2 (.3%) 4 (.7%) 
-Iraq-Al Qaida link 2 (.3%) 1(.2%)  0 (.0%) 3 (.5%) 
-WMD 5 (.8%) 2 (.3%) 3 (.5%) 10 (1.7%) 
Other categories 41 (6.7%) 29 (4.9%) 33 (5.4%) 103 (17.2%) 
-About Iraqi officials 8 (1.3%) 10 (1.7%) 5 (.8%) 23 (3.8%) 
-Iraq reconstruction 12 (2.0%) 7 (1.2%) 11 (1.8%) 30 (5.0%) 
-Media, War coverage 5 (.8%) 3 (.5%) 2 (.3%) 10 (1.7%) 
-Iraqi atrocities, crimes, abuse 6 (1.0%) 3 (.5%) 2 (.3%) 11 (1.8%) 
-US, Coalition crimes 2 (.3%) 1(.2%) 4 (.7%) 7 (1.2%) 
-Civil unrest 6 (1.0%) 5 (.8%) 7 (1.2%) 18 (3.0%) 
- Iraqi Opposition 2 (.3%)  0 (.0%) 2 (.3%) 4 (.7%) 
Other 25 (4.2%) 19 (3.2%) 19 (3.2%) 63 (10.5%) 
Total 246 (41%) 186 (31%) 168 (38%) 600 (100%) 
x2= 100.196 df=86, ρ=.140 
 
The economic, environmental and humanitarian impact of the Iraq War was featured 
prominently by the newspapers, with 85 items (10.7%) on this subject. Emphasis was 
more on the humanitarian (7.2%) and economic impact (3.3%). The Press gave a higher 
level of attention to the impact of war with 37 items (4.5%), followed by The New 
Zealand Herald (3.6%) and The Dominion Post (2.7%). The difference by newspapers 
was not statistically significant (x2= 100.196 df=86, ρ=.140). 
 
The coverage did not focus much on the casualties of the conflict. There were only 27 
items (4.6%) about the casualties of the war, with The New Zealand Herald publishing 
11 items (1.9%), followed by The Dominion Post (1.5%) and The Press (1.2%). The 
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three newspapers gave more attention to the Iraqi civilian casualties than US military or 
Coalition causalities.  Iraqi civilian causalities accounted for 16 items (2.7%), while US 
military casualties remained at four items (.7%). 
 
In the coverage of Iraqi civilian casualties, the impact of missile attacks and bombing 
on Iraq was featured prominently in the three newspapers. The Dominion Post on page 
A2 had a page-lead story about the use of cluster bombs on Iraq by the US, and quoted 
US military officials who acknowledged that they were investigating the deaths of at 
least 11 civilians from cluster bombs ("Cluster bombs unleashed on Iraq," 2003, p A2). 
The New Zealand Herald carried a brief article about the cluster bombs and how they 
were used in Iraq by the United States. The article “Deadly weapons with long legacy”, 
written by a journalist from The Independent, said that unexploded bomblets posed a 
danger to civilians (Whitaker, 2003, p B2). 
 
The publication of strong anti-war journalist Robert Fisk’s reports from Iraq in The New 
Zealand Herald and The Dominion Post further emphasised the unfavourable direction 
the newspapers took towards the US. 
 
In March 29-30 issue, The New Zealand Herald carried a feature by Robert Fisk of The 
Independent, headlined “Truth about Basra in the raw footage”, focusing on the civilian 
casualties resulting from the US and British attacks on Iraq. He wrote that “far more 
terrible than the pictures of the dead British soldiers, however, is the tape from Basra’s 
largest hospital as victims of the Anglo-American bombardment are brought to the 
operating rooms shrieking in pain” (Fisk, 2003d, p B16). The Dominion Post also 
carried the Fisk story, with a banner headline “Film reveals Basra’s suffering” on the 
front page of its World Section (Fisk, 2003b, p B1). 
 
The New Zealand Herald also looked at the humanitarian impact of the war in terms of 
civilian casualties. The article, “Innocent victims on the new front line”, from The New 
York Times focused on the impact of the conflict. It also carried a photo of an injured 
boy being led to surgery (Hicks & Burns, 2003, p B2). Another powerful expression of 
the humanitarian crisis in Iraq resulting from Coalition bombing was the article carried 
on the front page of The New Zealand Herald on 24th March. The article titled “The 
CHAPTER 9: THEMES AND ORIENTATION OF WAR COVERAGE                                           PAGE 249  
 
shock of war” by Robert Fisk, accompanied by a five-column photo of  a wounded Iraqi 
child,  occupied the entire front page of the newspaper (Fisk, 2003c). 
 
On 2nd April, on page two of the main section The New Zealand Herald carried an 
article from The Independent highlighting the crisis faced by hospitals in Baghdad in 
treating injured civilians.  Under the headline “Civilian casualties grow by hour”, the 
item reported that 12 hospitals, where headache pills were the only anaesthetic, had 
reached breaking point: 
 
At one point, the military and civilian toll from bombing by Coalition jets and clashes 
with the United States forces along the Tigris was so heavy that one hospital received 
100 casualties an hour (Milmo, 2003, p A2). 
 
The article appeared on the front page of The New Zealand Herald, under a banner 
headline, in the national edition.  The New Zealand Herald gave the most prominence to 
Iraq civilian casualties, with nine (1.5%) items on this subject, while The Dominion 
Post and The Press carried five (.8%) and two items (.3%) respectively.  
 
The Dominion Post carried a feature by Robert Fisk in its World News section, titled 
“Death comes to Babylon”, highlighting the impact of bombing on civilians and their 
predicament. Fisk, a strong critic of the war, wrote (Fisk, 2003a, p B1): 
 
But something terrible happened around Hilal this week, something unforgivable and 
something contrary to international law. One hesitates, as I say, to talk of human rights 
in this land of torture, but if the Americans and British don’t watch out, they are likely 
to find themselves condemned for what they have always – and rightly accused Iraq of: 
war crimes. 
 
The New Zealand Herald published a long feature from AP about the Iraqi civilian 
casualties in Hillah, blamed on US cluster munitions, which scatter many tiny bomblets 
over a wide area. The article, with accompanying photo of an Iraqi weeping over the 
bodies of his six children, wife, two brothers, mother and father, highlighted the horrors 
of war ("Bomblets still wreaking havoc," 2003, p B4). 
 
With regard to the position taken by the New Zealand Government on the invasion of 
Iraq, the three newspapers had a balanced view. There were 26 items (4.3%) for and 
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against the government’s policy. The New Zealand Herald and The Dominion Post 
carried more items that were supportive of the government’s stand, although they were 
significantly small compared to those that conveyed criticism of the policy. 
 
Though the existence of weapons of mass destruction was an important reason, as 
proclaimed by the US, for invading Iraq, coverage of the issue was minimal, as 
mentioned earlier. The New Zealand Herald carried five items (.8%), The Dominion 
Post and The Press two (.3%) and three (.5%) respectively. However The New Zealand 
Herald highlighted the fact that no WMD had been found and that there had been an 
intelligence failure with regard to WMD in Iraq. This newspaper carried a story credited 
to Reuters and AFP, which said that the US should have been embarrassed over their 
failure to uncover weapons of mass destruction in Iraq ("Embarrassing lack of 
weapons," 2003, p B14). The British intelligence services came under fire after the Iraq 
War for misleading the nation on the issue of weapons of mass destruction. The New 
Zealand Herald published a news analysis from The Telegraph on May 1, highlighting 
the ‘spin of the spies’, in justifying an attack on Iraq. The article quoted opposition MPs 
as saying that they had been ‘duped’ into supporting a war by intelligence reports that 
left them in no doubt that biological and chemical weapons would be found (Sylvester, 
2003, p A16). 
 
Despite the lack of evidence of chemical weapons, The New Zealand Herald ran a 
lengthy feature from The New York Times on the front page of its World news section 
about chemical weapons in Iraq. Quoting a former Iraqi scientist who had apparently 
worked on Iraq’s chemical weapons programme, the article said that Iraq had destroyed 
chemical weapons and biological warfare equipment just before the US-led invasion. 
The article appeared to favour the US position that Iraq had a chemical weapons 
programme (Miller, 2003, p B1). 
 
In the same way that The New Zealand Herald pulished criticism of the US for failing 
to prove the pre-war allegation of WMD in Iraq, The Dominion Post ran a news item 
about the criticism levelled against the United States and Britain for failing to find 
banned weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The AFP item quoted The Wall Street 
Journal as saying, “If the United States does not make any undisputed discoveries of 
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forbidden weapons, the failure will feed already widespread scepticism abroad about its 
motives for going to war” ("Pressure on to find banned weapons," 2003, p A2). 
 
 
9.5 Episodic and thematic coverage 
 
All the editorial content in the sample, excluding letters to the editor, was analysed to 
determine the orientation of the coverage in terms of episodic and thematic framing. 
With episodic framing the news item is event-oriented, while with thematic framing 
there is context to the story. According to Iyengar (Iyengar, 1991), in a thematically 
framed item there is more “in-depth, interpretive analysis”. 
 
The findings show that overall the coverage was more event-oriented, with 74.5 percent 
of the items episodic and only 25.5 percent thematic (n=486).  As shown in Table 9.6 
most of the news agencies and newspapers leaned towards episodic coverage. 
Regarding content sourced from the major news agencies, 95.2 percent of Reuters’ 
items were episodic, while the figures for AFP and AP were 96.2 percent and 93.8 
percent respectively. On the other hand, most of the content attributed to US and UK 
newspapers was focused on thematic coverage. 
 
Table 9.6 Episodic/thematic coverage by news agencies, newspapers 
 Episodic Thematic Total 
Reuters 79 (95.2%) 4 (4.8%) 83 (100.0%) 
AP 61 (93.8%) 4 (6.2%) 65 (100.0%) 
Independent 21 (48.8%) 22 (51.2%) 43 (100.0%) 
New York Times 23 (67.6%) 11 (32.4%) 34 (100.0%) 
NZ Herald 13 (41.9%) 18 (58.1%) 31 (100.0%) 
Times of London 25 (86.2%) 4 (13.8%) 29 (100.0%) 
AFP 25 (96.2%) 1 (3.8%) 26 (100.0%) 
Dominion Post 15 (62.5%) 9 (37.5%) 24 (100.0%) 
Telegraph 14 (70.0%) 6 (30.0%) 20 (100.0%) 
Press 11 (57.9%) 8 (42.1%) 19 (100.0%) 
No sources credited 10 (62.5%) 6 (37.5%) 16 (100.0%) 
Observer 6 (40.0%) 9 (60.0%) 15 (100.0%) 
Press Association 13 (92.9%) 1 (7.1%) 14 (100.0%) 
LA Times 9 (75.0%) 3 (25.0%) 12 (100.0%) 
Washington Post 8 (72.7%) 3 (27.3%) 11(100.0%) 
Other 1 (10.0%) 9 (90.0%) 10 (100.0%) 
NZPA 9 (100.0%) 0 (.0%) 9 (100.0%) 
KRT 8 (88.9%) 1 (11.1%) 9 (100.0%) 
AAP 5 (100.0%) 0 (.0%) 5 (100.0%) 
The Age 2 (50.0%) 2 (50.0%) 4 (100.0%) 
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Newsweek 1 (25.0%) 3 (75.0%) 4 (100.0%) 
Bloomberg 2 (100.0%) 0 (.0%) 2 (100.0%) 
Agencies 1 (100.0%) 0 (.0%) 1 (100.0%) 
 Total 362 (74.5%) 124 (25.5%) 486 (100%) 
x2= 126.031 df=22, ρ=.<.05 
 
More than 51 percent of the content from The Independent was thematic, while the 
figure for The Observer was 60 percent followed by The New York Times (32.4%), The 
Telegraph (30%), The Washington Post (27.3%), The Los Angeles Times (25%) and The 
Times of London (13.2%).  
 
However The New Zealand Herald (58.1%) carried significantly more thematic items, 
while the figures for The Dominion Post and The Press were 37.5 percent and 42.1 
percent. The difference by news agencies was statistically significant (x2= 126.031 
df=22, ρ=<.05). 
 
Among the three newspapers, The New Zealand Herald carried more thematic items 
compared to The Dominion Post and The Press. The New Zealand Herald published 76 
thematic items, which is 15.6 percent of the sample (n=486), while the figures for the 
other two newspapers were significantly lower (Table 9.7), at 5.1 percent for The 
Dominion Post and 4.7 percent for The Press. 
 
 
Table 9.7 Episodic/thematic coverage by newspapers (n=486) 
    NZ Herald Dominion Post Press  Total 
Episodic  109 (22.4%) 130 (26.7%) 123 (25.3%) 362 (74.5%) 
  within category 30.1% 35.9% 34.0% 100.0% 
  within newspaper 58.9% 83.9% 84.2% 74.5% 
Thematic  76 (15.6%) 25 (5.1%) 23 (4.7%) 124 (25.5%) 
  within category 61.3% 20.2% 18.5% 100.0% 
  within newspaper 41.1% 16.1% 15.8% 25.5% 
Total   185 (38.1%) 155 (31.9%) 146 (30.0%) 486 (100.0%) 
  within category 38.1% 31.9% 30.0% 100.0% 
  within newspaper 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
x2= 38.092 df=2, ρ=<.05 
 
However, all the newspapers carried more episodic items than thematic, with The Press 
publishing 123 episodic items, followed by The Dominion Post (130) and The New 
Zealand Herald (109). In terms of the total coverage by the newspapers (n=486), 84.2 
percent of the items in The Press were episodic, followed by The Dominion Post 
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(83.9%) and The New Zealand Herald (58.9%). The difference by newspapers was 
statistically significant (x2= 38.092 df=2, ρ=<.05). 
 
9.6 Discussion 
 
With the start of Iraq War II, the New Zealand press prioritised the war coverage, 
moving the war news to the front page and main section. From March 21 to 16 April, 
Iraq dominated the front pages and main sections of the three newspapers. The New 
Zealand Herald promised its readers on March 20, 2003 that they would be given the 
“most comprehensive coverage available in New Zealand” and The Dominion Post 
pledged that it would bring an “outstanding variety of news sources” from anywhere the 
news was breaking. Each newspaper used special logos to represent conflict in their 
coverage of the war, calling it “attack on Iraq” (The New Zealand Herald), “war in 
Iraq” (The Dominion Post) and “war on Iraq” (The Press). There were 81 items related 
to Iraq War II in the three newspapers on March 21, with most of the items being 
carried in Section A. The saturation of news space in New Zealand newspapers by war 
journalism discourse reflects the high news values of conflict-oriented news. The 
empirical findings of this research substantiate earlier research that in international 
news coverage, news media place importance on military conflicts (Galtung & Ruge, 
1965; Nam, 1970).  
 
However, the war journalism discourse lacked local input, as the economic costs of 
sending reporters to the fronts outweighed commercial benefits. For the three 
newspapers – The New Zealand Herald, The Dominion Post and The Press – all owned 
by foreign media companies, sourcing content from sister publications was a better 
economic choice in the market driven media industry. The New Zealand Herald 
extensively used content from Dublin-based Independent News and Media affiliates, 
while The Dominion Post and The Press relied on the publications of Australian-listed 
company Independent Newspapers Limited for content (Interview with Paul Thompson, 
2006). The Australian company Fairfax bought all INL publishing assets in New 
Zealand for NZ$1.2 billion in June 2003. Hence, during the period of this research The 
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Dominion Post and The Press were under the ownership of INL, 45 percent of which 
was controlled by Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp (Louisson, 2003). 
 
The attempts by the newspapers to widen the scope of coverage within the economic 
limitations and despite market forces was noted by Tully when he said that “some have 
made a serious attempt to recognise that we’re usually heavily reliant on the western 
news agencies and have sought to widen the lens a bit” (Cited in Hill, 2003). However, 
the empirical findings in this research show that despite the attempts by the newspapers 
to source content from many sources, there was in fact, no diversity, as the alternative 
voices in the conflict were given little coverage by the news agencies and other content 
providers. The mainstream news agencies or the ‘Big Three’ relied heavily on US and 
Coalition officials and thus to a large extent set the media agenda for the New Zealand 
press. 
 
The fact that more than 38 percent of the items that originated from New Zealand were 
unfavourable to the US and Coalition, is an indication of the editorial position taken by 
the newspapers. The findings show that when the newspapers are able to develop 
content, which may be opinion or news analysis or features, the perspectives are 
comparatively different from that of content coming from news agencies and other news 
services. These findings are also similar to those of Comrie and Fountaine, who found 
that editorial and commentary originating from New Zealand were unfavourable 
towards the US and “overwhelmingly critical” of US President George W Bush 
(Comrie & Fountaine, 2005, p 248). 
 
Iraq War II was a heavily ‘mediated war’, but the high intensity of the coverage 
declined with the fall of Baghdad on April 10. Conflict is always a high news value 
event, however the extensive coverage was also a reflection of concerns that Iraq War II 
would have an economic and social impact on New Zealand. The empirical findings 
show that there is a relationship between newspaper circulation, and amount of 
coverage. The New Zealand Herald, which is the largest newspaper in terms of 
circulation accounted for 41 percent of the total sampled items (n=600), followed by 
The Dominion Post (31 percent) and The Press (28 percent).   
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The coverage also differed in terms of how the newspapers put the conflict into context. 
The New Zealand Herald used more news analysis and features compared to The 
Dominion Post and The Press. In The New Zealand Herald straight news represented 
15.3 percent of the items, while the figures for The Dominion Post and The Press were 
20.3 percent and 19.3 percent respectively. More than 59 percent of the news analysis 
was carried in The New Zealand Herald, while the figure was low for both The 
Dominion Post (22.2%) and The Press (18.5%). The New Zealand Herald coverage was 
more context-oriented and thematic than the other newspapers. Of the thematic content, 
15.6 percent was carried in The New Zealand Herald, and the figures were relatively 
low for The Dominion Post (5.1%) and The Press (4.7%). Among the three newspapers, 
thematic coverage was 25.5 percent, while episodic items accounted for 74.5 percent 
(n=486). 
 
On the other hand, event-oriented or episodic coverage was higher in the The Dominion 
Post and The Press compared to The New Zealand Herald. Thematic coverage of 
conflicts is important as it helps the audiences decode the messages and understand the 
complex issues. Thematic coverage helps to explain the news events. The attempt by 
The New Zealand Herald to give a more focussed coverage of the war can be seen by 
this newspaper’s use of thematic framing when presenting stories of the conflict. As 
thematic coverage gives “in-depth, interpretive analysis” (Iyengar, 1991, p 14),  it was 
important for the New Zealand press, given the public and government attitude towards 
the war, to focus on a more thematic approach to the coverage.  
 
A look at the topics of coverage shows that the debate about the war was high in the 
three newspapers, covering aspects such as anti-war demonstrations and criticisms of  
the US, Coalition and Iraq. Such debate accounted for 18.9 percent of the total sample 
(n=600). Of these The New Zealand Herald accounted for 5.5 percent followed by The 
Dominion Post (4.8%) and The Press (3.2%). 
 
The coverage of the impact of the war stood at 10.7 percent, while coverage of the 
military and civilian casualties of the conflict were reported at 4.6 percent. All the 
newspapers focused on the humanitarian impact, followed by the economic impact. On 
the casualties of the war, the highest category of coverage was Iraqi civilian casualties 
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(2.7%), compared to US military casualties (.7%), Iraq military casualties (.5%), 
Coalition military causalities (.5%) and Coalition civilian casualties. 
 
In military confrontations involving major powers such as the US, news values become 
higher and Iraq War II was no exception. In the post 9/11 world, the US-led invasions 
of Afghanistan and Iraq were seen in the context of the ‘war on terror’ and this further 
increased the news values. The globalisation of media, and economic interdependence 
were also reasons for people in New Zealand to follow the military and political 
developments more than 1500 kilometres away in the Persian Gulf region. New Zealand 
was economically impacted by the conflict in Iraq, like most other countries in the 
world. The Middle East is a key export market for New Zealand dairy and meat 
products, and the country depends on oil from the region. Any impact on the supply and 
price of oil would be of concern to New Zealanders. 
 
Thussu and Freedman (2003) identified three key roles of the news media in war 
journalism, was seen as a critical observer, publicist and a battleground where “war is 
imagined and executed” (p 5). The war coverage in New Zealand was, however, distinct 
despite the country’s cultural and socio-economic ties with the US, Britain and 
Australia --  the key allies in the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ to oust Saddam Hussein. The 
war journalism discourse in New Zealand focused on the impact of the conflict and the 
humanitarian crisis. In the content that originated from New Zealand, written by 
newspaper staff, The New Zealand mainstream newspapers were to a certain extent 
‘critical observers’.  
 
However, in their use of foreign news reports the New Zealand newspapers were not 
‘critical observers’, partly because the editorial content was mainly sourced from news 
agencies and US and UK newspapers, which relied heavily on official sources. 
Nonetheless, the New Zealand newspapers were not ‘lap dogs’ in the coverage of the 
‘war on terror’, as they focused much on the humanitarian impact of the conflict. 
 
The degree of criticalness in the newspapers was, however, very low, which may have 
been the result of the heavy reliance on news agencies for war coverage. Although for 
international news coverage New Zealand newspapers usually rely on only a few news 
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agencies, notably Reuters, AP, AFP and AAP, more diverse sources were used during 
Iraq War II, it being a major international conflict. In the war coverage the three 
mainstream metropolitan newspapers used more than 15 different news agencies and 
newspapers. This gave a greater choice in the selection of content.  
 
In the mainstream discussion of Iraq War II, the ruling Labour Government did not 
favour the unilateral actions by the US to use force, instead taking a multilateral 
approach to tackle the Saddam regime through the UN system (Parliamentary Debates, 
2003). The main opposition parties, National and Act, demanded that New Zealand side 
with her traditional allies in the war (Power, 2003; Young & Mold, 2003). Away from 
the corridors of power, the New Zealand public opposed invasion of Iraq without UN 
approval (Roy Morgan Research Polls, 2003; Cone, 2003b; Phipps, 2004). An opinion 
poll conducted a month before the US-led coalition forces attacked Iraq, revealed that 
86 percent of the New Zealand public opposed a war without UN sanctions (Cone, 
2003b). The editorial content that originated from New Zealand also strongly reflected 
the opposition to the US-led war. A total of 186 items originated from New Zealand, 
which included news, opinion and letters to the editor. Of this only 10.2 percent of the 
items were favourable to the US, while 37.1 percent were unfavourable. More than 59 
percent of these were readers’ feedback to the newspapers. Of the readers’ feedback, 
35.1 percent was unfavourable to the US, while only 14 percent favoured the US. None 
of the six editorials that appeared in the three newspapers favoured the US, while three 
were unfavourable to the US. And 50 percent of the opinion and comments, written by 
the newspapers’ staff and contributors, were unfavourable to the US, while only 9.1 
percent were favourable. This shows that when the mainstream debate on the Iraq War 
highlighted government and public opposition to the unilateral stance taken by the US 
and its coalition partners, the news media also reflected a similar line in the content 
originating from New Zealand.  
 
Perhaps, in a manner explained by the indexing hypothesis, the newspapers were 
orienting themselves in line with the mainstream debate in which the government and 
the public had similar views on the war compared to the pro-war policy of some 
opposition parties. However, the basis of the index hypothesis as proposed by Bennett 
differed considerably from the New Zealand case. Bennett’s model (1990) was based on 
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the US foreign policy and conduct of military operations in Central America, with 
oppositional and public consensus. However, although, New Zealand was not involved 
in any military operation, the government policy on Iraq and the public attitude to the 
war were similar. 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 10: SETTING THE NEWS AGENDA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
10.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter reports the empirical findings of the content analysis, and by so doing 
addresses the research issues such as international news flows and dependence on 
mainstream news agencies and other content providers by the New Zealand newspapers 
in Iraq War II coverage. The traditional news agencies and major news services have 
become the dominant suppliers of news and information content to a large global 
market of news media. These media institutions have also been key instruments in the 
globalisation process, first by selling a commodity that enhances the global exchange of 
news and information, and secondly as part of a global media system. 
 
The discussion of the findings in this chapter includes an examination of the extent of 
US and Coalition domination of the news through government and military sources. As 
this research focuses on a major military conflict, the study also aims to explore the 
extent of source domination in war coverage. As discussed in previous chapters, in 
routine news production, source-media relations are important and both sectors benefit 
from one another. Sources, as primary definers of news, need to communicate to the 
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public through news media, while the information raw materials from the sources are 
equally important for the journalists and editors. During military conflicts, military and 
government officials have immediate and compelling reasons to dominate the media 
agenda, and thus try to influence the communication processes through media 
management strategies, as discussed in Chapter 2. This empirical chapter will 
demonstrate to what extent official sources dominated the war journalism discourse in 
New Zealand.  
10.2 International news agencies and newspapers as content providers  
 
In the analysis of news content providers, letters to the editors were omitted, as their 
content did not derive from commercial media entities. Rather these letters comprised 
reader feedback regarding the news agenda that was being set by the newspapers in the 
war coverage. The newspapers also used multiple news sources in single items, which 
meant that content was combined to create concise and comprehensive stories to cover 
the war-related issues. However such stories were very limited. Of the 486 stories, only 
37 items were credited with two news sources and five items with three sources. This 
shows the relative lack of effort by the newspapers to combine multiple sources in order 
to make news coverage more comprehensive. Where multiple sources were credited for 
an item, the first news source was coded for analysis. The main reason for use of the 
first cited agency was because most of the content came from the source first credited.  
The New Zealand Herald carried 185 items (38.1%), while The Dominion Post and The 
Press published 155 (31.9%) and 146 items (30%) respectively (Table 10.1).  
 
Table 10.1 News agencies, newspapers  
 NZ Herald Dominion Post Press  Total 
Reuters 20 (24.1%) 27 (32.5%) 36 (43.4%) 83 (100.0%) 
AFP 4 (15.4%) 13 (50.0%) 9 (34.6%) 26 (100.0%) 
AP 13 (20.0%) 34 (52.3%) 18 (27.7%) 65 (100.0%) 
AAP 0 (.0%) 2 (40.0%) 3 (60.0%) 5 (100.0%) 
NZPA 2 (22.2%) 2 (22.2%) 5 (55.6%) 9 (100.0%) 
New Zealand Herald 31 (100.0%) 0 (.0%)  0 (.0%) 31 (100.0%) 
Dominion Post  0 (.0%) 24 (100.0%)  0 (.0%) 24 (100.0%) 
Press  0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 19 (100.0%) 19 (100.0%) 
Times of London  0 (.0%) 10 (34.5%) 19 (65.5%) 29 (100.0%) 
Independent 29 (67.4%) 14 (32.6%)  0 (.0%) 43 (100.0%) 
New York Times 34 (100.0%)  0 (.0%)  0 (.0%) 34 (100.0%) 
Washington Post  0 (.0%) 3 (27.3%) 8 (72.7%) 11 (100.0%) 
Observer 10 (66.7%)  0 (.0%) 5 (33.3%) 15 (100.0%) 
KRT 1 (11.1%) 4 (44.4%) 4 (44.4%) 9 (100.0%) 
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The Age 1 (25.0%) 1 (25.0%) 2 (50.0%) 4 (100.0%) 
Telegraph 16 (80.0%) 4 (20.0%)  0 (.0%) 20 (100.0%) 
Press Association 1 (7.1%) 7 (50.0%) 6 (42.9%) 14 (100.0%) 
Bloomberg 1 (50.0%) 1 (50.0%)  0 (.0%) 2 (100.0%) 
LA Times  0 (.0%) 5 (41.7%) 7 (58.3%) 12 (100.0%) 
Newsweek 4 (100.0%)  0 (.0%)  0 (.0%) 4 (100.0%) 
Agencies 1 (100.0%)  0 (.0%)  0 (.0%) 1 (100.0%) 
No sources credited 10 (62.5%) 3 (18.8%) 3 (18.8%) 16 (100.0%) 
Other 7 (70.0%) 1 (10.0%) 2 (20.0%) 10 (100.0%) 
 Total 185 (38.1%) 155 (31.9%) 146 (30%) 486 (100%) 
x2= 353.332 df=44, ρ=<.05 
 
Reuters and AP, which are two of the major international news services, dominated the 
coverage, with 83 items from Reuters and 65 items from AP. Reuters accounted for 
17.1 percent and AP 13.4 percent of the total items (n=486). As shown in Table 10.1, 
other news agencies and newspapers whose content was frequently used by the New 
Zealand newspapers included The Independent (43 items), The New York Times (34), 
The Times of London (29) and AFP (26).  
 
The use of news sources varied among the newspapers, with The Press relying heavily 
on Reuters for its war coverage. This newspaper used 36 items (43.3%) from Reuters, 
while The Dominion Post used 27 (32.5%) and The New Zealand Herald 20 (24.1%). 
On the other hand, The Dominion Post used more AP stories than the other newspapers, 
publishing more than half of the 65 stories used by all the newspapers. The figure for 
The Dominion Post was 34 items (52.3%), followed by The Press 18 (27.7%) and The 
New Zealand Herald 13 (20%). 
 
Thus the use of international news agencies and other news sources varied among the 
newspapers significantly. The New Zealand Herald relied mainly on The New York 
Times and The Independent for Iraq War coverage.  
 
The New Zealand Herald was the only newspaper to use The New York Times stories, 
which accounted for 18.4 percent (34 items) of sources used within the newspaper. 
Although the three newspapers used major wire services such as Reuters, AP and AFP, 
they also relied on content from US and British newspapers, and with some exclusivity, 
as was the case with the use of The New York Times content by The New Zealand 
Herald. 
CHAPTER 10:  SETTING THE NEWS AGENDA                                                                          PAGE 262  
 
 
Of the British newspapers, The Times of London was used by The Dominion Post and 
The Press, while The Independent was used by The New Zealand Herald and The 
Dominion Post. The Press carried 19 items (65.5%) from The Times, while The 
Dominion Post published 10 items (34.5%). The New Zealand Herald ran more stories 
from The Independent, with 29 items (67.4%), while the figure for The Dominion Post 
was 14 (32.6%). According to Paul Thompson, editor of The Press, the reason for The 
Press not using content from The Independent, a newspaper which took a strong anti-
war position, was that it did not have clipping rights to the content (Interview with 
Thompson, February 23, 2006). 
 
The Daily Telegraph stories were published in The New Zealand Herald and The 
Dominion Post.  The New Zealand Herald carried 16 items (80%), while The Dominion 
Post published only four (20%).Content from The Observer was carried by The New 
Zealand Herald, with 10 items (66.7%), and The Press five (33.3%). The New Zealand 
Herald gave more Iraq War related local coverage compared to the other two 
newspapers. The New Zealand Herald developed 31 items, while the figure for The 
Dominion Post was 24 and for The Press 19. The New Zealand Press Association filed 
nine items which were carried by the three newspapers.  
 
The content analysis showed that in terms of item origin, more items originated from 
New Zealand than any other country. This was due to the large number of letters (114) 
that were published in the newspapers (Table 10.2). Of the 186 (31%) items that 
originated from New Zealand, 42 (22.6%) were news items, one news analysis (.5%), 
four features (2.2%), six editorials (3.2%), 22 opinion or comments (11.8%) and 111 
letters (59.7%).  
 
Table 10.2 Item origin 
 NZ Herald Dominion Post Press Total 
New Zealand 87 (14.5%) 56 (9.3%) 43 (7.2%) 186 (31.0%) 
Iraq 66 (11.0%) 58 (9.7%) 53 (8.8%) 177 (29.5%) 
US 34 (5.7%) 19 (3.2%) 15 (2.5%) 68 (11.3%) 
Unclear 19 (3.2%) 22 (3.7%) 27 (4.5%) 68 (11.3%) 
UK 14 (2.3%) 11 (1.8%) 8 (1.3%) 33 (5.5%) 
Front-line nations  14 (2.3%) 11 (1.8%) 6 (1.0%) 31 (5.2%) 
Australia 5 (.8%) 4 (.7%) 4 (.7%) 13 (2.2%) 
Other 1 (.2%) 1 (.2%) 5 (.8%) 7 (1.2%) 
Middle East 3 (.5%) 1 (.2%) 1 (.2%) 5 (.8%) 
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UN 0 (.0%) 2 (.3%) 3 (.5%) 5 (.8%) 
Europe (non-Coalition) 2 (.3%) 1 (.2%) 2 (.3%) 5 (.8%) 
Other Coalition nations 1 (.2%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 1 (.2%) 
Asia 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 1 (.2%) 1 (.2%) 
Total 246 (41.0%) 186 (31.0%) 168 (28.0%) 600 (100.0%) 
X2= 30.001 df=24, ρ>.05 
 
 
As shown in Table 10.2, 177 items (29.5%) originated from Iraq, followed by the US 
with 68 items (11.3%). The UK and Australia accounted for 33 items (5.5%) and 13 
items (2.2%) respectively. Very few items originated from Asia, the UN and the Middle 
East. Most of the stories originated from the key players in the war – the US, UK, 
Australia and Iraq – with 291 items (48.5%) originating from these regions (n=600).  
 
Of the 68 items originating from the US, 23 items (33.8%) were favourable to the US, 
18 unfavourable (26.5%) and 16 neutral (23.5%). Amongst the items originating from 
most of the other regions, there were more unfavourable items to the US than 
favourable items. Of the 177 items originating from Iraq, 40 items (22.6%) were 
unfavourable to the US, while 16 items (9%) were favourable and 83 items (46.9%) 
neutral. Of the 12 items favourable to Iraq that were carried in the three newspapers, 
five items originated from Iraq, and none came from any of the Coalition countries. The 
difference by newspapers was not statistically significant (x2= 30.001 df=24, ρ>.05). 
 
Figure 10.1 Composition of different news content providers in the New Zealand newspapers 
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The direction of news from news agencies and other content providers, which included 
newspapers from the US and UK, was analysed to ascertain how The New Zealand 
Herald, The Dominion Post and The Press oriented their war coverage.  The news 
agencies – Reuters, AP, AAP, Press Association, Bloomberg and KRT – accounted for 
41.98 percent (204 items) of the 486 items (Figure 10.1). Newspapers from Britain 
accounted for 107 items (22.02%), while the figure for the US newspapers stood at 61 
items (12.55%).The New Zealand newspapers – The New Zealand Herald, The 
Dominion Post and The Press – including content from New Zealand Press Association, 
accounted for 83 items (17.08%). Other sources accounted for 31 items (6.38%).  
 
The direction of items varied amongst the news agencies, and newspapers from the UK 
and the US, with news agencies illustrating a more unfavourable view of the US and its 
Coalition. As shown in Figure 10.2, of the 204 items credited to news agencies, 51 
items (25%) were unfavourable to the US and Coalition, while 25 items (12.25%) were 
favourable towards them. However, 89 items (43.63%) were neutral, while 31 items 
(15.20%) were unfavourable towards Iraq. 
 
Newspapers from the UK appear to have taken a more critical view of the war with 
regard to the US and Coalition forces. Of the 107 items there were 34 items (31.78%) 
that were unfavourable to the US and the Coalition, while favourable items accounted 
for only 17 items (15.89%). Neutral items stood at 29 (27%). Items that were 
unfavourable to Iraq accounted for 22 (20.56%), while five items (4.67%) were 
favourable. 
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Figure 10.2 Direction of items towards the US and Coalition, and neutral items 
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The content from US newspapers depicted a different direction, from that of other 
sources, with more items that were favourable to the US than unfavourable items. Of 
the 61 items attributed to US newspapers, 18 items (29.51%) were favourable to the US 
and Coalition, while 16 items (26.23%) were unfavourable. The number of neutral 
items was 17 (27.87%). There were 10 items (16.39%) that were unfavourable to Iraq, 
yet not a single item favoured Iraq. 
 
The New Zealand media were more critical of the war, with nearly half of the 83 items 
taking an unfavourable direction towards the US and Coalition. There were 35 items 
(42.17%) that were unfavourable to the US and Coalition against a mere three items 
(3.61%) that were favourable. Neutral items accounted for 32 (38.63%). 
 
The categories that are prominent in the findings, in terms of their direction and 
frequency, include neutral items and items that were unfavourable and favourable 
towards the US and Coalition. Of the 486 items, neutral items accounted for 180 (37%), 
followed by items unfavourable to the US and Coalition (29.4%) and favourable items 
(14.4%). Although among news agencies the highest figure was for neutral items (89), 
in content attributed to New Zealand news media and UK newspapers, items 
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unfavourable to the US and Coalition were most numerous. There were 35 items 
(42.17%) that were critical of the US and Coalition in the New Zealand newspapers 
while favourable items accounted for three (3.61%). Of the content from UK 
newspapers, 34 items (31.78%) were unfavourable to the US and Coalition, while 17 
items (15.89%) were favourable. Regarding the US newspapers, by a slight margin 
there was more content favourable to the US and Coalition were higher than that of 
unfavourable content. There were 16 items (26.3%) that were favourable to US and 
Coalition against 18 items (29.51%) that were unfavourable. 
 
10.3 Major news sources 
 
In military conflict coverage, especially larger regional conflicts involving major 
powers such as the United States and Britain, there are well organised media 
management practices to turn military and government sources into principal actors in 
the news. Primary sources were analysed from news, features and news analysis, which 
accounted for 401 items (66.8%) of the total sample (n=600). There were also some 
news items that did not use any sources or make an attribution to any institution. Such 
items were not included in the analysis, as the research explores the extent of source 
usage in the editorial content. 
 
To assess the extent of media agenda domination by news sources, news, features and 
news analysis were coded, generating a sample of 401 items, which is 66.8 percent of 
the total sample of 600. As expected, the US and Coalition sources dominated as 
primary sources. The study reveals that more than 55 percent of the primary sources in 
the sampled items (n=401) were US and Coalition sources. Of this, 21.9 percent were 
attributed to US military sources and 13.2 percent to the US government (Table 10.3). 
The relationship between primary sources and news, news analysis and features was 
statistically significant (x2= 127.937 df=84, ρ=<.05). 
 
The use of British government and military sources in the news followed a similar 
pattern. The British military was used as a primary source in 20 items (5%), while the 
government was acknowledged in three items (.7%) as the main news source. 
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Table 10.3 Primary sources used in news, news analysis and features (n=401) 
 News News analysis Features Total 
US, Coalition 176 (43.9%) 18 (4.3%) 33 (8%) 227 (56.1%) 
-US Military 69 (17.2%) 7 (1.7%) 12 (3.0%) 88 (21.9%) 
-US Government 46 (11.5%) 3 (.7%) 4 (1.0%) 53 (13.2%) 
-UK Military 19 (4.7%) 0 (.0%) 1 (.2%) 20 (5.0%) 
-US Academics, experts 6 (1.5%) 4 (1.0%) 7 (1.7%) 17 (4.2%) 
-US Soldiers 8 (2.0%) 0 (.0%) 4 (1.0%) 12 (3.0%) 
-US Ordinary citizens 3 (.7%) 1 (.2%) 2 (.5%) 6 (1.5%) 
-Coalition Government 6 (1.5%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 6 (1.5%) 
-UK Academics, experts 3 (.7%) 1 (.2%) 1 (.2%) 5 (1.2%) 
-UK Soldiers 3 (.7%) 0 (.0%) 1 (.2%) 4 (1.0%) 
-UK Government 3 (.7%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 3 (.7%) 
-UK Opposition 1 (.2%) 2 (.5%) 0 (.0%) 3 (.7%) 
-UK Ordinary citizens 2 (.5%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 2 (.5%) 
-Coalition Military 2 (.5%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 2 (.5%) 
-US Opposition 1 (.2%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 1 (.2%) 
-US Other 1 (.2%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 1 (.2%) 
-UK Other 1 (.2%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 1 (.2%) 
-Coalition Opposition 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 1 (.2%) 1 (.2%) 
-Coalition Academics, experts 1 (.2%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 1 (.2%) 
-Coalition Ordinary citizens 1 (.2%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 1 (.2%) 
Iraq 48 (11.8%) 3 (.7%) 25 (6%) 76 (18.8%) 
-Iraq Ordinary citizens 29 (7.2%) 3 (.7%) 17 (4.2%) 49 (12.2%) 
-Iraq Opposition 9 (2.2%) 0 (.0%) 3 (.7%) 12 (3.0%) 
-Iraq Government 7 (1.7%) 0 (.0%) 3 (.7%) 10 (2.5%) 
-Iraq Military 2 (.5%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 2 (.5%) 
-Iraq Soldiers 1 (.2%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 1 (.2%) 
-Iraq Academics, experts 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 1 (.2%) 1 (.2%) 
-Iraq Other 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 1 (.2%) 1 (.2%) 
New Zealand 36 (8.9%) 0 (.0%) 3 (.7%) 39 (9.6%) 
-NZ Academics, experts 14 (3.5%) 0 (.0%) 3 (.7%) 17 (4.2%) 
-NZ Government 12 (3.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 12 (3.0%) 
-NZ Opposition 5 (1.2%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 5 (1.2%) 
-NZ Ordinary citizens 2 (.5%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 2 (.5%) 
-NZ Other 2 (.5%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 2 (.5%) 
-NZ Military 1 (.2%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 1 (.2%) 
Arab, Muslim countries 6 (1.4%) 1 (.2%) 1 (.2%) 8 (1.9%) 
-Muslim Government 4 (1.0%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 4 (1.0%) 
-Arab Ordinary citizens 1 (.2%) 0 (.0%) 1 (.2%) 2 (.5%) 
-Arab Government 1 (.2%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 1 (.2%) 
-Arab Academics, experts 0 (.0%) 1 (.2%) 0 (.0%) 1 (.2%) 
UN, NGOs 10 (2.4%) 0 (.0%) 2 (.4%) 12 (3%) 
-UN 7 (1.7%) 0 (.0%) 1 (.2%) 8 (2.0%) 
-Red Cross 1 (.2%) 0 (.0%) 1 (.2%) 2 (.5%) 
- NGOs Other 2 (.5%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 2 (.5%) 
News media 16 (3.9%) 0 (.0%) 3 (.6%) 19 (4.7%) 
-News Media (Western) 9 (2.2%) 0 (.0%) 1 (.2%) 10 (2.5%) 
-News Media (Arab) 6 (1.5%) 0 (.0%) 1 (.2%) 7 (1.7%) 
-News Media (Other) 1 (.2%) 0 (.0%) 1 (.2%) 2 (.5%) 
Other (all) 18 (4.5%) 0 (.0%) 2 (.5%) 20 (5.0%) 
Total 310 (77.3%) 22 (5.5%) 69 (17.2%) 401 (100%) 
x2= 127.937 df=84, ρ=<.05 
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Although Iraq was a key coefficient in the news equation, it was sidelined, having only 
minimal access to the global mainstream media output. Iraqi sources were used in only 
18.8 percent of the items, of which the military (2.5%) and the government (.5%) were 
far behind Iraqi ordinary people, who accounted for 12.2 percent of the primary sources. 
The UN, although a key institution, was only cited in 4.7 percent of the items as the 
main source.  
 
The total outlook of the war reporting clearly demonstrates not only that the US and 
Coalition dominated the media agenda, but that Iraq was marginalised on the media 
front – US and Coalition sources were used in 56 percent of the items, while Iraq fared 
at a mere 19 percent (Figure 10.3). Arab and Muslim sources accounted for two percent, 
while UN and other NGOs stood at three percent. New Zealand sources accounted for 
10 percent. 
 
 
Figure 10.3 Primary sources in news, news analysis and features (n=401) 
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Despite the institution of the UN being an important source, as the Iraq issue was 
debated at the General Assembly and Security Council long before the war and during 
the conflict, the news agencies and newspapers did not generate much content using this 
world body as a primary source. There were only eight items attributed to the UN. Most 
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of the Arab and Muslim countries were critical of the invasion of Iraq, and due to their 
cultural and geographic proximity their reactions to the war were immediate and 
extensive, yet only eight items (2%) were attributed to them.  
 
Major news agencies such as Reuters and AP primarily relied on US and Coalition 
sources for coverage of the Iraq War, and the US military and government dominated as 
primary sources in the news. 
 
Figure 10.4 Use of primary sources in Reuters   
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Reuters attributed more US and Coalition sources as its primary sources than any other 
news agencies or newspapers. More than 65 percent of the 75 Reuters items used the 
US and Coalition as primary sources (Figure 10.4). Of this, 38 items (50.7%) used the 
US military or government as primary sources. US military sources accounted for 38.7 
percent, while the US government represented 12 percent of primary sources. The news 
agency used the Iraq government, military or other Iraqi sources as primary sources in 
only 11 percent of items, while the same figure stands for the use of the UN and other 
international organisations and NGOs. 
 
The US-based Associated Press also depended on US and Coalition sources for news, 
relying heavily on the US government and military. Of the total 61 AP items, the US 
CHAPTER 10:  SETTING THE NEWS AGENDA                                                                          PAGE 270  
 
and Coalition were primary sources in 40 items. The US military was the main source in 
37.7 percent (23 items), while the figure for the government was 13.1 percent (8 items). 
 
The French news agency Agence France-Press used US and Coalition sources in 13 of 
their 24 items. The agency relied less on the US military for information than the 
government. In four items the primary source was the US government, while the figure 
for the military was only one. 
 
Of the 401 items, 227 items attributed the primary source to US or Coalition sources, 
while the figure for Iraq was 76.  None of the three agencies – Reuters, AP and AFP – 
used the Iraqi military as their primary source. There were four Reuters’ items using the 
Iraqi government as the main source, while the figure for AP was one. Reuters, AP and 
AFP used Iraqi sources in eight, 14 and three items respectively. The London-based The 
Independent was the only media to make more use of Iraq sources as their primary 
sources. Of the 32 items attributed to The Independent, 16 used Iraqi sources, while US 
and Coalition sources were used in 14 items. 
 
A comparison of the usage of US and Iraqi sources illustrates the extent to which the 
news agencies and newspapers depended on the US military and government for 
information. It also indicates that the media management efforts by the US and 
Coalition successfully resulted in their sources dominating the stories about the conflict.   
 
The news agencies and newspapers used fewer Iraqi government and military sources 
but more ordinary Iraqi people as their main source. Of the 76 items attributed to Iraq, 
the Iraqi government was used in 10 items and the military as a primary source in only 
two items. However 49 items used Iraqi people as the primary source. 
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Figure 10.5 Comparison between the use of US and Iraq primary sources 
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Against 10 Iraqi government sources there were 53 US government sources, while the 
disparity was wider regarding military sources, with only two Iraqi sources against 88 
US military sources (Figure 10.5). One explanation for the relative lack of Iraqi 
government and military sources being used as primary sources in the news could be the 
media restrictions imposed by the Iraqi government and the difficulty in accessing 
sources in Iraq. The use of Iraqi people as the main source in 49 items indicates that the 
media had easier access to the Iraqi people. 
 
In military conflicts, attempts by the major official sources – government and military – 
to dominate the news agenda are part of the larger strategic goals of attracting 
favourable coverage, mobilising the home front and global support for the wars, and 
demoralising and weakening the enemy through propaganda. The content analysis 
shows that major news agencies were heavily dependent on US military and 
government sources compared to the Iraqi official sources. As shown in Figure 10.6, of 
the AP stories in which the primary source was the military or government, 64 percent 
were attributed to the US military and none to the Iraqi military. US government 
sources accounted for 22 percent while the figure for Iraq was only three percent. 
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Figure 10.6 Use of military and government sources as primary sources in AP stories 
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The other major news agency, Reuters, has similar figures in terms of military and 
government source usage. Like AP, none of the Reuters stories used any Iraqi military 
source as a primary source, while the figure for the US military was 64 percent. US 
government sources accounted for 20 percent, while the figure for Iraq was only nine 
percent. Even major coalition partners such as the UK were not widely used as main 
sources, indicating that the US dominated and were successful in occupying most of the 
media space. 
 
The findings show that the US military and government were setting the media agenda, 
as they were given prime space in the news media. Previous studies have shown that 
during military conflicts, the US military and government have determined how the 
conflicts were covered (Lent, 1977; Marchetti & Marks, 1974), using various media 
management techniques, one of which in Iraq War II was embedding of reporters with 
troops. 
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10.4 Discussion 
 
The findings in this chapter have demonstrated that The New Zealand Herald, The 
Dominion Post and The Press relied mainly on two types of content providers – the 
traditional news agencies and some US and UK newspapers. In the content generated by 
the newspapers, the respective publications attempted to localise war-related 
developments, for example interviewing Iraqis living in New Zealand about the impact 
the invasion was having on their families back in Iraq and by publishing New Zealand 
political debates, opinions and reader-feedback about the US-led invasion of Iraq. 
Without any New Zealand journalists based in the war zone, the bulk of coverage came 
from news agencies and foreign newspapers, who, as discussed in Chapter 4 and 5, 
gather and process news based on their news values framework, and ‘constructed’ the 
coverage for a diverse global news retail audience. New Zealand newspapers 
represented only a tiny fraction of the customers or retailers for whom this news was 
constructed. 
 
In international news coverage, the New Zealand newspapers usually rely on few of the 
well-known news agencies, most notably Reuters, AP and AFP. However for Iraq War 
II coverage, the newspapers sought content from more news agencies and from US and 
UK newspapers. News content was credited to more than 16 news agencies and 
newspapers. The news agencies included Reuters, AP, AFP, AP, KRT, Press 
Association, and Bloomberg, while the main newspapers were The Times of London, 
The Independent, The Observer, The Telegraph from the UK and The New York Times, 
The Washington Post, Los Angeles Times and Newsweek from the US. The news 
agencies – Reuters, AP, AAP, Press Association, Bloomberg and KRT – accounted for 
41.98 percent of the 486 items, with UK newspapers at 22.02 percent and US 
newspapers at12.55 percent. The New Zealand newspapers – The New Zealand Herald, 
The Dominion Post and The Press – including content from the New Zealand Press 
Association, accounted for 17.08 percent. Other sources accounted for 6.38 percent.   
 
News agencies were more neutral in their coverage, and this may be due to the editorial 
positions taken by them in order to appeal to a wide variety of media clients. Unlike 
newspapers which have specific audiences within certain geographic boundaries (online 
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versions of the newspapers being the exception), news agencies have to consider their 
diverse markets and thus, it was in their interests to take a cautious approach to the war 
reporting. However, even then their coverage was heavily influenced by Coalition 
official sources. 
 
The three New Zealand newspapers did not send journalists to cover the war, mainly 
because of economic reasons – it was cheaper to source from news agencies and 
newspapers than send journalists. Furthermore, as New Zealand was not involved in the 
conflict, sending journalists to the conflict zone was not considered an important 
consideration (Interview with Thompson, February 23, 2006; Interview with Gardner, 
March 8, 2006; Interview with Piercy, February 13, 2007). This does not, however, 
mean that the news values of the event was low, but that given the lack of direct local 
involvement in the conflict, re-locating journalists at an enormous cost was not 
economically worthwhile. Instead of accessing only the usual ‘Big Three’ news 
agencies, the newspapers sought more news sources such as US and UK newspapers 
and other news agencies. It is usual for newspapers to rely on a few news agencies, 
normally the main international wires. A 2002 study showed that Reuters, AP, AAP and 
AFP accounted for nearly 70 percent of the international news in the five New Zealand 
metropolitan newspapers. News content from Reuters, which is one of the largest news 
agencies, accounted for 35.7 percent (Taira, 2003). However, when major world news 
events break, such as Iraq War II, newspapers source content from additional sources 
such as news services of major US and UK newspapers. However, their reliance on 
Anglo-American media outlets for international news limits the diversity of views 
presented in the media discourse. Given the nature of Iraq War II, there were many 
alternative news sources, available, including national news agencies from the Gulf and 
Middle East countries, and blogs providing extensive alternative coverage. The New 
Zealand newspapers’ reliance on the more established news services within the Anglo-
American media system may be due to their sharing of similar news values and 
journalistic frameworks.  
 
There is a big difference between news agency or foreign newspaper copy and stories 
filed by newspaper staff reporters from the front. Both organisational and journalistic 
values play a significant role in the process of news gathering and writing. For a news 
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agency journalist, in selecting a news story and an angle to take, a global audience has 
to be considered, as the copy will be used by newspapers from different countries with 
conflicting interests in the news event. However, for journalists of a newspaper, in 
writing the item the main concern is making it more relevant, where possible, to the 
newspaper audience. A newspaper that subscribes to Reuters, for example, cannot ask a 
Reuters correspondent in Baghdad to cover a certain event from a news angle that suits 
the newspaper. When newspapers rely on news agencies, the opportunity to influence 
coverage according to the interests of the audiences is limited, thus foreign news 
agencies to a large extent determine the coverage and construct the global news events 
for the local audiences.  
 
In Iraq War II coverage, the major news agencies determined the coverage in New 
Zealand, with 77 percent of the items attributed to Western news agencies, and US and 
UK newspapers. According to Thompson, the New Zealand newspapers “republished 
whatever information had been supplied to them off the satellite and over the wires 
from what are almost exclusively US and UK news sources” (Interview with Thompson, 
February 23, 2006) in the coverage of Iraq War II. This dependence of the New Zealand 
news media resulted in foreign news sources determining what local audiences were 
given for news gratification.  
 
By exposing newspaper editors to a wealth of agency news, where certain events have 
been given prominence according to the news values of the news agencies and 
newspapers, “ the wire services set the media agenda by telling local editors (and their 
readers, in turn) what parts of the world and what issues they should think about” 
(Stevenson & Cole, 1984, p 48). By dominating the reporting of news globally, the few 
news agencies are in a position to “shape the wider view of a war” (Thussu, 2002, p 205) 
such as the conflict in Iraq. 
 
The dependence on external news agencies and the reluctance to use alternative sources 
in Iraq War II coverage has made the New Zealand newspapers and thus their audiences 
vulnerable to propaganda from the primary sources of the news. Given the nature of the 
conflict, news management and propaganda were institutionalised by the key actors 
such as the US and UK, and the global media were exposed to perception engineering. 
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Despite attempts by local gatekeepers to frame the coverage in a context that was in 
congruent with New Zealand public opinion about the war in Iraq, the reporting was 
heavily mediated, and by the elite actors in the war.  Thus as noted by Boyd-Barrett, 
during major military conflicts “news agencies are vehicles for dissemination of state 
information and propaganda to national and international audiences” (Boyd-Barrett, 
1997, p 132).  
 
As Iraq War II was a major conflict involving leading world powers, journalists in the 
conflict zone were exposed to media management strategies aimed at manipulating the 
war journalism discourse in favour of the dominant powers – the US and UK. The 
journalists – both embeds and unilaterals – had to work in an environment of media 
management, restricted access and logistical issues (Tumber & Palmer, 2004). The 
ideological issues also shaped how different media outlets approached the coverage.  
 
The comparison of the usage of the US and Iraqi sources illustrates the extent to which 
the news agencies and newspapers depended on the US military and government for 
information. It also indicates that the media management efforts by the US and 
Coalition successfully resulted in their sources dominating the stories about the conflict.   
 
The study also shows that the US and Coalition primary sources favoured the political 
and military strategies of their governments. More than 56 percent of the US 
government sources were favourable to the US government, while the figure for the 
military was 61.6 percent (n=399). None of the US government sources was 
unfavourable towards the US government, while only one military source (1.2%) was 
unfavourable to the government. When both categories – the government and the 
military – were combined, 60 percent were favourable to the US, while 22 percent were 
neutral and 15 percent unfavourable to Iraq. 
 
 
The findings show that the US military and government were setting the media agenda, 
as they have been given prime space in the news cycle. Previous studies have shown 
that during military conflicts the US military and government determined how the 
conflicts were covered (Lent, 1977; Marchetti & Marks, 1974), through various media 
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management techniques, one of which in the Iraq war was embedding of reporters with 
troops. When the news media select and publish content that is heavily influenced by 
military and political officials, coverage of events can be biased or unfair to others on 
the other side of the news events. As Goldman (1999) pointed out, military and 
government officials can exploit the news media through news management  strategies 
when the news media are dependent on official sources. 
 
One of the most successful PR victories in Iraq War II for the US authorities was that of 
the rescue of a US soldier from behind the enemy lines. The story drew not only 
widespread coverage in the US but elsewhere, due to the human interest nature of the 
story. The rescue of Jessica Lynch was prominently played in the New Zealand media, 
with the three leading daily newspapers – The New Zealand Herald, The Dominion Post 
and The Press giving it front-page treatment. The headline writers of the Press, on 3rd 
April 2003, opted to use the US Central Command spokesman Jim Wilkinson’s 
carefully phrased “America doesn’t leave its heroes behind” as its headline.  The New 
Zealand Herald headline was “Daring raid brings joy to mother”, while The Dominion 
Post, declared “Daring POW Rescue”. All the newspapers carried the story on the front 
page, and for The New Zealand Herald and The Dominion Post, it was the main story 
on the front page on 3rd April 2003. All the newspapers carried photos of Jessica Lynch 
along with the story (The New Zealand Herald, The Press, The Dominion Post, 3 April 
2003). The rush for ‘heroic’ stories by newspapers at a time when media were managed 
by dominant sources also reflects the vulnerability of the media for propaganda from 
the primary definers. As the case clearly illustrates in the three New Zealand 
newspapers, the military sources were the agenda setters. While one of the US 
newspapers that prominently covered the Lynch story, The Washington Post, later 
expressed regret for its uncritical acceptance of information from institutional sources 
(Cohen, 2003), there were no such acknowledgements from the New Zealand 
newspapers. Like many media outlets, the New Zealand press were caught in the ‘fog of 
war’. Furthermore, the newspaper’s dependence on external news agencies limited their 
ability to verify and challenge the information, while other logistical and organisational 
factors might have prevented them from critically evaluating the Lynch story.  
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Heavy reliance on news agencies, especially during military conflicts, can influence the 
direction and orientation of coverage (Pauling, 1996), and the impact on news content 
in Iraq War II coverage was unsurprising given the high dependence on the wires and 
US and UK newspapers. When news agencies, elite newspapers and networks depend 
on official sources, then smaller newspapers around the world tend to view conflicts 
from a similar perspective. In the case of New Zealand newspapers that relied heavily 
on Western news sources, “the wire services set the media agenda” (Stevenson & Cole, 
1984, p 48). When journalists, whether from news agencies or newspapers, depend on 
officials sources, the sources, who as Shoemaker and Reese term ‘eternal suppliers of 
raw materials’ (Shoemaker & Reese, 1991) can influence the way the news events are 
reported (Palmer, 2000). However, the preponderance of news items acknowledging US 
and Coalition official sources, is not an indication of the New Zealand newspapers’ 
favourable editorial stance towards the US and Coalition. Given the general direction of 
coverage, where 30.6 percent of the items were unfavourable to the US and Coalition, 
against a favourable 14.3, then it can be argued that the content providers – news 
agencies and newspapers – were dependent on official US and Coalition sources. The 
New Zealand newspapers were simply picking up and selecting stories from a ‘basket’ 
of foreign news, supplied to them by news wires.  
 
The study shows that there was a high degree of US and Coalition government and 
military sources being used as primary news sources in the editorial content published 
in the New Zealand newspapers. First, the news agencies relied on the officials sources 
and this dependency resulted in a pattern of news coverage that reflected successful 
media management at source, by US and Coalition officials. Source-media interactions 
during military conflicts are usually dominated by the ‘primary definers’, as they 
control news raw material. Thus, owing to the dependency of the news media on the 
sources, the military sources have the upper hand and lead the news discourse (Gans, 
1980). 
 
Although ideally the role of the war journalist is ‘to cut through the propaganda, spot 
the spin and uncover the truth” (Jukes, 2004, p vii), journalists reporting from the war 
zone, provided opportunities for elite sources to manufacture consent. Through news 
management strategies, the US and Coalition sources were able to dominate the news 
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agenda of the wire services. And the dependency on news agencies for war coverage by 
newspapers in New Zealand resulted in the US and Coalition sources saturating the 
news space and setting the local news agenda.  
  
CHAPTER 11: CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis has addressed key issues such as the orientation of war coverage, news flows 
in the context of globalisation of news, and source domination in war journalism 
discourse.  Several theoretical issues related to these topics have been explored in 
previous chapters and in this concluding discussion the empirical findings are discussed 
with reference to theoretical issues. This study illustrates the dominance of global news 
agencies and reinforces the media imperialism thesis, in that news wholesalers are able 
to dominate news space in the mainstream newspapers of New Zealand. Although at the 
outset of Iraq War II, newspapers claimed that they would give in-depth coverage of the 
war, the reporting exclusively relied on Anglo-American news sources. This also 
reinforces the media hegemony theory, given the domination of the war coverage by US, 
UK and Australian news sources. Within this hegemonic environment, however, the 
New Zealand newspapers attempted to frame the coverage in a way that was 
sympathetic to the strong anti-war discourse in the country. However, the newspapers 
were not very vehement in their anti-war stance. 
 
Furthermore, the thesis also shows that, in the globalised world, coverage of 
international conflicts such as Iraq War II is necessitated by the need for understanding 
an event that has implications globally. No matter how far New Zealand is 
geographically from the conflict zone, economic and political implications of the war 
made widespread coverage relevant. Moreover, the news values such as drama and 
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human interest, which are associated with a major military conflict involving world 
powers, also added to the importance of giving such as conflict prominence in the 
mainstream print media in New Zealand. Based on the empirical findings of the 
research, it can be concluded that The New Zealand Herald, The Dominion Post and 
The Press relied heavily on international news agencies and other Western news content 
providers for war coverage; the primary sources most frequently used in content 
sourced from news agencies and other content providers were US and Coalition 
officials.  
 
New Zealand news media gave extensive coverage to Iraq War II during the initial 
phase of the conflict and the nature of war journalism discourse appears to reflect 
several underlying factors. As has been discussed earlier, the globalisation of news, 
international news flows and market forces are key dimensions that affect the intensity 
and orientation of war coverage. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 5, Iraq War II 
coalesced two key news values – elite actors and conflict (Boyd-Barrett, 2004; Galtung 
& Ruge, 1965; Harcup & O’Neill, 2001; Musa, 2007). The involvement of two 
influential world military and economic powers – the US and UK – including New 
Zealand’s closest neighbour, Australia, raised the news values of the Iraq conflict. The 
media attention to conflicts such as the Iraq War II is also due to the compelling nature 
of war as “War is dramatic, attention-grabbing” (Webster, 2003, p 58). 
 
This research has shown how the three largest metropolitan newspapers of New Zealand 
– The New Zealand Herald, The Dominion Post and The Press – largely used news 
agency copy and content from elite US and UK newspapers in the coverage of Iraq War 
II. The editing of the content was minimal, and mainly focused on the re-writing of 
headlines, the occasional change of lead, and the combining of several different sources 
(Interview with Thompson, February 23, 2006; Interview with Gardner, March 8, 2006; 
Interview with Piercy, February 13, 2007). 
 
This in itself confirms that New Zealand audiences are part of the single global market 
that news agencies are marketing to. It also confirms the globalisation of news practices 
through the emergence of global news values. That a news agency headquartered in 
London or New York can write stories that New Zealand editors are able to publish 
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virtually unchanged indicates the subscription to some common working assumptions, 
principles and news values.  
 
The research has contributed to theory, notably news flows, globalisation, propaganda 
and news management. The findings of this thesis reinforce those theories. Following is 
a summary of the key findings of the research: 
 
1. The New Zealand newspapers relied heavily on international news agencies, and 
elite US and UK newspapers for Iraq War II war coverage.  
2. The primary sources most frequently used by the news agencies and newspapers 
were US and Coalition officials. 
3. The war coverage was unfavourable towards the US and Coalition. 
4. The New Zealand newspapers focused on the humanitarian impact of the war. 
5. The war coverage in the three largest New Zealand newspapers reflected public 
opinion and the foreign policy of the Labour-led government on the Iraq conflict. 
6. The war coverage did not put the issues of the conflict into context and was 
event-driven and framed episodically.  
7. The war coverage would have shown more New Zealand perspectives if local 
journalists were assigned to cover the war from the conflict zone.  
8. The extensive use of news content from mainly US and UK news agencies and 
newspapers, indicates the existence of ‘shared values’ between media 
professionals in New Zealand and overseas.  
 
The study shows that the New Zealand newspapers relied heavily on foreign news 
agencies for Iraq War II coverage, and the content from these agencies was dominated 
by US and Coalition military and government officials. The newspapers analysed in this 
research did not send reporters to cover the conflict and staff input on the war coverage 
was minimal, with occasional opinion pieces and columns. If there were New Zealand 
journalists in the conflict zone, coverage would have been different (Interview with 
Thompson, February 23, 2006; Interview with Gardner, March 8, 2006; Interview with 
Piercy, February 13, 2007), as they would have considered news values more specific to 
New Zealand. The thesis shows that there is dependency on major news agencies, and 
since Iraq War I, the New Zealand newspapers have been using additional news sources 
CHAPTER 11:  CONCLUSION                                                                                                      PAGE 283  
 
such as US and UK newspapers. This again illustrates and supports the media 
imperialism model, as the flow of news and information is from the periphery, where 
the mainstream news agencies and other news media are Anglo-American. During the 
Vietnam War, for example, the New Zealand newspapers used two news agencies – 
Reuters and NZPA – and the number of news sources increased to seven in Iraq War I, 
in 1991. During the invasion phase of Iraq War II, The New Zealand Herald, The 
Dominion Post and The Press used 17 different news sources, which included 
mainstream news agencies and major US, UK and Australian newspapers. While there 
was diversity in the number of news sources, the fact that these news sources shared a 
common cultural outlook and values, and the lack of use of alternative news sources in 
the war coverage show the further reinforcing of an international news dependency 
model. During military conflicts, where the principal actors are major powers, such 
dependency leads the way for the flow of propaganda and mediated communication. 
This thesis, for example, has shown that the US military and government officials 
dominated as primary sources in the news content. 
 
News agency content, received by the newspapers and selected for publication based on 
a set of news values, was not re-written to accommodate any particular world view or 
local perspective. Thus, what appeared in the newspapers in New Zealand reflected 
what really came out of the news agencies and other US and British newspapers. During 
the initial phase of the war, the newspapers saturated the news space with extensive 
coverage, often allocating the front page and Section A for war coverage. Nearly 40 
percent of the sampled items appeared on the front page and Section A. With the 
takeover of Baghdad on April 10th, 2003, coverage gradually declined.  
 
The extensive coverage given to Iraq War II not only reflects the importance of 
‘conflict’ as a high news value, but also shows the extent of globalisation, and of media. 
News and information have become important for decision making, policy formulation 
and other social, political and financial transactions. Although geographically distant 
from the Middle East and the Gulf region, New Zealand was concerned about the war in 
Iraq as the conflict would adversely affect the economy.  In the globalised world,  most 
countries are, like New Zealand, linked with others. And the involvement of the major 
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super power – the US – in the Iraq conflict meant that public diplomacy, propaganda 
and media management strategies were in top gear saturating the global media space. 
 
The “intensification of world-wide social relations” (Giddens, 1991, p 64) has made 
distant events local, given the impact such events have on societies. This intensification 
of globalisation has been largely due to modern communications technology, 
transportation and international commerce. The three largest newspapers in New 
Zealand at the centre of this research are owned by two foreign companies, and only 
one out of the major eight newspapers – The Otago Daily Times – is owned locally. 
This is a fitting example of the extent of the globalisation of media.  International news 
flows have also increased with the intensification of global relations. All these factors 
have shaped and oriented Iraq War II coverage in New Zealand.  
 
In the coverage of distant events for domestic audiences, the news media attempt to 
localise events. At a very basic level in Iraq War II coverage, the New Zealand 
newspapers focused on Iraqis living in New Zealand, political debate on the war and 
how it impacted the local people. And in an effort to frame the stories and make them 
more relevant, editors also re-wrote headlines and occasionally changed the story lead. 
 
In the localisation of foreign events, newspaper editors select the news and present it 
from a perspective that is deemed relevant to their audiences. As Jinquan  et al (2002) 
state, the gatekeeper “starts out with selective framing of issues or topics through the 
lens of professional norms, national interest, cultural repertoire, and market dynamics” 
(p 17) to make global events local, or give some relevance to events in the context of 
localisation for domestic media consumers. As noted by Skurnik (1981), “newspapers 
select information in accordance with their nation’s interests … [and in the selection 
process] concentrate on the more salient aspects of  foreign developments, usually those 
which affect them most” (p 101). The coverage in New Zealand, however, did not very 
strongly reflect the wider political and public views on the war. The coverage was more 
balanced, with positive and negative articles on the war. Given that the newspaper 
editors had numerous news sources to choose from in the war coverage, they had the 
options of becoming very pro or anti war or taking just one side of the conflict. 
However, The New Zealand Herald, The Dominion Post and The Press did consider 
CHAPTER 11:  CONCLUSION                                                                                                      PAGE 285  
 
local factors such as political and public debates and opinion in the framing of Iraq War 
II. 
 
Although Britain, Australia and the United States are traditional allies of New Zealand, 
the mainstream newspapers’ coverage in this country showed a remarkably stronger 
anti-war stance, in harmony with public opinion and the government’s stand. Given the 
political debates that were not favourable to the ‘Coalition of the Willing’, it is not 
surprising that the major newspapers opted to view the war critically. The newspapers 
framed the war negatively towards the US-led Coalition. Perhaps the direction of 
coverage would have been different if the New Zealand government had supported the 
invasion and become a member of the US-led Coalition.  
 
Analysis of the coverage of Iraq War II reveals that how the war was framed in New 
Zealand was different from the framing by countries such as the US, UK and Australia, 
partly due to the political debates and public opinion in New Zealand.  
 
11.2 Orientation of Iraq War II coverage 
 
As discussed in Chapter 9, the largest three newspapers of New Zealand oriented their 
coverage of Iraq War II in such a way that reflected public opinion and the government 
stance on the conflict. Although content for coverage was sourced from foreign media 
outlets, there were attempts by editors to frame the war in the context of local debates. 
Their approach to the war was also reflected in the logos used with war coverage 
reports, such as “Attack on Iraq” (The New Zealand Herald), “War in Iraq” (The 
Dominion Post) and “War on Iraq” (The Press). The newspapers emphasised the 
humanitarian impact of the conflict and attempted to be ‘critical observers’ (Thussu & 
Freedman, 2003), especially in the content they manufactured. However, as the bulk of 
items on the war were provided by major news agencies and US and UK newspapers, 
the New Zealand newspapers’ ability to be highly critical was limited. This was indeed 
a limitation and a shortcoming of the New Zealand press, given the demand for a 
stronger anti-war voice from the public and the government. The newspapers, as 
acknowledged by their editors, were vulnerable to propaganda and biased reporting. If 
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media consumers in New Zealand were to be served a ‘fair and balanced coverage’, 
then news content from diverse news sources would have had to be procured. In 
addition, the newspapers should have invested in stationing their own journalists in the 
Gulf region or Iraq.   
 
Not every major military and humanitarian conflict gets the same treatment in the world 
newspapers. Guided by news values specific to cultures, countries and audiences, 
journalists and editors decide on what events to cover. The same framework is used in 
the coverage of international issues. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda was not reported 
widely in the world media, although it was one of the worst humanitarian conflicts in 
recent times (Pottier, 2002). Africa accounted for nearly 60 percent of the world 
conflicts, yet coverage of events in this region is less prominent that coverage of events 
where the key actors are elite nations (Musa, 2007).  However, the war in Iraq attracted 
more extensive coverage in the global news media and the reasons for this news 
saturation are clear: the key actors in the conflict were major Western powers such as 
the United States and Britain; the extensive public diplomacy and propaganda 
campaigns waged by the US and UK; and the potential impact of the conflict on world 
economy.  
It emerges from the research that several factors shaped the way Iraq War II was 
reported in the three newspapers of New Zealand. The high news values associated with 
conflicts made extensive coverage justifiable for editors. For more than a month, 
beginning with the start of the war, the three largest newspapers of New Zealand used 
the first few pages in Section A for international news coverage, which is 
unconventional given that newspapers reserve that section for major local or national 
news. One explanation for making war coverage so prominent by allocating prime 
spaces for it, is that military conflicts have high news values and in international news 
coverage global conflicts and disasters are important features (Galtung & Ruge, 1965; 
Nam, 1970). As media coverage of wars provides “dramatic and attention-grabbing” 
(Webster (2003, p 58) discourse, it was natural that The New Zealand Herald, The 
Dominion Post and The Press attempted to give Iraq War II extensive coverage. The 
coverage also shows the competition in the newspaper industry with some newspapers 
marketing and promoting their coverage with, for example, the promise to give the 
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“most comprehensive coverage in New Zealand” by The New Zealand Herald and the 
pledge by The Dominion Post that “Anywhere the news is breaking … The Dominion 
Post readers will have up-to-date coverage, backed by expert analysis” (The Dominion 
Post, March 21, 2003, p 1). 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the news values associated with conflicts are high and the 
involvement of elite nations in Iraq War II made the war a major news event for the 
global media. Due to the high news values of the war in Iraq, media attention was at its 
highest, with thousands of journalists and support personnel mobilised by news 
agencies and some leading media outlets to report the conflict. These media companies, 
who were involved at the first stage of news production, fed the world frenzy for 
conflict news consumption, and the New Zealand newspapers were no exception in the 
packaging and provision of conflict news. Although the coverage of Iraq War II did not 
increase the circulation of newspapers, in the short term war is always “commercially 
rewarding for the media, since its threat and unfolding ignite insatiable audience 
appetite for news” (Boyd-Barrett, 2004, p 26).  Moreover war coverage is “high in 
tension and drama, with complex main plots and sub-plots played out within 
traditionally binary oppositions of aggressor and victim, winner and loser” (Boyd-
Barrett, 2004, p 26). With the take-over of Baghdad on 9th April 2003, coverage and 
prominence given to the conflict declined, indicating the presence of a somewhat 
‘winner and loser’ style of journalism in the New Zealand newspapers. When Saddam 
was symbolically and technically toppled, the war was over and so was the coverage. 
The conflict, though, continued, with new and equally bloody episodes emerging, yet 
once the war was superficially declared over on 1st May by the US, so the coverage 
almost ground to a halt. This again shows that external factors were decisive in the 
coverage of the war. Firstly, when the US declared that the war was over with the 
capture of Baghdad, the newspapers in New Zealand found that with the Coalition 
‘victory’, the war coverage did not warrant much prominence. The inter-media agenda 
setting may have also influenced the change in coverage, given that mainstream news 
media in the West also viewed the war ‘game’ as over. In the light of the three aspects 
of war journalism orientation – violence oriented, propaganda oriented, and victory 
oriented (Galtung, 2002) – the reporting in New Zealand was more victory and 
propaganda oriented. 
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11.3 International news flows and globalisation of news 
 
The military conflict in the Gulf was turned into a global news event with the extensive 
media attention, and the direct involvement of several countries in the much labelled 
‘war on terror’ drew great news interest. Although New Zealand had no direct 
involvement during the initial phase of the conflict, as in most countries the New 
Zealand press paid particular attention to the war, relying on numerous news media 
sources, such as Reuters, AP, AFP and some leading US and UK newspapers. The 
global news agencies mobilised to give Iraq War II extensive coverage, and thus their 
subscribers around the world were deluged with war-related news. Coverage in different 
countries, however, was oriented based on their political and cultural environment and 
attitude towards the conflict (Lee, 2004; Norris et al., 2003; Zaman, 2004). The 
direction and framing of coverage also changed with time, reflecting the dynamics of 
public opinion and foreign policies of countries (Bantimaroudis & Ban, 2001; Chyi & 
McCombs, 2004; Hallin, 1986). 
 
During the initial phase of the war coverage, Iraq War II dominated the front pages of 
The New Zealand Herald, The Dominion Post and The Press, and Op-Ed pages were 
occupied with opinion and public reaction. On the first day of coverage, 21 March 2003, 
the three newspapers carried more than 80 items that were related to the war, most of 
them appearing in the main section, usually reserved for top local and national events. 
The intense initial coverage of the conflict shows that globalisation has made conflicts 
of this nature important enough to warrant distinct prominence in the local newspapers. 
The coverage was more episodic and event-oriented and demonstrated the dramatisation 
of the conflict with war as a ‘media spectacle’. The extensive coverage was facilitated 
by a steady stream of content from several news agencies and news services who were 
aggressively marketing their products through the mobilisation of resources for 
coverage from the conflict zone. News agencies and major newspapers stationed more 
than 3,000 correspondents in seven countries in the Gulf, with news agencies such as 
Reuters relying on more than 140 journalists, while The New York Times sent 30 
journalists to the region (Leaper et al., 2003). 
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Thus with a steady supply of news raw material from news agencies , the New Zealand 
newspapers were well placed to cover Iraq War II. There are several key issues that 
appear to influence the extent of coverage – the impact of world events, such as the 
conflict in Iraq, on New Zealand; the globalisation of media and cultural products, and 
news values. But the heavy reliance on foreign content providers, who process and 
manufacture media products based on similar news values and professional frameworks, 
puts New Zealand in a position of complete dependency. 
 
Figure 11.1 Flow of international news through different stages of news selection and production 
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Figure 11.1 shows the flow of news from news agencies and other content providers to 
New Zealand news media, who retail the news back to their audiences. As shown in the 
above diagram, news passes through several stages in which content is selected and 
edited based on the specific news values frameworks in each stage of production and 
transmission. The more stages there are between news sources and the New Zealand 
audiences, the more likely it is that the stories are shaped by more layers of foreign 
input. Thus, relevance of the content to New Zealand audiences will become less. In 
other words, Iraq war coverage that was shaped for audiences elsewhere, was consumed 
by New Zealand newspaper readers. This led to the news providers setting the news 
agenda, as they controlled the news selection and orientation of coverage. 
 
If New Zealand newspapers had posted journalists to the war zone (as shown in the 
diagram by a grey arrow), the flow of news would have been more direct, bypassing 
several gatekeeping stages. Furthermore, in sending journalists on assignment, local 
editors would have had a say what aspects of the conflict to focus on. These decisions 
are made by editors based on audience and market considerations. 
 
Another important aspect of international news flows that needs to be examined is the 
nature of news that comes from major US and UK newspapers. What appears in The 
New York Times and The Washington Post is written for audiences in the US, and more 
specifically the readership in the area of circulation – the financial hub and the political 
‘beltway’ of the US. Similarly, what is reported about the war in Iraq in The Times of 
London or The Independent is shaped for audiences in the UK. Although some news 
stories may have common relevance to audiences in all geographic and political 
locations, content such as editorials, opinion and features is likely to be written based on 
specific audience considerations. The publication of news content, which has been 
manufactured and framed for audiences in the US and UK, in New Zealand newspapers 
is evidence of both shared cultural values and the globalisation of news. However, 
given the political debates and public opinion regarding the Iraq conflict in New 
Zealand, the republishing of content from foreign newspapers also shows that media 
consumers in New Zealand were exposed to mediated messages from countries which 
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were key actors in Iraq War II. As long as a high dependency on Western news sources 
exists, and New Zealand newspapers do not put great effort into re-orienting the 
coverage, the newspaper-reading public will be served with international news coverage 
mainly constructed by external actors according to their own news judgements and 
news value criteria.    
 
In the news production process, copy passes through various editorial stages according 
to the news values and newsworthiness framework of the specific organisation  (Knight, 
1982; Taylor, 1992a). These editorial changes shape stories to support the interests of 
the media outlets: “Media organisations tend to reproduce selectively according to 
criteria that suit their own goals and interests” (McQuail, 2005, p 329). Thus, the more 
gates news stories pass through to reach New Zealand newspapers and their audiences, 
the greater the implications of different editorial decisions are likely to be on the media 
consumers, since cultural and ideological biases would have affected the stories. 
Reliance on mainstream news agencies leads to them dominating and dictating the 
media agenda as they make the initial news selection and processing decisions  
(Whitney & Becker, 1982). The elite news agencies, through their domination of the 
global news retailing business, are in a position to “shape the wider view” of military 
conflicts (Thussu, 2002, p 205). 
 
As for the use of news agencies and news services by New Zealand news media, there 
was a marked increase in the number of media outlets providing international news. 
During the Vietnam War the main sources were Reuters and NZPA, while in Iraq War 
II coverage more than 15 different content providers were used for reporting the conflict. 
The ‘Big Three’ and AAP news agencies accounted for about 70 percent of world news 
content in five New Zealand metropolitan newspapers in 2002 (Taira, 2003). This again 
shows not only the globalisation of news, but also the dominance of mainly Anglo-
American media companies in the global news production.  
 
The greatest implication of dependency is that the news agencies are able to set the 
media agenda for New Zealand news media, as they are able to select what news events 
to cover and in which ways to frame them at the initial stage of news gathering and 
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processing, as shown in Figure 11.1. Through these news production choices and their 
ability to extensively report world news, news agencies are able to set the global media 
agenda  (Paterson, 1998; Stevenson & Cole, 1984; Wanta et al., 2004). Given the 
dominance of a global news retail market by the few news, news agencies and news 
services play “an important agenda-setting function” (Wanta et al., 2004, p 367). The 
extensive coverage given to military conflicts is also due to the globalisation of media 
systems which has increased news supply and reflects “the power of global news to set 
the agenda for news around the world” (Rantanen, 2004, p 302). 
 
The implications of news agency-dependence are more serious during military conflicts 
when major powers with stronger ‘information capital’ attempt to influence news. The 
impact of media management and propaganda is eventually felt by media consumers, as 
the messages are channelled via news agencies, news services and newspapers to media 
consumers. The New Zealand news media, like many others in the world, also felt the 
negative implications of heavy reliance on the mainstream news agencies during Iraq 
War I and II  (Comrie & Fountaine, 2005; Robie, 2003; Pauling, 1996; Shulman, 1994), 
and as noted by Tully with regard to Iraq War I coverage “our view of the world is 
narrowed by the fact that we rely for our international news on three or four main news 
agencies” (Cited in Pauling, 1996, p 6). A similar observation of Iraq War II coverage 
in Northern Ireland was made by Rolston and McLaughlin (2004) in their study of 
Belfast dailies, when they noted that “much of the coverage of the war in Iraq was 
determined from outside the local society” (p 200). While sourcing world news content 
from news agencies is economically logical, the negative implication is that the news 
suppliers are able to determine to a great extent what stories and what parts of the world 
to cover (Stevenson & Cole, 1984), thus influencing the foreign news agendas in 
various countries. 
 
As news and information suppliers to a growing worldwide market, the mainstream 
news agencies and other major media outlets syndicate content to world news media, 
and in so doing also promote their world views. In fact, news agencies were one of the 
first institutions that ‘exported’ comodified news and thus stimulated the globalisation 
of news (Boyd-Barrett, 1997). As noted by Boyd-Barrett (1997), the major news 
agencies “contributed to internationalization” of news (p 143). In this process of 
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mediating the global news content, news agencies have also become key actors, as press 
organisations, governments and individuals depended depend on them for news 
(Ossokina, 2003).  
 
As noted earlier, the increase in the number of news agencies and news services being 
used by the New Zealand news media is an indication of the growing demand for global 
news and information, and the globalisation of news agencies and news services. News 
‘wholesalers’ contribute to the “intensification of world-wide social relations which link 
distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring 
many miles away and vice versa” (Giddens, 1991, p 64). In facilitating the 
intensification of global relations,  “News agencies contribute to the homogenisation of 
global culture in their distribution of certain influential kind of political, economic, and 
sports discourse” (Boyd-Barrett, 1999, p 301).  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the current state of media the system in New Zealand is the 
result of neoliberal policies that were promoted, through global institutions such as 
WTO and IMF, in the early 1980s in Western Europe and North America (Castells, 
1997; McChesney, 2002). Today the media in New Zealand is highly commercialised 
with media concentration and foreign ownership, and, the print media is dominated by a 
duopoly of two foreign firms – Fairfax and APN News & Media (McGregor, 1992; 
Norris, 2002; Rosenberg, 2004).  
 
The implication of media concentration is that content is likely to be affected, since as 
profit maximising firms, these media organisations are bound to take cost-cutting 
measures. In the coverage of Iraq War II, the main reason cited by editors for not 
assigning own staff to cover the conflict from the Gulf region, was economic 
considerations. The editors, while acknowledging that coverage could have been 
enhanced if their own staff had covered the conflict, opted, however, to use news 
agencies and news services for Iraq War II coverage (Interview with Thompson, 
February 23, 2006; Interview with Piercy, February 13, 2007; Interview with Gardner, 
March 8, 2006). This research has shown that content written by the newspapers 
reflected a different perspective than news coming from foreign locations. Research by 
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Comrie and Fountaine (2005) has also shown that content originating from New 
Zealand was “overwhelmingly critical” of the US (p 248).  
 
The consequence for media consumers of the media concentration in New Zealand is 
that the diversity of opinions is being narrowed. As noted by Starke (2004), one of the 
concerns is “the risk of impacting negatively on the content of newspapers and the 
quality of information, by reducing its diversity, reliability, accessibility and 
meaningfulness” (p 15). 
 
11.4 News sources setting the news agenda 
 
As discussed in Chapter 10, major news sources such as the US government and 
military dominated the war coverage, and as primary definers of news were able to 
mediate their messages to global audiences through indirect channels such as news 
agencies and other news and information ‘wholesalers’. During Iraq War II, the US-led 
Coalition managed the media through carefully coordinated press conferences and 
media management strategies such as embedding and public diplomacy initiatives. The 
success of modern military engagements depends on the ability to affect perceptions 
and attract the ‘hearts and minds’ of national and global audiences. Tactical success in 
the battlefield is not enough, for public opinion also needs to be won. Given these 
dynamics, it is not surprising that the news media have become an integral “part of 
modern warfare and that public relations is a primary weapon of war” (Hiebert, 1993, p 
30). 
 
As discussed in Chapter 10, the US and Coalition sources dominated the news, features 
and analysis as primary sources. In over 55 percent of the items the US and Coalition 
were the main sources. Twenty-two percent of these were US military sources, while 13 
percent were the US government (n=401). The trend in source domination was similar 
regarding news agency copy, such that from Reuters and AP with 51 percent of Reuters 
copy attributed to US military or government sources, while 64 percent of AP copy 
used the US military or government as primary sources. Other key actors such as Iraq 
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and the UN were used far less, indicating the successful media management strategies 
of the US and Coalition countries. 
  
As discussed earlier, news and information have become so important for winning wars, 
military and government sources, as primary definers of news, attempt to weaponise 
information. As Jeffords et al (1994) argue, “the media can shape the ways in which 
war itself is waged” (p 11) and thus it is important for actors in military conflicts to 
dominate the media coverage. Through PR strategies, “the military and government 
sources set the agenda [in the battlefields] and help frame the issues from which the 
news is constructed” (Schechter, 2003, p xxvi). In the coverage of the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, journalists oriented the coverage towards “Western political and 
military sources, mainly about Western  military personnel, strategies, successes, and, 
less often, backed with comments from (often vetted) Western military ‘experts’” 
(Boyd-Barrett, 2004, p 29-30). The study also supports Herman and Chomsky’s (1988) 
propaganda model, as the government and military in the US and UK dominated the 
coverage, and oppositional views were not given prominence in the mainstream news 
sources. The ‘war on terror’ was seen by the media as a worthy cause for tackling 
‘Islamic extremism and terrorism’ and the alleged threat of Iraq’s WMD.  
 
The findings of this research have proven that the ‘authorities’ were able to dominate 
news as primary sources while the ‘challengers’ were virtually sidelined from the 
mainstream media reporting. However, this does not mean that other and alternative 
sources with a non-elite perspective were not available. The dominance of Anglo-
American media systems globally, through news agencies and other content providers, 
means that these sources are considered to be meeting the standard of professional 
journalism, news values and thus high integrity. The infrequent use of alternative 
sources in New Zealand newspapers is an indication of this line of thinking.  
 
The implications of official sources dominating media discourses in military conflict are 
great, given the ramifications that framing can have on audience perceptions. Studies 
have shown that during wars, military and government sources use disinformation and 
propaganda to dominate the media space. When official and authoritative sources 
dominate, in a kind of evolution of news, the alternative sources become less significant 
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and thus facilitate the survival of the strongest sources. And by managed and mediated 
selection, non-elite viewpoints are excluded from mainstream news discourse (Stech, 
1996).  
 
11.5 Directions for further research 
 
This research looked at the news content that has been published by the newspapers to 
determine the news sources and direction. It was not within the purview of this research 
to analyse how newspaper editors chose certain news items from a myriad of sources. 
An organisational and sociological approach to the analysis of news selection and 
processing is an area for further research. The newspaper editors have before them 
sorties on the same issue or incident from several sources with different news angles, 
and why a certain story gets selected for coverage is an important question. Such a 
study would need to examine all the news agency feed and other content available 
before editors, and the final media product carried in the newspapers. 
 
Coverage of military conflicts such as Iraq War II is mainly event-driven, and with 
news events developing by the hour, people do not always want to rely on the 
newspaper that gives an update only once in 24 hours – and with news that may have 
been written 24 hours earlier. News consumers use other sources such as TV and the 
internet for updates. An interesting area of research would be an audience-centred 
analysis of how people use different media in their own construction of the conflict.   
 
11.6 Discussion 
 
The thesis shows that Iraq War II coverage in New Zealand mainstream newspapers is 
unique in that it has given the opportunity for studying newspapers from a country that 
is not a direct participant in the war. But in this gloabalised world, distant events such as 
Iraq War II matter for several reasons – economic, political and cultural. The intensive 
but short-lived coverage in The New Zealand Herald, The Dominion Post and The Press 
illustrates that the conflict in the Gulf also mattered to the public in New Zealand. The 
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larger public and the government were vociferous in their opposition to unilateral 
military action by the US-led Coalition against Iraq. Thus there was no pressure on the 
newspaper editors to support the war and approve the stand taken by New Zealand’s 
traditional allies – Australia, Britain and the United States. The newspapers were 
uniquely placed to be either critical observers of the war or publicists favouring the 
Coalition countries. It is interesting that, as the findings of this research reveal, the three 
newspapers attempted to balance the coverage with negative and positive stories. They 
were neither critical observers nor publicists.   
 
What kind of war journalism discourse did the largest three New Zealand newspapers 
pursue in their Iraq War II coverage? When sampled newspaper content for this 
research was viewed through the lens of the three models of communicating conflict – 
media as critical observer, publicist, and the surface on which war is imagined and 
executed – proposed by Thussu and Freedman (2003), aspects of each narrative were 
apparent. Given the strong opposition in New Zealand to the invasion of Iraq without a 
UN mandate, one would have expected the media to be adversarial. However the 
coverage was more cautious, with attempts to balance the war journalism discourse with 
criticisms of the US and the highlighting of humanitarian issues, while also giving 
opportunity to official sources to dominate the war coverage. The newspapers were 
trying to balance the coverage, perhaps to appeal to local audiences and the government. 
Considering the public’s disapproval of the invasion of Iraq and the strong anti-war 
stance of the New Zealand government, the mainstream newspapers could have been 
more critical in their observations. However, it appears from this research that the three 
newspapers opted to give event-oriented coverage, with blow-by-blow accounts of the 
invasion, battlefield successes, casualties and the take-over of Baghdad. Coverage was 
within a winner-loser dichotomy, and there was little context provided. The newspapers 
instead capitalised on drama and tragedies to appeal to readers. Given the extensive 
media management strategies by the US, Britain and Australia, the reliance on Anglo-
American news sources by the New Zealand metropolitan press exposed local 
audiences to mediated communication from the Coalition military and government 
sources. By relying on elite US and UK newspapers for coverage in New Zealand, the 
newspaper editors were subscribing to war journalism frames that were relevant to US 
and UK audiences. And thus, in New Zealand where the public consensus and political 
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debates about the conflict in Iraq were different, the metropolitan press were unable to 
take a much stronger line that would have put the coverage in the local context. 
Although there were attempts by New Zealand editors at the ‘general level’ and ‘second 
level’ of framing to orient coverage to reflect discussions and debates in New Zealand, 
the heavy dependence on Western news agencies minimised their efforts. Furthermore, 
the few framing choices available to New Zealand editors show the vulnerability of 
media consumers in New Zealand to mediated messages issuing from key actors in Iraq 
War II.  
 
In military conflict coverage these issues of media biases become more common, given 
the ideological and political issues affecting media practitioners and media 
organisations. But the news media’s responsibility is to provide a ‘marketplace of ideas’, 
and this can be provided by not exclusively relying on mainstream news agencies and 
elite US, UK news media. Alternative news sources can be used to provide diversity. 
For example, content from the national news agencies of countries such as Kuwait, Iraq 
or Iran could be monitored and used in stories, perhaps to provide more background, or 
to substantiate or refute claims from various sources. Given the options available to 
media consumers to access many different sources for news, the newspapers need to 
look into addressing the issue of content plurality. Otherwise, when major conflicts 
begin, people looking for different perspectives will seek gratification from alternative 
sources.  
 
World news media coverage of military conflicts, in which the principal actors include 
major Western powers, is influenced by several factors, such as the scale of coverage 
given by the news or content providers (news agencies), the scale and impact of the 
conflict on countries and audiences, and public diplomacy and propaganda campaigns 
carried out by the countries involved in the conflict. 
 
New Zealand’s war coverage did not put the conflict into context and was episodically 
framed. A key issue that was raised as the reason for invading Iraq was the alleged 
WMD programmes. However, when the US and Coalition were unable to provide 
evidence to substantiate the claims, the discussion of this in the press was minimal. 
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There were only 10 (1.7%) articles in which the WMD issue was reported and discussed 
(n=600). Research in Britain has also shown similar trends (Tumber & Palmer, 2004).  
 
The purported reason of the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ for invading Iraq, according to 
the US, was that Iraq was producing WMD and had links with Al-Qaeda. When the war 
started the news media did not offer debate about these issues and give more 
perspective to the underlying reasons for the invasion. There was very little on the two 
key issues of WMD and Al-Qaeda in the coverage during the sampled period from 21st 
March until 22nd May 2003. Of the sampled items only 1.7 percent was related to WMD 
and .5 percent to the alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda connection. One explanation of this is that 
major news agencies and other content providers also did not see the significance of 
focusing on these issues, as in the ‘fog of war’ other aspects of the conflict had become 
more prominent partly highlighted by the news management strategies of the US. 
Furthermore, US and Coalition sources would not be forthcoming in providing any 
information that would undermine their tactical and strategic goals. The claims about 
WMD and Iraq-Al Qaeda links were made by the US government. For Western 
newspapers to reproduce this perspective of ‘truth’ points to the symbiosis between 
state and mainstream news media in times of military conflict. No doubt the newspapers 
in New Zealand were also short of content about those issues, or they may have 
preferred more dramatic and sensational news than the issue of whether WMD were 
found in Iraq or not. The lack of context in the war coverage is very clearly exemplified 
by the inattention to the larger issues of the conflict. Like most Western newspapers, the 
New Zealand press failed to highlight the issue of WMD and the inability of the 
Coalition to show evidence of WMD in Iraq. The failure of the New Zealand 
newspapers to focus on issues rather than events shows, among other things, that the 
Anglo-American media hegemony dominates and that it dictates the war journalism 
discourse in New Zealand. 
 
The extensive coverage given to the rescue of Jessica Lynch also illustrates that the 
New Zealand newspapers were predisposed to sensational and dramatic journalism. 
Furthermore, it is a clear example of the extent of propaganda and mediated 
communication originating from the dominant military action in Iraq War II. The lack 
of adversarial or critical journalism may also be due to the reliance on external sources, 
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who were much more interested in the dramatic aspects of battlefield victories. The 
news media, from wholesalers to retailers, appear to see “conflict as a battle and the 
battle as sports arena and gladiator circus” where the focus is on winning (Galtung, 
2002). When coverage is geared towards ‘war as spectacle’ contextualisation and 
critical evaluations of the causes of war become insignificant, as has been shown in this 
research. Although the newspapers focused on the impact of the war, notably the 
humanitarian issues, the justifications given for the invasion of Iraq were not critically 
analysed. Interestingly, content that originated from New Zealand was more critical of 
the US.  
 
The commodification of news and cultural products by the news agencies, and the flow 
of these products, is advancing the process of globalisation. Aided by communications 
technology, the “globalisation of news is having far reaching effects on the news 
gatherers and the news disseminators” (Herbert, 2001, p vii), while the globalisation of 
the media is impacting the content and directions of coverage.  
 
The coverage of Iraq War II in the New Zealand newspapers was also determined by 
market forces. As profit-motive enterprises the newspapers relied on more economical 
sources to cover foreign news – news agencies – instead of sending their own 
journalists to cover the conflict. The consequence of this was that the newspapers got 
few opportunities to frame the war coverage within a local context. The newspapers 
were not able to directly relate to the political debates in New Zealand about the social 
and economic implications of the war in Iraq. The dependence on foreign news 
providers also demonstrates the media hegemony of the Anglo-American news 
practices. While larger and more established newspapers such as The New York Times 
could generate content from their staff reporters, smaller newspapers had to rely on 
news wholesalers (Lee, 2004). In Iraq War II coverage, for example, the Arab News and 
the Middle East Times relied heavily on news agencies, while in the Iraq War I 
coverage the Saudi Arabian press also depended on wire services (Al-Kahtani, 1999). 
This thesis has also shown that international news is exclusively supplied by the 
mainstream news agencies and that in the reporting of Iraq War II these news sources 
dominated the coverage. The immediate need for New Zealand journalists to cover the 
war was not there for two reasons. First, the war was not a conflict involving New 
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Zealand troops and thus there was no need to localise the conflict. Second, news 
agencies and US and UK newspapers were cheaper sources for reporting the war to 
New Zealand audiences. 
 
As New Zealand was not involved in the war, there was no opportunity for coverage 
from the front. Had there been New Zealand troops involved in the war, the newspapers 
would have sent journalists or assigned stringers to cover, with local angles for the 
audiences in New Zealand (Interview with Thompson, February 23, 2006; Interview 
with Gardner, March 8, 2006; Interview with Piercy, February 13, 2007). Thus, without 
the need for ‘localisation’ in the war journalism discourse, The New Zealand Herald, 
The Dominion Post and The Press depended on foreign content providers in the 
construction of the Iraq War for local audiences.  
 
Through news selection processes the New Zealand newspapers attempted to frame Iraq 
War II coverage in a context that reflected the public opinion and foreign policy of the 
government. This partly supports the indexing hypothesis (Bennett, 1990), and in New 
Zealand’s case, the government and the public had largely similar views on the war and 
thus the newspaper coverage also followed that line. However, despite the orientation of 
the coverage to reflect a more unfavourable view of the US-led invasion, exclusive 
reliance on a few mainstream news agencies and Anglo-American newspapers made the 
news media vulnerable to propaganda from the primary definers. The institutional 
sources – the military and government – of the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ were able to 
channel propaganda and dominate war journalism discourse in New Zealand. The case 
of Jessica Lynch illustrates, how effective and instantly the US propaganda could work, 
by getting prime space not only in the mainstream New Zealand press but even in 
newspapers such as The New York Times and The Washington Post (McQuail, 2005).  
The latter two newspapers acknowledged the flawed coverage in the Jessica Lynch 
story, but self-criticism was not forthcoming from the New Zealand newspapers.  
 
Since World War II, war coverage has undergone dramatic changes, influenced by 
technology and the media management and public relations strategies of the key actors 
in conflicts. Global news agencies have become stronger, as a handful of them control 
the global market for news and information. Driven by the commercialisation of media 
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firms and the need for profit maximisation in the neoliberal globalisation era, the news 
media in most countries find it feasible to rely on the mainstream news agencies. Within 
this environment of dependency, propaganda, and news management by powerful actors 
in military conflicts, the public are not best served by the news media, as was the case 
in New Zealand during the invasion phase of Iraq War II. Although since Iraq War I the 
use of more news sources has increased, this has not infact increased the diversity of 
views. Rather, the perspective has become parochial, as shown in the coverage of Iraq 
War II. Three reasons could be advanced for the approach taken by the newspapers in 
New Zealand to cover the war. First, as New Zealand was not involved in the conflict, 
there was no economic value in sending reporters to the front. Second, New Zealand 
newspapers therefore end up relying on sources whose countries are direct participants 
in the war and who are therefore not detached from the mainstream discourse about the 
war. Third, the globalisation of news values has made such news agency and foreign 
news media content useable with little or no alteration by New Zealand newspapers. 
 
Although the New Zealand newspapers were not able to serve news consumers with a 
diverse mix of news content, or give context to the coverage, the news reading public 
have at their disposal other media choices. The enormous range of alternative news 
media outlets in the public sphere and the immediacy of information available on the 
internet have empowered individuals. While such choices would have been limited to 
the mainstream news agencies in the 1960s and early 1970s, the emergence of 
alternative media on the internet has given media choices to the public. While New 
Zealand newspaper readers were vulnerable to heavily mediated messages during Iraq 
War II, the availability of alternative views on the internet lessens the impact of 
propaganda and news management from the primary definers.  
 
This study of Iraq War II coverage by The New Zealand Herald, The Dominion Post 
and The Press has supported the existing theories of media hegemony, dependency, 
propaganda and public relations. The study also revelas that, through the gatekeeping 
processes such as news selection, the New Zealand editors attempted to orient the 
coverage to reflect the views of the readers and the government. However, the coverage 
was not critical, but more a balanced discourse of events unfolding in the Gulf region.  
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In conflicts where New Zealand has been involved, most newspapers in this country 
have taken much stronger positions, as during the coverage of the Vietnam War. As 
casualties mounted, the mainstream New Zealand newspapers became more critical of 
the government and the country’s engagement in Vietnam in the 1960s and early 1970s 
(Witte, 1990; Rabel, 2005). The newspapers that strongly supported New Zealand’s 
involvement in the Vietnam conflict were The Dominion, The Otago Daily Times, The 
New Zealand Herald and The Evening Post (Rabel, 2005). 
 
During that period, the newspapers in New Zealand were wholly local enterprises and 
thus they were likely to promote and defend New Zealand interests. During the Vietnam 
War, the newspapers were under contesting pressures – from the government, political 
elites and the public – to take a certain position or emphasise some aspects of the 
conflict. The news media during Iraq War II, however, were not under such strong 
pressure, as the country had no direct involvement in the conflict. Within the limited 
debates, the newspapers played safe by not leaning to any sides, instead giving a 
relatively balanced coverage. 
 
Since the 1980s, the media landscape has also changed. With neo-liberal globalisation, 
the media in New Zealand, as in most Western countries, have also become part of the 
global media system. Changing ownerships, acquisitions and the integration and 
commercialisation of media systems globally have also restructured the New Zealand 
media system with foreign control. Furthermore, the globalisation of news and news 
values has also remodelled the press system in New Zealand. Thus, it is not surprising 
that the press in New Zealand followed the dominant perspective and relied on Anglo-
American news sources. New Zealand is now part of the global news production 
machinery, where the main objective is profit maximisation rather than making the 
medium a marketplace of ideas.  
 
While ownership may have influenced the orientation of Iraq War II coverage in 2003, 
the globalisation of news media and the shared news values are also key factors that 
influenced the coverage of the conflict. Given the public and the government consensus 
on the invasion of Iraq, the newspaper editors were in a unique position to make their 
coverage more critical, in line with the public and mainstream views of the war.  
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Considering the newspapers’ cautious approach to coverage, and their attempts at 
balancing negative and positive items, one can argue that, as foreign-owned enterprises, 
the three largest newspapers were driven by commercial and ideological interests. That 
is, it was cheaper to source material from the news agencies, and these news agencies, 
being US and UK based, shared similar ideological perspectives. New Zealand’s 
acceptance of content from these sources is also made easier due to the shared cultural 
and professional journalistic values. The coverage in the three New Zealand newspapers 
confirms the observations made in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 that in the globalisation process 
news values have become homogenised. Thus, editors in New Zealand easily make use 
of the news content from news agencies and Western newspapers.  
 
If New Zealand newspapers want to provide diversity in coverage they need to take into 
consideration the need for content from various sources rather than depending on the 
Anglo-American news agencies and newspapers. News agencies such as Inter Press 
Service, or national news agencies of countries involved in conflicts can be used to give 
variety. Diversity of perspectives is also needed during military conflicts as news 
sources attempt to spread propaganda. As discussed in Chapter 2, during major wars 
countries such as the US and UK have extensively used strategies to manage news and 
change the perception of the readers, as winning public opinion, whether national or 
international, is also important for the strategic victory of the wars (Seib, 2006; Boyd-
Barrett, 2004; Knightley, 2000).  
 
In times of conflict, New Zealand newspapers could use the national news agencies of 
key actors to ensure that viewpoints from contesting sides are covered. This means the 
editors have would have to monitor, re-write and verify the stories coming in from 
various news sources. However this would be an enormous task as foreign news 
departments would need additional staff to carry out such work. While the priority is 
always on the national and local reporting, organisational and structural constraints 
prevent them from allocating more resources to international conflict coverage. If the 
New Zealand newspapers want to be more critical observers of conflicts such as the Iraq 
War II, critical perspectives can be given if the newspapers are willing to use alternative 
news sources and allocate additional resources to war coverage. In the case of Iraq War 
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II, the environment existed for the newspapers to be critical observers given the 
opposition to the war from the government and the public. 
 
 
 
 APPENDICES  
 
Appendix 1: Coding sheet 
 
 
 
1. Newspapers 
1. The New Zealand Herald  
2. The Dominion Post 
3. The Press 
 
2. Headline size 
1. One column 
2. Two columns   
3. Three columns   
4. Four columns 
5. Five columns 
6. Six columns 
7. Banner headline  
 
3. Type of item  
1. News 
2. News analysis 
3. Feature 
4. Letters to editor 
5. Editorial   
6. Opinion, column, commentary 
 
4. Item origin, location 
1. USA 
2. Iraq 
3. UK 
4. Australia 
5. Other coalition nations 
6. New Zealand 
7. Arab nations 
8. UN 
9. Europe 
10. Non-Coalition 
11. Asian nations  
12. Unclear 
13. Other 
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5. Direction of item 
1. Favourable to US   
2. Unfavourable to US   
3. Favourable to Britain  
4. Unfavourable to Britain 
5. Favourable to Iraq   
6. Unfavourable to Iraq 
7. Unfavourable to US  and Iraqi   
8. Neutral 
9. Favourable to coalition 
10. Unfavourable to coalition 
11. Criticism of NZ Iraq policy 
12. Support for NZ Iraq policy 
13. Other 
 
6. Section  
1. Front page 
2. Front section (Section A) 
3. Editorial, Op-ed page 
4. World News section 
5. Business 
6. Other 
 
7. Editorial priority of the item on the page 
1. Lead story   
2. Second story  
3. Third story 
4. Other 
 
8. News agencies/ content providers 
 
1. Reuters 
2. AFP 
3. Associated Press 
4. AAP 
5. NZPA 
6. New Zealand Herald 
7. Dominion Post 
8. Press 
9. Times of London 
10. Independent 
11. Guardian  
12. New York Times 
 
13. Washington Post 
14. Observer 
15. KRT 
16. The Age 
17. Telegraph 
18. PA 
19. Bloomberg 
20. Los Angeles Times 
21. Agencies 
22. Other 
23. No source cited 
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9. Primary source in the item  (Applicable to News, News analysis and Features) 
 
US, Coalition 
1. US Government 
2. US Military 
3. US Soldiers 
4. US Opposition 
5. US Academics, experts 
6. US Ordinary citizens 
7. US Other 
8. UK Government 
9. UK Military 
10. UK Soldiers 
11. UK Opposition 
12. UK Academics, experts 
13. UK Ordinary citizens 
14. UK Other 
15. Coalition Government 
(Other) 
16. Coalition Military 
17. Coalition Soldiers 
18. Coalition Opposition 
19. Coalition Academics, 
experts 
20. Coalition Ordinary citizens 
21. Coalition Other 
 
Organisations, NGOs 
1. UN 
2. EU 
3. Asean 
4. OIC 
5. Red Cross 
6. Green Peace 
7. Other   
 
Iraq 
1. Government 
2. Military 
3. Soldiers 
4. Opposition 
5. Academics, experts 
6. Ordinary citizens 
7. Other 
 
New Zealand 
1. Government 
2. Military 
3. Soldiers 
4. Opposition 
5. Academics, experts 
6. Ordinary citizens 
7. Other 
 
Arab/ Muslim countries 
1. Government 
2. Academics, experts 
3. Ordinary citizens 
4. Other 
 
News media 
1. Western 
2. Arab 
3. Other 
Other 
 
 
10. Direction of primary source  (Applicable to News, News analysis, features and not 
applicable to editorials, opinion and letters) 
1. Favourable to U.S. 
2. Favourable to British 
3. Favourable to Iraq 
4. Neutral 
5. Unfavourable to U.S. 
6. Unfavourable to British 
7. Unfavourable to Iraq 
8. Favourable to coalition 
9. Unfavourable to coalition 
10. No source cited  
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11. Favourable to NZ govt Iraq policy 
12. Unfavourable to NZ Iraq policy 
13. Other 
14. Unclear 
 
 
11. Main theme of the item  
 
Process of combat 
1. Process of combat 
 
Military build-up/ technology 
1. US Military build-up 
2. US Military hardware-technology  
3. Iraq military build-up 
4. Iraq military hardware-technology  
5. Coalition military build-up 
6. Coalition military hardware-technology  
 
Impact of war 
1. Economic impact       
2. Environmental impact  
3. Humanitarian impact 
 
Debate about the war, antiwar responses 
1. Anti-war demonstrations, responses 
2. Criticism of US government/military 
3. Criticism of Iraq government/ military 
4. Criticism of other coalition members 
 
New Zealand and Iraq War 
1. Criticism of NZ government Iraq policy 
2. Support for NZ government Iraq policy 
 
Casualties of war 
1. US military casualties 
2. Iraq military casualties 
3. US civilian casualties 
4. Iraq civilian casualties 
5. Coalition military casualties 
6. Coalition civilian casualties 
 
Diplomacy, peace journalism 
1. Diplomatic efforts by UN (for peace, ceasefire) 
2. Diplomatic efforts by US-Coalition 
3. Diplomatic efforts by Iraq 
4. Diplomatic efforts by Middle East 
5. Diplomatic efforts by EU 
6. Diplomatic efforts by NZ 
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7. Diplomatic efforts by others 
 
Context of war 
1. Background to conflict 
2. Iraq history, culture 
3. Iraq al Qaeda link 
4. Weapons of Mass Destruction 
 
Other categories  
2. About Iraqi officials 
3. Iraq reconstruction 
4. Media, war coverage 
5. Iraqi atrocities, abuse 
6. US, Coalition atrocities, abuse 
7. Civil unrest 
8. Iraq Opposition 
 
 
12. Contextualising the conflict  
1. Episodic coverage 
2. Thematic coverage  
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Appendix 2: Iraq timeline of key events (19th March to 30th May 2003) 
Mar. 19 President Bush declares war on Iraq 
Mar. 20 The war against Iraq begins 5:30 am Baghdad time when the US launches Operation 
Iraqi Freedom. 
Mar. 21 The major phase of the war begins with heavy aerial attacks on Baghdad and other cities. 
Mar. 24 Troops march within 60 miles of Baghdad. 
Mar. 26 About 1,000 paratroopers land in Kurdish-controlled Iraq 
Mar. 27 Iraq says 350 civilians have died in air raids since the conflict began. 
Mar. 29 The Iraqi Information Minister accused the US forces of killing 140 civilians during the last 
24 hours. Four US servicemen are killed by a suicide bomber at a checkpoint near Najaf. 
Mar. 30 US Marines and Army troops launch first attack on Iraq's  
Republican Guard, about 65 miles outside Baghdad. 
Mar. 31 US troops kill 7 civilians including women and children in a car whose driver refuses to 
stop at a checkpoint 
Apr. 1 Saudi Arabia urges Saddam to make a war-ending 'sacrifice' and quit, while Saddam 
Hussein's aides deny US reports that some of the president's family have fled abroad. 
Apr. 2 Special operations forces rescue Pfc. Jessica Lynch from a hospital in Nasiriya. She was 
one of 12 members of the 507th Ordnance Maintenance Company captured by Iraqi 
troops on March 23 
Apr. 3 About 320 Iraqi soldiers were killed in the advance by some 1,000 US troops, US military 
sources say. As many as 80 Iraqis, some of them civilians, are reported to have been 
killed at the village of Furat near the airport in what witnesses described as a rocket 
attack. 
Apr. 5 US tanks roll into the Iraqi capital and engage in firefights with Iraqi troops 
Apr. 7 British forces take control of Basra, Iraq's second-largest city. 
Apr. 8 Three journalists are killed by coalition fire. Two die after a shell hits the main hotel in 
which the media are staying in the city. 
Pentagon officials say they cannot confirm whether the Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein, 
was killed in the bombing of a Baghdad suburb. However, Iraqi command orders are still 
being issued to key elements of the regime's military 
Apr. 9 US forces take control Baghdad, but sporadic fighting continues 
US marines help crowds to topple a giant statue of Saddam Hussein in the heart of 
Baghdad. Widespread looting breaks out unhindered in the Iraqi capital. 
The US vice-president, Dick Cheney, says the Iraqi regime is collapsing, and that military 
progress shows criticism of the war was misguided. 
Apr. 11 Kirkuk falls to Kurdish fighters 
Apr. 12 Looting and unrest in major cities such as Baghdad and Basra. In Baghdad, with the 
notable exception of the Oil Ministry, which was guarded by American troops, the majority 
of government and public buildings were totally plundered, 
Apr. 13 Marines rescue five US soldiers captured by Iraqi troops on March 23 in Nasiriya, and two 
pilots who had been shot down on March 24 near Karbala. 
Apr. 14 Major fighting in Iraq is declared over by the Pentagon 
Apr. 15 At least seven Iraqis are killed when US troops try to restore order at a demonstration in 
Mosul. 
Apr. 18 Tens of thousands of Iraqis demonstrate against the US occupation of Iraq in central 
Baghdad. 
Apr. 24 The UN secretary general calls on the US-led coalition to respect international law as the 
"occupying power" in Iraq, drawing immediate ire from US officials who resist the label 
"occupier". 
Apr. 25 Tariq Aziz, the former Iraqi deputy prime minister, surrenders to US forces in Baghdad. 
Apr. 28 US troops fire on a group of Iraqi demonstrators near Baghdad, killing at least 13 people 
and wounding 75 others. 
Apr. 30 US troops open fire on Iraqi civilians, killing two, for the second time as an angry crowd in 
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Falluja protested over an earlier shooting 
May 1 The US declares an end to major combat operations 
May 7 The US military says it has found a vehicle which appears to be a mobile bio-arms lab. 
May 12 A new civil administrator takes over in Iraq 
May 15 May 15 2003 
British Foreign secretary, Jack Straw, concedes that hard evidence of weapons of mass 
destruction might never be found in Iraq. 
May 22 UN Security Council approves a resolution lifting the economic sanctions against Iraq 
May 27 Two US soldiers are killed and nine injured in an attack on an army checkpoint in the Iraqi 
town of Falluja. 
May 30 US secretary of state Colin Powell and British prime minister Tony Blair deny that 
intelligence about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction was distorted or exaggerated to 
justify an attack on Iraq.  
 
Source: http://www.guardian.co.uk/   
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Appendix 3: Jessica Lynch story in New Zealand newspapers 
 
 
1. The New Zealand Herald (3 April 2003) 
 
 
 
 
2. The Dominion Post (3 April 2003) 
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3. The Press (3 April 2003) 
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Appendix 4: War coverage in New Zealand newspapers 
The New Zealand Herald (March 24, 2003) 
 
 
The New Zealand Herald (March 29-30, 2003) 
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The Dominion Post (March 21, 2003) 
 
 
The Dominion Post (April 10, 2003) 
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The Press (March 27, 2003) 
 
 
The Press (April 28, 2003) 
 
 Appendix 4: Questionnaire used in the semi-structured interview with 
editors 
 
1. How are the foreign news selected for publication? 
2. What are the criteria for selecting foreign news? 
3. Are the news selection and editing process different during military conflicts and 
natural disasters? (eg Iraq War II, Tsunami and hurricane Katrina) 
4. How and who decides the story placement, location and importance? 
5. To what extent are the stories modified? 
6. Are the headlines re-written or used as in the wire copies? 
7. Who chooses photos and graphics to go along with the story? 
8.  Is foreign news coverage discussed at the daily budget or editorial meetings? 
9. Does the newspaper completely depend on wire services for foreign news coverage? 
10. To what extent were the wire copies modified by editors? 
11. Did the newspaper send reporters to Iraq or Middle East between March and May 
2003? If not has the newspaper sent reporters in any period of time to cover the Iraq 
War of 2003? 
12. If the newspaper had journalists in the theatre of conflict will the newspaper’s 
coverage/ outlook of the war be different than it is now? 
13. What are the reasons for the newspaper not to post reporters in Iraq or the Middle 
East? Were they economic reasons or low news value? 
14. Will the newspaper send reporters to Iraq or Middle East, if New Zealand was 
engaged militarily as a member of the ‘Coalition of the Willing’? Will that change the 
news values? 
15. Does war news/coverage boost circulation and readership? 
16. Does extent of coverage depend on business/ market forces or public interest? 
17. How far is it true that ‘war is good for the media businesses’? 
18. Is Iraq War coverage extensive because major actors are the major economic and 
political and military powers? 
19. In Iraq War II coverage, what aspects of the war were emphasised?  
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